JP 3-40, Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 November 2019

•

Joint Publication 3-40

Joint Countering Weapons of

Mass Destruction

27 November 2019

Validated on 14 July 2021

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and

assess military activities to counter weapons of mass destruction.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance

of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations

for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational

forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise

of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and

prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use

by the Armed Forces of the United States, in preparing and executing their plans and orders.

It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing

the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure

unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders

of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate

components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat

support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter;

however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service

publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in

coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current

and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance

Preface

ii JP 3-40

or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures

ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States,

commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and

procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE

Lieutenant General, USMC

Director, Joint Force Development

iii

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-40

DATED 31 OCTOBER 2014

• This publication was validated without change on 14 July 2021.

• Updates and aligns the countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD)

doctrine for the joint force with major changes to Department of Defense

(DOD) policy, strategy, and planning guidance for CWMD.

• Highlights the DOD strategy for CWMD as the underpinning for CWMD

guidance.

• Introduces the weapons of mass destruction activity continuum.

• Introduces the operational framework for CWMD that consists of three

organizing principles (prevent, protect, and respond) carried out through

specialized activities (pathway defeat; weapons of mass destruction [WMD]

defeat; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN] response).

• Describes the organizing principles: prevent, protect, and respond.

• Defines the specialized activities: pathway defeat, WMD defeat, and CBRN

response.

• Describes the specialized tasks associated with each specialized activity and

organizing principle.

• Describes the role of the functional campaign plan for CWMD, integrating

DOD-wide efforts to prevent the use, acquisition, and proliferation of WMD;

prepare the joint force to respond to WMD crises; and assure allies and

partners.

• Describes the relationship between military organizations and functions to

other US Government departments and agencies and international partners.

Summary of Changes

iv JP 3-40

Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

 General ....................................................................................................................... I-1

 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Strategy ................................ I-1

 Relationship to the Joint Functions ............................................................................ I-6

 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Doctrine Relationship to

Other Doctrine ........................................................................................................... I-7

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

 General ......................................................................................................................II-1

 Weapons of Mass Destruction Activity Continuum .................................................II-1

 Weapons of Mass Destruction Supply and Demand Networks ................................II-4

 Weapons of Mass Destruction Actors of Concern ...................................................II-4

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment ...............................II-5

 Operational Framework ............................................................................................II-7

CHAPTER III

PLANNING

 General .................................................................................................................... III-1

 The Competition Continuum and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Across the Range of Military Operations ............................................................... III-1

 General Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Guidance ................ III-4

 Campaign and Operational Design for Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction Planning .............................................................................................. III-5

 Department of Defense Functional Campaign Plan Countering Weapons |

of Mass Destruction Integration ............................................................................. III-5

 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Approach for Planning ........ III-5

 Planning Considerations ......................................................................................... III-6

CHAPTER IV

EXECUTION

 General .................................................................................................................... IV-1

 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities and Tasks ........................... IV-1

 Foundational and Crosscutting Activities and Tasks .............................................. IV-2

 Organizing Principles and Specialized Activities and Tasks ................................. IV-5

Table of Contents

vi JP 3-40

APPENDIX

A Organizational and Command Relationships ............................................ A-1

B Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations ......................B-1

C Weapon Characteristics ..............................................................................C-1

D Dual-Use Challenges ................................................................................. D-1

E Science and Technology ............................................................................. E-1

F Points of Contact ........................................................................................ F-1

G References ................................................................................................. G-1

H Administrative Instructions ....................................................................... H-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5

FIGURE

I-1 National Defense Strategic Approach ......................................................... I-4

II-1 Weapons of Mass Destruction Activity Continuum ..................................II-3

II-2 Weapons of Mass Destruction Development Framework ..........................II-8

IV-1 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities and Tasks ............. IV-2

IV-2 Prevent (Pathway Defeat) Specialized Tasks ........................................... IV-5

IV-3 Protect (Weapons of Mass Destruction Defeat) Specialized Tasks ......... IV-7

IV-4 Respond (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response)

Specialized Tasks ................................................................................... IV-11

C-1 Agents with Significant Risks of Deliberate Misuse .................................C-4

C-2 Chemical Weapons Production ..................................................................C-5

D-1 Dual-Use Chemical/Biological Applications ............................................ D-1

D-2 Chemical Reactor Vessel .......................................................................... D-2

D-3 Chemical Storage Tanks ............................................................................ D-3

D-4 Chemical Heat Exchanger ......................................................................... D-4

D-5 Chemical Distillation Column ................................................................... D-5

D-6 Chemical Filling Equipment ..................................................................... D-6

D-7 Chemical Valve ......................................................................................... D-7

D-8 Chemical Pressing Piping .......................................................................... D-9

D-9 Chemical Production Pumps ................................................................... D-10

D-10 Biological Production Fermenter ............................................................ D-11

D-11 Biological Production Fermenter ............................................................ D-12

D-12 Biological Production Filtration .............................................................. D-13

E-1 Science and Technology Trends ................................................................ E-2

E-2 Chemical and Biological Advancements ................................................... E-4

vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Outlines countering weapons of mass destruction policy and strategy

• Discusses countering weapons of mass destruction activities and operations

relation to the joint functions

• Describes the operational environment and operational framework

• Outlines a countering weapons of mass destruction strategic approach for

planning

• Examines how foundational and crosscutting activities and tasks, along with

specialized tasks within and across the countering weapons of mass

destruction organizing principles, logically group tasks to prevent or counter

specific weapons of mass destruction threats

Introduction

The US, its partners, and allies face an increasing weapons

of mass destruction (WMD) threat from actors of concern

who operate transregionally, conduct activities throughout

the operational environment (OE), and are

multifunctionally organized. Countering weapons of mass

destruction (CWMD) is a national security priority that

requires a coordinated, whole-of-government approach that

brings all instruments of national power to bear against

these actors and their WMD-related activities. The

Department of Defense (DOD) contributes to the United

States Government (USG) effort by providing joint forces

that plan and execute tasks to ensure the US, its forces, and

partners are neither coerced nor attacked with WMD.

WMD are chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

(CBRN) weapons capable of a high order of destruction or

causing mass casualties, excluding the means of

transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is

a separable and divisible part from the weapon.

Countering Weapons of

Mass Destruction Policy

and Strategy

The President provides policy and strategy for USG

departments and agencies to ensure unified effort in the

2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of

America [short title: National Security Strategy (NSS)],

National

Executive Summary

viii JP 3-40

Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Terrorism, Presidential directives, and other plans and

orders.

DOD derives its national strategic direction primarily from

the President’s guidance in the NSS, presidential directives,

and other national strategic documents, in conjunction with

the National Security Council and the Homeland Security

Council. The (U) 2018 National Defense Strategy of the

United States of America: Sharpening the American

Military’s Competitive Edge [short title: National Defense

Strategy] is DOD policy that refines the strategic direction

of the NSS for DOD.

Relationship to the Joint

Functions

CWMD activities and operations intersect all functional

areas, domains, and combatant commands (CCMDs) and

require the integration and coordination of the joint

functions discussed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint

Operations.

Countering Weapons of

Mass Destruction

Doctrine Relationship to

Other Doctrine

CBRN-related joint doctrine includes JP 3-11, Operations

in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Environments, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

Operational Environment and Operational Framework

The evolution of the WMD threat has created new

challenges for joint force commanders (JFCs) beyond

dealing with adversary WMD use. The proliferation of

WMD is a transregional problem that routinely crosses

geographic CCMDs’ geographical boundaries. The

primary challenges facing the JFC encompass:

• The diversity of threat actors—expansion from

traditional state actors down to the possibility of a lone

actor with no particular affiliation.

• The emergence of novel WMD threats (i.e.,

nontraditional agents).

• The dual-use nature of much of the related technology

and expertise.

• The increasing complexity of the WMD continuum and

number of proliferation and procurement networks.

Executive Summary

Weapons of Mass

Destruction Activity

Continuum

Although the characteristics of the WMD continuum are

continuously evolving, one constant remains—all actors

use pathways to develop or acquire WMD. These pathways

consist of networks or connections among individuals,

groups, and organizations that enable the development,

possession, and/or proliferation of WMD and related

capabilities. WMD pathways continuously adapt to keep

pace with changes in the OE. They are supported by a

complex array of actors and networks that take advantage

of permissive environments, accessibility of dual-use

technology, and available expertise to support WMD

development.

Though not necessarily sequential, the WMD activity

continuum covers the spectrum of WMD activities from

intent to use:

• Intent.

• Infrastructure.

• Expertise.

• Production.

• Weaponization.

• Delivery systems.

Weapons of Mass

Destruction Supply and

Demand Networks

WMD networks are the connective tissue a state or non-state

actor uses to gain or transfer access to weapons, material,

technology, and expertise. These networks enable state and

non-state actors to acquire, develop, proliferate, or use

WMD. Licit and illicit organizations operating

transregionally may wittingly or unwittingly support the

proliferation and/or use of WMD through networks and add

to the complexity of mitigating the WMD threat.

Weapons of Mass

Destruction Actors of

Concern

Actors of concern consist of state and non-state actors that

carry out activities that, left unaddressed, pose a potential

threat to the strategic objectives of the USG. In the WMD

context, an actor of concern poses a threat of developing,

acquiring, proliferating, or employing WMD; related

expertise; materials; technologies; and means of delivery.

These actors may also perceive destructive capabilities of

WMD as a highly desirable means to counter more

technologically advantaged nations and alliances.

Executive Summary

x JP 3-40

Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear

Environment

CBRN weapons may be used to attack US citizens,

infrastructure, or vital interests; to target US power

projection, sustainment, and force protection

vulnerabilities; to deny access to an area, limiting the ability

of the US to respond to urgent threats; or to undermine

support by key regional partners for US vital interests

through intimidation.

Operational Framework

The operational framework for CWMD consists of three

organizing CWMD principles (prevent, protect, and

respond) carried out through specialized activities (pathway

defeat, WMD defeat, and CBRN response).

CWMD Organizing Principles. CWMD operations and

activities focus on pathway defeat and utilize prevent,

protect, and respond as CWMD organizing principles for

planning. The joint force conducts a wide range of CWMD

operations and activities against state and non-state actors

of concern to deter the conceptualization, development,

possession, proliferation, and use or threat of use and

mitigate the effects of WMD.

Planning

The Competition

Continuum and

Countering Weapons of

Mass Destruction Across

the Range of Military

Operations

Competition Continuum. The competition continuum is

the environment under which we conduct the range of

military operations. The dynamic and complex

environment in which WMD acquisition and use occur

requires the integration of activities and operations across

the competition continuum. The common aspect across the

continuum is an active campaigning mindset. Cooperation

and competition below armed conflict are, for practical

purposes, always occurring, so the presence or absence of

armed conflict is the only variable element. This

comprehensive framework requires the joint force to play a

more prominent role in areas regarded as outside the

military sphere and thus requiring integrated efforts with

USG partners. JFCs determine the most effective blend of

CWMD activities and operations throughout the

competition continuum to address unique challenges posed

by WMD. JFCs ensure these activities are best suited to

dissuade countries from developing WMD, deter use of

WMD by actors of concern that have developed a WMD

capability, and, if necessary, defeat any state or non-state

actor that uses or threatens the use of WMD.

Executive Summary

General Countering

Weapons of Mass

Destruction Planning

Guidance

Guidance for CWMD planning exists within national and

DOD-specific guidance documents. The development of

CWMD plans and planning products serve to address

campaign, contingency, and support planning requirements

derived from strategic guidance. Specific planning

products support requirements described in Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint

Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).

Campaign and

Operational Design for

Countering Weapons of

Mass Destruction

Planning

The geographic combatant commander’s operational

approach for CWMD should be consistent with the strategic

approach. The CWMD operational approach reflects the

JFC’s visualization for creating desired effects. The

approach provides the necessary foundation for detailed

planning, as well as related branch plans that may evolve.

During development of the operational approach, the

CCMD staff incorporates CWMD planning considerations.

Department of Defense

Functional Campaign

Plan Countering Weapons

of Mass Destruction

Integration

The Department of Defense Strategy for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Functional

Campaign Plan for Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction provides CCMDs, the Services, and combat

support agencies with a common strategy and framework

to synchronize planning on a regional, transregional, and

global basis. It integrates DOD-wide efforts to prevent the

use, acquisition, and proliferation of WMD; prepare the

joint force to respond to WMD crises; and assure allies and

partners.

Countering Weapons of

Mass Destruction

Strategic Approach for

Planning

All plans, where appropriate, should support achievement

of DOD’s strategic CWMD objectives, namely:

• Reduce incentives to pursue, possess, and employ WMD.

• Increase barriers to acquisition, proliferation, and

potential use of WMD.

• Manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, or

failed states and safe havens.

• Deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats

through layered, integrated defenses.

Planning Considerations

Strategic Implications. Commanders at every level need

to be aware of the strategic implications associated with any

WMD threat and adapt their CWMD planning efforts

accordingly. CWMD activities and operations occur at all

three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and

Executive Summary

xii JP 3-40

tactical—and any single action may have consequences at

all levels.

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational

Environment (JIPOE). JIPOE supports the JFC by

characterizing the OE that contains WMD as a system of

pathways, networks, relevant actors, resources, and extant

and potential capabilities, all interacting within the

competition continuum. This holistic characterization and

predictive analysis enables development of the operational

design elements and effective targeting.

Interagency Coordination. USG departments and

agencies planning and acting together create effects that

cannot be created by DOD alone due to differing

authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities. Various

CWMD missions often place DOD in a supporting role to

other USG departments or agencies.

Allies and Partner Nations. DOD CWMD efforts have a

greater likelihood of success if planned in cooperation with

allies and partner nations. CWMD shaping activities

planned and executed in cooperation with partners may

prevent or disrupt actors of concern acquisition,

development, or employment of WMD and alleviate the

need for more aggressive and costly action later.

Network Perspective. A JFC’s ability to characterize and

monitor proliferation networks and state WMD programs

as holistic systems is essential to affecting that system. One

of the primary challenges facing the JFC is the proliferation

of WMD technology and products.

Execution

DOD leverages foundational and crosscutting activities and

tasks to support specialized tasks that help prevent new

WMD threats or use of WMD, protect against extant

WMD, and respond to WMD use by managing and

mitigating the associated consequences. DOD coordinates

these CWMD efforts while incorporating them into broader

plans and activities.

Countering Weapons of

Mass Destruction

Activities and Tasks

The arrangement of foundational and crosscutting activities

and tasks along with specialized tasks within and across the

organizing principles, serve as a method for logically

grouping tasks to prevent or counter specific WMD threats.

Executive Summary

xiii

To the extent possible, foundational and crosscutting tasks

are executed within the activities of: maintain and expand

technical expertise; cooperate with and support partners;

and understand the OE, threats, and vulnerabilities.

Specialized tasks are placed within the respective

organizing principles of prevent, protect, and respond.

Foundational and

Crosscutting Activities and

Tasks

Foundational Activities and Tasks. Foundational

activities and tasks for countering WMD consist of:

• Maintain and Expand Technical Expertise. This

activity focuses on nurturing and sustaining the

intellectual capital provided by DOD and mission partner

CWMD experts.

• Cooperate with and Support Partners. JFCs should

plan to perform CWMD activities and tasks in full

cooperation with USG interagency partners in a variety

of departments and agencies, multinational partners, and

nongovernmental organizations.

Crosscutting Activity and Tasks

• Understand the Environment, Threats, and

Vulnerabilities. The JFC develops and maintains a

comprehensive understanding of the WMD actors and

materials that affect the OE.

Organizing Principles and

Specialized Activities and

Tasks

The organizing principles (prevent, protect, and respond)

and associated specialized activities (pathway defeat,

WMD defeat, and CBRN response) serve as the operational

framework for CWMD. The specialized activities and

tasks are conducted to impede the development or

acquisition of new WMD threats; defeat, contain, or reduce

extant WMD capabilities; and minimize the effects of

CBRN use. Specialized tasks are not unique to a particular

organizing principle, but their effects may be greater when

conducted in relation to any one organizing principle.

• WMD Pathway Defeat. WMD pathway defeat and

related specialized tasks focus on the prevention of

development or acquisition of WMD, to include

conventional, cyberspace, and special operations.

Pathway defeat activities focus on actions to dissuade,

deter, delay, disrupt, destroy, divert, or otherwise

complicate conceptualization and development of

WMD. Though not exclusive, pathway defeat actions are

Executive Summary

xiv JP 3-40

often in support to or in close collaboration with

interagency partners.

• WMD Defeat. After acquisition or development of a

capability, WMD defeat efforts target the ability to

assemble, stockpile, deliver, transfer, or employ WMD.

This involves the JFC employing tailored capabilities to

neutralize or destroy weapons and agents; delivery

systems; and materials, facilities, and processes,

including the functional or structural defeat of hardened

targets.

• CBRN Response. CBRN response efforts minimize the

effect of CBRN use to the joint force and other mission-

critical personnel. Actions to manage consequences

support US and foreign civil authorities and their

populations by responding to a CBRN incident and

mitigating the hazards and effects of WMD use. Actions

to safeguard the force are completed during the conduct

of other CWMD activities, since those activities may

require the force to operate in an environment

contaminated by CBRN hazards or effects of WMD use.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental principles and

guidance to plan, execute, and assess military activities to

counter WMD.

Executive Summary

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I-1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. General

a. The US, its partners, and allies face an increasing weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) threat from actors of concern who operate transregionally, conduct activities

throughout the operational environment (OE), and are multifunctionally organized.

Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) is a national security priority that

requires a coordinated, whole-of-government approach that brings all instruments of

national power to bear against these actors and their WMD-related activities. The

Department of Defense (DOD) contributes to the United States Government (USG) effort

by providing joint forces that plan and execute tasks to ensure the US, its forces, and its

partners are neither coerced nor attacked with WMD.

b. While various definitions of WMD and CWMD exist across the USG and

international communities, this joint publication (JP) describes WMD and CWMD

specifically to guide joint force understanding, campaigning, planning, execution, and

assessment of CWMD activities.

(1) WMD are chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons

capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, excluding the means of

transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part

from the weapon. WMD delivery systems are part of the WMD activities continuum and

are of concern to conducting CWMD operations even when they can be separated from the

WMD payload. However, while recognizing that CWMD activities may complement

DOD efforts to combat separable delivery systems, this JP does not prescribe doctrine to

combat delivery systems or conventional (non-CBRN) weapon threats where no explicit

WMD link exists.

For further information on countering delivery systems, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and

Missile Threats, and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(2) CWMD is efforts to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession,

proliferation, use, and effects of WMD, related expertise, materials, technologies, and

means of delivery.

2. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Strategy

a. The President provides policy and strategy for USG departments and agencies to

ensure unified effort in the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America

“The danger from hostile state and non-state actors who are trying to acquire

nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons is increasing.”

National Security Strategy

December 2017

Chapter I

I-2 JP 3-40

[short title: National Security Strategy (NSS)], National Strategy for Countering Weapons

of Mass Destruction Terrorism, presidential directives, and other plans and orders.

(1) NSS. The President establishes CWMD policy within the first pillar of the

2017 NSS (Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life).

It is characterized by counterproliferation (CP) and targeting terrorists that possess WMD.

(2) National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism.

The President provides broad lines of effort, strategic objectives, and desired end states in

the National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism. The

strategy emphasizes “global-burden-sharing” to counter terrorists with WMD.

(3) Presidential Directives. Presidential directives establish strategy and

framework and assign roles, responsibilities, and tasks to USG departments and agencies

to achieve unity of effort. Presidential directives providing direction for the CWMD

mission area include the following:

(a) Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-25, (U) Guidelines for US

Government Interagency Response to Terrorist Threats or Incidents in the US and

Overseas, provides a framework for the USG response to imminent terrorist threats or

incidents requiring a time-sensitive response, including crises involving WMD.

(b) PPD-33, (U) Detection and Early Warning of Nuclear Proliferation,

establishes interagency framework for the detection of nuclear proliferation to optimize US

capabilities, avoid duplication of efforts, address high-priority gaps, and ensure activities

are supportive of US national security objectives.

Proliferation, Terrorism, and Use, is a comprehensive document that addresses

proliferation, terrorism, and use of WMD and strengthening nonproliferation regimes and

provides a framework for civil nuclear cooperation and countering WMD threats. PPD-42

provides detailed guidance on nuclear threat reduction, technologies, and capabilities to

prevent and counter the proliferation and use of WMD, national technical nuclear forensics,

and countering WMD terrorism.

b. Secretary of Defense (SecDef). DOD derives its national strategic direction

primarily from the President’s guidance in the NSS, presidential directives, and other

national strategic documents, in conjunction with the National Security Council (NSC) and

the Homeland Security Council. SecDef’s (U) 2018 National Defense Strategy of the

United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge [short

title: National Defense Strategy (NDS)] is DOD policy that refines the strategic direction

of the NSS for DOD.

(1) 2018 NDS

(a) The NDS is derived from the NSS and is designed to sharpen the Armed

Forces of the United States’ competitive edge to compete, deter, and win. The strategy

recognizes the reemergence of great power competition and focuses on deterring

Introduction

I-3

aggression and coercion by great powers, rogue regimes, terrorists, and WMD threats. It

seeks to rebuild our military strength and establish competitive advantages in the face of

intensifying pressure from major challengers to ensure the US can sustain its current

advantages into the future.

(b) The NDS has 11 defense objectives. The CWMD mission area may be a

factor in all 11 of the objectives, one is specifically focused: dissuade, prevent, or deter

state adversaries and non-state actors (e.g., terrorists, violent extremist organizations,

criminals, scientists, businesses, facilitators, and their networks) from developing,

acquiring, proliferating, or using WMD.

is to achieve the defense objectives by expanding the competitive space through a more

lethal, rapidly innovating joint force and defense enterprise, combined with a robust, more

capable alliance and partnership network, and thereby generate the military advantage

needed to maintain favorable regional balances of power and increase US influence. This

strategic approach and ways provide the capabilities to compete, deter, and win in conflict

and reinforce all levels of national power from sustainable positions of military advantage.

Expanding the competitive space requires application of all instruments of national power.

(d) The NDS recognizes the threat of WMD as a major global trend. It notes

that rogue regimes continue to seek out or develop CBRN weapon capabilities—as well as

long-range missile capabilities—and, in some cases, proliferate these capabilities to malign

actors. Terrorists likewise continue to pursue WMD. Breakthroughs in chemistry continue

to perpetuate the threat of use of deadlier chemical agents such as fourth generation agents.

The spread of radiological sources and nuclear weapons technology and advanced

manufacturing technology remains a persistent problem. Advances in bioengineering are

increasing the potential, variety, and ease of access to biological weapons.

(e) The NDS simultaneity guidance envisions a joint force capable of

simultaneously operating and deterring adversaries’ and enemies’ capabilities and winning

any war. For the CWMD mission, this means day-to-day actions to degrade WMD threats,

and offensive operations during periods of competition below armed conflict or armed

conflict itself, to disrupt WMD threats to protect the homeland. Joint forces apply

simultaneous CWMD efforts across all layers of the global operating model: contact, blunt,

surge, and homeland defense (HD).

1. Contact Layer. Joint force CWMD capabilities are applied together

with allies and partners to expand the competitive space by countering WMD proliferation

by state and non-state actors and includes pathway defeat and, when required, WMD

defeat. See Chapter II, “Operational Environment and Operational Framework,” for

discussion of both pathway and WMD defeat. The contact layer may include joint force

support to nonproliferation efforts by USG departments and agencies charged with

managing and ensuring compliance with treaties, conventions, and other control measures.

Appendix A, “Organizational and Command Relationships,” describes USG departments

and agencies’ CWMD roles, organization, and responsibilities.

Chapter I

I-4 JP 3-40

2. Blunt Layer. Ready forces conduct operations to gather data to help

commanders determine if a situation or incident should be treated as a WMD event and to

support resolution efforts.

3. Surge Layer. War-winning forces apply mass to the fight, including

action against adversaries with nuclear capabilities.

4. HD Layer. Joint forces operate in the homeland and defend the

approaches to the homeland. They are capable of defending the homeland against WMD

through robust response to threats and incidents. These operations may include defense

support of civil authorities (DSCA) and/or HD activities and operations.

Figure I-1. National Defense Strategic Approach

National Defense Strategic Approach

Generate United States Advantages

and

Adversaries Dilemmas

Expand

Competitive

Space

Revitalized

Alliances

and

Partnerships

Creative

Operating

Concepts

Accelerate

Cycle of

Innovation

Interoperability

Reform the

Department

Greater

Performance

and Affordability

Strengthen

Allies and

Partners

Robust

Networks

Build a

Lethal

Force

Military

Advantage

Introduction

I-5

(2) The Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction (DODS-CWMD) emphasizes shaping the environment to dissuade actors

from pursuing WMD, early action through pathway defeat, and cooperating with partners

to achieve CWMD objectives. The strategy’s four objectives focus efforts for DOD

CWMD activities conducted in concert with other USG instruments of national power. For

more discussion, see Chapter III, “Planning,” paragraph 6, “Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction Strategic Approach for Planning.” For more discussion on the means of DOD

CWMD, see Chapter IV, “Execution,” paragraph 2, “Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction Activities and Tasks.”

(3) Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2060.02, DOD Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy, directs US forces to:

(a) Dissuade, deter, and defeat actors of concern and their networks that seek

to harm or coerce the US, its citizens, forces, and its allies and partner nations (PNs)

through the use or threat of use of WMD, while maintaining the ability to respond to and

mitigate the effects of WMD use.

(b) Implement a strategy for CWMD that supports national strategic

guidance and frameworks; support military force planning and doctrine to organize, train,

exercise, and equip the Services to counter WMD and prepare appropriate plans to address

the defensive aspects of CWMD.

by focusing efforts on the objectives outlined in the DODS-CWMD.

(d) Prepare DOD to support the objectives outlined in the DODS-CWMD by

ensuring effective CWMD capabilities, including maintaining and expanding technical

expertise.

(4) The (U) National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2018

(short title: National Military Strategy [NMS]).

(a) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides the joint force

with an overarching strategic framework to protect and advance US national interests

globally in the NMS. The 2018 NMS contains five mission areas, cited as ways for

employment of the joint force. The mission areas are to respond to threats, deter strategic

attack (and proliferation of WMD), deter conventional attack, assure allies and partners,

and compete below the level of armed conflict. The strategy informs the prioritization of

force employment, force development, and force design for the joint force.

(b) The CJCS also directs strategic planning, including development of a

functional campaign plan to counter WMD globally. The CJCS is the global integrator for

the campaign, while Commander, United States Special Operations Command

(CDRUSSOCOM), is the coordinating authority.

Chapter I

I-6 JP 3-40

3. Relationship to the Joint Functions

a. CWMD activities and operations intersect all functional areas, domains, and

combatant commands (CCMDs) and require the integration and coordination of the joint

functions discussed in JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(1) Command and Control (C2). Unity of command and unified action are

essential to CWMD. Acknowledging that not all required CWMD activity authorities are

resident in DOD, commanders and planners leverage the authorities, experience, access,

and capabilities of the interagency partners, allies, and PNs.

(2) Information. Information encompasses the management and application of

information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to influence relevant

actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and human and automated decision making

regarding the potential development, acquisition, proliferation, or use of WMD. Joint force

activities should consider messages that support WMD deterrence, making clear that the

cost of adversary action outweighs perceived benefits and that the joint force is prepared

to deny the adversary benefits they hope to gain through use of WMD. The overarching

theme to DOD efforts supporting CWMD messaging is that the US is committed to

identifying and holding fully responsible any actor of concern who willfully supports,

enables, or engages in WMD activities to target or threaten the US or our allies and

partners, and our aggregate defenses and any post-incident response will result in adversary

costs greatly exceeding any perceived benefits of using WMD.

(3) Intelligence. Intelligence support to CWMD is critical for commanders and

staffs to fully understand WMD in the OE. Intelligence identifies an adversary’s WMD

pathways and capabilities and will illuminate an adversary’s probable intentions, activities,

and vulnerabilities. It provides locations, characterization, and security status of toxic

industrial materials.

(4) Fires. Fires support CWMD operations, actions, and investments by

engaging targets associated with WMD pathways and, if necessary, can create effects on

WMD targets or delivery systems to prevent their imminent use. When planning CWMD

operations, actions, and investments in support of pathway defeat, WMD defeat, or during

combat, consider all available joint fires—including electronic attack and other capabilities

such as fires in and through cyberspace—along with their effects and associated risks.

(5) Movement and Maneuver. CWMD activities and operations can enhance

joint force movement and maneuver by limiting the adversary’s ability to deny freedom of

action with the use or threatened use of WMD. Specific CWMD activities may require

careful movement and maneuver considerations, especially when planned to take place in

denied areas. When possible, this function should posture and position conventional

forces, special operations forces (SOF), or specialized CBRN response capabilities where

they can most effectively prevent, protect against, or respond to WMD use.

(6) Protection. Protection focuses on conserving the joint force’s combat

capabilities through:

Introduction

I-7

(a) Active defensive measures to protect the joint force from a WMD attack.

(b) Passive defensive measures, including detectors and mission-oriented

protective posture/collective protection, which will enable friendly forces, systems, and

facilities to identify and continue to function in a contaminated environment and to

continue emergency management and CBRN response in order to reduce the loss of

personnel and capabilities due to WMD attacks or CBRN incidents. When directed, the

joint force commander’s (JFC’s) requirement to protect may extend beyond force

protection and encompass protection of US civilians; the forces, systems, and civil

infrastructure of PNs; and interagency partners.

(7) Sustainment. Sustainment refers to the provision of logistics and personnel

services necessary to maintain and execute CWMD operations and activities until mission

accomplishment. Sustainment support can be provisioned from military units or

commercial sources. Operational contract support is the process of planning for and

obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of

combatant commander (CCDR)-directed operations. Planners should consider CWMD-

and CBRN-related sustainment requirements, such as chemical defense equipment,

medical countermeasures, and CBRN defense materials required for protection, continuing

the fight, and remediation after CWMD activities.

For more information, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics; JP 4-02, Joint Health Services; and JP

4-10, Operational Contract Support.

4. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Doctrine Relationship to Other

Doctrine

CWMD doctrine applies across the scope of military activities and operations where

the potential for WMD threats exists. Other doctrinal publications addressing activities

and operations for which CWMD doctrine should be a planning and operational

consideration. Since CWMD activities are often linked with the potential for operations in

CBRN environments, the relationship with CBRN defense doctrine is important. CBRN

defense refers to the employment of capabilities that counter the entire range of CBRN

hazards. Specific CBRN-related joint doctrine includes JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

Chapter I

I-8 JP 3-40

Intentionally Blank

II-1

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

1. General

a. This chapter provides a general overview of the WMD environment, which

comprises development pathways, proliferation and procurement networks, possession

and/or use of WMD, and actors of concern operating within the WMD continuum. This

chapter also introduces the operational framework as the foundation for specific CWMD

tasks, as well as planning and execution considerations addressed in follow-on chapters.

b. The global security environment is becoming more complex and threatened with

adversary pursuit of WMD, delivery systems, and related CBRN technologies which

challenges the joint force, international organizations, and PNs. The evolution of the

WMD threat has created new challenges for JFCs beyond dealing with adversary WMD

use. The proliferation of WMD is a transregional problem that routinely crosses

geographic CCMDs’ geographical boundaries. The primary challenges facing the JFC

encompass:

(1) The diversity of threat actors—expansion from traditional state actors down

to the possibility of a lone actor with no particular affiliation.

(2) The emergence of novel WMD threats (i.e., nontraditional agents [NTAs]).

(3) The dual-use nature of much of the related technology and expertise.

(4) The increasing complexity of the WMD continuum and number of

proliferation and procurement networks.

c. The scope and speed associated with WMD development activities juxtaposed with

the dispersed nature of CWMD activities across the USG require the JFC to coordinate

with interagency partners to enable their activities while leveraging PNs’ capabilities.

CWMD requires a strong partnership between the US, its allies, and other PNs to combine

their CWMD capabilities and to dissuade, deter, or defeat WMD adversaries and threats.

2. Weapons of Mass Destruction Activity Continuum

a. Overview

“Actors of concern pose a threat of developing, acquiring, proliferating, or

employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related capabilities–

expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery. These activities

present a clear potential threat to the strategic objectives of the United States”

Department of Defense Strategy for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 2014

Chapter II

II-2 JP 3-40

(1) Although the characteristics of the WMD continuum are continuously

evolving, one constant remains—all actors use pathways to develop or acquire WMD.

These pathways consist of networks or connections among individuals, groups, and

organizations that enable the development, possession, and/or proliferation of WMD and

related capabilities. WMD pathways continuously adapt to keep pace with changes in the

OE. They are supported by a complex array of actors and networks that take advantage of

permissive environments, accessibility of dual-use technology, and available expertise to

support WMD development.

(2) Supply and demand characteristics of the proliferation supporting pathways

are a combination of witting and unwitting participants that may or may not adhere to

existing proliferation norms and rules. The increasing number of suppliers and network

enablers available to those seeking to develop WMD increases the availability of the

necessary materials and knowledge to develop WMD and the means to deliver them. This

increase also creates greater challenges for those attempting to prevent proliferation.

(3) Innovation and the dual-use nature of technology, materials, and equipment

make identifying pathways and preventing WMD development difficult. Advanced

technology, materials, and equipment is available to anyone who can afford it and

ownership does not necessarily constitute illegal or nefarious intent. The procurement of

advanced technology can condense timelines which limits options to prevent WMD

development and increases the risk of surprise.

(4) Monitoring and controlling WMD pathways is essential in denying actors of

concern access to WMD technology, knowledge, materials, expertise, and weapons.

Globalization has enabled the creation of new, innovative, and sophisticated pathways that

facilitate development, procurement, and proliferation efforts. The evolution of new

pathways, combined with the spread of knowledge and ease of access to critical

components, makes WMD detection more difficult.

b. WMD Activities

(1) Though not necessarily sequential, the WMD activity continuum covers the

spectrum of WMD activities from intent to use (Figure II-1). A subset of this continuum

is those activities that are strictly associated with the development of a WMD capability.

These activities encompass intent, infrastructure, expertise, production, weaponization,

and delivery systems. Beyond the development pathways is the achievement of an initial

capability, qualitative and quantitative capability improvements, and potential WMD use.

(2) WMD development is not a linear process. Actors can conduct multiple

activities simultaneously to reduce the time needed to achieve a capability. Additionally,

procurement of advanced technologies can enable actors to bypass technological hurdles

inherent in WMD development. Actors can also circumvent WMD development entirely

by directly acquiring a weapons capability from another actor.

(a) Intent. Desire or decision to develop and/or acquire WMD. This

decision may be made by a small group of actors, organizations, or nation leaders. The

Operating Environment and Operational Framework

II-3

likely compartmentalization and secrecy of such decisions can make it difficult to gather

intelligence to identify an actor’s intent.

(b) Infrastructure. Development and establishment of physical and

organizational infrastructure necessary to support WMD development. This includes

specialized facilities, equipment, raw materials, acquisition, and logistic networks, as well

as financial means to support them.

expertise required to build WMD. This includes building the knowledge base to support

all of the activities in the continuum.

(d) Production. Activities to produce components and materials necessary

to construct and maintain WMD. Production can include the use of civil infrastructure to

progress along the continuum without inciting international reaction.

(e) Weaponization. Activities to convert critical components,

chemical/biological agents, or radiological/fissile material into a weapons package.

(f) Delivery Systems. Development of mechanisms to mate CBRN weapon

packages with a system capable of delivering it to a specified target.

Figure II-1. Weapons of Mass Destruction Activity Continuum

Weapons of Mass Destruction Activity Continuum

Legend

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Procurement/direct acquisition can occur at any point to circumvent the continuum.

Intent

Demand

Capability

WMD

Use

Initial

Enhanced

Supply

Production

Infrastructure

Weaponization

Expertise

Delivery Systems

Chapter II

II-4 JP 3-40

3. Weapons of Mass Destruction Supply and Demand Networks

a. WMD networks are the connective tissue a state or non-state actor uses to gain or

transfer access to weapons, material, technology, and expertise. These networks enable

state and non-state actors to acquire, develop, proliferate, or use WMD. Licit and illicit

organizations operating transregionally may wittingly or unwittingly support the

proliferation and/or use of WMD through networks and add to the complexity of mitigating

the WMD threat. Examples of existing networks include the use of front companies,

intermediaries, and shell corporations to procure sensitive items from the global market.

Networks may be limited in their duration and may be dissolved once their purposes are

achieved. The interconnectedness and sheer number of networks available to move

knowledge and materials globally complicates the ability to identify and interdict them.

b. Most WMD pathways take advantage of preexisting networks (both licit and illicit)

to facilitate the movement of people, material, information, infrastructure, and money. The

use of existing legitimate networks for nefarious purposes presents a challenge to the JFC.

Decisions to interdict, surveil, or disrupt a given network node or connective link may

create unintended consequences if not thoroughly analyzed. For example, if an established

transportation route is used to move WMD materials of concern, the JFC and PN officials

should develop interdiction plans that minimize the disruption of legitimate movement of

goods, while ensuring the means to stop the flow of WMD materials is in place. Potential

links between networks comprise material, people, information, infrastructure, money, and

lines of communication. Recognition and appreciation of these links, and their

interconnectivity, will guide the development of the means to illuminate, monitor, and, if

necessary, interdict, disrupt, or destroy them. This awareness is paramount for a pathway

defeat approach to CWMD.

c. States that have developed WMD, or were once recipients of WMD-related

technologies and materials, may begin to indigenously produce and export these same

technologies to other countries of proliferation concern. The ability and willingness of

these states to export WMD-related expertise, technologies, and materials to other states

outside of, or in noncompliance with, international nonproliferation rules are a serious

threat. Non-state actors (e.g., terrorists, violent extremist organizations, criminals,

scientists, businesses, facilitators) and their networks may be involved in the intentional or

unintentional proliferation of WMD-related technologies and materials. This compounds

the risks of acquisition of WMD by actors of concern.

For further information on networks, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

4. Weapons of Mass Destruction Actors of Concern

Actors of concern consist of state and non-state actors that carry out activities that, left

unaddressed, pose a potential threat to the strategic objectives of the USG. In the WMD

context, an actor of concern poses a threat of developing, acquiring, proliferating, or

employing WMD; related expertise; materials; technologies; and means of delivery. These

actors may also perceive destructive capabilities of WMD as a highly desirable means to

counter more technologically advantaged nations and alliances.

Operating Environment and Operational Framework

II-5

a. State Actors. States may view WMD possession as a source of strategic leverage,

international prestige, regional dominance, or deterrence. This may be accomplished

through the threat or actual use of WMD. For a state to employ WMD, it must possess one

or more weapons, a viable delivery capability, and the infrastructure necessary for C2 of

the weapon system. States lacking a conventional delivery capability or seeking to avoid

attribution may use asymmetric means or proxies (state or non-state) to deliver weapons.

JFCs use joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) to assess

an actor of concern’s capability to employ WMD. If state and regional instability increases

in or around WMD possessor states, full control of weapons or WMD materials of concern

may be jeopardized. JFCs should partner with other USG and multinational partners to

advocate for responsible stewardship.

For further information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the

Operational Environment.

b. Non-State Actors. The WMD acquisition and development efforts of non-state

actors differ from traditional state programs in their organization, scale, and resourcing.

Many chemical and biological production facilities used by a non-state actor, such as

clandestine laboratories, can operate within a limited space (e.g., one-car garage), using

common, dual-use, or improvised equipment. Detecting and disrupting non-state actor

networks and small-scale production facilities is a significant challenge for the JFC. Non-

state actors can operate independently, with state actor support, or in tandem as enablers or

as proxies of state actors. Non-state actors are likely to employ WMD in an unconventional

manner as an improvised threat. This can include improvised CBRN weapons or using

CBRN material as enhancements to improvised explosive devices. Employment of

CWMD capabilities, such as weapons technical intelligence, facilitate understanding and

subsequent defeat of networks that support non-state actors in acquiring or developing

WMD.

5. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment

a. This section provides a general overview of the CBRN threat and effects of WMD

use. CBRN weapons may be used to attack US citizens, infrastructure, or vital interests;

to target US power projection, sustainment, and force protection vulnerabilities; to deny

access to an area, limiting the ability of the US to respond to urgent threats; or to undermine

support by key regional partners for US vital interests through intimidation.

(1) Chemical Agent Effects. Most chemical agents are extremely lethal and

rapidly produce mass casualties among unprotected personnel. The burden posed by

implementing protective measures and measures to mitigate the spread of contamination

will likely negatively affect operating tempo. Mass casualties could overwhelm medical

facilities or spread contamination denying continued use of those facilities. C2 assets can

become overwhelmed with managing effects of the chemical weapon attack, which would

adversely impact awareness of other activities. Additionally, contaminated ports and

airfields could hamper the flow of logistics, reduce sortie generation, and delay forward

movement.

Chapter II

II-6 JP 3-40

(2) Biological Agent Effects. The effects of biological weapons on an operation

will depend on the type of operation, the number of casualties, the severity of incapacitation

of individual military personnel (i.e., Service members merely inconvenienced or

completely removed from the fight), the demand for medical personnel, the amount and

type of medical supplies required, equipment (from antibiotics to beds and ventilators) and

facilities to treat casualties, quarantine or monitoring of exposed but asymptomatic

personnel, the need for medical evacuation assets (e.g., vehicles, planes, escorting medical

attendants), and the infectiousness of the agent between humans. A biological attack can

range in operational decrement from that of a more limited impact to unit effectiveness due

to lost duty days (e.g., norovirus outbreak) to catastrophic for affected units (e.g.,

pneumonic plague). Depending on the agent, effects can be temporary or permanent for

those affected. Toxins are poisonous substances that may be produced synthetically, such

as commercial processes for microbial and fungal products. Technology for bulk

production of some toxins exist. Disease outbreaks must be aggressively addressed to save

lives, but it is also imperative to discern whether an outbreak is deliberate, accidental, or

naturally occurring. Forensics provide attribution to identify those responsible. Following

a disease outbreak, a case definition needs to be constructed to determine the number of

cases and the attack rate. If the attack rate deviates from the norm, an outbreak is more

likely. Potential epidemiological clues to a biological attack include highly unusual events

with large numbers of casualties, higher morbidity or mortality than expected for a given

disease, unprecedented antibiotic resistance for a given pathogen, uncommon disease in a

geographical area, point-source outbreak with shorter incubation time than usual (due to

an increased amount of inoculum), multiple disease outbreaks, lower attack rates in

protected individuals, dead animals, reverse spread (i.e., from humans to animals or disease

observation in animals and people concurrently), unusual disease manifestation (e.g.,

inhalation and cutaneous anthrax in multiple regions concurrently), downwind plume

pattern, and direct evidence.

(3) Radiological Effects. Radiological weapons include radiological dispersal

devices (RDDs) and radiological exposure devices (REDs). Radiological weapons are

considered a serious threat due to the availability of radiological sources. These sources

are used throughout the medical, research, and industrial communities with minimal

security precautions. Radiological weapons are not considered to be militarily useful for a

state but may be desirable for non-state actors and terrorist organizations wishing to inflict

psychological and economic damage.

(a) RDD. RDDs are improvised assemblies or processes, other than nuclear

explosive devices, designed to disseminate radioactive material to cause destruction,

damage, or injury. RDDs contaminate the environment with radioactive materials and

threaten populations with exposure. Their use may also result in area denial and costly

cleanup or decontamination. An RDD is a possible terrorist weapon given the prevalent

commercial use of radioactive source material and the relatively ease to disperse this

material using conventional explosives.

(b) RED. REDs are highly radioactive penetrating sources (gamma and/or

neutron) which are relatively easy to deploy and are placed in a location where people

could be exposed, injured, or killed.

Operating Environment and Operational Framework

II-7

For further guidance on improvised explosive devices, refer to JP 3-15.1, Counter-

Improvised Explosive Device Activities.

(4) Nuclear Weapons Effects. When detonated, a nuclear weapon will release

its energy as blast, electromagnetic pulse, thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation (alpha

and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons). The primary hazards for unshielded

personnel are blast, prompt radiation, and thermal radiation, which are dependent on the

size of the weapon, the proportion of energy released due to fission instead of fusion, the

height of the detonation, and atmospheric conditions. When the detonation occurs as an

air burst high enough that the fireball does not touch the ground, the fission products are

scattered widely from the point of detonation. When the detonation occurs under, at, or

near the surface, the fission products mix with surface materials, such as dirt and soil, and

settle in a pattern commonly known as fallout around the area of detonation in the direction

of the prevailing winds. This produces the preponderance of the radiation hazard and

casualties beyond the immediate point of detonation. The effects from a nuclear weapon

will extend hundreds of meters to hundreds of kilometers depending on the weapon

characteristics and method of delivery. These effects include electromagnetic pulse effects

that may vary based on weapon type and configuration, height of burst, and environmental

conditions, and other factors. These effects could damage or disrupt various electronic

systems impacting operations.

For further information on CBRN weapons and effects, see JP 3-11, Operations in

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

6. Operational Framework

a. Overview. The operational framework for CWMD (Figure II-2) consists of three

organizing CWMD principles (prevent, protect, and respond) carried out through

specialized activities (pathway defeat, WMD defeat, and CBRN response).

b. CWMD Organizing Principles. CWMD operations and activities focus on

pathway defeat and utilize prevent, protect, and respond as CWMD organizing principles

for planning. The joint force conducts a wide range of CWMD operations and activities

against state and non-state actors of concern to deter the conceptualization, development,

possession, proliferation, and use or threat of use and mitigate the effects of WMD.

(1) Prevent. This organizing principle consists of activities and operations to

dissuade states or non-states from pursuing the development or acquisition of WMD.

Prevent activities and operations also extend beyond the attainment of WMD capabilities,

disrupting proliferation from possessor state or non-state actors and deterring WMD use.

Examples of activities conducted in support of prevent include promoting treaty

compliance and control regimes; impeding the transfer of materials of concern; restricting

the supply of WMD-related capabilities; and conducting pathway defeat activities and

operations to dissuade, deter, delay, disrupt, destroy, deny, and assure. Such activities will

complicate access to scientific expertise and technologies, infrastructure, and materials of

concern. Prevent activities and operations are frequently conducted with other USG

departments and agencies, as well as PNs with capabilities and capacity to address WMD

Chapter II

II-8 JP 3-40

threats and related missile systems. Prevent includes aspects of both nonproliferation and

CP. While nonproliferation is principally applied to prevent the acquisition or development

of WMD by state or non-state actors during the early WMD development stages, it may

also be employed in latter stages. CP applies to those actions taken to prevent proliferation,

stop or roll back current WMD programs, defeat delivery systems, and protect US interests

from the threat of or use of WMD. CP activities are principally applied after adversaries

develop WMD, but they can also be applied early on in the WMD development and

acquisition stages.

(2) Protect. This organizing principle consists of activities and operations to

protect the US and its interests from attack or coercion by WMD possessors. Concurrently,

the joint force conducts activities and operations to contain or reduce existing WMD

stockpiles. Protect activities and operations, below armed conflict, may include building a

layered and integrated WMD defense to disrupt WMD deployment and posturing forces to

respond to WMD attacks. Central to planning for and execution of WMD defeat activities

and operations are the ability to control, defeat, disable, and dispose of extant WMD

capabilities, to include related delivery systems. The joint force builds partner capacity

and conducts security cooperation (SC) to assist allies and PNs with CWMD activities in

their homeland or abroad.

Figure II-2. Weapons of Mass Destruction Development Framework

Weapons of Mass Destruction Development Framework

Legend

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear WMD weapons of mass destruction

Intent

Demand

Capability

WMD

Use

Initial

Enhanced

Supply

Production

Infrastructure

Weaponization

Expertise

Strategic End

States

Organizing

Principles

(Specialized

Activities)

No New WMD

Prevent (Pathway

Defeat)

No WMD Use

Protect (WMD

Defeat)

Minimize WMD

Effects

Respond (CBRN

Response)

Delivery Systems

Operating Environment and Operational Framework

II-9

(3) Respond. This organizing principle consists of activities to support

operations in a CBRN environment, to respond to or mitigate the effects of a WMD or

CBRN event, and to support USG efforts to attribute WMD attacks. Respond emphasizes

CBRN preparedness of personnel, capabilities, and forces to attribute, mitigation effects,

support and sustain operations during day-to-day activities. Leveraging USG capabilities

to respond to CBRN events such as WMD use or toxic industrial incidents is critical.

Building partner capacity to respond to such incidents is also essential and should influence

planning priorities at all levels. Ensuring strong working relationships exist between the

USG and PNs will help to minimize the effects of WMD or CBRN crises, demonstrate

resiliency, and contribute greatly to deterrence.

c. Specialized Activities. The JFC conducts the following specialized activities with

the ultimate end state of ensuring the US, allies, partners, and interests are neither coerced

nor attacked:

(1) Pathway Defeat. Pathway defeat activities and operations are designed to

prevent actors of concern from developing or acquiring WMD capabilities and to ensure

those who do not possess WMD do not obtain them. Pathway defeat comprise operations

and activities to delay, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise complicate networks, links, and nodes

that support the conceptualization, development, production, and proliferation of WMD.

Though pathway defeat efforts primarily focus on the prevention of WMD development,

activities and operations also include countering horizontal proliferation and/or

procurement once an initial capability has been attained. Chapters III, “Planning,” and IV,

“Execution,” expand on planning and executing considerations and specialized tasks for

preventing WMD acquisition or development. Designated USG departments and agencies

have primary responsibility for most CWMD efforts preceding WMD use. Therefore, the

JFC must closely work with other USG partners to learn about their activities, as well as

cooperate to fully understand the intricacies of pathways and associated networks to

effectively counter WMD development, proliferation, and/or procurement. By examining

WMD pathways through the lens of people, places, and things, it is possible to detect efforts

previously unidentified, emerging WMD actors and take action to complicate, disrupt, or

stop progress toward WMD development.

(2) WMD Defeat. WMD defeat activities focus on actions to contain and reduce

risks posed by extant WMD and/or stockpiles. Whether supporting the interagency or as a

lead, WMD defeat comprise operations and activities to contain, reduce, reverse,

neutralize, or destroy extant WMD and the ability to stockpile, transfer, or employ WMD.

These activities and operations may range from threat reduction cooperation while

operating in a permissive environment to the execution of lethal options. Chapters III,

“Planning,” and IV, “Execution,” expand on planning and executing considerations for

protecting against extant WMD capabilities and preparing for response, as well as

specialized tasks for CBRN response.

(3) CBRN Response. CBRN Response activities focus on actions taken to

defend, respond, and recover from WMD use if and when deterrence fails. The JFC

postures, prepares the force, and mitigates CBRN effects to operate and win in any given

environment. The JFC may also be called upon to support response efforts of allies and or

Chapter II

II-10 JP 3-40

PNs, as well as provide defense support to US civil authorities and assist with forensic

attribution. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, expands

on planning and executing considerations, as well as specialized tasks for responding to

CBRN use.

For additional information on the specialized tasks, see Chapter IV, “Execution,”

paragraph 4, “Organizing Principles and Specialized Tasks."

d. Proactive actions can be taken at every stage of the WMD activity continuum to

successfully counter WMD development or proliferation, or use. CBRN defense activities

including reconnaissance and surveillance provide hazard awareness and understanding of

threats in order to posture forces. Furthermore, JFCs should bear in mind international

nonproliferation rules and dual-use technologies and capabilities may complicate CWMD

activities (e.g., Article IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [short

title: Nonproliferation Treaty {NPT}] acknowledges its signatories right to develop nuclear

energy for peaceful purposes, which may also mask the development of fissile material for

warheads).

e. States with extant WMD capabilities may begin to indigenously produce and export

these same or related technologies to other actors of concern. The ability and willingness

of these states to export WMD-related technologies and materials to other states outside

of, or in noncompliance with, international nonproliferation rules are a serious threat.

Furthermore, a proliferation threat exists from non-state actors who proliferate WMD-

related technologies and materials, increasing the risks of terrorists acquiring WMD.

While difficult to detect, WMD proliferation that occurs outside of international controls

remains a JFC concern.

JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, expands on planning

and executing considerations, as well as specialized tasks for responding to CBRN use.

III-1

CHAPTER III

PLANNING

1. General

Introduction. This chapter provides JFCs with information to assist them in the joint

planning process (JPP) to translate strategic CWMD guidance into operational designs and

corresponding plans that account for the transregional nature of the WMD problem set.

This chapter also discusses the many aspects of CWMD that should be integrated into joint

campaign, contingency, concept, and operation plans. Additionally, current planning

requires the integration of military CWMD planning with the other instruments of national

power to accomplish USG strategic objectives. Ultimately, across the entirety of the

CWMD mission, CWMD planning integrates WMD-specific knowledge, experience, and

capabilities into the JFC’s overall JPP.

2. The Competition Continuum and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Across the Range of Military Operations

a. Competition Continuum. The competition continuum is the environment under

which we conduct the range of military operations. The dynamic and complex

environment in which WMD acquisition and use occur requires the integration of activities

and operations across the competition continuum. The common aspect across the

continuum is an active campaigning mindset. Cooperation and competition below armed

conflict are, for practical purposes, always occurring, so the presence or absence of armed

conflict is the only variable element. This comprehensive framework requires the joint

force to play a more prominent role in areas regarded as outside the military sphere and

thus requiring integrated efforts with USG partners. JFCs determine the most effective

blend of CWMD activities and operations throughout the competition continuum to address

unique challenges posed by WMD. JFCs ensure these activities are best suited to dissuade

countries from developing WMD, deter use of WMD by actors of concern that have

developed a WMD capability, and, if necessary, defeat any state or non-state actor that uses

or threatens the use of WMD.

(1) Competition may also include, with SecDef approval, WMD defeat

operations against extant WMD capabilities in the hands of actors of concern. Competition

with a state actor does not preclude some cooperation with the same actor on other areas.

When properly executed, competition below armed conflict creates strategic opportunities

for the US and its partners.

“Countering WMD [weapons of mass destruction] efforts often occur as part of

larger United States Government activities or military operations. Consequently,

they must be fully integrated into other plans and activities rather than isolated

as separate efforts.”

Department of Defense Strategy for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction,

June 2014

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III-2 JP 3-40

(2) The joint force cooperates with existing and new partners to understand the

OE and develop their capabilities to conduct CWMD actions unilaterally or with the US

either regionally or transregionally. Cooperation may also include nonproliferation

activities to ensure compliance with treaties, conventions, and other control regimes.

b. Operations Across the Competition Continuum. JFCs conduct CWMD in a

wide variety of combat and non-combat situations across the competition continuum. The

competition continuum is augmented by the understanding that military activities and

operations take place along a continuum that spans from cooperation to competition below

the level of armed conflict to armed conflict. Military activities and operations involve

USG interorganizational support, as well as engagement with local CWMD forces and

governments; developing indigenous CWMD security capabilities; deterring WMD

threats; WMD crisis response operations; limited contingencies; and, when required,

CWMD operations in support of major operations and campaigns to counter WMD threats.

Furthermore, CWMD operations and activities along the competition continuum are not

arbitrarily binned into phases and may take place concurrently.

For more information on the competition continuum, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(1) Major Operations and Campaigns. The President and SecDef may decide

to conduct major operations or campaigns involving large-scale combat to defeat a

significant WMD threat. Major operations and campaigns are characterized by the legal

use of violence to defeat another state’s military forces, as well as employment of other US

instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic. CWMD may be

the primary focus of a major operation or campaign or a subordinate objective. Operations,

activities, and investments below armed conflict and cooperation efforts may take place

while the joint force simultaneously executes major operations and campaigns.

(2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

(a) Crisis Response. The President and SecDef respond to imminent WMD

threats or actual WMD incidents by executing CJCS or CCMD CWMD crisis response

plans. CWMD crisis response operations, such as mitigating the effects of a CBRN

incident, may involve multiple threat locations. SecDef may deploy national forces to

address the situation and/or a CCMD may employ theater forces. Given the transregional

nature of the WMD environment, response plans often require an integrated approach and

collaboration between multiple CCMDs, PNs, and other mission partners.

For further guidance on military support to foreign CBRN response, refer to Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01, Defense Support for Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory, and JP 3-41,

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, for joint CBRN response.

(b) Domestic Response. Domestically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) is the lead federal agency for criminal investigations of all terrorist-related incidents

and threats, including those that involve nuclear/radioactive materials. The Department of

Planning

III-3

Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead for contingency response operations domestically

with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and Environmental Protection Agency.

For further guidance on military support to domestic CBRN response, refer to CJCSI

3125.01, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)

Incidents in the Homeland. See JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Response, for joint CBRN response, and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities,

for guidance on DSCA.

develop a contingency plan, the CCMD may employ CWMD forces in small-scale

operations, limited by duration and/or scope of the objective. Limited contingencies may

be conducted to achieve independent objectives as part of activities below armed conflict

or in support of major operations of extended duration involving sustained combat to

protect US interests, prevent attack, further conflict, or engage adversaries. CWMD

limited contingencies may take the form of intelligence operations to illuminate a WMD

proliferation network determined to be a threat to the US, strikes, or raids to neutralize or

reduce the threats and other operations as directed by SecDef.

For more guidance on joint operations and planning, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and

JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(3) Military Engagement, SC, and Deterrence Activities. The primary

purpose of CWMD military engagement and SC activities is to enable PNs to build

indigenous capabilities that deter WMD threats and incidents, as well as conduct

operational preparation of the environment (OPE) to a desired set of conditions to facilitate

stability and future operations, as well as to support CWMD planning. Intelligence

operations and OPE include activities to understand the OE, information exchange and

intelligence sharing, development of PN and friendly military capabilities, identification

and development of infrastructure and logistics capabilities, interagency coordination, and

other efforts to ensure access to critical regions across the globe.

(a) Military Engagement. CWMD military engagement is a noncombat

activity conducted by CWMD staff representatives and forces conducting CWMD

operations. The objective of military engagement is to build trust and confidence, share

information, coordinate mutual activities, maintain influence, build defense relationships,

and develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational

operations.

(b) SC. SC in support of CWMD is a noncombat activity involving

interaction with foreign forces and the building of relationships promoting US CWMD

interests, developing PN CWMD capabilities and capacities for self-defense and

multinational operations, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access

to critical regions around the world. SC activities may advance US CWMD interests and

efforts.

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III-4 JP 3-40

to prevent WMD proliferation and/or use by presenting a credible US and/or PN response

through specific counteractions that would deny the effects an enemy intends to create by

using WMD. Effective deterrence may also call into question the utility of an adversary’s

intent to develop, maintain, or use WMD. Military force may be necessary to compel an

enemy to stop using WMD and to reestablish deterrence. Ideally, effective deterrence

influences an adversary’s decision-making processes without the need for military action.

Military engagement, SC, force posturing and forward deployment, information

integration, and demonstration of fielded CWMD capabilities all contribute to deter use of

WMD. Deterrence in one region may cause actors in another area to reconsider their intent

to proliferate or deliver WMD.

3. General Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Guidance

a. Guidance for CWMD planning exists within national and DOD-specific guidance

documents (addressed in Chapter I, “Introduction”). The development of CWMD plans

and planning products serve to address campaign, contingency, and support planning

requirements derived from strategic guidance. Specific planning products support

requirements described in CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)

[short title: JSCP].

b. The JSCP contains a number of CWMD planning requirements, to include a JSCP-

directed, CWMD-specific functional campaign plan (Functional Campaign Plan for

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction [FCP-CWMD]); CWMD portions of global and

regional campaign plans, which are produced by CCMDs and promulgated through the

JSCP; either JSCP- or command-directed contingency plans with CWMD supporting

annexes or appendices; existing contingency plans, concept plans concept plans, or

operations plans; and CWMD-specified plans for existing execute orders.

(1) In addition, regional planning requirements are addressed through geographic

combatant commander (GCC) guidance to develop plans focusing on military engagement;

SC; deterrence; and other noncombat, understand, shape, and preventive activities through

the development of theater-specific plans such as a combatant command campaign plan

(CCP) or regional campaign plan. Regional CWMD planning can either be written into

stand-alone plans or incorporated into a CCP.

(2) Supporting CCMDs reinforce the planning efforts of supported commands to

address transregional planning concerns in their assigned global campaign plans and

integrated contingency plans. The GCC may direct the development of a contingency plan

to respond to WMD aggression, instability, or failure of a possessor state and other WMD-

related threats by crisis response, limited contingencies, or major operations.

For further information on detailed general planning considerations and process

descriptions of the JPP, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

Planning

III-5

4. Campaign and Operational Design for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Planning

Once the JFC and staff have reviewed and analyzed the strategic guidance for CWMD-

related campaign plans, and the FCP-CWMD, together with the OE, they articulate current

and desired conditions relevant to CWMD. Understanding the underlying factors

associated with existing conditions enables planners to identify and describe complex

WMD problems and issues. Once problems and issues have been thoroughly identified,

the CCMD staff develops their operational approach to describe the commander’s vision

of where and how resources and effort can be applied to create effects toward the

achievement of objectives. The GCC’s operational approach for CWMD should be

consistent with the strategic approach. The CWMD operational approach reflects the JFC’s

visualization for creating desired effects. The approach provides the necessary foundation

for detailed planning, as well as related branch plans that may evolve. During development

of the operational approach, the CCMD staff incorporates CWMD planning considerations

outlined later in this chapter.

5. Department of Defense Functional Campaign Plan Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction Integration

The DODS-CWMD and the FCP-CWMD provides CCMDs, the Services, and combat

support agencies (CSAs) with a common strategy and framework to synchronize planning

on a regional, transregional, and global basis. It integrates DOD-wide efforts to prevent

the use, acquisition, and proliferation of WMD; prepare the joint force to respond to WMD

crises; and assure allies and partners. While conducting campaign and contingency

planning, CCMDs should integrate FCP-CWMD objectives and tasks. CCMDs may either

integrate their CWMD planning with respective campaign plans or develop a stand-alone

CWMD support plan. All plans should be coordinated with relevant USG departments and

agencies, allies, and PNs.

6. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Approach for Planning

a. All plans, where appropriate, should support achievement of DOD’s strategic

CWMD objectives, namely:

(1) Reduce incentives to pursue, possess, and employ WMD.

(2) Increase barriers to acquisition, proliferation, and potential use of WMD.

(3) Manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, or failed states and safe

havens.

(4) Deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats through layered,

integrated defenses.

b. CCMD planning also accounts for regional, as well as the transregional and global,

implications of CWMD-related efforts. In response to the broader NDS guidance and more

specific JSCP requirements, CCMDs prepare, coordinate, and include activities and

Chapter III

III-6 JP 3-40

operations within their respective campaign plans to support global campaign plans. In

this manner, transregional planning efforts achieve common regional and global CWMD

objectives. GCCs should maintain awareness of CWMD operations and activities

occurring outside their area of responsibility (AOR) to avoid negatively impacting or being

impacted by other CCDRs’ decisions and/or activities. Additionally, Services and CSAs

resource the majority of strategic CWMD programs and activities. Therefore, CCMDs

should coordinate their plans with these organizations to ensure alignment with current

resources and capability development.

7. Planning Considerations

a. Strategic Implications. Commanders at every level need to be aware of the

strategic implications associated with any WMD threat and adapt their CWMD planning

efforts accordingly. CWMD activities and operations occur at all three levels of warfare—

strategic, operational, and tactical—and any single action may have consequences at all

levels. Nowhere is this more evident than in joint operations involving WMD, where

action or inaction at the tactical level can have profound strategic repercussions. The

transregional nature of the threat and spectrum of the WMD continuum requires JFCs fully

understand the OE, foster civil-military dialogue, align military and nonmilitary activities,

employ an integrated approach, and continually assess and adapt planning.

b. JIPOE. JIPOE supports the JFC by characterizing the OE that contains WMD as

a system of pathways, networks, relevant actors, resources, and extant and potential

capabilities, all interacting within the competition continuum. This holistic

characterization and predictive analysis enables development of the operational design

elements and effective targeting. Additionally, analysis of potential transformational

events, such as the rise of new actors of concern and the impact of technology

breakthroughs, facilitates national-level determination of end states, objectives, and

priorities.

(1) Understanding the OE. Progress in the effort to counter WMD depends on

understanding the environment as it is, recognizing the change desired, identifying

activities to bring about that change, assessing whether that change has occurred, and

determining whether the change is a result of those activities or some external factor.

Assessing the conditions in the OE will determine where DOD resources and efforts should

be focused on a more acceptable set of conditions (e.g., responsible state behavior). This

understanding provides planners and operators a better appreciation of the actor of concern

and ultimately support preparation of the environment activities for any possible CWMD

operation.

(2) Understanding Baseline Conditions. As part of the JIPOE process, JFCs

develop an understanding of baseline conditions within the OEs. Establishing baseline

conditions is essential to creating effects, achieving objectives, and measuring progress

toward attaining end states. Analysis of baseline conditions enables the JFC to identify

where desired change is possible and to assess whether change has occurred. Baseline

conditions are critical to identifying anomalies that may indicate the presence of a WMD

threat. Many WMD threats may not be readily apparent without an understanding of

Planning

III-7

historical conditions. For instance, identifying biological anomalies that are indicators of

WMD usage requires an understanding of current and historical disease patterns, since

many potential biological weapons are the intentional use of naturally occurring pathogens.

Another consideration is the toxic industrial materials that may be manufactured, stored,

and/or transported within the OE that may cause WMD-like effects.

For further guidance on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the

Operational Environment.

c. Interagency Coordination. USG departments and agencies planning and acting

together create effects that cannot be created by DOD alone due to differing authorities,

responsibilities, and capabilities. Various CWMD missions often place DOD in a

supporting role to other USG departments or agencies. CCMDs consider command

relationships, integration of resources, and coordination and synchronization of activities

as they develop any CWMD-related plans.

d. Allies and PNs. DOD CWMD efforts have a greater likelihood of success if

planned in cooperation with allies and PNs. CWMD shaping activities planned and

executed in cooperation with partners may prevent or disrupt actors of concern acquisition,

development, or employment of WMD and alleviate the need for more aggressive and

costly action later. In addition, collaborative action is effective at building partner

capabilities and creating stronger security relationships with allies and international

partners, which reduces impact on joint force resources and enhance the GCC’s ability to

respond to all types of crises.

e. Network Perspective. A JFC’s ability to characterize and monitor proliferation

networks and state WMD programs as holistic systems is essential to affecting that system.

One of the primary challenges facing the JFC is the proliferation of WMD technology and

products. The JFC strives to understand the continuous and complex interaction of

friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral networks.

For further guidance on threat networks, refer to JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

Chapter III

III-8 JP 3-40

Intentionally Blank

IV-1

CHAPTER IV

EXECUTION

1. General

Introduction. This chapter describes CWMD specialized tasks, as well as

foundational and crosscutting activities and tasks. It also articulates the critical role DOD,

joint forces, allies, and partners play in the successful execution of CWMD tasks.

Depending on the mission and OE, joint forces may also need to execute actions beyond

those discussed in this chapter.

a. Enabling and specialized tasks and associated capabilities are guided by DOD

CWMD strategic end states and priority objectives, as shown in Chapter I, “Introduction.”

CWMD activities and tasks are part of the range of military operations that take place

within the competition continuum. In this context, commanders ensure their forces counter

the threatened or actual use of WMD by actors of concern in their operational areas and

within in all OEs.

b. DOD leverages foundational and crosscutting activities and tasks (as illustrated in

Figure IV-1) to support specialized tasks that help prevent new WMD threats or use of

WMD, protect against extant WMD, and respond to WMD use by managing and mitigating

the associated consequences. DOD coordinates these CWMD efforts while incorporating

them into broader plans and activities.

2. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities and Tasks

a. The arrangement of foundational and crosscutting activities and tasks along with

specialized tasks within and across the organizing principles, serve as a method for

logically grouping tasks to prevent or counter specific WMD threats. To the extent

possible, foundational and crosscutting tasks are executed within the activities of: maintain

and expand technical expertise; cooperate with and support partners; and understand the

OE, threats, and vulnerabilities. Specialized tasks are placed within the respective

organizing principles of prevent, protect, and respond (Figure IV-1). While CWMD tasks

may be conducted individually or in conjunction with other operations, collectively they

support JFC operations.

b. The joint force leverages specialized and non-CWMD-specific activities and tasks

to achieve CWMD objectives. JFCs conduct a range of activities and tasks to advance

DOD CWMD efforts or support other USG requirements. These efforts utilize DOD

capabilities, such as ballistic missile defense; interagency capabilities, such as materials

analysis conducted by national laboratories; and PN capabilities, such as port security.

Execution of tasks bolsters common threat awareness and advances CWMD self-

sufficiency and military and civilian preparedness. The JFC and staff need to understand

“Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Chapter IV

IV-2 JP 3-40

the nonlinear and often concurrent nature of military activities that span across the

competition continuum.

3. Foundational and Crosscutting Activities and Tasks

a. Foundational Activities and Tasks. As depicted in Figure IV-1, foundational

activities and tasks for countering WMD consist of:

(1) Maintain and Expand Technical Expertise. This activity focuses on

nurturing and sustaining the intellectual capital provided by DOD and mission partner

CWMD experts. This knowledge and skill sets provide the necessary expertise for

CWMD-related planning, research and development, programing, exercising, system

integration, analysis, reachback, mission execution, and assessments. Maintaining

expertise requires long-term commitment to recruiting, developing, and retaining high-

quality personnel.

Figure IV-1. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities and Tasks

Legend

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear WMD weapons of mass destruction

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities and Tasks

WMD Pathway Defeat

Dissuade, deter, delay,

disrupt, destroy, deny,

assure

Dispose (reduce,

redirect, dismantle,

monitor)

Disable (exploit,

degrade)

Control (isolate, divert,

intercept, secure, seize)

Defeat (neutralize,

destroy)

Attribute, mitigate,

sustain, support

Prevent

WMD Defeat

Protect

Organizing

Principles

Specialized

Activities

Specialized

Tasks

Foundational Activities and Tasks:

Crosscutting Activity and Tasks:

CBRN Response

Respond



Cooperate with support partners (partner, coordinate).



Maintain and expand technical expertise (recruit, develop, retain).



Understand the environment, threats, and vulnerabilities (locate, identify,

characterize, assess, predict).

Execution

IV-3

(2) Cooperate with and Support Partners. JFCs should plan to perform

CWMD activities and tasks in full cooperation with USG interagency partners in a variety

of departments and agencies, multinational partners, and nongovernmental organizations.

In concert with the NDS, this activity recognizes the by, with, and through method as an

imperative to attaining strategic CWMD end states. This activity promotes common threat

awareness, builds CWMD self-sufficiency, improves military interoperability, enhances

military and civilian preparedness, enhances deterrence, and, in some cases, facilitates

security of dual-use and CBRN materials. The JFC will coordinate with partners to ensure

tasks associated with this activity are successfully conducted within military engagement,

SC, cooperative threat reduction (CTR), and deterrence operations and activities across the

competition continuum. The JFC should seek to strengthen existing partner relationships

and support programs to build the foundation for future partnering opportunities. When

conducting this activity, CCMDs coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD) and Department of State (DOS) to make contact with international counterparts in

PNs. JFCs need to include partners in planning and execution processes as early as

possible. CCMDs can then leverage existing activities, such as multinational training and

exercises, to strengthen relationships and improve regional capabilities and capacity to

achieve CWMD objectives.

For more information on exercises, see CJCS Guide 3500.01, (U) Chairman’s Guidance

for Training and Exercise Support to Global Integration.

(a) Partner Task. CCDRs maintain partnerships and seek new relationships

to build partner capacity in key areas that support CWMD across the competition

continuum. Domestic and foreign security partnerships support the collective capability to

deter, prevent, respond to, and defeat WMD threats and manage the effects of an attack.

These integration activities may require a coordinated international military response to

support nonproliferation efforts assigned by treaties, agreements, sanctions, and export

control regimes and frameworks and national, international, and host nation (HN)

programs.

(b) Coordinate Task. Promote and improve common threat awareness,

interoperability, and response preparedness. Actions that support this task include

operational planning with partners and SC efforts that synchronize CP activities such as

interdiction.

b. Crosscutting Activity and Tasks

Understand the Environment, Threats, and Vulnerabilities. The JFC

develops and maintains a comprehensive understanding of the WMD actors and materials

that affect the OE. To accomplish this, the JFC needs to locate, identify, characterize,

assess, and predict threats against US and partner vulnerabilities. Capabilities that support

these tasks include detection; modeling; identity intelligence; detailed operational

planning; and analysis of materials, precursors, and agents related to WMD proliferation,

development, or use. The JFC may use a combination of forces and capabilities such as

surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence analysts, interagency experts, conventional

forces, and SOF in support of this activity. This activity is an iterative process undertaken

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IV-4 JP 3-40

continually throughout the planning process and during execution of operations and

activities.

(a) Locate Task. The JFC uses SOF and intelligence collection assets to

locate WMD-associated system nodes and program elements, to include production

facilities, storage/stockpile sites, and key program personnel. Developing robust

information sharing relationships, particularly related to identity data, is an essential

component to this task.

(b) Identify Task. Once a WMD-related element and capability is located,

the JFC’s intelligence staff, in coordination with mission partners, scopes, categorizes, and

prioritizes the posed threat. Confirmation of a threat will lead to further analysis to

characterize and then assess specific elements of the program more effectively in follow-

on tasks. During conflict, initial identification of CBRN materials will most likely be

performed by conventional forces. Prior to execution, conventional forces should be made

aware of the types of facilities, material, and munitions they may encounter so personnel

protective equipment, security, and reporting are properly prepared.

concern’s WMD program by mapping its individual components, internal linkages, and

external associations through a variety of intelligence collection and analysis capabilities.

This understanding must include the types of weapons and the materials, technology, and

expertise associated with all aspects of an actor of concern’s WMD capability. The JFC

staff uses characterization to inform assessment, attribution, and predictive analysis.

During and after conflict, characterization occurs when the joint force has access to and

can fully examine WMD facilities, stockpiles, weapons, and/or personnel. Understanding

gained through this process conducted by specifically trained and designated forces,

combined with subsequent definitive analyses at internationally recognized laboratories,

provides overall characterization of a WMD program’s size, scope, and type. Specialized,

technical capabilities are used to construct a common operational picture presenting current

information on the actors of concern, friendly forces, neutral elements, the environment,

and geospatial information.

(d) Assess Task. Analysis conducted in conjunction with larger DOD,

civilian, USG, and international partners helps the JFC determine the threat posed by an

actor of concern’s WMD program. This includes an assessment by the JFC staff of US and

PN vulnerabilities in relation to a specific actor’s WMD capability and the overall OE. The

JFC may use hazard estimation, measurement, and modeling systems, as well as

multinational exercises, to assess the level of threat that an actor of concern’s WMD poses

to US and friendly forces.

(e) Predict Task. Specialized, technical capabilities forecast changes to

actors of concern, friendly forces, neutral elements, the environment, and geospatial

information. JFCs use modeling, diagnostics, intelligence, and analysis capabilities to

understand the current environment, detect anomalies, and continually assess the WMD

threat and related networks to extrapolate possible future threats.

Execution

IV-5

4. Organizing Principles and Specialized Activities and Tasks

a. The organizing principles (prevent, protect, and respond) and associated

specialized activities (pathway defeat, WMD defeat and CBRN response) serve as the

operational framework for CWMD. The specialized tasks are conducted to impede the

development or acquisition of new WMD threats; defeat, contain, or reduce extant WMD

capabilities; and minimize the effects of CBRN use. Specialized tasks are not unique to a

particular organizing principle, but their effects may be greater when conducted in relation

to any one organizing principle (see Figures IV-2 through IV-4). The DODS-CWMD

emphasizes early action through pathway defeat to dissuade actors from pursuing WMD

and cooperating with partners to achieve countering WMD objectives.

(1) Specialized Activity 1: WMD Pathway Defeat. WMD pathway defeat and

related specialized tasks focus on the prevention of development or acquisition of WMD,

to include conventional, cyberspace, and special operations. As illustrated in Figure IV-2,

pathway defeat activities have the greatest impact on the prevent organizing principle and

focus on actions to dissuade, deter, delay, disrupt, destroy, divert, or otherwise complicate

conceptualization and development of WMD. Though not exclusive, pathway defeat

actions are often in support to or in close collaboration with interagency partners.

(a) Dissuade and Deter. JFCs conduct efforts to persuade or convince

potential actors of the futility or overwhelming cost of developing, acquiring, proliferating,

or using WMD. These actions, which are employed early in the pathway defeat continuum,

are intended to prevent potential actors of concern from making adverse geopolitical

Figure IV-2. Prevent (Pathway Defeat) Specialized Tasks

Prevent (Pathway Defeat) Specialized Tasks

Dissuade

Deter

Delay

Disrupt

Destroy

Deny

Assure

Prevent

Greatest Effect

(Preferred)

Protect

Partial Effect

(Secondary)

Marginal Effect

(Tertiary)

Respond

Organizing

Principles

Specialized

Tasks

Chapter IV

IV-6 JP 3-40

choices but may also serve to persuade known actors of concern from challenging global

norms. Ideally, these pre-development activities may preclude the need to directly employ

offensive capabilities against actors of concern.

1. Dissuade Task. This task involves joint force efforts and resources

to prevent actors of concern from development ideation, acquisition, proliferation, or

maintaining WMD capabilities.

2. Deter Task. This task involves joint force efforts and resources to

prevent the use of WMD by actors of concern by creating a credible threat of unacceptable

consequences resulting from WMD use and the belief that the costs of WMD use outweigh

the potential benefits.

(b) Delay Task. The JFC conducts efforts to slow down an actor of

concern’s development, acquisition, proliferation, or use of WMD. These efforts may

include capabilities employed directly against the actor of concern or in support of another

lead agency to create lethal and/or nonlethal effects. This can include direct action against

specific nodes in a WMD network or program such as production facilities, computer

networks, and transportation or financial nodes. Efforts to delay adversaries may also

include financial sanctions, legal actions, or restriction of travel (e.g., national watch list).

development or acquisition of a WMD capability by preventing access to critical

components. This may be done with direct action interdicting material en route.

Disruption is particularly well suited for targeting key nodes in an actor of concern’s

network, such as transportation, leadership, logistics, or financial nodes.

(d) Deny Task. Early in the WMD continuum, the JFC frustrates and

ultimately negates all paths to an actor of concern’s acquisition or development ambitions.

Though less effective and more costly and difficult, denying WMD proliferation, further

qualitative or quantitative improvements, and WMD use may also take place in the protect-

WMD defeat activity.

(e) Assure Task. The joint force reassures friends and partners through

force posture and the use of cooperative security agreements to extend deterrence,

particularly nuclear forces, for their protection. This reassurance serves to dissuade states

from developing their own deterrent WMD capabilities.

(2) Specialized Activity 2: WMD Defeat. After acquisition or development of

a capability, WMD defeat efforts target the ability to assemble, stockpile, deliver, transfer,

or employ WMD. This involves the JFC employing tailored capabilities to neutralize or

destroy weapons and agents; delivery systems; and materials, facilities, and processes,

including the functional or structural defeat of hardened targets. WMD defeat activities

have the greatest impact on the protect organizing principle. This activity is sub-divided

in four major groupings: control, defeat, disable, and dispose. Figure IV-3 lists major

groupings and specialized tasks associated with WMD defeat, which has the greatest

impact on the protect organizing principle.

Execution

IV-7

(a) Control WMD Threats. The joint force isolates, diverts, intercepts,

seizes, and secures WMD, including related technology, materials, expertise, and means of

delivery to prevent access to or movement of the actor of concern’s program elements.

Control may be executed throughout the competition continuum. It routinely relies on

capabilities that are not specialized for CWMD but are nonetheless essential to CWMD

success.

1. Isolate Task. The joint force isolates and denies access to critical

WMD program components to impede actors of concern from furthering WMD

acquisition, development, proliferation, or utilization. This task includes conducting

critical factors analyses of WMD programs to identify capabilities, requirements, and

vulnerabilities that can be acted upon. Isolation operations may require the coordination

of conventional forces and interagency and international partners, to include law

enforcement and specialized technical capabilities. Isolation of WMD critical components

may be necessary for follow-on CWMD activities and tasks.

Figure IV-3. Protect (Weapons of Mass Destruction Defeat) Specialized Tasks

Protect (Weapons of Mass Destruction Defeat) Specialized Tasks

Reduce

Redirect

Dismantle

Monitor

Dispose

Destroy

Neutralize

Defeat

Exploit

Degrade

Disable

Isolate

Divert

Intercept

Seize

Secure

Control

Prevent

Greatest Effect

(Preferred)

Protect

Partial Effect (Secondary)Partial Effect (Secondary)

Marginal Effect (Tertiary)Marginal Effect (Tertiary)

Respond

Organizing

Principles

Groups

and

Specialized Tasks

Chapter IV

IV-8 JP 3-40

2. Divert Task. This task involves efforts and resources to change the

intended course or destination of shipments of WMD, related technologies, materials,

expertise, and/or means of delivery, either willingly or by force. The JFC may use a

combination of operations to accomplish this task. In some cases, this may not require

employment of force; rather, a show of force, the demonstration of a US presence, or a

formal communication of USG concern will create the desired effect. For example,

diversion may result from activities such as cyberspace operations, maritime interception

operations, or formal diplomatic actions (demarche).

3. Intercept Task. Conventional forces and SOF may be necessary to

stop the movement or proliferation of CBRN materials, WMD components, means of

delivery, WMD-related personnel, or functional weapons. Such actions may require

boarding, search, and detection capabilities to secure and seize shipments. Intercept

operations will likely involve interagency or multinational partners. This task may involve

a combination of activities such as port inspections and checkpoints that would authorize

USG or international partner inspections. This may include US Navy personnel embarked

aboard USCG vessels to carry out necessary technical inspections.

For more information on maritime interdiction, see JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

4. Seize Task. The joint force uses offensive action to obtain control

and possession of WMD capabilities (e.g., a designated area, building, transport, materials,

or personnel) to deny an actor of concern’s access to WMD capabilities. Once a force

seizes a WMD-related objective, it secures the objective and prepares it for follow-on

actions such as exploitation and/or destruction.

5. Secure Task. The joint force establishes protective measures to

prevent unauthorized access to sites or removal of WMD-related technologies, materials,

or personnel. Security may be necessary to prevent use, proliferation, or looting of WMD

capabilities or to prevent compromising integrity of physical evidence. The requirement

to secure sites is a crucial mission-analysis consideration due to the potentially large force

requirements and the balance of competing JFC priorities. WMD master site lists prioritize

WMD-related sites for deconfliction and integration with other objectives.

(b) Defeat WMD Threats. The joint force neutralizes or destroys extant

WMD to ensure no WMD use. The preponderance of the scope and efforts take place

within WMD defeat activities and the protect organizing principle but, as with every

activity or task, aspects of it may bleed over into the prevention and response organizing

principles. Within the prevent organizing principle, the joint force may defeat an actor of

concern’s ability to develop, acquire, proliferate, or use WMD by neutralizing or

destroying nodes in the WMD network or program. Defeat may take place below the level

of armed conflict and in conflict as either a specialized action or as part of a larger

operation.

1. Destroy Task. The joint force destroys WMD capabilities so they

cannot perform their intended function without being entirely rebuilt. Such actions require

a significant amount of pre-strike planning and authorization prior to execution. Proper

Execution

IV-9

weaponeering and hazard modeling help the JFC employ the proper resources, understand

the potential consequences of execution, and minimize collateral damage. The JFC needs

to consider national and strategic objectives of such an operation or campaign before

deciding to destroy a WMD-related target. This task is also applicable to disabling WMD

threats.

2. Neutralize Task. The joint force utilizes a combination of

capabilities that create lethal and/or nonlethal effects to render actor of concern’s WMD

capabilities ineffective or unusable. Examples include making chemical and biological

agents and materials harmless or making delivery systems unusable. When assigning tasks

to neutralize WMD, commanders specify the actor of concern’s capability or material and

the duration it should be rendered ineffective or unusable. Forces (including specialized

units and equipment) required to neutralize a target vary according to the type and size of

the target and desired effects.

and at-risk components of a WMD program. Critical components are those that pose an

immediate threat to friendly forces, while at-risk components are those components of a

WMD program that are at risk of loss or proliferation. The joint force disables WMD

program components to ensure these items are not used, lost, stolen, or proliferated. If

follow-on activities to complete WMD program dismantlement are required, the joint force

may transfer responsibility to another department or agency for final disposition. The joint

force must establish control of the specified WMD target before disablement can be

conducted.

1. Exploit Task. The joint force seeks to maximize the value of

intelligence gained from personnel, data, information, and materials obtained during

CWMD operations. Processing and exploitation of information, personnel, and/or materiel

found during the conduct of CWMD operations may be conducted at various locations in

conjunction with interagency and international partners, as required, to produce timely,

actionable intelligence.

For further guidance on processing and exploitation, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence,

and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

2. Degrade Task. The joint force seeks to erode an actor of concern’s

ability to develop, proliferate, or use WMD by disrupting functionality of WMD or related

capabilities. Degradation should ensure the actor of concern is not able to threaten friendly

forces for a period of time. Typically destruction and disposal of an actor’s WMD

capability are preferred to degradation, but factors such as time, resources, access, and

security may necessitate only the most critical, at-risk elements be degraded and/or

destroyed.

(d) Dispose of WMD Threats. The joint force conducts and/or supports a

systematic effort to rid an actor of concern of the remnants (e.g., program elements,

facilities, surplus, dual-use capacity, confiscated/seized cargo, equipment, delivery

systems) of a WMD program. Typically, the JFC sets conditions for disposition of an actor

Chapter IV

IV-10 JP 3-40

of concern’s WMD program, but final disposition will probably require a larger USG or

international effort. This may include deliberate technical processes that reduce or

dismantle production methods, materials, stockpiles, and technical infrastructure;

establishment of protocols of reductions and compensation or agreements to return seized

cargo; the redirection of WMD, related technologies, materials, or an actor’s efforts and

expertise towards peaceful productive activities; and monitoring to ensure expertise or

program elements are not re-constituted or reused in any illicit capacity. Appendix B,

“Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations,” addresses treaties,

resolutions, control regimes, activities, and legal considerations, which JFCs account for

and which will shape the planning of operations and campaigns that deal with the WMD

threats or hazards.

1. Reduce Task. The joint force conducts and/or supports efforts to

diminish an actor of concern’s WMD program, improve the security of remaining

capabilities and critical components, reduce costs of sustaining the program elements, and

eliminate excess capacity or capability. Reduction programs and operations, such as

demilitarization of stockpiles, may be led by another USG department or agency, PN, or

international organization. CCMDs should coordinate activities to make certain they are

mutually supporting and do not conflict.

2. Redirect Task. The joint force conducts and/or supports repurposing

facilities, expertise, and material associated with an actor of concern’s WMD program

elements. Redirection of expertise includes retaining personnel with WMD expertise (e.g.,

scientists and engineers) for new, legitimate employment. This is especially acute when

program elements have a dual-use nature. Depending on the OE, the lead for this effort

will most likely have transitioned to another organization or PN. The JFC should be

prepared to provide support as directed.

3. Dismantle Task. The joint force conducts and/or supports the

process by which an actor of concern’s WMD facility, stockpile, or program is

systematically taken apart to a level that it can no longer operate for its intended purpose.

Depending on the operating environment, the lead for this effort may have already

transitioned to another organization or PN. The JFC should be prepared to provide support

as directed. If directed to execute this task, the JFC may require specialized capabilities

and will need to consider possible consequences of execution.

4. Monitor Task. The joint force conducts and/or supports continuous

review and inspection of programs, personnel, and facilities to ensure they are not

producing WMD and remnants of an actor of concern’s WMD program are not being

reconstituted or reused in any illicit capacity. The JFC and DOD will normally be

functioning in support of USG interagency and international partners. Depending on

information requirements, the JFC may conduct intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance, or use other collection methods to support this task. Monitoring treaty

compliance is also addressed in Appendix B, “Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal

Considerations.”

Execution

IV-11

(3) Specialized Activity 3: CBRN Response. CBRN response efforts minimize

the effect of CBRN use to the joint force and other mission-critical personnel. Figure IV-

4 lists the specialized tasks associated with CBRN response: attribute, mitigate, sustain,

and support, and as depicted in the figure, they have the greatest effect on the respond

organizing principle. Actions to manage consequences support US and foreign civil

authorities and their populations by responding to a CBRN incident and mitigating the

hazards and the effects of WMD use. Actions to safeguard the force are completed during

the conduct of other CWMD activities, since those activities may require the force to

operate in an environment contaminated by CBRN hazards or effects of WMD use. When

conducted on a small scale, tasks to safeguard the force may constitute part or all of a crisis

response or limited contingency operation. For major operations and campaigns, which

balance offensive, defensive, and stability operations, this activity supports the joint force’s

defensive and stability actions. Within the construct of such operations, the joint force

needs to be prepared for a variety of WMD situations, such as an inadvertent release,

release due to joint force action, or an actor of concern’s employment of CBRN materials.

For further guidance on DSCA, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

For more information on safeguarding the force and managing consequences, see JP 3-

11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, and JP

3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, respectively.

For further guidance on domestic CBRN response, refer to CJCSI 3125.01, Defense

Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the

Homeland.

Figure IV-4. Respond (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response)

Specialized Tasks

Respond (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response)

Specialized Tasks

Attribute

Mitigate

Support

Sustain

Prevent

Partial Effect

(Secondary)

Greatest Effect

(Preferred)

Marginal Effect

(Tertiary)

Protect

Respond

Organizing

Principles

Specialized

Tasks

Chapter IV

IV-12 JP 3-40

For further guidance on international CBRN response operations, refer to Department of

Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.21, DOD Support to International Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents, and CJCSI 3214.01, Defense Support for

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory.

b. Attribute Task. The joint force conducts and/or supports efforts to determine the

origin of the material or weapon, as well as the actor responsible for a CBRN event. The

process derives forensic conclusions from analysis of collected samples and information

from law enforcement and intelligence sources. Forensic-enabled intelligence collection,

processing, exploitation, and analysis capabilities support the identification of CBRN

sourcing and attribution. Joint forces directly support the attribution process through

intelligence (e.g., site exploitation), sample collection and transfer, and technical analysis.

These forces require training, certification, specialized equipment and expertise, and, in

some cases, the JFC requests unique authorities prior to execution. These forces are

identified early in the planning process. Attribution provides a dissuasion and deterrence

value if properly signaled to actors of concern but as a capability is focused on response

activities.

c. Mitigate Task. The joint force conducts

efforts to lessen the effects of a CBRN

incident or WMD attack. This task focuses on minimizing or negating the vulnerability to,

and effects of, WMD attacks and CBRN incidents. These activities may support civil

authorities and foreign governments.

d. Sustain Task. The joint force conducts logistics and personnel efforts to maintain

and prolong the capability to respond to CBRN incidents. In reference to the joint force,

sustainment is the ability to support operations in a CBRN environment and conduct

recovery/reconstitution operations to regenerate unit combat readiness (e.g., detailed troop

decontamination, detailed equipment decontamination, medical activities, and rest and

relaxation). These activities may also support civil authorities and foreign governments.

e. Support Task. In many scenarios, DOD, and the JFC, will be directed to support

another USG department or agency (e.g., DHS or DOS) in the conduct of operations to

provide assistance to civil authorities when their own capabilities are insufficient to save

lives and maintain essential government services. In the event of a CBRN incident where

the HN does not have the capability to support the local population and DOS does not have

a presence, DOD may be directed by the President or SecDef to lead US operations. The

JFC should be aware of any standing agreement that may provide a means to deliver this

support as required.

A-1

APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. General

a. This appendix identifies the numerous USG organizations that have a role in

CWMD and highlights their various responsibilities, functions, and capabilities. While

this list is extensive, it is not all-inclusive. Conventional forces and SOF regularly conduct

operations and activities that contribute to CWMD efforts, either directly or indirectly.

Additionally, specially trained or designated forces used to conduct strategic deterrence;

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; or counterterrorism (CT) missions also

contribute to CWMD mission success. This appendix highlights organizations with

specific CWMD authorities, responsibilities, or missions. However, when planning or

executing a CWMD operation, a JFC should leverage all of DOD’s and USG’s CWMD

capabilities.

b. Success in CWMD requires a coordinated, whole-of-government effort. DOD

recognizes that DOS is normally the USG lead agency for CWMD operations abroad, and

DOD has a supporting role during shaping activities. To formally coordinate with

interagency partners, CCMDs identify programs and activities of concern to the Joint Staff

(JS) and OSD. Using the National Security System coordination process, OSD facilitates

interaction among CCMDs and interagency partners. CCDRs use established relationships

to coordinate with interagency partners to increase their success in CWMD.

c. When planning or executing CWMD operations and activities, JFCs coordinate and

cooperate with not only other USG departments and agencies but also multinational

partners. With numerous stakeholders in the CWMD mission area, it is critical that unity

of effort is achieved and the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the numerous

organizations are understood by the JFC. JFCs should consider the capabilities and

responsibilities of the organizations in this chapter when determining command

relationships and coordinating interorganizational activities.

2. Department of Defense Organizations, Responsibilities, and Relationships

a. SecDef and the CJCS

(1) OSD. OSD develops, coordinates, and oversees implementation and

integration of DOD CWMD policy. OSD coordinates with interagency partners for the

transition or transfer of responsibility of CWMD operations from the Armed Forces of the

United States to and from other USG departments and agencies, international

organizations, or other nations, as appropriate. OSD coordinates with both DOS and the

JS to obtain international CWMD legal authorities, protocols, standards, and agreements;

multinational support for CWMD operations; and, when required, HN support. They

coordinate with DOS to notify the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

of discoveries or destruction of chemical weapons materials and former production

facilities. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is the international

organization tasked to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Appendix A

A-2 JP 3-40

Production, Stockpiling, and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction [short

title: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)]. They coordinate with the National

Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) to enhance intelligence support regarding WMD

capabilities of all state and non-state actors. OSD coordinates with other USG departments

and agencies in support to the homeland in the conduct of DSCA operations, such as

domestic CBRN response or nuclear forensics. They also coordinate DOD processes and

procedures within the USG National Technical Nuclear Forensics interagency community.

For further information on roles and responsibilities for CWMD, refer to DODD 2060.02,

DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy.

(2) CJCS. The CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to the President,

NSC, and SecDef regarding CWMD activities. The CJCS approves the apportionment of

forces for planning. The CJCS also recommends assignment and allocation of forces to

the SecDef to execute the CWMD mission. The CJCS is designated as the global

integrator. Subject to the CJCS’s authority, direction, and control, the JS coordinates with

the CCMDs and Services to ensure CWMD operations are executed in compliance with

domestic, international, and foreign laws, policies, treaties, and agreements. The JS assists

with interagency support for CWMD operations and assists in planning and exercising

CWMD activities within the interagency process. They also coordinate and provide

intelligence support to the CCDRs for target identification and prioritization. When

required, after SecDef approval, the CJCS will publish appropriate execute orders for

CWMD activities.

For more information on the CJCS role as the global integrator, refer to CJCSI 3050.01,

(U) Implementing Global Integration.

b. CCMDs

(1) General. GCCs plan and execute CWMD missions within their AORs. They

develop CWMD strategy, policies, and campaign and contingency plans for their AORs;

determine CWMD mission shortfalls; identify CWMD mission resourcing requirements;

and incorporate CWMD activities into their operational plans. Functional CCMDs support

GCC CWMD activities as designated in CCPs, functional campaign plans, regional

campaign plans, contingency plans, or as directed by SecDef.

(2) United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

(a) CDRUSSOCOM serves as the DOD CWMD coordinating authority and,

where appropriate, provides mission advocacy to enable CCMD transregional CWMD

campaign activities to counter emerging and existing threats and disrupt WMD capability

development. As coordinating authority, CDRUSSOCOM leads CWMD plans

development; recommends changes in any area of the plan and resourcing, including

changes to strategic prioritization matrix; integrates assessments emphasizing or

deemphasizing areas based on the broader campaign objectives; sets priorities of all tasks

or objectives in the plan; assesses risk and mitigations for all tasks and objectives;

nominates strategic objectives; and develops decision support templates and aligns

Organizational and Command Relationships

A-3

campaign resources to support contingency plans. Additionally, CDRUSSOCOM

performs the following functions:

1. In collaboration with the CCMDs, the Defense Intelligence Agency

(DIA), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), facilitates the development of

strategic-level JIPOE in support of the CWMD mission.

2. In coordination with the CCMDs, JS, DOD agencies, other USG

departments and agencies, and PNs, develops a CWMD assessment and transregional

synchronization process that supports shared understanding of WMD threats, coordinates

DOD campaign activities, and informs priorities and resource decisions.

3. In collaboration with the CCMDs, supports the conduct and

coordination of preparation of the environment/OPE to facilitate GCC campaign activities

to identify, disrupt, or interdict proliferation of illicit WMD material or dual- and multi-

use use technology.

4. In collaboration with DIA, the JS, the CCMDs, and DTRA, creates,

maintains, and manages a CWMD collaboration and dissemination dashboard. This

dashboard is a strategic visualization of DOD CWMD products and portals to support

CDRUSSOCOM’s CWMD coordinating authority. It displays transregional situational

awareness of WMD threats and DOD, interagency, and PN CWMD efforts. The dashboard

enables coordination and collaboration within, and external to, DOD to inform

CDRUSSOCOM, the JS, and SecDef decision making. It also assists CDRUSSOCOM in

executing advocacy, assessment, planning, and recommendation roles.

5. The USSOCOM CWMD Fusion Cell coordinates planning of a DOD

CWMD campaign; integrates intelligence priorities; assesses progress against WMD

networks and pathways; articulates gaps and advocates for capabilities to improve DOD

unity of effort; and supports the execution of CWMD operations, activities, and

investments to disrupt and defeat national, regional, and transregional WMD threats. The

Fusion Cell also provides planning assistance to CCMDs for CWMD-related campaigns,

contingency plans, and exercise activities through regionally aligned, yet transregionally

focused, planning support teams.

(b) USSOCOM has a Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 167,

responsibility to provide specialized forces developed, recruited, selected, trained,

organized, equipped, and capable of carrying out assigned missions, including the conduct

of the military activities and operations to counter WMD as directed in DODD 2062.02,

DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy, and DODD 5100.01,

Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. USSOCOM

synchronizes the planning of special operations and provides SOF to support persistent,

networked, and distributed CCMD operations to deter adversary use of WMD and advance

national interests. USSOCOM provides DOD with unique capabilities: operational reach

as well as agile, scalable, and flexible options for military action across the breadth of

special operations core activities, the competition continuum, and geographic boundaries,

and seams. USSOCOM CWMD capabilities include its ability to provide tailored SOF

Appendix A

A-4 JP 3-40

executing the special operations core activities, C2 for SOF, and planning capabilities for

SOF and DOD CWMD requirements.

(3) United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). Commander,

USNORTHCOM, exercises coordinating authority for planning of DOD efforts in support

of the USG response to pandemic influenza and infectious disease. Both USNORTHCOM

and United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) have specific

responsibilities related to DSCA that may include CBRN response operations to save lives

and minimize suffering.

(4) United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Commander,

USSTRATCOM, leads strategic deterrence planning, in coordination with other CCMDs,

and executes strategic deterrence operations as directed. USSTRATCOM employs tailored

nuclear, global strike, electronic warfare, missile defense, and intelligence capabilities to

deter strategic attack, assure allies, and, as directed, decisively respond if deterrence fails.

(5) United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Commander,

USCYBERCOM, plans and executes global cyberspace operations. USCYBERCOM

employs tailored cyberspace operations missions to deter adversaries, counter the

proliferation of WMDs, shape the OE, and, when required, defeat threats via effects in and

through cyberspace.

(6) United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

Commander, USTRANSCOM, exercises coordinating authority for joint deployment and

distribution enterprise operations and planning. USTRANSCOM provides common-user

and commercial air, land, and sea transportation; terminal management; aerial refueling;

and aero medical evacuation of patients, as required, to support the global deployment,

employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US forces in support of CWMD missions.

When requested by a federal agency and approved by SecDef, USTRANSCOM provides

transportation support to non-DOD organizations, such as movement of critical capabilities

or commodities or evacuation of personnel. The command advocates for policy and

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and

facilities requirements for returning CBRN-contaminated airlift and sealift platforms to

general use. In coordination with the geographic CCMDs, USTRANSCOM ensures

contingency plans address CBRN vulnerabilities of the entire supply chain.

c. Military Departments. The Services serve in the following roles in CWMD:

(1) Organize, train, equip, and otherwise prepare military forces to conduct

missions to counter WMD and their means of delivery in support of the JFC.

(2) Contribute to shaping an international environment hostile to proliferation

and strengthening deterrence through building partners’ CWMD-related capabilities and

capacities.

(3) Coordinate CWMD capability needs with the CJCS and advocate for military

capabilities to counter WMD.

Organizational and Command Relationships

A-5

(4) Maintain and expand CWMD technical expertise.

(5) Provide subject matter expertise to support CCMD requirements in the

CWMD mission area, as directed.

d. Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB). The CNGB formulates, develops, and

coordinates all policies, programs, and plans affecting CWMD assets within the National

Guard (NG). The CNGB synchronizes the alert and deployment of the NG CBRN response

enterprise with the state adjutant general via their National Guard joint force headquarters

state (NG JFHQ-State) and Commander, USNORTHCOM, for major or catastrophic

CBRN incidents within the US and its territories to support civil authorities in response to

CBRN incidents in order to save lives and minimize human suffering. NG CBRN

enterprise assets consist of military first responders comprised of WMD-civil support

teams; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives enhanced

response force packages; and homeland response forces.

For more information on DOD CBRN Response Enterprise assets, see JP 3-41, Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

e. CSAs

(1) DIA. The DIA Office of Science and Technology applies CWMD technical

expertise, scientific methods, and technical tradecraft across the full range of intelligence

operations in support of global technical collection, exploitation, and operations. The DIA

also develops a deep understanding of the following specialties: research and development,

technical collections, technical exploitation, and technical operations.

(2) DTRA. DTRA enables DOD, the USG, and international partners to counter

and deter WMD and improvised threat networks. Implied in this mission statement is the

strategic imperative to enable a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrence. Specific

DTRA capabilities and functions supporting the CCMDs include the following:

(a) In coordination with USSOCOM, provides planning to support CCMDs

for CWMD-related plans. Specifically, provides CWMD support to CCMDs with respect

to global, regional, and functional campaign, contingency, and component-level planning.

(b) Manages and oversees research, development, test, and evaluation to

counter the threat and use of WMD and assist in the development and integration of

capabilities to support DOD CWMD efforts and activities.

the technical hub for the National Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Technical

Reachback Enterprise. The National Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Technical

Reachback Enterprise provides planning, execution, and battle damage assessment for

military operations on WMD, CBRN, and toxic industrial chemical/toxic industrial

material facilities and events, including hard and deeply buried targets, collateral damage

estimation, and collateral effect analyses. The National Countering Weapons of Mass

Appendix A

A-6 JP 3-40

Destruction Technical Reachback Enterprise also provides federal and civil authorities’

hazard assessment and response assistance and foreign CCMD response assistance.

(d) In coordination with CCMDs, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,

and the JS, and under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition and Sustainment, implements the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),

CTR, International Counterproliferation Program, and CBRN Preparedness Program to

build partnership capacity in coordination with CCMDs.

(e) Conducts arms-control treaty monitoring and on-site inspections in

support of DOD’s role in the verification of, and compliance with, WMD treaties and

agreements.

(f) Plans support to GCCs in identifying and prioritizing opportunities to

reduce or secure vulnerable nuclear weapons and chemical biological warfare stockpiles;

delivery systems; and materials of concern, including NTAs.

(g) Provides tactical radiological and nuclear search operations expertise and

equipment for overt and low-visibility search, spanning from a recovery or recapture of a

lost or stolen US weapon or interdiction of nuclear materials of concern. Also, conducts

field confirmatory analysis and characterization of CBRN materials of concern and

advises, trains, equips, assists, and provides exercise support to designated CCMD forces.

(3) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NGA is a unique

combination of intelligence agency and CSA. It provides timely, relevant, accurate, and

actionable geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). The NGA serves an important role in

GEOINT support to CWMD activities.

3. United States Government Organizations, Responsibilities, and Relationships

a. General. CWMD requires unity of effort, which results in a coordinated response

of combined capabilities of the USG. Coordination between DOD and other USG

departments and agencies is critical to the success of CWMD operations against the global

WMD threat. Short of war, these CWMD efforts are normally led by a department or

agency other than DOD. In many cases, the JFC will be supporting another USG

department or agency and that organization may be supporting a PN or international

organization. SecDef is a statutory member of the NSC, while the CJCS serves in the role

of principal military advisor. The NSC Staff oversees lines of communications between

USG departments and agencies involved in CWMD activities to facilitate unity of effort.

This is intended to leverage all instruments of national power. The Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy and JS facilitate coordination between CCMDs and interagency partners

to meet defense planning requirements. Additionally, where appropriate, coordination

with interagency partners also occurs through a combination of military representatives to

country teams, geographic CCMDs’ joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs) or

similar elements, and established joint interagency task forces.

b. The majority of interagency CWMD programs and contributions occur as shaping

activities, which include ongoing operations and activities such as SC. Since there are a

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number of different organizations within the USG that contribute to CWMD, it is important

to develop some level of mutual awareness of their roles and capabilities to identify

potential areas for cooperation. USG departments and agencies, and their CWMD-related

functions, are summarized in the following paragraphs.

(1) Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

(a) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC is the primary

organization in the USG that integrates and analyzes intelligence pertaining to terrorism

and CT, including all intelligence related to terrorist use of WMD. The NCTC collocates

intelligence, military, law enforcement, and homeland security networks to facilitate

information sharing across USG departments and agencies. In addition to its information

sharing role, the NCTC provides an interagency planning function for CT activities and is

responsible for integrating all instruments of national power toward successful

implementation of the national CT strategy.

(b) NCPC. The NCPC works with the intelligence community to identify

critical gaps in WMD knowledge resulting from shortfalls in collection, analysis, or

exploitation and then develops solutions to reduce or close these gaps. The NCPC does

this by analyzing, integrating, and disseminating comprehensive, all-source WMD

proliferation intelligence; providing all-source intelligence support needed for the

execution of CP plans or activities; and performing independent WMD proliferation

analysis. It may also play a role in the nuclear attribution process by fusing law

enforcement and intelligence information with nuclear forensics conclusions provided by

national technical nuclear forensics center. The majority of the NCPC staff are detailed

from the intelligence community, as well as DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE)

national laboratories.

(2) DOS. DOS plays a crucial role in the overall USG effort to counter WMD.

DOS aims to build international consensus on arms control and nonproliferation based on

common concern and shared responsibility. The Under Secretary for Arms Control and

International Security leads interagency policy development on nonproliferation and

manages global US security policy, principally in the areas of nonproliferation, arms

control, regional security and defense relations, and arms transfers and security assistance.

Other specific responsibilities include directing and coordinating export control policies

and policies to prevent missile, nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons

proliferation. DOS CWMD responsibilities are primarily planned and executed via the

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC); the Bureau of International

Security and Nonproliferation (ISN); and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), all

of which report to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security.

(a) AVC. The AVC core missions concern arms control, verification, and

compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements

or commitments. The AVC advances national and international security through the

negotiation and implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements involving

WMD and their means of delivery. As the principal policy community representative to

the intelligence community, The AVC ensures US intelligence capabilities are effectively

Appendix A

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acquired, maintained, and enhanced to collect, analyze, and disseminate precise and timely

information bearing upon matters of verification and compliance. These verification and

compliance reviews concern the nature and status of foreign governments’ WMD and

delivery system programs. The AVC also provides, through its Nuclear Risk Reduction

Center, information technology support and secure government-to-government

communications linkages with treaty partners.

(b) ISN. The ISN manages a broad range of US nonproliferation policies,

programs, agreements, and initiatives. The ISN leads DOS’s efforts to prevent the spread

of WMD—whether chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear—and their delivery

systems.

security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense

trade. The PM also facilitates coordination of CWMD efforts between DOS and DOD.

(d) International Security Advisory Board. The International Security

Advisory Board provides DOS with independent insight and advice on all aspects of arms

control, disarmament, international security, CWMD, and related aspects of public

diplomacy.

(3) DHS. DHS protects the US against threats to the homeland. The National

Response Framework, prepared by DHS, provides information on how USG departments

and agencies should work together to prepare for and respond to WMD events. The global

nuclear detection architecture is a framework for detecting (through technical and

nontechnical means), analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials

that are out of regulatory control. DHS agencies, along with the Department of Justice

(DOJ) through the FBI, DOE, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of

Commerce (DOC), DOD, and the intelligence community, play a vital role in supporting

national CWMD efforts. Agencies within DHS that contribute to the CWMD mission

include:

(a) USCG. The USCG may play an integral role in WMD interdiction

operations by protecting US economic and security interests in maritime regions, including

international waters, US coastal regions, ports, and waterways. Additionally, the USCG’s

Title 14, USC, authorities allow them to perform law enforcement operations that DOD

forces are precluded from performing under the Posse Comitatus Act. USCG personnel

can be used to enforce all applicable US laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters

subject to US jurisdiction and retain their Title 14, USC, authority, when participating in

interdiction operations led by DOD while under DOD C2. Area commanders should

clearly lay out roles and responsibilities for USCG personnel prior to interdiction

operations.

(b) Customs and Border Protection (CBP). To prevent WMD smuggling,

CBP works through existing partnerships with customs and law enforcement agencies in

PNs to protect US borders and ports of entry and screen admissibility of persons, cargo,

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and vessels arriving into US ports. CBP also supports a National Targeting Center and

operates the Container Security Initiative with DOE.

by terrorists or other threat actors to carry out an attack against the US or its interests using

a WMD. The CWMD Office is a support component within DHS formed by consolidating

primarily the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and a majority of the Office of

Health Affairs, as well as other DHS elements. The goals of the CWMD Office are to

enhance the nation’s abilities to prevent terrorists and other threat actors from using WMD,

support operational partners in closing capability gaps along adversary pathways, and

invest in and develop innovative technologies to meet partner requirements and improve

operations. DNDO improves the nation’s ability to detect and report transportation of

nuclear or radiological material. Additionally, DNDO operates the National Technical

Nuclear Forensics Center, which has two primary missions. The first provides centralized

planning, integration, assessment, and stewardship of the nation’s nuclear forensics

capabilities to ensure a ready, robust, and enduring capability in coordination with other

USG departments and agencies who have assigned responsibilities for national technical

nuclear forensics. These include DOJ/FBI, who is the lead federal agency responsible for

the criminal investigation of terrorist events and the nuclear forensic investigation of

planned or actual attack; DOD; DOE; DOS; ODNI; and DHS. The second mission is to

advance the capability to perform nuclear forensics on nuclear and radiological materials

in a pre-detonation (intact) state.

(d) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA provides

support to our nation’s critical infrastructure in response to CBRN hazards through

comprehensive emergency management programs, including risk reduction, preparedness,

response, and recovery.

(e) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). One of ICE’s highest

priorities is to prevent illicit procurement networks, terrorist groups, and hostile nations

from illegally obtaining US military products; sensitive, dual-use technology; WMD; or

CBRN materials. The ICE homeland security investigation’s CP investigations program

oversees a broad range of investigative activities related to such violations. The CP

investigations program enforces US laws involving the export of military items and

controlled, dual-use goods, firearms, and ammunition, as well as exports to sanctioned or

embargoed nations.

(4) DOJ. The Attorney General has lead authority to investigate and prosecute

federal crimes, which includes the use or attempted use of WMD and the export or re-

export of strategic commodities and dual-use goods, software, or technologies. Much of

this investigation authority has been delegated to the FBI.

(a) FBI. The FBI is the lead federal agency for investigating WMD crimes.

It focuses its WMD-related activities to prevent the illicit acquisition of WMD and identify

and disrupt their attempted use. The preemptive focus of these efforts requires the FBI to

use its investigative and analytical capabilities to identify potential WMD suspects, targets,

and threats before an attack occurs. FBI WMD investigation and prevention efforts are

Appendix A

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managed by the WMD Directorate within its National Security Branch. Comprising

primarily special agents, intelligence analysts, and program managers, the WMD

Directorate develops training for employees of the FBI; interagency partners; state and

local law enforcement organizations; and public health, industry, and academia partners.

The WMD Directorate also provides national-level WMD intelligence support to FBI field

divisions and to the larger intelligence community. At the local level, each field division

has a special agent who serves as the WMD coordinator responsible for coordinating the

FBI’s WMD-related activities.

(b) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA utilizes unique

capabilities with counterparts in the international law enforcement community and PNs to

locate, track, apprehend, and seize personnel, assets, and resources used to smuggle WMD.

(5) United States Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID’s

work advances US national security and economic prosperity, demonstrates American

generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience. USAID may

support a USG response to a CBRN incident in a foreign nation.

(6) Department of the Treasury. The Department of the Treasury is the primary

USG department responsible for economic and financial security of the US. It works with

USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, and international financial

institutions in support of national strategies to counter WMD proliferation; safeguards US

financial systems; and supports DOS programs to train and equip PNs customs agents.

(7) DOC. DOC develops and administers federal policy and programs affecting

the industrial and commercial segments of the national economy. DOC formulates US

export control policy to prevent WMD proliferation and control sensitive, dual-use

technology transfers.

(8) Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS protects the

health and safety of all Americans and provides essential human services. The key

CWMD-related organizations within DHHS are the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC), the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), and

the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

(a) CDC. The CDC provides a system of health surveillance to monitor and

prevent disease outbreaks (including bioterrorism), implements disease prevention

strategies, prevents and controls infectious and chronic diseases, and maintains national

health statistics. The CDC also provides for immunization services, environmental disease

prevention, and essential human services, including medical preparedness. The CDC exists

to fight disease, whether naturally occurring or due to accidental release or deliberate

attack.

(b) ATSDR. The ATSDR protects people from environmental hazards by

responding to natural and man-made disasters, working with communities in crisis from

environmental threats, supporting state and city public health programs to reduce or

eliminate hazardous substances in communities, and to reduce exposure to hazardous

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substances. The ATSDR conducts epidemiological health studies in communities across

the country, maintains nationwide exposure and disease registries, and collects data from

chemical release incidents to support emergency response and prevention decisions.

with the development of policies and regulations concerning dual-use research and

facilities. This is primarily done by the NIH’s Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA)

and the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). The NIH’s OBA

promotes science, safety, and ethics in biotechnology through the Dual-Use Research

Program, development of public policies, and the convening of the NSABB. The NSABB

is a federal advisory committee chartered to provide advice, guidance, and leadership

regarding biosecurity oversight of dual-use research, (i.e., biological research with

legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biological threat to public health

and/or national security).

(9) Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT establishes national

transportation policy. Its federal administration includes highways; urban mass transit;

railroads; aviation; and the safety of waterways, ports, highways, and oil and gas pipelines.

(10) DOE. DOE contributes to the future of the nation by ensuring energy

security; producing and maintaining the nation’s nuclear stockpile; promoting nuclear

nonproliferation; providing specialized nuclear and radiological emergency response;

assisting nuclear and radiological CT and CP efforts; and fostering fundamental science,

advanced computing, and technological innovation.

(a) DOE Watch. The Forrestal Watch Office provides the 24-hour single

point of contact for collecting, processing, and disseminating time-sensitive emergency

notifications. It performs initial notifications and coordinates management, logistics, and

mobilization actions during periods of national emergencies, natural and man-made

disasters, acts of terrorism, or other extraordinary situations requiring centralized

management notification and response.

(b) Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The Office of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence provides policy makers and the intelligence

community with scientifically based and technically sound intelligence analysis in the areas

of foreign nuclear programs, proliferation of nuclear materials to state and non-state actors,

nuclear and energy security, and emerging science and technology.

semi-autonomous agency within DOE responsible for the management and security of the

nation’s nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also

responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the US and abroad. NNSA’s program

support is divided into several key program areas, including defense, nuclear

nonproliferation, naval reactors, emergency operations, infrastructure and environment,

nuclear security, management and administration, and the Office of the Administrator.

Each program area is focused on specific challenges:

Appendix A

A-12 JP 3-40

1. Defense Programs. One of the primary missions of the NNSA is to

maintain and enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear weapons

stockpile. The NNSA, through its Office of Defense Programs, ensures the US nuclear

arsenal meets national security requirements and continues to serve as a deterrent. In

partnership with DOD, NNSA’s defense programs provide the research, development,

secure transportation, and production activities necessary to support the US nuclear

weapons stockpile.

2. Nonproliferation. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

works closely with a wide range of international partners, key USG departments and

agencies, the US national laboratories, and the private sector to detect, secure, and dispose

of dangerous nuclear and radiological material and related WMD technology and expertise.

3. Emergency Response. The Office of Emergency Operations is the

USG’s primary capability for radiological and nuclear emergency response and for

providing security to the nation from the threat of nuclear terrorism. The Office of

Emergency Operations maintains a high level of readiness for protecting and serving the

US and its allies through the development, implementation, and coordination of programs

and systems designed to serve as a last line of defense in the event of a nuclear terrorist

incident or other types of radiological accident. This readiness level provides the USG

with quickly deployable, dedicated resources capable of responding rapidly and

comprehensively to nuclear or radiological incidents worldwide.

4. Nuclear Security. The Office of Defense Nuclear Security develops

and implements the security programs for the NNSA. In this capacity, Defense Nuclear

Security is the NNSA line management organization responsible for security direction and

program management with respect to prioritization of resources, program evaluation, and

funding allocation. Key management areas include security operations, resources,

engineering, and technical support to NNSA field elements and facilities.

5. CT and CP. The Office of Counterterrorism and

Counterproliferation provides expertise, practical tools, and technically informed policy

recommendations required to advance US nuclear CT and CP objectives. The office

executes a unique program of work focused solely on these missions, synchronizing their

support activities across the NNSA, coordinating DOE/NNSA-related policies, and

building partnerships with USG departments and agencies and key foreign governments

on these issues.

(11) Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

regulates all US use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate

protection of public health and safety, to promote the common defense and security, and

to protect the environment.

4. Command Relationships

a. General. CWMD operations can be global, transregional, or regional in scope.

The environment in which actors of concern and associated proliferation networks operate,

Organizational and Command Relationships

A-13

rather than geographic boundaries, defines the operational area. Operations against the

same actor may occur in several geographic AORs simultaneously. CWMD operations

that occur in more than one AOR will be coordinated between responsible CCDRs with

specific command relationships established by SecDef tasking orders or CCMD plans and

operation orders.

b. C2

(1) Day-to-Day Operations. Many critical CWMD operations and activities are

conducted during periods of normal day-to-day operations. These CWMD operations and

activities should be included in regional plans and supporting plans and integrated into

CCMD contingency plans for execution. The day-to-day integration of these activities

across the three CWMD lines of effort described in the Strategy for Countering Weapons

of Mass Destruction is an important part of CWMD. These efforts help shape an

environment that prevents an actor from obtaining or successfully employing WMD and

may prevent the necessity of responding to a WMD attack. C2 of day-to-day operations is

per existing CCMD C2 relationships established by the CCDR and commanders of

subordinate commands and forces.

(2) Contingency Operations. C2 arrangements for CWMD operations are

tailored for the requirements of each contingency and are determined by the supported

commander. The size and scope, as well as preplanned integration, of CWMD operations

determine the requirements for specific CWMD C2 functions. Small-scale or less complex

CWMD operations may not require formation of a separate C2 structure. A CCMD’s

preexisting command structure, with limited staff and technical augmentation, may suffice.

Increasing CWMD expertise within an existing standing joint force or component

headquarters (HQ) increases the unit’s capacity to address WMD aspects of the mission.

For a large-scale or more complex effort, CWMD operations may require formation of a

functional joint task force (JTF) for CWMD operations. The following discussion applies

to situations requiring additional CWMD emphasis, such as staff augmentation or

formation of a functional JTF.

(3) Functional JTF Considerations. SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified

commander, or an existing JTF commander can serve as the establishing authority for a

JTF to execute a specific CWMD mission or when CWMD operations require joint

resources on a significant scale.

(a) Subordinate Commands and Forces. Forces conducting CWMD

operations may be a combination of conventional forces and SOF, support organizations

from the Services, or CSAs, augmented by other USG departments and agencies or non-

US personnel.

(b) C2 Relationships. The JTF establishing authority also establishes the

command relationships between the JTF and other subordinate commands. Other specific

C2 relationships within the JTF are determined by the supported commander based on

mission requirements. Notional C2 relationships for a functional CWMD JTF include

establishing a separate JTF at the CCMD level, with the JTF commander reporting directly

Appendix A

A-14 JP 3-40

to the CCDR; establishing the CWMD JTF under an existing JTF; or establishing a CWMD

task force under a component commander.

functional and technical experts; be augmented by non-DOD personnel, as required; and

have real-time reachback to national-level technical experts. When formed, a CWMD JTF

HQ may draw personnel from portions of an existing standing joint force or subordinate

component; CWMD subject matter experts from other CCMDs; and/or the Services and

specialized joint activities, including a CSA such as DTRA.

(4) JTF HQ. At a minimum, and as required by the supported commander to

conduct a specific CWMD operation, the functional JTF HQ should be able to:

(a) Conduct the assigned CWMD mission and C2; coordinate operations of

assigned forces.

(b) Coordinate with US forces, other USG departments and agencies, foreign

governments, international organizations, and HNs.

operations.

(d) Coordinate CWMD planning activities with other commands.

(e) Plan for JTF deployment, employment, and redeployment.

(f) Plan for transfer of responsibility of CWMD operations to or from the

CCDR and from or to other USG departments and agencies, international organizations,

and HNs, as appropriate.

(g) Plan to minimize or mitigate potential CWMD collateral effects.

(h) Maintain situational awareness of CWMD activities and operations, both

friendly and actors of concern.

(i) Recommend prioritization of CWMD resources and forces.

(j) Integrate into the supported CCMD’s C2 and coordination processes (e.g.,

joint targeting coordination board).

(5) JTF Staff Organization. When providing C2 directly for a small-scale

CWMD operation or overseeing a functional JTF for a large-scale CWMD operation, JFCs

should consider augmenting their staffs with CWMD expertise. This augmentation may

be from a Service component, a standing joint force HQ, subject matter experts resident at

the CCMD, a CSA, or individual augmentation. JFCs may require the following cross-

functional staff organizations to manage CWMD processes and tasks:

Organizational and Command Relationships

A-15

(a) CWMD Cell. A CWMD cell is formed to manage CWMD processes,

capabilities, and activities within a JFC’s HQ. The CWMD cell provides the JFC with

specialized, technical, subject matter expertise to support CWMD operations. The CWMD

cell collaborates with interagency and multinational partners as required, to develop

CWMD situational awareness and support the planning, coordination, and synchronization

of operations.

(b) CWMD Working Group. A CWMD working group is an enduring or

ad hoc organization within a CCMD HQ or JFC’s HQ focused on CWMD activities to

provide analysis to the commander. The working group consists of a core functional group,

such as CWMD cell members and other staff and component representatives, as required.

5. Interagency Coordination and Interorganizational Cooperation

a. Domestic. Domestic CWMD operations involve complex command relationships;

in most cases, DOD will act in a supporting role to another USG department or agency. In

conducting DSCA, to include CBRN response, a distinction is made between the different

chains of command for active DOD; Title 10, USC; federal forces providing support to

civil authorities; and for NG forces commanded by the state governor under Title 32, USC,

and state active duty. State and local governments are closest to those affected by incidents

and have a lead role in response and recovery. For a federal response to a CBRN incident,

DOD support is tailored to the scope and magnitude of the incident. DOD assets are

employed with a focus on response requirements beyond the resources of state and federal

civil authorities. A dual-status commander may be appointed to C2 both federal military

and state NG forces. The dual-status commander is supported by separate federal and state

NG chains of command and can be employed for DSCA events, including CBRN response.

USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM are the DOD-designated planning agent and the

supported commander for DSCA missions in their respective AORs.

For further guidance on C2 relationships, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters;

for further information, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

b. Interorganizational Cooperation. DOD will liaise and coordinate with other

agencies and civilian authorities. Interorganizational cooperation is a continuous process

that should be established and emphasized during planning, prior to the execution of

CWMD operations and activities. Coordination takes place at the strategic, operational,

and tactical levels. Whether coordination is conducted through the CCDR’s JIACG or

other means, such as an interagency planning cell or group at the CCMD or JTF levels, the

importance of interorganizational cooperation in the planning process cannot be overstated.

c. State and Local Coordination. In the case of a domestic CBRN incident, DOD

should determine what specialized national, international, or local assets are responding to

the incident. The CNGB facilitates the use of Air National Guard (ANG) and Army

National Guard (ARNG) forces and assets through the state adjutants general to conduct

CBRN response operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities in responding

to a domestic CBRN event. When directed by SecDef, the CNGB supports transition of

state active duty or Title 32, USC, NG forces to federalized Title 10, USC, status for DSCA

Appendix A

A-16 JP 3-40

in coordination with individual states and the ANG and ARNG. At the state level, the NG

JFHQ-State will coordinate with state and local authorities to ensure the NG efforts are

synchronized with civil authorities. Once deployed to a supported state, the NG CBRN

response enterprise, (WMD-civil support team, CBRN and high-yield explosive enhanced

response force packages, and homeland response forces) will be controlled through the NG

JFHQ-State or, if designated, a dual-status commander. After the state has requested

federal assistance, the defense coordination officer will coordinate for the use of all Title

10, USC, portions of the CBRN response enterprise and conventional forces after a

validated request for assistance is approved by DOD. These processes should be practiced

during training events and exercises.

For further guidance on interorganizational cooperation, refer to JP 3-08,

Interorganizational Cooperation. For further guidance on CBRN response, refer to JP 3-

41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response. For further guidance on

dual-status command, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. For further

information on National Guard domestic operations, see Chief, National Guard Bureau

Instruction 3000.24, National Guard Bureau Domestic Operations, and Chief, National

Guard Bureau Manual 3510.25, National Guard Homeland Response Force and Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force

Package Procedures.

6. Multinational and Security Cooperation

a. Participation by multinational partners is critical to the successful prosecution of

CWMD efforts. DOD, in cooperation with multinational partners, plays a critical role in

building new coalitions, mechanisms, and international norms to counter actors of concern

that pose a threat of developing, acquiring, proliferating, or employing WMD, related

expertise, technologies, and materials. CCMDs are encouraged to conduct military-to-

military exchanges in areas such as tactics, techniques, and procedures; intelligence; and

technology.

b. US military operations are routinely conducted with forces of other nations within

the structure of an alliance or coalition. An adversary may employ CBRN weapons against

non-US forces, especially those with little or no defense against these weapons, in an effort

to weaken, divide, or destroy the multinational effort. When conducting combat

operations, the JFC should consider the capabilities and limitations of all available forces

to maximize their contributions and minimize their vulnerabilities. Peacetime activities

with multinational partners, particularly multinational and interagency training and

planning exercises focused on building their CWMD capabilities, provide means of

preparing for multinational combat operations in CBRN environments.

c. With very few exceptions, multinational operations will involve the use of HN

sovereign airspace and territory, bases or civilian airports, facilities, and personnel

(including non-USG and contracted civilian workers supporting US and multinational

forces). For CCDR campaign and contingency plans, HN considerations, including CBRN

defense, are the subject of significant peacetime planning in which operational, legal,

contractual, and personnel issues are addressed. CCDR coordination of HN support

Organizational and Command Relationships

A-17

activities will involve a number of interagency partners, as well as the US country team.

Particular emphasis is placed on early warning and detection; actions to prepare US and

indigenous military forces; and protection of threatened civilian populations, essential

infrastructures, and facilities. The CCDR should coordinate the development and

implementation of plans and exercises that are aligned with HN agreements for providing

assistance in the event of a CBRN incident, especially where those agreements may affect

US military response.

d. SC. SC encompasses US activities with foreign security establishments to build

relationships and develop friendly military capabilities to achieve US CWMD objectives.

SC activities can include, among other things, military-to-military contacts, exchanges,

security force assistance to develop foreign security force capability and capacity,

education, exercises, operational support, and defense institution building. DOD CWMD

SC activities should seek to improve PN capabilities and capacity to achieve the following:

(1) Develop SC initiatives to maintain and enhance situational awareness of

proliferation pathways and indicators of potential use.

(2) Develop SC initiatives to disrupt proliferation pathways and use.

(3) Develop prioritized SC initiatives that enable PNs to respond safely and

effectively to CBRN events.

For further guidance on SC, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

Appendix A

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Intentionally Blank

B-1

APPENDIX B

TREATIES, RESOLUTIONS, ACTIVITIES, AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. General

This appendix provides a reference for staff officers assigned to CCMDs, JTFs, or

other major staff and operational elements responsible for CWMD planning and execution.

It addresses treaties, resolutions, control regimes, activities, and legal considerations which

JFCs account for and which will shape the planning of operations and campaigns that deal

with the WMD threats or hazards.

2. Treaties and Control Regimes

a. Overview. Treaties and control regimes are two tools that are used to implement

the NSS. They establish global norms against the proliferation of WMD precursors, dual-

use goods, weapons, and their means of delivery. Both provide international standards to

gauge and address the activities of potential proliferators. Joint forces will comply with

treaties to which the US is a party and may support building cooperation and arms control

and treaty monitoring activities. Several of the cornerstone treaties regarding WMD are

listed within this appendix. Joint forces also need to be aware of those treaties that the US

is not party to but may pose constraints or restraints, such as nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(See http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/ for text of treaties.)

b. Nuclear Policies and Agreements. The US has historically used two methods to

counter the threat and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The first is its overt strategic

deterrence policy laid out in the current Nuclear Posture Review. The second is its

nonproliferation policy, which is implemented through a network of formal arms control

treaties and agreements such as CTR programs and informal agreements like the PSI.

While the US is not party to all of these policies and agreements, and some are nonbinding,

they can affect joint force actions and the JFC should account for them. Significant

nuclear-related treaties, policies, and agreements include the START [New Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty], the NPT, nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-

Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), various

United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) sanctions, and the Nuclear Suppliers

Group control lists. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile

Defense and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for CWMD represents DOD

interests on these and other CP and nonproliferation policy issues.

(1) The NPT. The NPT is the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the

spread of nuclear weapons, as it prohibits non-nuclear-weapon state party from receiving,

manufacturing, and acquiring nuclear weapons and a nuclear-weapon state party from

transferring nuclear weapons, related materials, and technology. DOD supports US efforts

to promote full compliance by all parties to the treaty. In becoming party to the NPT,

nonnuclear weapon states pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a pledge

by the nuclear weapon states (US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) not to

assist the development of nuclear weapons by any nonnuclear weapon states and to

facilitate “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and

Appendix B

B-2 JP 3-40

technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” The nuclear weapon

states, defined as any state that tested a nuclear explosive before 1967, also agree to “pursue

negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms

race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” The NPT does not prohibit US

movement of nuclear WMD, devices, and/or associated materials to final disposition sites

in the US or another country authorized to store nuclear material.

(2) Nuclear Test Ban Treaties. Efforts to curtail nuclear weapon tests have been

made since the 1940s. Previous treaties have restricted nuclear testing as follows: the 1963

Limited Test Ban Treaty barred explosions in the atmosphere, in space, and under water;

the 1974 US-USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] Threshold Test Ban Treaty

banned underground nuclear weapons tests having an explosive force of more than 150

kilotons; and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed in 1976, extended the 150-

kiloton limit to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. While the CTBT was opened for

signature in 1996, it has not entered into force, leaving a ban on nuclear testing as the oldest

item on the arms control agenda—the CTBT would ban all nuclear explosions.

(3) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. Several regions of the world have treaties in

force between the states in those regions that ban those states from developing, possessing,

and using nuclear weapons, known as nuclear-weapon-free zones, including Latin America

(Treaty of Tlatelolco), Central Asia (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central

Asia), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), and Southeast

Asia (Treaty of Bangkok). The US is party to the protocols for the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

which obligates the US not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states in

Latin American that are parties to Treaty of Tlatelolco.

c. Chemical Policies and Agreements

(1) Policies. DOD has developed an array of policy and implementation

guidance to ensure adherence to treaties, control regimes, and to forward global norms.

They ensure efforts to demilitarize stockpile weapons, current research, and development

of defensive measures are conducted in a manner that ensures safety and adherence to state

and national regulations and international obligations.

(2) CWC. The CWC seeks to eliminate, under international verification, an

entire category of WMD. The US is a party to this multilateral treaty, which prohibits the

development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, except for limited

research, development, test, and evaluation, and requires the destruction of existing

stockpiles and former chemical weapons production facilities under international

verification. Each signatory is allowed to operate one single small-scale facility to produce

small quantities of Schedule 1 toxic chemicals (i.e., chemical agents) for use in research

and development of defensive measures and for any other purpose not prohibited by the

CWC, and one additional facility to produce Schedule 1 toxic chemicals in even smaller

quantities for protective purposes only. The Army’s Combat Capabilities Development

Command Chemical Biological Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, operates

the single small-scale facility; and the Army's Chemical Defense Training Facility

Laboratory at the US Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear School at Fort

Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations

B-3

Leonard Wood, Missouri, operates the protective purpose facility. The CWC is

internationally implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

which verifies compliance with the treaty. The CWC, coupled with the activities of the

Australia Group, strives to limit transfer of dual-use technology that could be used to make

chemical weapons to states that are not states parties to the CWC. The CWC seeks to

eliminate, under OPCW [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons]

verification, an entire category of WMD.

(3) The Australia Group. The Australia Group is an international organization

that aims to minimize the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon proliferation

and terrorism. Members commit to implementing effective export controls for items on

the Australia Group common control list and to provide adequate licensing and

enforcement. Participants meet annually to maintain the currency of the control list,

exchange information on proliferation threats, and explore best practices for export

controls and customs enforcement. Candidates for membership must be a manufacturer,

exporter, or trans-shipper of Australia Group controlled items; meet the group’s stated

nonproliferation credentials; and demonstrate a willingness to implement the regime’s

control guidelines and are admitted by a consensus decision.

d. Biological Policies and Agreements

(1) The National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats provides the basis

for US policy on countering biological threats. It is a presidential document with the

overarching goal to protect against the misuse of the life sciences to develop or use

biological agents to cause harm. The National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats

identifies biological threat challenges; strategic objectives; and the roles and

responsibilities of the federal, state, and local governments; the private sector; individuals

and families; and international partners. Additionally, the National Strategy for

Biosurveillance emphasizes information sharing among USG departments and agencies to

identify biological threats. The National Biodefense Strategy is a USG coordinated effort

to protect the US and its citizens from biological threats.

(2) Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences. The dual-use research of concern

(DURC) policy establishes regular review of USG-funded research with certain high-

consequence pathogens and toxins with the potential to be deliberately misused. The

DURC policy is designed to mitigate risks and collect information for the oversight of

agents and toxins with the most significant potential for mass casualties or devastating

effects to the economy, critical infrastructure, or public confidence. The aim of the DURC

policy is to preserve the benefits of life sciences research and minimize the risk of misuse

of knowledge, information, products, or technologies provided by such research. The

DURC policy focuses on 14 pathogens and one toxin regulated by DHHS and US

Department of Agriculture Select Agent Program due to their potential to pose a severe

threat to human, animal, or plant health or to animal and plant products. The responsibility

for maintaining this policy falls to OBA, under the Office of Science Policy within NIH,

DHHS. The NSABB and the DURC policy help to align interagency partners’ situational

awareness of biological agents with the potential to be used as WMD.

Appendix B

B-4 JP 3-40

(3) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

[short title: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)]. The BTWC established

the first multilateral treaty banning the development, production, or stockpiling of an entire

category of weapons. The BTWC prohibits parties from developing, producing, and

stockpiling biological agents and toxins in types and quantities that have no justification

for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. The BTWC does not prohibit the

biological agents or toxins themselves but rather certain purposes for which they may be

employed. Unlike the CWC, the BTWC does not contain a verification regime to ensure

signatories are complying with their obligations. To increase compliance and transparency,

State Parties agreed to the voluntary exchange of confidence-building measures “to prevent

or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts, and suspicions and in order to improve

international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities.” The confidence-

building measures consist of six measures, including exchange of data on research centers

and laboratories; national biological defense research and development programs and

outbreak of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins; encouragement

of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge; declaration of legislation,

regulations, and other measures; declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive

biological research; and development programs and declaration of vaccine production

facilities.

3. United Nations Security Council Resolutions

a. Overview. UNSCRs 1540, 1673, and 1810 require member states to “detect, deter,

prevent, and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the

illicit trafficking and brokering” of WMD and delivery systems to non-state actors.

Additional related UNSCRs apply to North Korea and Iran. It is important to understand

that UNSCRs are not US law, but the US has an international obligation under the United

Nations (UN) Charter to comply with them. The US must approve legislation, executive

orders, or regulations which support UNSCRs goals or use existing authorities that support

UNSCR enforcement in their current form.

b. UNSCR 1540. UNSCR 1540 requires member states to “criminalize proliferation,

enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.” It also

requires states to enforce effective domestic controls over WMD and WMD-related

materials in production, use, storage, and transport; to maintain effective border controls;

and to develop national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, all of which

help interdiction efforts. The resolution does not, however, provide any enforcement

authority nor does it specifically mention interdiction. About two-thirds of all states have

reported to the UN on their efforts to strengthen defenses against WMD trafficking.

UNSCRs 1673, 1810, and 1977 extended the duration of the 1540 Committee, with the

2011 resolution extending the Committee’s mandate for 10 years.

4. International Activities

a. Overview. The US, along with its partners and allies, participates in a variety of

international activities to counter WMD, particularly to stop the proliferation of WMD and

Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations

B-5

the materiel, technology, and expertise necessary to create and sustain a WMD program.

These activities seek to strengthen international norms and common values and build

capacity through cooperation, information sharing, and exercises. The following list

highlights select relevant international activities but is not an all-inclusive listing.

b. The PSI. The PSI is a global effort to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery

systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles

identifies specific steps participants can take to effectively interdict WMD-related

shipments and prevent proliferation. The PSI Principles also recognize the value in

cooperative action and encourage participating nations to work together to apply

intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, military, and other capabilities to prevent

WMD-related transfers to state and non-state actors. A group of diplomatic, law

enforcement, legal, military, and intelligence experts from 21 PSI participating states form

an operational experts group. The operational experts group works on behalf of all PSI

partners and meets regularly to develop operational concepts, organize the interdiction

exercise program, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue

cooperation with key industry sectors. Participation in the PSI is voluntary. There is no

organizational HQ or secretariat. Support for the PSI is an acknowledgement of the need

for stronger measures to defeat proliferators through cooperation with other countries.

c. Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a multinational body

concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of

materials that may support nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and

protection of existing materials. The US encourages adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers

Group’s guidelines, seeks to improve information sharing on nations of concern and

commodities sought by proliferators, and seeks to ensure Nuclear Suppliers Group control

lists are current and properly focused.

d. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR is an informal and

voluntary association of nations that share the goal of nonproliferation of unmanned

delivery systems capable of delivering WMD. The MTCR limits the transfer of long-range

(i.e., greater than 300 kilometers in range or 500 kilograms [kg] in payload) missiles and

associated technology. The MTCR rests on adherence to common export policy guidelines

applied to a common list of controlled items, making it more difficult for nations seeking

to acquire and produce unmanned means of WMD delivery.

e. GICNT. In July 2006, Russia and the US announced the creation of the GICNT

before the Group of Eight Summit in St. Petersburg, Russia. The mission of the GICNT is

to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism by

conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and

interoperability of PNs. Like the PSI, this initiative is nonbinding and requires agreement

on a statement of principles. Thirteen nations—Australia, Canada, China, France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Russia, and

the US—endorsed a Statement of Principles at the first meeting in October 2006. Today,

the GICNT is an international partnership of 88 nations and six international organizations

who are committed to working individually and collectively to implement a set of shared

nuclear security principles to improve accounting, control, and protection of nuclear and

Appendix B

B-6 JP 3-40

radiological materials and facilities; develop capabilities to detect and halt illicit trafficking

of such materials; prevent terrorists/other non-state actors from acquiring nuclear

materials; put in place laws to counter nuclear terrorism-related activity; share information;

and develop a capability to respond and mitigate acts of nuclear terrorism. The US and

Russia serve as co-chairs of the GICNT, and Spain serves as coordinator of the

Implementation and Assessment Group. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the

European Union, the International Criminal Police Organization-International Police, and

the UN Office on Drugs and Crime have observer status. Without dues or a secretariat,

actions under the initiative will take legal guidance from the International Convention on

the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection

of Nuclear Materials, and UNSCRs 1540 and 1373. GICNT PNs periodically hold

exercises and workshops to improve coordination and exchange best practices.

5. Interdiction Legal Considerations

a. Introduction. WMD interdiction encompasses operations directed towards

weaponized CBRN devices/warheads and delivery vehicles; dual-use items required to

produce weapons, their precursors, or related items; related technology; financial and

transportation intermediaries which facilitate trade in WMD; and individuals associated

with all of the above. JFCs account for the legal issues inherent in WMD interdiction

operations to fully comply with US law, treaties, and international agreements. Planners

should involve their respective general counsel or staff judge advocate (SJA) representative

early in the mission analysis and throughout execution to identify key issues and work to

resolve them (see JP 3-84, Legal Support). Additionally, allies and PNs may have differing

interpretations of rights and obligations under international law than the US. This will

require sensitivity, cooperation, and negotiation when operating in a multinational

environment.

For further guidance on legal support, see JP 3-84, Legal Support.

b. General Considerations. The international treaties and agreements discussed in

the previous section, in addition to specific UNSCRs, obligate member states to prevent

WMD proliferation. Treaties, US laws and regulations, and bilateral agreements also

identify, however, certain rights and obligations of states, ships, and aircraft related to

search and seizure in territorial and international waters and airspace. These issues include

state of belligerency; territorial rights; legal status of the target vessel, aircraft, or vehicle;

use of military forces; seizure of material and detention of persons; preservation of

evidence; and rules of engagement/rules for the use of force during interdiction. Use of

cyberspace operations to support WMD interdiction may pose additional legal concerns.

Where CCDRs believe they require additional legal authority to conduct WMD interdiction

activities, they should seek guidance from OSD and the JS.

(1) State of Belligerency. International law recognizes a difference in the rights

of states during armed conflict (state of belligerency). Belligerent states may seize and

condemn enemy vessels or vehicles; stop and search neutral vessels, aircraft, or vehicles

for contraband; and blockade enemy port(s) and airspace on both the high seas and within

the enemy’s territorial seas. This right does not extend to the territorial seas or airspace of

Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations

B-7

neutral states or to international straits. Less clear are circumstances where no declared

state of belligerency exists. This is the circumstance under which most WMD interdiction

activities will occur. Some interdiction authorities include flag-state consent, ship master’s

consent, or specific boarding authorities contained within the United Nations Convention

on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that constitute customary international law. Article 51

of the UN Charter (right to self-defense) may provide some basis for action in this

circumstance. UNSCRs may also provide basis for action under certain circumstances.

(2) Territorial Rights. The authority to stop and inspect a ship, aircraft, or ground

vehicle resides with the nation in whose territory the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle is transiting.

The UNCLOS and Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation are cornerstone

territorial rights agreements. Although the US may not be a party to the UNCLOS, many

provisions of the treaty reflect customary norms, which give rise to rights and obligations

under international law.

(a) It is important to note that some military actions, such as hailing and

querying vessels on the high seas, can be supportive of USG CP objectives without being

classified as interference with ships otherwise conducting legitimate commerce.

(b) National Airspace. The requirement for a state to obtain diplomatic

clearance for state aircraft prior to entering or transiting another nation’s airspace (over its

territory or territorial waters) affects all aspects of planning and deployment. Overflight

constraints are to be complied with by all forces and are a key element in the planning

process. Under the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known

as the Chicago Convention, a state has the right to enforce its domestic laws and regulations

on aircraft transiting its national airspace, to include the airspace above its territorial

borders and waters, and to ensure the observance of any obligation of such state under a

multilateral international agreement. A state may deny access to its national airspace or

compel an aircraft entering its national airspace to land for inspection if suspected of

violating its laws or if it poses an imminent security risk. A state may also deny access to

its national airspace to aircraft contaminated by WMD. No state aircraft may fly over, or

land on, the territory of a foreign nation without prior diplomatic clearance.

1. PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles (Aircraft). The PSI calls

upon participant states to take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts, to the

extent permissible under their national legal authorities and international legal obligations,

to include:

a. At their own initiative or upon request and good cause shown by

another state, require aircraft transiting their airspace to land for inspection if reasonably

suspected of carrying WMD cargo to or from states or non-state actors, seize any such

cargo, and deny transit rights to aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargo.

b. Conduct aircraft inspections and seize WMD cargo at their

airfields or other facilities used for transshipment to/from states or non-state actors.

2. Interdiction in National Airspace

Appendix B

B-8 JP 3-40

a. General principles

(1) The Chicago Convention, International Air Services

Transit Agreement, and other instruments of international air law attempt to strike a

balance between the legitimate safety and security interests of territorial states and the

economic and social benefits of unimpeded transit/overflight.

(2) Ultimately, every state has complete and exclusive

sovereignty over the airspace above its territory (Chicago Convention, Article 1).

b. State aircraft (e.g., military aircraft) require “authorization by

special agreement or otherwise” to overfly a foreign state (Chicago Convention, Article

3[c]). Usually this is accomplished through the diplomatic clearance process. Transit and

landing rights may be withdrawn at any time. As a matter of international custom and

practice, state aircraft are not subject to search or inspection in a foreign state.

c. Non-scheduled (e.g., charter) international civil flights are

granted right of overflight by the Chicago Convention without prior permission (Chicago

Convention, Article 5); however, the right is conditional. Overflown states have the right

to require landing (Chicago Convention, Article 5) as a condition of overflight and may

conduct an inspection of aircraft, may require prior notification and special permission for

overflight in the interests of safety (Chicago Convention, Article 5), expect that aircraft not

carry “munitions of war or implements of war” (defined nationally) without permission,

may prohibit the transit of other items (defined nationally), and expect aircraft to comply

with UNSCR obligating denial of overflight.

d. “Scheduled” international civil flights require special permission

to transit foreign airspace. For states that are parties to both the Chicago Convention and

International Air Services Transit Agreement, this permission is granted for non-stop

transit and non-traffic stops (International Air Services Transit Agreement, Article 1).

Additional bilateral/multilateral agreements apply for traffic stops (e.g., scheduled airline

passenger service). States have the right to deny transit or order landing for inspection of

a flight over its territory suspected of violating its laws or applicable UNSCRs and

international law or if the aircraft poses an imminent security risk.

3. National Registry of Civil Aircraft. States of registry maintain

international jurisdictional rights and legal obligations over their civil aircraft. Aircraft

have the nationality of the state in which they are registered. Under some circumstances,

UNSCRs may obligate states to prevent the use of their registered aircraft for WMD

proliferation (Iran UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929; North Korea UNSCRs 1718, 1874,

2087, 2094). Once entered into force, the Beijing Convention (2010) will require states of

registry to establish jurisdiction and criminalize air transport of WMD and some

precursors.

a. Legal Status. The commercial maritime shipping and aviation

industries often involve multiple layers of nationality in ownership, operating company,

voyage contracting, leasing, flagging, and vessel’s master/captain. Each nation associated

Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations

B-9

with a specific transaction can be approached in some fashion to cooperate with WMD

interdiction efforts.

b. Flag State Consent. Unless a UNSCR expressly states otherwise,

the authority to stop and inspect a ship or civil aircraft in international waters or airspace

or authority to authorize a third-party nation to stop and inspect in international waters or

airspace, generally depends upon the “flag” registry of the ship or aircraft. The flag state

can be different from the owner or operator nationality, and the ship or aircraft is considered

under the jurisdiction of the laws and directives of competent authority of the flag state.

Generally, states have the right to stop and search any ship or aircraft in international waters

or airspace flagged (registered) by the state or authorize a third party to do the same. Under

the PSI, the US has negotiated a series of ship “boarding agreements” with certain other

participants. These agreements provide for US boarding of these states’ flagged ships

under specific circumstances and conditions. Planners should consult their command’s

political advisor and SJA on these specific agreements.

c. Master’s or Command Pilot’s Consent. The US holds that it may

board and carry out certain activities on ships otherwise immune if the master (captain) of

the ship provides consent. Although such boarding, while in international waters, is

technically limited to a visit only, the master may authorize a boarding party to examine

any portion of the ship. The master is, however, not obligated to provide extended

authorization unless directed by competent authority of the flag state. With respect to

aircraft in international airspace, the command pilot of a civil aircraft may consent to have

the aircraft diverted from its original destination to a designated airport so it can land and

be boarded for inspection. Some states do not necessarily concur with the US position.

d. Sovereign Immunity. Warships and military aircraft of a state

enjoy sovereign immunity. Coastal states may not stop and search warships but may direct

them to depart the coastal state’s territorial waters if the warship violates the right of

innocent passage.

e. Seizure of Material and Detention of Persons. Seizures and

detentions must have basis in international law, US law, or HN law. Specific cases and

circumstances are too numerous to be recounted here. It is critical to involve the SJA as

early as possible in the planning process to aid in determining requirements to support

seizures, detentions, and expedite disposition.

f. Disposition–Availability of Evidence and Chain of Custody. In

cases involving probable prosecution by the US or prosecuting state, agencies should take

measures and provide guidance to field units regarding preservation of relevant evidence

and establishing chain of custody. Preservation of the chain of custody is also essential to

support attribution.

g. In cases involving possible foreign prosecutions arising from US

interdictions and investigations, the interagency team should ascertain whether US

investigators intend to make available all unclassified and relevant evidence to their

counterparts in the prosecuting state for use by the prosecuting state in any hearings and

Appendix B

B-10 JP 3-40

trials. This may include testimony, weapons, ammunition, imagery, small vessels, and

other physical evidence requiring special handling or storage.

h. The prosecuting state should consider its transport and storage

options (items are often located in third-party states or at-sea), as well as chain of custody

procedures it may wish to communicate to the US and other investigators. The prosecuting

state may wish to immediately coordinate with officials and investigators of other

concerned states to establish early chain of custody and collection and preservation of

evidence in ways that ensure admissibility in prosecuting state courts.

i. The US will, in appropriate circumstances, facilitate delivery of

statements from US military witnesses to the prosecuting state. All requests for such

personnel or their statements will normally be made to the cognizant US embassy for

forwarding to DOD, DHS (for the USCG), and DOJ. Consideration should be given to the

availability of witnesses and facilitating contact with (including travel of) potential

prosecuting state investigators while the witnesses remain available.

6. Domestic Legal Considerations

Accounting of legal considerations is also essential for domestic operations. For

CWMD-related DSCA activities, military forces could be requested and used to manage

the consequences of a CBRN incident. In a domestic setting, it is imperative that JFCs

understand the statutory and operational relationships among US states, territories, and

federal government. They must also understand the distinctive roles, responsibilities,

capabilities, and limitations of Titles 10, 14, 18, and 32, USC, and state active duty

personnel.

For more detailed information on domestic legal considerations, see JP 3-28, Defense

Support of Civil Authorities.

C-1

APPENDIX C

WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS

1. Purpose

This appendix provides an unclassified overview of CBRN weapons. A general

knowledge of CBRN weapon characteristics will aid the JFC in gaining an overall

situational awareness of diverse CBRN threats within the operational area and the

development of specific risk assessments to counter these threats.

2. Nuclear Weapons Materials Production

a. Mining, Milling, Refining, and Conversion. During mining and milling, uranium

ore is processed to isolate the uranium into concentrate called yellow cake. Uranium that

is too enriched for reactor fuel, medical use, or weapons development is converted into

UF6 [uranium hexaflouride]. This uranium is then reduced (converted) to metal, metal

oxide, or a metal-ceramic matrix for further fabrication into reactor fuel elements.

b. Uranium Enrichment. Isotope separation (enrichment) technologies are

processes that usually begin with natural uranium and result in enriched uranium and

depleted uranium. Enrichment seeks to isolate and collect the relatively small percentage

of the isotope uranium-235 (U-235), in natural uranium, which is suitable for fission

weapons. Highly enriched uranium contains 20 percent or more of U-235; low-enriched

uranium contains less than 20 percent U-235. Most power reactors require low-enriched

uranium containing between three to five percent U-235. Weapons-grade uranium will

contain 90 percent or more of U-235. Natural uranium can be used as fuel in certain types

of specially moderated reactors—a byproduct of energy production from that fuel is

plutonium-239 (Pu-239).

c. Plutonium Production. Plutonium, one of the two fissile elements used to fuel

nuclear explosives, is not found in significant quantities in nature. Plutonium can only be

made in sufficient quantities in a nuclear reactor. It is usually produced in a production

reactor. To achieve the high percentages of Pu-239 required for weapons-grade plutonium,

it must be produced specifically for this purpose. The uranium must spend several weeks

in the reactor core and then be removed. Production reactors are used to make plutonium

(and often tritium) efficiently. Production reactors can be graphite-moderated and either

air-,

carbon dioxide-

, or helium-cooled; some programs have also used heavy water

reactors. The longer a given sample of fuel is irradiated, the greater the build-up of

plutonium-240 (Pu-240), an isotope which decays by spontaneous fission and which should

be minimized in weapon plutonium. Consequently, plutonium production reactors are

usually designed to be refueled at specific intervals while operating (on-line refueling) so

relatively little Pu-240 is generated in the removed “spent” fuel. To be used in a nuclear

weapon, plutonium must be separated from the much larger mass of non-fissile material in

the irradiated fuel. Plutonium is removed from spent fuel by chemical separation; no

nuclear or physical separation (as for example in uranium enrichment) is needed. After

being separated chemically from the irradiated fuel and reduced to metal, the plutonium is

ready for machining and use in a nuclear explosive device. If the reactor involved uses

Appendix C

C-2 JP 3-40

thorium fuel, uranium-233 (U-233), also a fissile isotope, can be recovered in a process

similar to plutonium extraction.

For further guidance on enrichment, refer to The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

3. Radiological Weapons and Sources

a. Radiological Weapons Development Lifecycle. The lifecycle of radiological

weapons is derived in a similar manner as nuclear weapons. This pathway is more difficult

to characterize due to the prevalence of radioactive sources in everyday life.

b. RDD Candidate Materials. Radioactive materials that make the best candidates

for use in an RDD are those that are widely used in medicine, industry, and research. RDD

candidates should have an intermediate half-life—highly radioactive materials decay too

quickly to assemble and deliver as an RDD, while those with very long half-lives are not

radioactive enough to cause much damage. All of the candidate isotopes that pose the

greatest security risk for an RDD are produced in the nuclear fuel cycle and for industrial

applications of radiation.

For further guidance on the medical effects of radiological weapons, refer to Armed Forces

Radiobiology Research Institute; Medical Management of Radiological Casualties; or

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-02.83/Marine Corps Reference Publication

(MCRP) 4-11.1B/Navy Tactical Reference Publication (NTRP) 4-02.21/Air Force Manual

(AFMAN) 44-161(Interservice [I]), Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological Casualties.

4. Biological Weapons and Sources

a. Biological Weapons Development Lifecycle. The lifecycle of a biological

weapon begins with the culturing of a specific organism with the virulence required. This

RESEARCH REACTORS

Most radioisotope production occurs in research reactors, with power

ranges from tens of kilowatts to several hundred megawatts, compared to

2,000 megawatts in commercial nuclear reactors. However, a few

commercial power reactors also function as radioisotope producers.

From the security viewpoint, it is worth noting that both reactor and

accelerator produced radioisotopes are usually processed in hot cells near

the production facility. The processing involves chemical preparation after

initial manufacture to produce a more pure form of the radioisotope for

commercial use. It also physically shapes the product into the desired form

(e.g., pellets or pencils).

SOURCE: “Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security

Risks”, Charles D. Ferguson, Tasheen Kazi, and Judith Perera.

Occasional

Paper No. 11, Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Monterrey Institute of International Studies

Weapon Characteristics

C-3

capability generally runs on a continuum from research, product scale-up, testing

production, weaponization, storage, deployment/employment, and demilitarization. These

stages can run in parallel as a capability is upgraded or circumvented as capability is

contracted, out-sourced, imported, or stolen. Additionally, production times may be

relatively short within the lifecycle as some bacteria can double in number every 20

minutes. Large stockpiles could be produced within a few years in a modest-sized

pharmaceutical plant before it is repurposed for another use.

b. Production. Fermenters may be employed to grow large amounts of certain

bacteria, but biological agents are not stored in bulk containers or in munitions. Biological

agents would most likely be stored in small quantities of a few milliliters in plastic

“cryovials” in liquid nitrogen canisters or in -80 degrees Celsius freezers in a containment

room or building, such as biosafety level 3-4 facilities with access control and exterior

security. Maintaining the capability does not depend on continued serviceability of the

agent as it can be kept in frozen storage until needed. When prepared for use, large volumes

of liquid nutritive media would be necessary to revive bacterial agents in incubators or

warm rooms, possibly in flasks on shaker platforms for extracellular bacteria or in tissue

culture for intracellular species. Virus preparation from the frozen state would require,

depending on the species, numerous live eggs in incubators or tissue cultures employing

commercially available cell lines, large amounts of liquid media, and numerous flasks to

expand the amount of agent for deployment.

c. Biological Agents. Biological agents (pathogens and toxins) pose a risk of

deliberate misuse with significant potential for mass casualties or devastating effects to the

economy, critical infrastructure, and public confidence (see Figure C-1). Many diseases

caused by weaponized biological agents present with nonspecific clinical signs that could

be difficult to diagnose and recognize as a biological attack.

For further guidance on the medical effects of biological weapons, refer to US Army

Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases Pocket Reference Guide to Select

Biological Agents and Toxins; Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook;

or ATP 4-02.84/MCRP 4-11.1C/NTRP 4-02.23/AFMAN 44-156_Integrated Policy (IP),

Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Biological Warfare

Agent Casualties.

5. Chemical Weapons and Sources

a. Chemical Weapons Development Lifecycle (Figure C-2). The lifecycle of a

chemical weapon capability runs on a continuum from research through production,

weaponization, storage, deployment/employment, and demilitarization. Agents and

munitions that have exceeded their shelf life should be disposed of in a manner that

precludes their continuing to be a hazard (e.g., incineration or neutralization). These stages

can run in parallel as a capability is upgraded or circumvented as the capability is

franchised or imported. Research involves gathering and cultivating needed expertise and

validating production and weaponization processes. Production times are often relatively

short within the life-cycle. Large stockpiles can be produced within a few years in a

Appendix C

C-4 JP 3-40

modest-sized chemical plant before it is re-purposed to another use. Agents are usually

stored in munitions or in bulk containers.

b. Maintaining the capability depends on continued serviceability of the munitions,

the agent, and the munitions filling equipment for agents stored in bulk. Deployment and

employment may involve specialized units qualified to handle agents and fill munitions.

The task of controlling chemical warfare agent identification is further complicated through

nations’ use of binary compounds. Binary compounds have significantly extended storage

life. Frequently, the agent must be reprocessed or replaced to maintain the usefulness of

the weapon. Eventually, agents and munitions will need to be demilitarized. Burial of

chemical warfare agents is not a permitted destruction method in accordance with the

CWC. Munitions buried prior to CWC entry into force may remain buried but, if

recovered, will be destroyed in accordance with an approved destruction method. Weapons

degraded beyond normal military usefulness can still pose significant hazards, especially

if proper control is lost. Agents and munitions that were disposed of through burial or

Figure C-1. Agents with Significant Risks of Deliberate Misuse

Influenza viruses (avian, swine, etc.)

Ebola virus

Marburg virus

Variola major and minor viruses (Smallpox)

Alphaviruses (Eastern Equine Encephalitis, Venezuelan

Equine Encephalitis)

Foot-and-mouth disease virus (animal disease only)

Rinderpest virus (animal disease only)

Exemplary list, not exhaustive of Pathogens and Toxins.

Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax)

Burkholderia mallei (Glanders)

Burkholderia pseudomallei (Melioidosis)

Francisella tularensis (Tularemia)

Yersinia pestis (Plague)

Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)

Brucella species (Brucellosis)

Rickettsia prowazekii (Epidemic typhus)

Clostridium botulinum neurotoxin

Ricin toxin

Abrin toxin

Staphylococcus enterotoxins

Viruses

Pathogens

Bacteria

Toxi ns

Agents with Significant Risks of Deliberate Misuse

Weapon Characteristics

C-5

ocean dumping prior to the CWC should remain undisturbed, and if they pose an

environmental hazard, or are recovered, they should be destroyed in an approved manner

as any other munition or agent.

For further guidance on chemical weapons, refer to US Army Medical Research Institute

of Chemical Defense Field Management of Chemical Casualties; Medical Management of

Chemical Casualties Handbook; or ATP 4-02.85/MCRP 4-11.1A/NTRP 4-02.22/Air Force

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP)(Instruction) 3-2.69, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Chemical Warfare Agent Casualties and

Conventional Military Chemical Injuries.

Figure C-2. Chemical Weapons Production

Chemical Weapons

Defense

Chemical Weapons Production

Munitions Research

and Development

Weapons

Production and

Filling

Associated

Production and

Storage

Stockpile

Chemical

Weapons

Administration

Destruction and

Disposal

Employment

and

Training

Agent Research

and

Development

Agent Production

Precursor Production

Appendix C

C-6 JP 3-40

Intentionally Blank

D-1

APPENDIX D

DUAL-USE CHALLENGES

1. General

JFCs should understand the implications associated with dual-use technologies,

materials, equipment, and expertise, which can provide the capability to develop WMD

(Figure D-1). Many CBRN-associated resources have a range of legitimate applications in

academia, industry, public health sector, and research. Even though they are normally used

for civilian purposes, they may be exploited for military or nefarious applications. These

dual-use items present actors of concern a means to covertly acquire or develop CBRN

weapon capabilities. The legitimate appearance of these activities and facilities

complicates the JFC’s ability to detect, track, and target these potential threats. The

Australia Group maintains an extensive collection of information related to potential

chemical/biological materials and equipment that may be clandestinely used to produce

chemical or biological weapons. The following is an excerpt from Australia Group

Common Control List Handbook, Volume I: Chemical Weapons-Related Common Control

Lists and describes some dual-use items of concern. For more information and access to

additional Australia Group products see: https://australiagroup.net/en/index.html.

a. Chemical Production Dual-Use Equipment

Figure D-1. Dual-Use Chemical/Biological Applications

Dual-Use Chemical/Biological Applications

Chemicals Have Multiple Uses

Nitrogen

Mustard

Schedule 1A

Cross-link

between

two quanine

bases

...and anti-cancer drug (as a salt)

CH3

CI CI

Appendix D

D-2 JP 3-40

(1) Reaction vessels, reactors, or agitators reaction vessels or reactors (Figure D-

2), with or without agitators, with total internal (geometric) volume greater than 0.1 cubic

meters (m³) (100 l) and less than 20 m³ (20000 l), where all surfaces that come in direct

contact with the chemical(s) being processed or contained are made from the following

materials:

(a) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(b) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by

weight.

percent fluorine by weight).

(d) Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

(e) Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

(f) Titanium or titanium alloys.

(g) Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

Figure D-2. Chemical Reactor Vessel

Chemical Reactor Vessel

Dual-Use Challenges

D-3

(h) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

(2) Prefabricated repair assemblies and their specially designed components,

that:

(a) Are designed for mechanical attachment to glass-lined reaction vessels

or reactors that meet the parameters above.

(b) Have metallic surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s)

being processed which are made from tantalum or tantalum alloys.

b. Storage Tanks, Containers or Receivers

(1) Storage tanks, containers or receivers (Figure D-3) with a total internal

(geometric) volume greater than 0.1 m³ (100 l) where all surfaces that come in direct

contact with the chemical(s) being processed or contained are made from the following

materials:

(a) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(b) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by

weight Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35 percent

fluorine by weight).

Figure D-3. Chemical Storage Tanks

Chemical Storage Tanks

Appendix D

D-4 JP 3-40

(d) Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

(e) Titanium or titanium alloys.

(f) Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

(g) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

(2) Prefabricated repair assemblies and their specially designed components,

that:

(a) Are designed for mechanical attachment to glass-lined storage tanks,

containers or receivers that meet the parameters above.

(b) Have metallic surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s)

being processed which are made from tantalum or tantalum alloys.

c. Heat Exchangers or Condensers and Distillation or Absorption Columns

(Figure D-4 and Figure D-5). Heat exchangers or condensers with a heat transfer surface

area of greater than 0.15 square meters, and less than 20 square meters, and tubes, plates,

coils, or blocks (cores) designed for such heat exchangers or condensers, where all surfaces

that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed are made from the

following materials:

Figure D-4. Chemical Heat Exchanger

Chemical Heat Exchanger

Dual-Use Challenges

D-5

(1) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(2) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by weight.

(3) Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35

percent fluorine by weight).

(4) Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

(5) Graphite or carbon-graphite.

(6) Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

(7) Titanium or titanium alloys.

(8) Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

(9) Silicon carbide.

(10) Titanium carbide.

(11) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

Figure D-5. Chemical Distillation Column

Chemical Distillation Column

Appendix D

D-6 JP 3-40

Technical note 1: Carbon-graphite is a composition consisting of

amorphous carbon and graphite, in which the graphite content is eight

percent or more by weight.

d. Filling Equipment (Figure D-6). Remotely operated filling equipment in which

all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed are made from

the following materials:

(1) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(2) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by weight.

e. Valves (Figure D-7)

(1) Valves, having both of the following:

(a) A nominal size greater than 1.0 centimeters (cm) (3/8 inch).

(b) All surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being

produced, processed, or contained are made from the materials of construction in technical

note 2.

Figure D-6. Chemical Filling Equipment

Chemical Filling Equipment

Dual-Use Challenges

D-7

(2) Valves, not already identified in paragraph 6.a., having all of the following:

(a) A nominal size equal to or greater than 2.54 cm (1 inch) and equal to or

less than 10.16 cm (4 inch).

(b) Casings (valve bodies) or preformed casing liners.

(d) All surfaces of the casing (valve body) or preformed case liner that come

in direct contact with the chemical(s) being produced, processed, or contained are made

from the materials of construction in technical note 2.

(3) Components, as follows:

(a) Casings (valve bodies) designed for valves in paragraphs 6.a.or 6.b., in

which all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being produced,

processed, or contained are made from the materials of construction in technical note 2.

(b) Preformed casing liners designed for valves in paragraphs 6.a.or 6.b., in

which all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being produced,

processed, or contained are made from the materials of construction in technical note 2.

Figure D-7. Chemical Valve

Chemical Valve

Appendix D

D-8 JP 3-40

Technical note 2. Materials of construction for valves include any of the

following:

a. Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

b. Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by

weight.

c. Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35

percent fluorine by weight.

d. Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

e. Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

f. Titanium or titanium alloys.

g. Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

h. Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

i. Ceramic materials as follows:

(1) Silicon carbide with a purity of 80 percent or more by weight.

(2) Aluminum oxide (alumina) with a purity of 99.9 percent or more

by weight.

(3) Zirconium oxide (zirconia).

f. Multi-Walled Piping (Figure D-8). Multi-walled piping incorporating a leak

detection port, in which all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being

processed or contained are made from the following materials:

(1) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(2) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by weight.

(3) Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35

percent fluorine by weight).

(4) Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

(5) Graphite or carbon-graphite.

(6) Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

(7) Titanium or titanium alloys.

(8) Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

Dual-Use Challenges

D-9

(9) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

g. Pumps (Figure D-9). Multiple-seal and seal-less pumps with manufacturer’s

specified maximum flow-rate greater than 0.6 m

/hour, or vacuum pumps with

manufacturer’s specified maximum flow-rate greater than 5 m³/hour (under standard

temperature (273 Kelvin [0o Celsius]) and pressure [101.3 kilopascal] conditions), and

casings (pump bodies), preformed casing liners, impellers, rotors or jet pump nozzles

designed for such pumps, in which all surfaces that come into direct contact with the

chemical(s) being processed are made from any of the following materials:

(1) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(2) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by weight.

(3) Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35

percent fluorine by weight).

(4) Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

(5) Graphite or carbon-graphite.

(6) Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

(7) Titanium or titanium alloys.

Figure D-8. Chemical Processing Piping

Chemical Processing Piping

Appendix D

D-10 JP 3-40

(8) Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

(9) Ceramics.

(10) Ferrosilicon (high silicon iron alloys).

(11) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

Technical note 3: The seals referred to in this control come into direct

contact with the chemical(s) being processed (or are designed to) and

provide a sealing function where a rotary or reciprocating drive shaft

passes through a pump body.

2. Biological Facilities and Equipment

a. Facilities. Containment facilities and related equipment as follows:

(1) Complete containment facilities that meet the criteria for the appropriate level

of biosafety.

(2) Containment as specified in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual.

(3) Equipment designed for fixed installation in containment facilities specified

in a., as follows:

Figure D-9. Chemical Production Pumps

Chemical Production Pumps

Dual-Use Challenges

D-11

(a) Double-door pass-through decontamination autoclaves.

(b) Breathing air suit decontamination showers.

b. Equipment

(1) Fermenters (Figure D-10 and Figure D-11). Fermenters capable of cultivation

of microorganisms or of live cells for the production of viruses or toxins, without the

propagation of aerosols, having a total internal volume of 20 liters or greater. Components

designed for such fermenters, as follows:

(a) Cultivation chambers designed to be sterilized or disinfected in-situ.

(b) Cultivation chamber holding devices.

controlling two or more fermentation system parameters (e.g., temperature, pH, nutrients,

agitation, dissolved oxygen, air flow, foam control). Fermenters include bioreactors

(including single-use [disposable] bioreactors), chemostats, and continuous-flow systems.

Figure D-10. Biological Production Fermenter

Biological Production Fermenter

Appendix D

D-12 JP 3-40

(2) Centrifugal Separators. Centrifugal separators capable of the continuous

separation of pathogenic microorganisms, without the propagation of aerosols, and having

all the following characteristics:

(a) One or more sealing joints within the steam containment area.

(b) A flow rate greater than 100 liters per hour.

(d) Capable of in-situ steam sterilization in a closed state.

Technical note 4: Centrifugal separators include decanters.

(3) Cross (tangential) Flow Filtration Equipment (Figure D-12). Cross

(tangential) flow filtration equipment capable of separation of microorganisms, viruses,

toxins, or cell cultures having all the following characteristics:

(a) A total filtration area equal to or greater than one square meter.

(b) Having any of the following characteristics:

1. Capable of being sterilized or disinfected in-situ.

Figure D-11. Biological Production Fermenter

Biological Production Fermenter

Dual-Use Challenges

D-13

2. Using disposable or single-use filtration components.

(4) Freeze-Drying Equipment. Steam, gas, or vapor stabilizable freeze-drying

equipment with a condenser capacity of 10 kg of ice or greater in 24 hours and less than

1000 kg of ice in 24 hours.

(5) Spray-Drying Equipment. Spray drying equipment capable of drying toxins

or pathogenic microorganisms having all of the following characteristics:

(a) A water evaporation capacity of ≥ 0.4 kg/hour and ≤ 400 grams/hour.

(b) The ability to generate a typical mean product particle size of ≤10

micrometers with existing fittings or by minimal modification of the spray-dryer with

atomization nozzles enabling generation of the required particle size and capable of being

sterilized or disinfected in-situ.

(6) Protective and containment equipment as follows: protective full or half suits,

or hoods dependent upon a tethered external air supply and operating under positive

pressure.

Figure D-12. Biological Production Filtration

Biological Production Filtration

Appendix D

D-14 JP 3-40

Technical note 5: This does not control suits designed to be worn with

self-contained breathing apparatus. Biocontainment chambers,

isolators, or biological safety cabinets having all of the following

characteristics, for normal operation:

a. Fully enclosed workspace where the operator is separated from the

work by a physical barrier.

b. Able to operate at negative pressure.

c. Means to safely manipulate items in the workspace.

d. Supply and exhaust air to and from the workspace is HEPA [high-

efficiency particulate air]-filtered.

(7) Spraying or fogging systems and components. Complete spraying or fogging

systems, specially designed or modified for fitting to aircraft, lighter than air vehicles or

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), capable of delivering, from a liquid suspension, an

initial droplet volume median diameter (VMD) of less than 50 microns at a flow rate of

greater than two liters per minute. Spray booms or arrays of aerosol generating units,

specially designed or modified for fitting to aircraft, lighter than air vehicles or UAVs,

capable of delivering, from a liquid suspension, an initial droplet VMD of less than 50

microns at a flow rate of greater than two liters per minute.

(8) Nucleic Acid Assemblers and Synthesizers. Nucleic acid assemblers and

synthesizers, which are partly or entirely automated and designed to generate continuous

nucleic acids greater than 1.5 kilobases in length with error rates less than 5 percent in a

single run.

(9) Items for inclusion in Awareness Raising Guidelines. Experts propose that

the following items be included in awareness raising guidelines to industry:

(a) Equipment and technology (not specified elsewhere in the control list of

Dual-use Biological Equipment and Related Technology and Software) for the

encapsulation of live pathogenic microorganisms, viruses, and toxins, with a typical mean

product particle size of 10 micrometers or less.

(b) Fermenters of less than 20 liter capacity with special emphasis on

aggregate orders or designs for use in combined systems.

fan-HEPA [high-efficiency particulate air] filter units that may be used for the appropriate

level of biosafety containment facilities.

3. Radiological Dual-Use Equipment

Radioactive materials are both legitimately and extensively used around the world.

These materials serve important roles in medicine, industry, research, and academia.

Dual-Use Challenges

D-15

Within an area of operation, JFC’s can expect to find numerous radioactive material

applications. Commanders should also recognize that nefarious actors may seek to acquire

these materials for bad intent. While the technical, security, and financial hurdles required

to make or acquire a nuclear weapon are monumental, common thieves may be able to steal

radioactive materials with relative ease. The following information is provided by the US

Nuclear Regulatory Commission and serves as an overview of common radioactive

material uses. For more information, see https://www.nrc.gov/

a. Diagnostic Medical Use. Use of nuclear materials in radioactive uptake, dilution,

excretion, imaging, or localization diagnostic clinical or research procedures for humans

and animals. The metabolic or physiological properties of radiolabeled drugs are used to

obtain medical information, and the radiation produced from sealed sources are used in

diagnostic devices to image body parts or determine tissue density. Diagnostic medical

use includes the use of certain portable imaging devices in dentistry and podiatry, as well

as bone mineral analysis devices in podiatry.

b. Therapeutic Medical Use. Use of nuclear materials to deliver palliative (pain

relieving) or therapeutic doses of radiation to specific tissues or body areas. Although most

therapeutic uses of radiation involve the treatment of cancer, therapeutic doses may also

be used to treat benign conditions such as the use of intervascular brachytherapy radiation

to treat clogged blood vessels (restenosis).

c. Medical Research Use. Research involving human subjects using byproduct

materials may only be performed if the licensee has a Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR), Part 35, medical use authorization. There are a wide variety of research uses of

nuclear materials in human subjects. They include the use of nuclear materials in well-

established nuclear medicine procedures to monitor a human research subject’s response

to a nonradioactive drug or device treatment, as well as clinical trials to determine the

safety or effectiveness of new radioactive drugs and devices. The particular medical

research use must conform with the requirements in Title 10, CFR, Part 35, and the

possession and medical use authorizations in the license.

d. Certain in Vitro Diagnostic Tests. Some medical facilities or private physicians

may only have regulated material in the form of prepackaged in vitro diagnostic test kits.

These facilities and physicians do not have “medical use” licenses because these materials

are not regulated pursuant to Title 10, CFR, Part 35. The amount of regulated materials

used in this form of in vitro diagnostic testing determines whether its use is authorized by

a specific license issued pursuant to Title 10, CFR, Part 30, or a general license pursuant

to 10 CFR, Part 31.11. See the general license uses page for those materials generally

licensed pursuant to Title 10, CFR, Part 31.11.

e. Industrial Radiography. Industrial radiography is the use of radiation to produce

an image of internal features on photographic film; it is used to inspect metal parts and

welds for defects.

f. Irradiators. Irradiators are devices or facilities that expose products to radiation

to sterilize them, such as spices and some foods, milk containers, and hospital supplies.

Appendix D

D-16 JP 3-40

Self-shielded irradiators are constructed so there is no external beam during use and there

is “usually a small cabinet type device that is not built in.” Non-self-shielded irradiators

do not provide shielding from the radiation beam; therefore, additional shielding needs to

be provided and special radiation protection precautions need to be taken.

g. Well Logging. Well logging is a process used to determine whether a well drilled

deep into the ground has the potential to produce oil. This process uses byproduct or

special nuclear material tracer and sealed sources in connection with the exploration for

oil, gas, or minerals in wells.

h. Gauging Devices. Gauging devices are used to measure, monitor, and control the

thickness of sheet metal, textiles, paper napkins, newspaper, plastics, photographic film,

and other products as they are manufactured. No portable gauging devices (i.e., gauges

mounted in fixed locations) are designed for measurement or control of material density,

flow, level, thickness, or weight, and so forth. The gauges contain sealed sources that

radiate through the substance being measured to a readout or controlling device. Portable

gauging devices, such as moisture density gauges, are used at field locations. These gauges

contain a gamma-emitting sealed source, usually cesium-137, or a sealed neutron source,

usually americium-241 and beryllium.

i. Other Measuring Systems. Other measuring systems includes analytical systems

such as x-ray fluorescence analyzers, gas chromatographs used for quality control testing

in industrial processes, instrument calibrators, krypton leak detectors, and other “non-

gauge” measuring systems.

j. Research and Development. Research and development involves the possession

and use of radionuclides in industrial facilities for research and development.

k. Source Material. Source material licenses are issued for the possession and use

of refined uranium or thorium for fabrication, research, and manufacture of consumer

products such as ceramics and glassware, manufacture of refractories, uranium shielding,

analytical standards, military munitions, and other uses. A small number of these licenses

are issued to allow the use of uranium in subcritical assemblies.

l. Special Nuclear Material. Special nuclear material licenses are issued for the

possession and use of small quantities of Pu-239, U-235, and U-233 (less than 200 grams

total) for purposes such as biological and chemical testing; calibration of instruments;

neutron sources for use in industrial applications; power sources to generate heat or power

for remote weather stations and sensors, satellites, and other special applications; and

sealed sources in devices such as gauges.

E-1

APPENDIX E

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

1. General

Developments in science and technology have progressed at a blistering pace since the

end of World War II. New breakthroughs in science and technology are announced, and

each breakthrough in turn begets another breakthrough. While these scientific and

technological advancements have largely been applied to improve our quality of life, the

potential for misuse is of great concern. The following discussion is intended to highlight

a few areas of future science and technology development that have application to CWMD.

a. Technology Advancement Examples

(1) Advanced information communication technologies, artificial intelligence,

robotics and automation, cloud-based platforms, and Internet of things.

(2) Digital currencies, blockchain technology applications.

(3) Advanced materials and manufacturing.

(4) Biotechnologies at an inflection point—genetic testing and editing advances,

catalyzed by the new gene manipulation methods are turning science fiction into reality.

(5) Unconventional energy sources.

b. Science and Technology Pace

(1) Rapid technological advancements will increase the pace of change and create

new opportunities but will aggravate divisions between winners and losers.

(2) Automation and artificial intelligence threaten to change industries faster than

economies can adjust, potentially displacing workers and limiting poor country

development.

(3) Biotechnologies such as genome editing will revolutionize medicine and

other fields, while sharpening moral differences.

c. Figure E-1 shows examples of several science and technology trends.

“…artificial intelligence, 3D [three-dimensional] printing and synthetic biology will

bring profound changes to our everyday lives and benefits to millions of people.

However, their potential for misuse could also bring destruction. The nexus

between these emerging technologies and WMD [weapons of mass destruction]

needs close examination and action.”

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 2016

Appendix E

E-2 JP 3-40

2. Chemical Developments

As Figure E-2 shows, advancements in chemical and biological sciences have out-paced

treaty inspection regimes’ (e.g., BTWC and CWC) ability to keep up with the increase number

of chemical compounds and genetic sequences since these treaties were signed. The

development of fourth generation chemical agents has made protective measures more difficult.

3. Biological Developments

Synthetic Biological Production. Scientific advances over the past several decades

have accelerated the ability to engineer existing organisms and to potentially create novel

ones not found in nature. Synthetic biology, which collectively refers to concepts,

approaches, and tools that enable the modification or creation of biological organisms, is

being pursued overwhelmingly for beneficial purposes ranging from reducing the burden

of disease to improving agricultural yields to remediating pollution. Although the

contributions synthetic biology can make in these and other areas hold great promise, it is

also possible to imagine malicious uses that could threaten US citizens and military

personnel.

ure E-1. Science and Technolo

Trends



Applied metamaterials

Exploitation of unique material properties at the nanoscale

Fuels and batteries with increased energy density

Biochemistry and biological engineering



Additive manufacturing goes global

Evolution of autonomous robotic systems

Open source design

Emergence of micro/nano-satellites and near-space capabilities



Regional command, control, and communications/intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance parity

Exploitation of command, control, and

communications/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

vulnerabilities

Advanced information analysis and exploitation



Proliferation of advanced radio-frequency weapons

Availability of nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse

Robotics as force multiplier



Deployment of >100 kilowatt electrical lasers

Breakthrough energy

Hypersonics

Multidisciplinary

Scientific Research

The Significance of

Systems and

Systems integration

Proliferated

Information

Technologies

Emerging Measure/

Countermeasure

Competitive Spaces

Emergence of New

High-End, Capital-

intensive Capabilities

Science and Technology Trends

Science, Technology, and Engineering Trends and Conditions

Science and Technology

E-3

For more information on Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, see

https://www.nap.edu/read/24890/chapter/1.

4. Nuclear and Radiological Developments

a. Particle Beam Weaponry. A particle-beam weapon uses a high-energy beam of

atomic or subatomic particles to damage the target by disrupting its atomic and/or

molecular structure. A particle-beam weapon is a type of directed-energy weapon, which

directs energy in a particular and focused direction using particles with miniscule mass.

Some particle-beam weapons have potential practical applications (e.g., as an antiballistic

missile defense systems).

b. The critical nature of modern communications systems, and in particular satellite

technology, makes the threat of electromagnetic pulse weapons a great concern for commanders.

Advancements in this area are increasing rapidly with our peer and near-peer competitors.

Figure E-1. Science and Technology Trends (continued)

Present

Energy (advanced fission, renewables, solar)

hydraulic fracturing, photovoltaic efficiencies

Energy storage (advanced batteries, capacitors)

Communications (internet, wireless, reading brain

waves)

Information (artificial intelligence, big data, machine

learning, quantum computing)

Robotics and autonomous systems (Predator,

Reaper)

Bionics (exoskeletons)

Biomedical (cloning, gene therapy, geneering,

neuroscience)

Manufacturing (additive manufacturing/3D printing,

growth, prefab skyscrapers)

Propulsion/transport (hypersonics, magnetic

levitation, quadcopters)

Materials (nanotechnology, metamaterials, high-

temperature superconductors)

Civil Engineering (sky needles, bridges, tunnels)

Positioning (Beidou, Galileo, GLONASS, GPS)

Space (nanosatellites, orbital habitats, reusable

launch)

tensility structures

Weapons (advanced chemical and biological,

DEWs [laser, microwave], railguns)

Future (<25 Years)

Energy (fusion, solar <$1 watt)

ubiquitous 3rd generation SILEX (laser enrichment)

antimatter, LENR

Energy Storage (flywheels, supercapacitors)

Communications (virtual reality/augmented reality,

telepresence)

Information (DNA, general artificial intelligence/strong

artificial intelligence, human machine interface, Moore’s

Law extinction)

Robotics and autonomous systems (anthropomorphics)

Bionics (neural dust, powered combat armor)

Biomedical (antisenescence, chimeras, optogenetics)

Manufacturing (nanoassembly)

Propulsion/transport (single-stage-to-orbit)

Cannae, electromagnetic, and mach-effect thruster

drives

Materials (room temperature superconductors)

Civil engineering (archologies, megastructures,

seabases)

Positioning (NAVIC)

Space (exomining, orbital manufacturing, manned Mars

2024)

propellantless propulsion, laboratory faster than light/

space warping

Weapons (DEWs [particle, plasma])

Science and Technology Trends (continued)

Legend

3D three-dimensional

DEW

DNA deoxyribonucleic acid

GLONASS Globalnaya Navigazionnaya

Sputnikovaya Sistema or Global

Navigation Satellite System

directed energy weapon

GPS Global Positioning System

LENR low energy nuclear reaction

NAVIC Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System

Prefab prefabricated

SILEX separation of isotopes by laser excitation

Appendix E

E-4 JP 3-40

5. Nano-Technology

a. Science and technology has been focusing for many years on the miniaturization of

equipment, machines, and sub-components such as microchips. This trend will continue

as a benefit to friendly forces, yet also provide adversaries with increased capability.

Increasing science and technology advances in three-dimensional printing will also help

friendly forces, but adversaries will have a better ability to avoid detection of their

activities.

b. The previous discussion is designed to emphasize the importance of keeping up-to-

date with advancements in both science and technology. JFC’s are not expected to be

subject matter experts on all facets of technology, but the inclusion of science and

technology subject matter experts within a JTF will assist commanders with recognizing

the impacts of advancements in science and technology on future CWMD operations.

Figure E-2. Chemical and Biological Advancements

190

180

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

Chemical and Biological Advancements

Monitoring Science

BWC

Opened for

Signature

CWC

Opened for

Signature

> 110 Million

Compounds and

Sequences since

CWC Schedules

Created in 1993

Grows by

~15,000/

day

Data Base Entries [in Millions]

Year

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

CAS Chemical Abstracts Service

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

CAS registry numbers (chemicals, oligomers)

Genebank sequences (genes)

Legend

F-1

APPENDIX F

POINTS OF CONTACT

Joint Staff/J-7/Joint Doctrine Division

Website: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/

E-mail: [email protected]il

Phone number: 703-692-7273 (DSN 222)

Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor

Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy

Deputy Directorate for Strategic Stability, CWMD Division

Phone: 703-693-3709

E-mail: js.pentagon.j5.list.dd-sts-cw[email protected]

Lead Agent

USSOCOM J59-D

7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill, AFB, FL 33621

Phone: 813-826-6829

E-mail: [email protected]il

Office of Coordinating Responsibility

USSOCOM J5

USSOCOM CWMD-FC

7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill, AFB, FL 33621

Appendix F

F-2 JP 3-40

Intentionally Blank

G-1

APPENDIX G

REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-40 is based on the following primary references:

1. General

a. Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan.

b. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

c. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and

Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.

d. Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

e. Guidance for Employment of the Force.

f. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic

Incidents.

g. Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan.

h. National Biodefense Strategy.

i. (U) National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the

American Military’s Competitive Edge.

j. National Incident Management System.

k. (U) National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2018.

l. National Response Framework.

m. National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

n. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.

o. National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

p. National Strategy for Homeland Security.

q. National Strategy for Strategic Interdiction.

r. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-17/HSPD-4, National Strategy to

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

s. NSPD-20, Counterproliferation Interdiction.

Appendix G

G-2 JP 3-40

t. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62, (U) Protection Against Unconventional

Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas.

u. PPD-8, National Preparedness.

v. PPD-21, (U) Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.

w. The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles.

x. Title 10, USC.

y. Title 14, USC.

z. Title 32, USC.

aa Title 50, USC.

bb. Unified Command Plan.

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. DODD 2060.02, DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy.

b. DODD S-2060.04, (U) DOD Support to the National Technical Nuclear Forensics

(NTNF) Program.

c. DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

d. DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major

Components.

e. DODD 5134.08, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and

Biological Defense Programs ASD[NCB]).

f. DODD 5205.14, DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy.

g. DODI 2000.21, DOD Support to International Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents.

h. DODI 3020.52, DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards.

i. DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.

j. DODI 6055.17, DOD Emergency Management (EM) Program.

k. DODI 6200.03, Public Health Emergency Management Within the Department of

Defense.

References

G-3

l. DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 2030.01D, Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation and Compliance

Policy Guidance.

b. CJCSI 2110.01E, International Transfer of US Defense-Related Technology and

Munitions.

c. CJCSI 3100.01D, Joint Strategic Planning System.

d. CJCSI 3110.01K, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

e. CJCSI 3125.01D, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland.

f. CJCSI 3214.01E, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory.

g. CJCSI 3261.01C, Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons.

h. CJCSI 3401.01E, Joint Combat Capability Assessment.

i. CJCSI 3500.01H, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States.

j. CJCSI 3520.02B, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program.

k. CJCSI 5113.03, (U) Counterproliferation Interdiction Policy.

l. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

m. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

n. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

o. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

p. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

q. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

r. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

s. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Environments.

t. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

Appendix G

G-4 JP 3-40

u JP 3-13, Information Operations.

v. JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Activities.

w. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

x. JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

y. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

z. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

aa. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

bb. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

cc. JP 3-80, Resource Management.

dd. JP 3-84, Legal Support.

ee. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

ff. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

gg. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

hh. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

ii. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

4. Multi-Service Publications

a. ATP 3-11.32/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 10-10E.8/Navy Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-11.37/AFTTP 3-2.46, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive

Defense.

b. ATP 3-11.36/MCRP 10-10E.1/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP 3-2.70, Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Planning.

c. ATP 3-11.41/MCRP 10-10E.6/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP 3-2.37, Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Consequence Management Operations.

d. ATP 4-02.7/MCRP 3-40A.6/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support in a Chemical, Biological,

Radiological and Nuclear Environment.

References

G-5

e. ATP 4-02.283/MCRP 3-40A.2/NTRP 4-02.21/AFMAN 44-161(I), Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological

Casualties.

f. ATP 4-02.84/MCRP 3-40A.3/NTRP 4-02.23/AFMAN 44-156_IP, Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent

Casualties.

g. ATP 4-02.285/MCRP 4-11.1A/NTRP 4-02.22/AFTTP (Instruction) 3-2.69, Multi-

Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties

and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries.

h. Field Manual (FM) 3-11/MCRP10.10E.3/Navy Warfare Publication 3-11/AFTTP

3-2.42, Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Operations.

i. FM 6-05/MCRP 3-30.4/NTTP 3-05.19/AFTTP 3-2.73/USSOCOM Publication 3-

33, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and

Special Operations Forces Integration Interoperability, and Interdependence.

j. Technical Manual 3-11.32/MCRP 10-10E.5/NTRP 3-11.25/AFTTP 3-2.56, Multi-

Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear Warning and Reporting and Hazard Prediction Procedures.

5. Army Publications

a. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations.

b. ADP 3-07, Stability.

c. ADP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

d. ADP 5-0, The Operations Process.

e. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations.

f. ADRP 3-07, Stability.

g. ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process.

h. FM 3-13, Information Operations.

6. Marine Corps Publication

Marine Corps Tactical Publication 10.10E, MAGTF Nuclear, Biological, and

Chemical Defensive Operations.

Appendix G

G-6 JP 3-40

7. Navy Publication

Navy Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.

8. Air Force Publications

a. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-0, Operations and Planning.

b. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-40, Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

Operations.

c. Air Force Instruction 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program.

d. AFMAN 10-2503, Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Environment.

e. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-25, Air Force Emergency Management

Program.

f. AFPD 10-26, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Enterprise.

9. Allied Publications

a. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Medical Publication

(AMedP)-6(C) Volume 1, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive

Operations (Nuclear).

b. NATO AMedP-6(C) Volume 2, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC

Defensive Operations (Biological).

c. NATO AMedP-6(C) Volume 3, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC

Defensive Operations (Chemical).

10. Other Sources

a. DIA and Joint IED Defeat Organization Improvised Explosive Device (IED)

Technical Exploitation Lexicon, 5th edition.

b. Defense Intelligence Agency, Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) Handbook.

H-1

APPENDIX H

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using

the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to:

[email protected]. These comments should address content

(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is United States Special Operations Command.

The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategy, Plans, and

Policy (J-5).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,

made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. John

Campbell, United States Special Operations Command; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr.

Giovanni Pindilli, Joint Staff J-5; Mr. Alan Armistead, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine

Analysis Division; and Lt Col Mark Newell, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.

c. The lead agent would like to acknowledge the efforts of the late Mr. Ernest “Lee”

Smith of USSOCOM J-53 in crafting this publication. Mr. Smith’s lifetime of dedication

to protecting America and its allies from the scourge of weapons of mass destruction has

made an incalculable contribution to the progress the nation has made in controlling the

world’s most dangerous weapons.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31

October 2014.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,

please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to:

[email protected].

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other

organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents

reflected in this publication are initiated.

Appendix H

H-2 JP 3-40

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force

readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint

Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons

learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative

resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness

of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine

development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,

events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become

institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are

routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the

development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil

(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be

IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,

Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD

Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are

available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and

https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/generic.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at

http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and

Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-

Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member,

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-

ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally

reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support

agencies.

GL-1

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

ADP Army doctrine publication

ADRP Army doctrine reference publication

AFMAN Air Force manual

AFPD Air Force policy directive

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures

AMedP Allied medical publication

ANG Air National Guard

AOR area of responsibility

ARNG Army National Guard

ATP Army techniques publication

ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

(DHHS)

AVC Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance

(DOS)

BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

C2 command and control

CBP Customs and Border Protection (DHS)

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CCDR combatant commander

CCMD combatant command

CCP combatant command campaign plan

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (DHHS)

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

cm centimeter(s)

CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau

CP counterproliferation

CSA combat support agency

CT counterterrorism

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

CTR cooperative threat reduction

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ)

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DHS)

Glossary

GL-2 JP 3-40

DOC Department of Commerce

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

DODI Department of Defense instruction

DODS-CWMD Department of Defense Strategy for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction

DOE Department of Energy

DOJ Department of Justice

DOS Department of State

DOT Department of Transportation

DSCA defense support of civil authorities

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DURC dual-use research of concern

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)

FCP-CWMD Functional Campaign Plan for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)

FM field manual (USA)

GCC geographic combatant commander

GEOINT geospatial intelligence

GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

HD homeland defense

HN host nation

HQ headquarters

HSPD homeland security Presidential directive

I interservice (USAF)

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)

IP integrated policy (USAF)

ISN Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

(DOS)

JFC joint force commander

JIACG joint interagency coordination group

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational

environment

JP joint publication

JPP joint planning process

JS Joint Staff

JTF joint task force

kg kilogram(s)

Glossary

GL-3

m³ cubic meter(s)

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCPC National Counterproliferation Center

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NDS national defense strategy

NG National Guard

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NG JFHQ-State National Guard joint force headquarters-state

NIH National Institutes of Health (DHHS)

NMS national military strategy

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE)

NPT Nonproliferation Treaty

NSABB National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NIH)

NSC National Security Council

NSPD national security Presidential directive

NSS national security strategy

NTA nontraditional agent

NTRP Navy tactical reference publication

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

OBA Office of Biotechnology Activities (NIH)

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OE operational environment

OPE operational preparation of the environment

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PM Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS)

PN partner nation

PPD Presidential policy directive

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

Pu-239 plutonium-239

Pu-240 plutonium-240

RDD radiological dispersal device

RED radiological exposure device

SC security cooperation

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SJA staff judge advocate

SOF special operations forces

U-233 uranium-233

U-235 uranium-235

Glossary

GL-4 JP 3-40

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolution

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USC United States Code

USCG United States Coast Guard

USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command

USG United States Government

USINDOPACOM United States Indo-Pacific Command

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

VMD volume median diameter

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-5

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. In countering weapons of

mass destruction, the activities to attribute responsibility for an event, minimize

effects, sustain operations, and support follow on actions. Also called CBRN

response. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

countering weapons of mass destruction. Efforts against actors of concern to curtail the

conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons

of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery.

Also called CWMD. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-40)

counterproliferation. Those actions taken to reduce the risks posed by extant weapons of

mass destruction to the United States, allies, and partners. Also called CP. (DOD

Dictionary. Source: JP 3-40)

nonproliferation. Actions to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by

dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material,

and expertise. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-40)

pathway defeat. Activities to dissuade, deter, delay, disrupt, destroy, deny, and assure to

complicate conceptualization, development, production, and proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

weapons of mass destruction. Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons

capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, excluding the means

of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible

part from the weapon. Also called WMD. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD

Dictionary)

weapons of mass destruction defeat. Activities designed to control, defeat, disable, and

dispose of extant weapons of mass destruction and the ability to stockpile, transfer, or

employ weapons of mass destruction. Also called WMD defeat. (Approved for

inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

weapons of mass destruction proliferation. None. (Approved for removal from the

DOD Dictionary.)

Glossary

GL-6 JP 3-40

Intentionally Blank

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment

matrix

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first

draft (FD)

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

FC joint working group

STEP #4 - Maintenance

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Revision begins 3.5 years

after publication

Formal assessment begins

24-27 months following

publication

STEP #1 - Initiation

Joint doctrine development

community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

Program directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant

command, JS directorate)

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-

end analysis

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM

PLANSPERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

JP 3-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint

Publication (JP) 3-40 Operationsis in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below

illustrates an overview of the development process: