Beauty Pays: Why Attractive People Are More Successful

BEAUTYPAYS

DANIELS.HAMERMESH

BEAUTY

PAYS

WhyAttractivePeople

AreMoreSuccessful

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Hamermesh,DanielS.

Beautypays:whyattractivepeoplearemore

successful/DanielS.Hamermesh.

p.cm.

Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.

ISBN978-0-691-14046-9(hardcover)1.Successinbusiness.2.Success.3.Beauty,

Personal.I.Title.

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CONTENTS
Preface
PARTIBackgroundtoBeauty
CHAPTERITheEconomicsofBeauty
CHAPTERIIIntheEyeoftheBeholder
DefinitionsofBeauty
WhyDoBeautyStandardsMatter?
HowDoWeMeasureHumanBeauty?
DoObserversAgreeonBeauty?
DoesBeautyDifferbyGender,Race,orAge?WhatMakesYouBeautiful?
CanWeBecomeMoreBeautiful?
TheStageIsSet
PARTIIBeautyontheJob:WhatandWhy
CHAPTERIIIBeautyandtheWorker
TheCentralQuestions
HowCanBeautyAffectEarnings?
HowMuchMoreDoGood-LookingPeopleMake?
IsBeautytheRealCause?
WhyAreBeautyEffectsSmallerAmongWomen?

DoBeautyEffectsDifferbyRace?
DoBeautyEffectsDifferbyAge?
CompensatingtheBeauty-DamagedWorker?
LooksMatterforWorkers
CHAPTERIVBeautyinSpecificOccupations
BeautyandChoosinganOccupation
HowBigAreBeautyEffectsWhereBeautyMightMatter?
HowBigAreBeautyEffectsWhereBeautyMightNotMatter?
SortingbyBeauty
CHAPTERVBeautyandtheEmployer
ThePuzzles
DoGood-LookingEmployeesRaiseSales?
HowDoesBeautyAffectProfits?
HowCanCompaniesPayforBeautyandSurvive?
DoCompanieswithBetter-LookingCEOsPerformBetter?
BeautyHelpsCompanies—Probably
CHAPTERVILookismorProductiveBeauty,andWhy?
WhattheBeautyEffectMeans
HowCanBeautyEffectsBeDiscrimination?
HowCanBeautyBeSociallyProductive?
WhatAretheSourcesofBeautyEffects?
WhatIstheDirectEvidenceontheSources?
TheImportanceofBeauty
PARTIIIBeautyinLove,Loans,andLaw
CHAPTERVIIBeautyinMarketsforFriends,Family,andFunds
BeyondtheLaborMarket
HowIsBeautyExchanged?
HowDoesBeautyAffectGroupFormation?

HowDoesBeautyAffectDating?
HowDoesBeautyAffectMarriage?
CouldThereBeaMarketforBeautifulChildren?
DoesBeautyMatterWhenYouBorrow?
TradingBeautyinUnexpectedPlaces
CHAPTERVIIILegalProtectionfortheUgly
FairnessandPublicPolicy
WhatKindsofProtectionArePossible?
HowHaveExistingPoliciesBeenUsed?
IsItPossibletoProtecttheUgly?
WhatJustifiesProtectingtheUgly?
WhatJustifiesNotProtectingtheUgly?
WhatIsanAppropriatePolicy?
ProtectingtheUglyintheNearFuture
PARTIVTheFutureofLooks
CHAPTERIXProspectsfortheLooks-Challenged
TheBeautyConundrum
AreBeautifulPeopleHappier?
WhatWillBeBeautiful?WhatShouldBe?
WhatCanSocietyDo?
WhatCanYouDoIfYou’reBad-Looking?
Notes
Index

PREFACE

I got involved instudyingtheeconomicsofbeautyinacuriousway.Earlyin

1993, I noticed that the data I was using on another research project included

interviewers’ ratings of the beauty of the survey’s respondents. I thought it

would be fun to think about how beauty affects earnings and labor markets

generally.TheresultwasthefirstofthesixrefereedscholarlypapersthatIhave

publishedonthistopic.Aseriousdifficulty formein thislineof researchhas

beenthatmanyeconomistsfindworkonthistopic,andeventhiskindoftopic,

tobebeyondthescopeofeconomicresearch.Thatkindofnarrow-mindedness

hasconspiredinthepasttomakeeconomicsappearboringintheeyesofmany

non-economists.AstheworkofGaryBecker,SteveLevitt,and,toamuchlesser

extent,myownhasshown,economicresearchcanbeanythingbutboring.Many

ofthetopicsthatweworkon,andonwhichseriouseconomicthinkingcanshed

light,arefunandinvolveissuesthatcouldnotbeunderstoodusingthemethods

ofanyotherscholarlydiscipline.

Ibeganworkingnearlytwentyyearsagotodiscoverwhateconomicshasto

sayonthetopicofphysicalappearance.Manyofthethemesthatarediscussed

inthisbookwerefirsttestedoutinscholarlypapers,andlaterbecamepartofan

ever-evolving lecture that I have delivered in various venues, entitled “The

EconomicsofBeauty.”Indevelopingthescholarlypapersandinpresentingthe

public lecture, I have received numerous comments from listeners, both other

economistsand the smartpeoplewho happened toshowup to hearme.Large

numbersofthecommentshavebeenuseful;andevenwheretheyhavenotbeen,

they have still been fun to receive. Perhaps themost amusing was acomment

fromadistinguishedeconomistwhoasked,“Areyousurethatbeautyisn’tjust

correlated with early-birdness [a term whose meaningwas initiallycompletely

opaque to me and most of the audience,but presumably alludes to earlybirds

catchingworms]?”

Iwasnotthefirst to look at the relationship betweenbeautyandeconomic

outcomes—that’s an old topic. I was, however, the first to examine it using a

nationally representative sample of adults, and to do so in the context of

economic models of the determination of earnings. My subsequent work

broadenedthisapproachintoaresearchagendathatinquiredintothe“Why?”of

this relationship and, more generally, into the meaning of discrimination as

perhaps represented by the economic roles of beauty and ugliness. As one

formerstudentofmineputit,allofthishasledtothedevelopmentofasubfield

thatonemightdubpulchronomics.

Many of my colleagues have contributed indirectly to this book. The most

importanthavebeenthecoauthorswhohaveworkedonbeautytopicswithme,

includingthestudentsCiskaBosmanandAmyParker,andmyfriendsXinMeng

andJunsenZhang.CrucialthroughouthavebeenJeffBiddleandGerardPfann,

who have become the most frequent coauthors in my now forty-three-year

professional career. Seminar attendees at a very large number of universities,

and especially at the National Bureau of Economic Research Labor Studies

meetings,havemadecommentsthathaveimprovedsomeofthepapersIdiscuss

inthisvolume.MylaboreconomistcolleaguesGeraldOettingerandSteveTrejo

were also very generous with theirtimetolistentomyideas,aswasMelinda

Moore.

The authors of all the economic studies that have been published since the

early1990shavealso,withoutintendingit,contributedsubstantiallytothework.

Threereviewersofanearlierdraftofthemanuscriptmadecogentcommentsthat

greatlyimprovedthepresentation.Particularcontributionstothebookwerealso

madebyJudithLanglois,ViceProvostattheUniversityofTexasatAustin,and

probably the leading expert on the perception of beauty by infants. My law

professorbrothermade helpful comments on chapter8,andat age ninety-one,

my late mother, Madeline Hamermesh,solved mysearch for a good title.Her

contributionisthefirstthingthatthereadersees.

Usingthe5to1scalethatIdiscussinchapter2,Iama3.Inmyeyes,my

wifeofforty-fouryears,FrancesW.Hamermesh,isa5.(Idid,however,make

themistakeofcommentinginawidelycirculatednewspaperinterviewthatshe

was not Isabella Rossellini,nor was I AlecBaldwin.) She has encouragedmy

work on thistopic over nearly twodecades. Still more important,she made it

clearwhenitwastimetostopproducingnewworkandmaketheentireoeuvre

accessibleoutsidethenarroweconomics specialty.Hercommentsonall drafts

ofthemanuscriptimprovedittremendously.Idedicatethisbooktothisamazing

woman:Shewalksinbeauty,likethenightOfcloudlessclimesandstarryskies:

Andallthat’sbestofdarkandbrightMeetinheraspectandhereyes:

Thesmilesthatwin,thetintsthatglow,Buttellofdaysingoodnessspent,

Amindatpeacewithallbelow,

Aheartwhoseloveisinnocent!

“SheWalksinBeauty,”GeorgeGordon,LordByron

DanielS.Hamermesh,Austin,TexasNovember2010

PARTI

Background

toBeauty

CHAPTER1

TheEconomicsofBeauty

Modern man is obsessed with beauty. From the day we are old enough to

recognizeourfacesinamirroruntilwellaftersenilitysetsin,weareconcerned

with our looks. A six-year-old girl wants to have clothes like those of her

“princess”dolls;apre-teenageboymayinsistonahaircutinthelateststyle(just

asIinsistedonmycrewcutin1955);twenty-somethingsprimpatlengthbefore

a Saturday night out. Even after our looks, self-presentation, and other

characteristicshavelandedusamate,westilldevotetimeandmoneytodyeing

our hair, obtaining hair transplants, using cosmetics, obtaining pedicures and

manicures,anddressingintheclothesthatwespentsubstantialamountsoftime

shopping for and eventually buying. Most days we carefully select the right

outfitsfromourwardrobesandgroomourselvesthoroughly.

The average American husband spends thirty-two minutes on a typical day

washing, dressing, and grooming, while the average American wife spends

forty-four minutes. There is no age limit for vanity: Among single American

womenageseventyandolder,forsomeofwhomyoumightthinkthatphysical

limitationswouldreducethepossibilityofspendingtimeongrooming,wefind

forty-three minutes devoted to this activity on a typical day.

 Many assisted

living facilities and nursing homes even offer on-site beauty salons. For most

Americans, grooming is an activity in which they are willing to invest

substantialchunksoftheirtime.

Wenotonlyspendtimeenhancingourappearance—wespendlargesumsof

money on it too. In 2008, the average American household spent $718 on

women’sandgirls’clothing;$427onmen’sandboys’clothing;$655oninfants’

clothing, footwear, and other apparel products and services; and $616 on

personalcareproductsandservices.
2
Suchspendingtotaledroughly$400billion
andaccountedfornearly5percentofallconsumerspendingthatyear.Nodoubt
some of this spending is necessary just to avoid giving olfactory or visual
offensetofamilymembers,friends,andotherswhomwemeet;butthatminimal
amountisfarlessthanweactuallyspendontheseitems.
There is nothing uniquely modern or American about concerns about dress
and personal beautification. Archaeological sites from 2500 BCE Egypt yield
evidence of jewelry and other body decoration, and traces of ochre and other
bodypaintsarereadilyavailableevenearlier,fromPaleolithicsitesinsouthern
France.Peopleinotherindustrializedcountriesearlyinthetwenty-firstcentury
show similar concerns for their appearance and beauty: For example, in 2001
German husbands spent thirty-nine minutes grooming and dressing, while
German wives spent forty-two minutes in these activities, quite close to the
American averages. This similarity is remarkable, since you would think that
cultural differences might lead to different outcomes.
3
 It suggests the
universalityofconcernsaboutbeautyanditseffectsonhumanbehavior.
The public’s responses to beauty today are fairly similar across the world.
TheChineseproducersofthe2008SummerOlympicsmusthavebelievedthis
whentheyputan extremely cute nine-year-old girlonworldwide television to
lip-syncthesingingofalessattractivechildwhohadabettervoice.
4
Thesame
attitudes underlay the worldwide brouhaha about the amateur English singer,
Susan Boyle, whose contrasting beautiful voice and plain looks generated
immensemediaattentionin2009.
Ourpreoccupationwithlookshasfosteredthegrowthofindustriesdevotedto
indulging this fascination. Popular books have tried to explain the biological
basisforthisbehaviorortoexhortpeopletogrowoutofwhatisviewedasan
outdated concern for something that should no longer be relevant for purely
biologicalpurposes.
5
Newsstandsineverycountryareclutteredwithmagazines
targeting people of different ages, gender, and sexual preference, counseling
their readers on methods to improve their looks. A typical example from the
coverofalifestylemagazineforwomenoffersadviceon“BeautySecretsofthe
Season.”Oneofitscounterpartscounselsmen onhowto“GetFit,Strongand
Leanin6Weeks.”
6
Theimportanceofbeautyisevidentintheresultsofatelephonesurveyinthe
United States.
7
 Among the randomly selected people who responded to the
survey, more felt that discrimination based on looks in the United States
exceeded discrimination on ethnicity/national background than vice-versa.

Slightly more people also reported themselves as having experienced

discriminationbasedontheirappearancethanreporteddiscriminationbasedon

theirethnicity.AverageAmericansbelievethatdisadvantagesbasedonlooksare

realandeventhattheyhavepersonallysufferedfromthem.

Allwellandgood—thetimeandmoneythatwespendonitshouldenhance

ourinterestinbeautyanditseffects,andwe areworriedaboutandexperience

negativefeelingsifourlooksaresubpar.Butistheconcernofeconomistsmore

thanjustaprurientoneinresponsetothisintriguingtopic?Partoftheanswerto

this question stems from the nature of economics as a discipline. A very

appealingcharacterizationisthat economicsis thestudyofscarcityand ofthe

incentivesforbehaviorthatscarcitycreates.Aprerequisiteforstudyingbeauty

asaneconomicissuemustbethatbeautyisscarce.Forbeautytobescarce,as

buyersofgoodsandrentersofworkers’timepeoplemustenjoybeauty.Ifthey

cannotfindsufficient beauty suppliedfreely,and are thereforewillingto offer

moneytoobtainmoreofit,itmustbethatbeautyisscarce.

Take as given the notion that the scarcity of beauty arises from genetic

differencesinpeople’slooks,sothatbysomesociallydeterminedcriteriasome

people are viewed as better-looking than others. (I discuss what I mean

operationallyby“beauty”inthenextchapter.)Wouldbeautystillbescarceifwe

wereallgeneticallyidentical?Ofcourse,thiseventualityisnotabouttooccur,

butevenunderthisunrealisticscenarioitwouldstillmakesensetotalkaboutan

economics of beauty. So long as people desire to distinguish themselves from

others, someofthesehypotheticalcloneswillspend more on their appearance

thanothersinordertostandoutfromthecrowd.SomeofDr.Seuss’sSneetches

—a tribe of birdlike creatures who look identical—illustrate this desire for

distinctionalongonedimensioninthefaceofboringsamenessalongallothers

byputtingstarsontheirbellies.Theterm“scarcebeauty”isredundant—byits

nature,beautyisscarce.

The other part of the answer to this question stems from what I will

demonstrate are the large number of economic outcomes related to beauty—

areaswheredifferencesinindividuals’ beauty can directly influence economic

behavior.Marketsforlaborofavarietyoftypes,perhapsevenalllabormarkets,

mightgeneratepremiumpayforgoodlooksandpaypenaltiesforbadlooks.The

measurement of pay premia and penalties in different jobs and for people

belonging to different demographic groups is a standard exercise among

economic researchers. Doing so in the case of beauty is a straightforward

application.

Witheveryeffectonthepriceofagoodorservice,inthesecaseswagerates,

which are the prices of workers’ time, there is an effect on quantity. How a

personal characteristic alters the distribution of workers across jobs and

occupations is standard fodder for economists; and beauty is surely a personal

characteristic that can change the kinds of jobs and occupations that people

choose.

Ifbeautyaffectsbehaviorinlabormarketsandgeneratesdifferencesinwages

and the kinds of jobs that we hold, it may also produce changes in how we

choosetouseourtimeoutsideourjobs.Howwespendourtimeathomeisnot

independentofhowwespendourtimeatworkorofthekindsofoccupationswe

choose.Ifdifferencesinbeautyalteroutcomesintheworkplace,theyarelikely

toalteroutcomesathometoo.

A characteristic like beauty that affects wages and employment will also

affectthebottom line of companies andgovernmentsthatemploy the workers

whose looks differ. Are certain industries likely to be more significantly

affected? How does the existence of concerns about beauty affect companies’

salesandprofitability?Howisexecutives’payaffectedbytheirbeauty?Perhaps

mostimportant,howcancompaniessurviveifbeautyisscarceandthusaddsto

companies’costsandpresumablyreducestheirprofitability?

Themorebasicquestioniswhythesedirecteffectsonlabor-marketoutcomes

arise.Whosebehaviorgeneratestheoutcomesthatwehopetomeasure?Aside

from allowing us to measure the importance of the phenomenon of beauty in

economicbehavior,economicsasapolicyart/scienceshouldbeabletoisolate

themechanismsbywhichitaffectsoutcomes.Itiscrucialtoknowhowbeauty

generates its effects if we are to guard against giving undue importance to its

role in the functioning of labor markets. It is also important in weighing the

benefitsandcoststosocietyofourattitudesabouthumanbeauty.

Allofthesepossibleeconomicinfluencesofbeautyaredirectandareatleast

potentially measurable. And those measurements can readily be made in

monetaryterms,oratleastconvertedintomonetaryequivalents,sothatwecan

obtainsomefeelforthesizeoftheimpactsrelativetothoseofothereconomic

outcomes.Becauseofthescarcityofbeauty,itseffectsoutsidemarketsforlabor

andgoodscanalsobestudiedineconomicterms.Marriageisjustsuchamarket,

althoughhusbandsandwivesarenotboughtorsoldinrichcountriestoday.Yet

theattributesthatwebringtothemarriagemarketaffecttheoutcomesweobtain

inthatmarket,specificallythecharacteristicsofthepartnerwhowematchwith.

Beautyisoneofthoseattributes,soitisreasonabletoassumethatdifferencesin

thebeautythatwebringtothemarriagemarketwillcreatedifferencesinwhat

wegetoutofit.Wetradeourlooksforotherthingswhenwedateandmarry;but

whatarethoseother things, and how much of themdoourlooks enable us to

acquire?

Takingallofthistogether,theeconomicapproachtreatsbeautyasscarceand

tradable. We trade beauty for additional income that enables us to raise our

living standards (satisfy our desires for more things) and for non-monetary

characteristicsofworkandinterpersonalrelations,suchaspleasantcolleagues,

anenjoyableworkplace,andsoon,thatalsomakeusbetteroff.Researchersin

other disciplines, particularly social psychology, have generated massive

amounts of research on beauty, occasionally touching on economic issues,

particularlyinmarriagemarkets.Buteconomistshaveaddedsomethingspecial

and new to this fascinating topic—a consistent view of exchange and value

relatedtoacentralhumancharacteristic—beauty.

Theeconomicsofbeautyillustratesthepowerofusingverysimpleeconomic

reasoning to understand phenomena that previously have been approached in

otherways.Thatpower,thetimeandmoneythatarespentonbeautyworldwide,

and human fascination with beauty, are more than sufficient reasons to spend

time thinking about beauty from an economic point of view. The economic

approachtobeautyisanaturalcomplementtoeconomicresearchonlessgeneral

topicssuchassuicideandsumowrestling,sleepandcommercialsex.

I concentrate on economic issues, introducing studies from the psychology

and other literatures only where they amplify the economics or contribute

essential foundations to understanding the economics of beauty. These other

approaches are important; they have provided many insights into human

behaviorandgarneredalotofmediaattention.Butbecausetheydonotrestona

choice-basedeconomicapproach,theycannotprovidetheparticularinsightsthat

economicthinkingdoes.

The economic approach is broad, but not all-encompassing. Economic

analysiscannotexplainwhatmakessomepersonalcharacteristicsattractiveand

othersnot—orwhythesameindividual’slooksevokedifferentresponsesfrom

eachdifferentobserver.Wetakethesourcesofdifferencesinpreferencesinthe

samecountryandatthesametimeasoutsideourpurview.Itdoesnotdescribe

how responses to personal characteristics differ over the centuries or among

societies.Ittreatsthesetooasgiven.Butknowingwhathumanbeautyis—what

aretheattributesthatmakethetypicalonlookerviewsomepeopleasattractive

andothersasnot—istheessentialpre-conditionforthinkingabouttheeconomic

impacts of beauty. For that reason, the next chapter describes what we know

about the determinants of human beauty, a topic that has received a lot of

attentionfromsocialpsychologistsandthatunderlieswhateconomicshastosay

abouttheroleofbeauty.

CHAPTER2

IntheEyeoftheBeholder

DEFINITIONSOFBEAUTY

Whatishumanbeauty?Howdoesbeautyvarybygender,race,andage?Most

important,doobservershaveatleastsomewhatconsistentviewsofwhatmakes

apersonbeautiful?Inordertoanswerthesequestions,wefirstneedtoattemptto

definebeauty.Oneonlinedictionaryoffersadefinitionofbeautythatisrelevant

forourpurposes:“Thequalityoraggregateofqualitiesinapersonorthingthat

givespleasuretothesensesorpleasurablyexaltsthemindorspirit.”

Theterm

“aggregate of qualities in a person” comes close to describing beauty in an

economiccontext;butitstillleavesthedefinitionvagueforpracticalpurposes—

whatqualities,whataggregate?“Beautyisintheeyeofthebeholder,”thefirst

stockphrasethatcomestoyourmindwhenaskedabouthumanbeauty,suggests

thatpeople’sopinionsaboutthisquestionofhumanbeautydiffer.

Foreconomicpurposesthequestionsarewhatcharacteristicsmakeaperson

beautiful, and do people agree on what these characteristics are and what

expressionsofthemconstitutehumanbeauty.YouandImaydifferinourviews

about what beauty is. But if our views about human beauty are somewhat

similar, and we are typical individuals, then our opinions are valuable

representativesofhowthegeneralpopulationviewsbeauty.Andifweexamine

how people have viewed beauty over the ages, we can acquire a more

sophisticated understanding of what humanbeauty isand havemore informed

opinionswhenwejudgepeople’slooks.

Even if people agreed completely on what expressions of various

characteristicsconstitutebeauty,wewouldstillneedtodecidewhichparticular

constellationofcharacteristicsshouldbeconsideredinthedefinition.Isithairor

hair color? Weight? Height? Physiognomy—just the face? Internal beauty—

character and its expression—reversing the popular saying that beauty is only

skindeep?Isitgenerosity?Sympathy?Facialexpression?Dress?Combinations

ofthese?Todiscusstheeconomiceffectsofbeauty,Iwanttonarrowthefocus

asmuchaspossibletofaces.Onemightarguethatphysiognomyrepresentsonly

atinypartofhumanbeauty—andthatiscorrect.Nonetheless,physiognomycan

beisolatedandusedasabasisforjudgmentsabouthumanbeauty:

She reminded me of the daughter that I always had wished for. Bright

eyes, a mouth ready to laugh, high cheekbones and luxurious shoulder-

length brown hair. The photo didn’t show if she was short or tall, fat or

thin,bentorerect—itwasonlyapassportphoto.

Or,asthepsychoanalystOliverSacksputit,“itistheface,firstandlast,thatis

judged‘beautiful’inanaestheticsense.”

Asthesequotationssuggest,peoplecananddomakejudgmentsaboutbeauty

based only on physiognomy. Throughout this book I examine how judgments

aboutthisonemanifestationofbeautyaffectbehavior.

No doubt standards of beauty do change over time. The Renoir nudes that

enthralled the art world from the 1880s through the early twentieth century

wouldnotberegardedasgreatbeautiestoday—whilenotunattractive,theyare

probablytoozaftigforcontemporarytastes.Ontheotherhand,late-nineteenth-

centuryobservers almostcertainly wouldhave regardedtoday’s modelson the

runways of Parisian haute couture as incipiently consumptive, perhaps a

character out of La Bohème (just as my late grandmother, born in Europe in

1887, viewed my thin face as suggesting that I am dangerously underweight).

Evenwithinasociety,standardsoffacialbeautydochangeovertime.Standards

alsodiffer,oratleastusedtodiffer,acrosssocietiesatroughlysimilarpointsin

time.Thegentlemaninfigure2.1isRudolfValentino,theHollywoodheartthrob

ofthe1920s.Mostpeopleeventodaywouldagreethathewasquitebeautiful—

presumablythatwasamajorunderpinningofhissuccessasamovieactor.The

gentleman in figure 2.2 also lived in the early twentieth century, but in the

Arctic.Whilehis fellows would haveagreedthathe is beautiful, itisunlikely

thathislookswouldhavelandedhimaHollywoodmoviecontract.

Within a society at a point in time, including the worldwide society of

developed nations, there is substantial agreement on what constitutes human

beauty. I asked three women, ages twenty, thirty-five, and sixty-five, who the

sexiestmenintheworldaretoday.AllthreeincludedGeorgeClooneyintheir

list.Havingpresentedhispictureandthoseofanumberofothermen,including

Asian and American politicians and actors, to audiences in the United States,

Asia,Australia,andEurope,Iamcertainthatthereisnearlyuniversalagreement

thatGeorgeClooneyisconsideredbetter-lookingthanalmostanyoneelse.

Figure2.1.RudolfValentino,actor,1920s.©Bettmann/CORBIS

Figure2.2.Inuitman,1920s.PhotofromMaritimeHistoryArchive,MemorialUniversityof

Newfoundland,St.John’s,NL.

It is not that George Clooney is a Westerner and there is some kind of

universalprejudiceinfavorofWesternfaces.Takethetwowomeninfigures2.3

and 2.4. I would wager that most readers, be they Western or not, would

considerSouthCarolinagovernorNikkiHaley,whoisofSouthAsiandescent,

much better-looking than U.S. senator Barbara Mikulski. These cases at least

provideanecdotalevidenceofthecurrentnear-universalityoftoday’sstandards

ofhumanbeauty.

Figure2.3.NikkiHaley,U.S.politician,2000s.APPhoto/AlexBrandon,File.

Cultural differences do still exist. A recent report on a “fat farm” in

Mauritania, one of the poorest countries in the world, illustrates their

persistence.

Thisisnotthekindof “fatfarm” towhichrichNorthAmericans

retreattoloseweight,butonewhereyounggirlsarefed,andevenforce-fed,to

producerotundyoungadultswhoareviewedasattractive.Buteventhisunusual

cultural difference appears to be diminishing in importance as Mauritania

industrializesandbecomesmoreintegratedwiththeoutsideworld.

Figure2.4.BarbaraMikulski,U.S.politician,2000s.OfficialgovernmentphotofromtheU.S.Senate

HistoricalOffice.

WHYDOBEAUTYSTANDARDSMATTER?

Unlesspeopleagreeonwhatconstituteshumanbeauty—unlessthereisatleasta

somewhat common standard of beauty—it cannot haveany independenteffect

onoutcomessuch as earnings.Itmight seemtohave an effect,evenif people

disagreedaboutbeauty,butthatcouldonlybeifothercharacteristicsthataffect

thoseoutcomesarerelatedtobeauty.

These same arguments apply to the role of beauty in other areas in which

humanbeingstrade.Wetradeourcharacteristicswhenweenterintoamarriage.

AsthestoryofJacob’seffortstowinthehandofRachel“ofbeautifulformand

fair to look at” illustrates, throughout human history men who can raise more

sheep,producemorecrops,orearnmoredollarsinthestockmarkethaveused

thesecharacteristicstoobtainmoredesirable(and,insomesocietiesandepochs,

more)wives.

Ifmenagree on feminine beauty, just as inlabormarkets those

womenviewedasbeautifulwillcommandahigherprice,eitherexplicitlyorin

the form of husbands who can provide them with more resources. They will

obtainmoreandbetterfood,aneasierlifestyle,morefreedomtodowhatthey

want,andotherbenefits.Asmenandwomenbecomemoreequaleconomically,

solongaswomenhavecommonviewsaboutmen’sbeauty,thesamebehavior

will apply in reverse: Women who have more to offer men, including the

economicadvantagestheycanofferprospectivehusbands,willobtainthebetter-

lookinghusbands.

Solongastherearecommonstandardsofbeauty,theywillaffectoutcomes

inanymarketwherebeautyaffectstransactions—whereitaffectswhatistraded.

Thatisastrueforhiringworkersasitisformarriagecontracts.Thequestionfor

analyzingtheeconomiceffectsofbeautyiswhethertheideaofcommonbeauty

standardsisrepresentedbymorethanjustthepictorialanecdotespresentedhere.

Do people agree, at least to some extent, on which of their fellows are good-

lookingandwhicharenot?Dotheysharecommonviewsofhumanbeauty?

HOWDOWEMEASUREHUMANBEAUTY?

Wecan’tseewhethertherearecommonstandardsofbeautyunlessweareable

tocomparedifferentpeople’sviewsaboutbeauty.Andwecan’teasilycompare

them unless we can somehow measure them. The difficultyis that thereis no

singlewaytoattachnumericalscorestoobservers’beliefsaboutthebeautyof

thepeopletheysee.WhenIwasaseniorinhighschoolwereadMarlowe’sDr.

Faustus, in which the title character describes a vision of Helen of Troy and

declaims,“Isthisthefacethatlaunch’dathousandships,andburntthetopless

towers of Ilium?” This prompted one of my fellow nerds to suggest that we

shouldmeasurethepulchritudeofthegirlsinourclassinmilli-Helens!Thisis

as reasonable a subjective measuring device as another, but perhaps

unsurprisinglyithasnotbeenappliedinresearchonbeauty.

One might, for example, use a numerical rating scheme and use a 10 to 1

scale.Onemightinsteadusea5to1scale.Toseethatthesearenotthesame,

lookatthenextfivepeopleyouseeandgiveeachonearatingona5to1scale.

Askyourselfafterward:“IfIhadinsteaduseda10to1scale,wouldmyratings

just have been double those that I gave on the 5 to 1 scale?” I doubt it. In

particular, I would bet that scores of 10 on the 10 to 1 scale would be

substantiallylessfrequentthanthetopscoreonthe5to1scale.

Inaskingonlookerstoratepeople’sbeauty,doweattachverbaldescriptions

to the numerical ratings that observers are asked to give, or are they simply

askedtochooseascore?Evenwiththesamescale,say5to1,theanswerswill

differdependinguponwhat,ifanything,theobserveristoldaboutthemeaning

ofthescores.

What are the observers asked to rate—people standing in front of them, or

pictures? Both approaches have been used, and the difference between them

formsthemainunderlyingdistinctionamong studies of beauty. Ratings of the

same person by the same observer will differ between the two methods. The

picture may show her looking radiant upon her college graduation, or him

beamingonhisweddingday.Peopledonotreactthesamewaytothecamera,

and it is impossible to adjust for differences in their reactions when we use

observers’ratingsofpictures.Somemaybedressedwellforthepicture,others

dressedsloppily.Somemaybecapturedscowling,whileothershaveasmilethat

isglowingenoughtoturna4intoa5.

Assumingthatwerelyonratingsofpictures,whataretheypicturesof?What

are the observers asked to rate?Faces alone? Headand shoulders?Full body?

Posed or not? Since I have defined beauty for the purpose of this study as

physiognomy, head and shoulders, or even the face alone, would be best; but

pictureslikethatarenotalwaysavailable.

Theproblemisequally,but differently,challengingifwerelyonratingsof

peoplewhoarebeinginterviewedface-to-face.Ifnothingelse,andevenwiththe

mostexplicitinstructions,interviewerswilltendtobasetheirassessmentsonthe

natureoftheinteractionsthattheyhavealready hadwiththeperson.Does the

intervieweeanswerthedoorinadresssuit,orinasweatsuitpost-workout?Is

sheattheendofatiringday,orisshefreshandreadytodealwithwhateverthe

world may bring? All of these variations in appearance and behavior will

conditionhowtheinterviewerassessesherlooks.

With both photographs and interviews, it is impossible to be sure that the

raterisbasingtheratingsolelyonphysiognomy.Arestrictiontophysiognomyis

more likely with pictures, but even there, weight may enter into the rating

(remembertheRenoirmodel).Intheend,itisimpossibletorestrictratingstobe

objective—the rating of beauty is inherently subjective. People will always

disagreetosomeextent.

While there may be universal standards of beauty, and thus substantial

agreementonwhatisbeautiful,therearenouniversalstandardsonhowpeople

indifferentcountriesandculturesrespondwhenconfrontedbywhatappeartobe

identical requests to rate others’ beauty. Even with the best translation, what

appeartobethesameratingsystemsmay havedifferentmeanings indifferent

societies. And there may be international differences in raters’ generosity or

willingnesstomakefinedistinctions.

There is no way of avoiding these problems. The best we can do in

interpreting studies of the effects of beauty is to be sure that raters of beauty

were monitored so that they adhered to strict guidelines that are at least

internallyconsistentwhentheyprovidedtheirratings.

Themostwidelyusedscaleinthebeautyliteraturehasbeena5to1rating

scheme, usually with instructions to the interviewers/raters about what these

ratingsmean.Thenumericalscoresweredefinedininstructionstointerviewers

in a nationally representative 1971 survey conducted by the University of

Michigan. They have been used with minor variations in many subsequent

studies,boththosebasedonobservationsduringliveinterviewsandthosebased

onratingsofphotographs.

NeartheendofalengthyinterviewintheMichigansurvey,theinterviewer

wasinstructedto“ratetherespondent’sphysicalappearance”usingthescale:

5 Strikinglyhandsomeorbeautiful

4 Good-looking(aboveaverageforageandsex)

3 Averagelooksforageandsex

2 Quiteplain(belowaverageforageandsex)

1 Homely

Notetheparentheticalqualifiersthatwereincludedtoinducetheinterviewersto

abstract from preconceptions that they might have about age or gender

differencesinlooks.

Togetafeelfortheuseofthisratingscheme,lookatthenexttenstrangers

you see and try rating their looks along this scale. Don’t intellectualize about

your rating—as the interviewers did, it should be a snap response to your

impressions.Iwouldbesurprisedifyoucannoteasilydistinguisha“4”froma

“2”amongthepeopleyouencounter.

IwasobsessedbythesedatainthefirstfewdaysafterIdiscoveredthem.I

walked around my campus mentallyrating the beauty of mostof the people I

passedonthis5to1scale.IadmitthatIalsoratedmycolleagues’looksonthis

scale,thusviolatingtheanonymitythat should exist between subject and rater

butthatisnecessarilyviolatedinratingsbasedoninterviews.

Thedistributionsoftheseinterviewers’ratingsalongthe5to1scaleinthis

studyandinarelatedstudyconductedlaterinthe1970sareshownintable2.1,

separately for men and women. Here, as in many subsequent tabulations of

ratingsofbeautybasedoninterviews,moreindividualsareassessedasbeingin

the top two categories than inthebottom two. Interviewers’ formal subjective

ratings of beauty are not quite characterized by a Lake Wobegon effect—not

everyone is above average in beauty—but the average person whose beauty is

assessedinthisstudyisconsideredaboveaverage.

TABLE2.1

RatingsofAppearance,QualityofAmericanLife,andQualityofEmploymentSurveys,AmericansAges

18–64,1970s(percentdistributions)*

*Tabulationsfromrawdatadescribing1,495womenand1,279men.

Interviewer-based ratings from vastly different cultures produce the same

generalresults.EvidencefromasurveyinShanghai,China,fromthemid-1990s

demonstratesthesimilarityofratingstothoseintheUnitedStates.TheChinese

interviewers were, though, particularly unwilling to rate people as below-

averageinlooks—only1percentofmen,and1percentofwomen,wereratedas

below-averageorugly.Nearlytwo-thirdsofeachgroupwasratedasaverage.

Using the same 5 to 1 scale as in table 2.1, raters examined nearly 2,500

photographs of students who entered a large, prestigious law school between

1969and1984.Eachphotograph(typicallyhead-and-shouldersshots)wasrated

byfourdifferentobservers.Aswiththeinterviewratings,nearlyhalfthepeople

wereratedasaverage-looking.

The 5 to1 scale ora minor variant is most common, but others have been

used. One study asked six raters (three male and three female undergraduate

students)tousea10to1scaletoexaminephotographstoassessthelooksofa

groupofninety-fourprofessors(whomthesixstudentsdidnotknow).

Asinthe

lawstudents’study,therewasnotendencytoratetheprofessors’looksasabove

themiddle ofthe 10-pointscale—indeed,morewererated 5or lessthanwere

rated6orabove.Partlythismaybeduetotheprofessors’ages(averagingfifty)

beingso differentfromthose oftheundergraduates doingtheratings. Partlyit

mayjustbethesample:Whenaskedwhyhisratingswereparticularlylow,one

malestudentremarked,“Becausetheseprofsarereallyugly!”

DOOBSERVERSAGREEONBEAUTY?

That people are biased in favorof judging others’ beauty as onaverage being

above-average,orevenasbelow-average,isnotaproblem—itiseasytoadjust

statistically for these biases in drawing conclusions about the relationship

betweendifferencesinbeautyandanyeconomicorotheroutcome.Thetougher

questioniswhetherpeopleagreeonthebeautyofaparticularindividual,andthe

extent of that agreement, if any. Without that there would be no common

standards of beauty. Beauty would have no meaning in an economic context,

since its diffuseness would mean it could not be scarce. And I would not be

writingthisbook!

Therearetwodifferentwaystodiscovertheextentofraters’agreementabout

people’s beauty. The first,which has been usedonly rarely, is tolook at how

raters’assessmentsofpeople’sbeautyvarywhentheyviewthesameindividuals

atdifferenttimes.Answersusingthisapproachcanbeseenfromastudybased

onpicturesofeconomists.Iaskedfour studentswho werejust beginningtheir

graduate studies to rate the looks of a large number of pictures of leading

economists, many of whom were included multiple times and submitted a

differentphotographeachtime.Ofcourse,thesameindividualreceiveddifferent

ratingsfordifferent pictures,butthose differencesweresmallcomparedtothe

differencesintheaverageratingsreceivedbydifferenteconomists.

Answers based on interviews can be seen from a nationally representative

studyundertakeninCanada,inwhichthesamepeoplewereinterviewedin1977,

1979,and1981.Eachindividualwascontactedbyadifferentinterviewerineach

year,allowinganopportunityfordifferentviewsoftheinterviewee’slookstobe

expressed. The interviewerswereaskedtoassess looks using the 5 to 1 scale.

Comparing ratings in adjacent years, 54 percent of women and 54 percent of

men were rated identically in each of the two years; and only 3 percent of

womenand2percentofmenreceivedaratinginthesecondyearofapairthat

differedbymorethan1fromtheratingthattheyhadreceivedinthefirstyearof

thatpair.

Evenindifferentinteractionswithdifferentinterviewerstherewasa

remarkabletendencytoviewtheinterviewees’looksverymuchthesameway.

Thesecondwayoftestingforconsistencyinourviewsofothers’beautyisto

ask a group of individuals to provide independent ratings of another person’s

looks. Typically this has been done by showing each of a number of people,

noneofwhomcancontacttheothers,thesamephotograph.Whiletherewillbe

disagreements, the question is whether they are small, so that the averages

informusaboutgeneralperceptionsofeachperson’slooks.

Asanexample,taketheratingsofthelawstudents’photosdescribedearlier.

Complete agreement—all four observers giving the exact same score to a

photograph—wasfairlyuncommon,occurringforonly14percentofthephotos.

Butnearagreement,definedasallfourratingsthesame,asthreeoffourraters

ratingthepictureidentically,orastwopairsofraterswhodifferbyonly1point

on the 5-point scale, occurred with the photos of 67 percent of the female

studentsand75percentofthemalephotos.Onlyone-tenthof1percentofthe

studentswererateddifferentlybyallfourraters.Completedisagreementabout

looksisanextraordinarilyrareevent.

Even in the case of the professors, where the 10 to 1 scale allows for a lot

moreminordisagreementamongthesixraters,54percentoftheprofessorswere

ratedidenticallybyatleastthreeofthesixraters.Amongtheeconomists,who

werealsoratedonthe10to1scale,28percentofthepicturesreceivedthesame

scorefrom threeof thefour raters,and 80percent wererated identicallyby at

leasttwoofthefour.

Thereareconsistentdifferencesinhowindividualsrateeachother’sbeauty.

Within the same culture some people are always harsh in rating their fellow

citizens’ looks, and others are consistently more generous. In the study that

establishedthe5-pointratingscheme,eachofsixtyinterviewersratedatleastten

subjects.Theaverageratingsranged from3.6 (closerto above-averagethanto

average)bythemostgenerousinterviewerdownto2.4(closertoplainthanto

average)bythemostnegativeinterviewer.Butonly10percentofthedifferences

intheratingsofintervieweescanbeascribedtojudgmentsbyraterswhoapplied

particularly harsh or generous standards. While interviewers do have different

standards,theeffectsoftheirdifferencesaredwarfedbytheinherentdifferences

inpeople’slooks.

About half of the interviewers in thatstudy were between ages twenty-two

andforty-nine,theotherhalfwerebetweenagesfiftyandseventy-four.Despite

their possibly different perspectives on the subjects’ looks, there were no

statistically meaningful differences in the ratings given by interviewers of

differentages. But while interviewers’age was independent oftheratings that

they assigned, there were differences by gender. Men seemed to be stingier

ratersofthesubjects’beauty.

There are also differences across countries, probably having to do with

culturaldifferencesinpeople’swillingnesstosaysomethingnegativeabouttheir

fellows.Forinstance,AmericansseemslightlymorewillingthantheirCanadian

neighbors to label someone as plain or homely. As noted earlier, in the

Shanghainese data, only 1 percent of the interviewees were rated as below

average. The only useful distinction in those data is between those rated as

averageandthoseratedasprettyorverypretty.

Despite these consistent disagreements and biases, the answer to the titular

question of this section is a resounding, “MOSTLY!” There is no universal

agreementbygroupsofpeopleonanyoneelse’sbeauty.Somepeopleareharsh

judgesofothers’looks,whileotherpeoplearegenerousintheirappraisals.But

individuals do tend to view others’ beauty similarly, although not identically.

Someone who is considered above-average in looks by one observer will be

viewed the same way by most other observers. Someone who a randomly

selectedpersonthinksisquiteuglywillbeviewedasquiteuglybymostother

observers. Yes, there are disagreements, but there is also a lot of agreement.

Thereisnouniqueviewaboutbeauty—nouniquestandard.Butbecausepeople

tendtoviewhumanbeautysimilarly,thosewhoaregenerallyviewedasgood-

looking possess a characteristic—their beauty—that appeals to most other

human beings in similar ways and that ipso facto is in short supply. Human

beautyisscarce.

DOESBEAUTYDIFFERBYGENDER,RACE,OR

AGE?WHATMAKESYOUBEAUTIFUL?

Arewomenbetter-lookingthanmen?IthinksowhenIthinkromantically,but

you no doubt have your own views on this subject. The question, though, is

whetherwethinkthatwaywhenwetrytoassesspeople’slooksobjectively.The

averagemaleinthedataunderlyingtable2.1wasratedalmostthesameasthe

average woman. In the Shanghai data, women were rated as slightly better-

lookingthanmen,withthedifferenceresultingfrommorewomenbeingratedas

beautiful.

This near equality only arises if the individuals being rated are chosen

randomly.Womenconstitutedonly12percentofthelawstudentswhoentered

theprestigiouslawschoolbetween1969and1974.Theaverageratingoftheir

lookswas3.1,comparedtothe2.8averageratingoftheirmalefellowstudents,

perhapsbecausethosefewwomenwerespecialinmanyotherways.Bythenext

decade,femalestudentshadincreasedto31percentoftheenteringclasses,and

thedifferenceinaveragelooksbetweenmaleandfemalestudentswasonlyhalf

aslargeasbefore.Selectionintothesamplecanproduceunequalaveragesofthe

ratingsofthelooksofmenandwomen.Butwheremenandwomenareroughly

equally represented among the subjects, the average ratings of men’s and

women’slooksareusuallynearlyidentical.

Whileaverageratingsoflooksareroughlyequalbygender,thedistributions

differ, as the columns in table 2.1 illustrate. Ratings of women’s looks were

moreextremethanratingsofmen’s:Morewereratedasplainorhomely,more

were rated as strikingly beautiful or above-average, and fewer were rated as

possessing average looks. Interviewers react more strongly to women’s looks,

both positively and negatively in other interview studies too; and in studies

examiningphotographs,womenarealsoviewedmoreextremelythanmen.For

example,14percentoftheratingsoffemaleprofessorswereabove7,whileonly

6percentoftheratingsofmaleprofessorswere.

Whether beauty differs by race is another concern—if, for example,

employersperceive AfricanAmericans’ beautydifferently fromthat ofwhites,

any differences in earnings related to race could be confounded by disparate

treatment based on looks rather on than on race per se. In the two American

studies from the 1970s the interviewers, nearly all of whom were white, gave

almostidenticalratingson averageto whitesand AfricanAmericans.Butthey

did rate subjects of different races differently, reacting more extremely to the

whitesthantotheAfricanAmericans.Thirteenpercentofwhiteswereratedas

plainorhomely,whileonly10percentofAfricanAmericanswere.Attheupper

end, 32 percent of whites were viewed as being at least above-average, while

only 28 percent of African Americans were. There may well be differences

betweenhow membersofother races—AsianAmericans,for example—would

beratedbythewhiteraters,butwejusthavenoinformationonthatpossibility.

Whetherweconsiderlooksbygenderorrace,wereachthesameconclusion.

Therearenodifferencesinaverages,butthedistributionsofratingsofwomen’s

looksaremoredispersedthan those of men’s, and of whites’ looks morethan

thoseofAfricanAmericans.

The same conclusion cannot be drawn about differences in ratings of the

beautyofpeopleofdifferentages.Ratingsofwomen,andofmenfromstudies

conductedinthe1970s,demonstratethatthelooksofyoungerpeoplearerated

onaveragemorefavorablythanthoseofolderpeople.Eventhoughinterviewers

wereexplicitlyinstructedtoadjust“forageandsex,”theycouldn’t.

The differences in ratings by age are not small. Of women in the 18–29

group, 45 percent were rated at least above-average, while only 18 percent of

women50–64wereratedthatfavorably,aremarkabledrop-off.Thedeclinein

perceived looks with age is smaller among men, with 36 percent of men ages

18–29 rated above-average, while 21 percent of men 50–64 were rated that

favorably.Ageisharsheronourperceptionsofwomen’slooks.

Thereisnothinguniqueaboutthedifferencesinperceivedbeautybyagein

ourWesternculture.EveninChina,wherethestereotypeisoneofgreatrespect

forolderpeople,youngerpeople’sbeautyisratedmorepositively.Theaverage

ratingofpeopleages22–34 intheShanghaidatawas3.5;thatofpeopleages

35–49 was 3.4, while people 50 and over received ratings that only averaged

3.3.

 The Chinese observers were no more able to separate beauty from age

thantheirAmericancounterparts.

Whytheseagedifferencespersistisnotatopicforthisbook—theirexistence

isallthatisimportant,asthecorrelationofperceivedbeautywithagedictates

thatanystudyoftheimpactofbeautymustadjustforageifwebelievethatage

mightalso affecttheoutcome. Itisinteresting, though,to speculate whythese

differences arise. It might be that people’s inability to adjust mentally for age

when they rateothers’ looks is evolutionarily valuable. We are conditioned to

believethatyouthandbeautygotogether,sincethatbeliefencouragesmatingat

atimewhenfecundityisnearitsmaximum.

Thisevidenceonbeautyandagedoesnotcomparethesamepeopleovertheir

lifetimes, and no large-scale study has followed the same people’s looks over

largepartsoftheirlives.Smallerstudieshavedonethis,though,takingpictures

ofpeopleatanearlyageandaskingraterstoratethemandphotosofthesame

people taken much later in life. The ratings were very highly correlated. The

generalconclusionis,“Uglyducklingsgenerallyblossomintouglyducks.”

Whatisitaboutaperson’sfacethatleadsmostobserverstoviewitasgood-

looking? What characteristics of another person’s face cause most of us to

consider it plain or even homely? The answers to these questions are not

requiredforourpurposeshere:Solongaspeopleagreeaboutothers’looks,and

so long as we can adjust for any systematic differences across culture, age,

gender, race, or other characteristics in how looks are viewed, we can use

observers’commonagreementsaboutindividuals’lookstoanalyzetheimpacts

oflooksonoutcomesandevenonsuccessinavarietyofareas.

Althoughnoteconomic,thesequestionsarefascinating;andtheyhavebeen

studied by a number of social psychologists. The leading work, by my

University of Texas colleague Judith Langlois, has produced a number of

interestingresults,amongwhichare:(1)Agreementonwhatconstituteshuman

beauty, and especially human ugliness, is formed very early in life—probably

during infancy. (2) Symmetry is beauty—a symmetric face is considered

beautiful,whileincreasinglyasymmetricfacesareviewedasincreasinglyugly.

CANWEBECOMEMOREBEAUTIFUL?

The evidence makes it clear that people’s looks relative to those of others of

theiragedonotchangegreatlyovertheirlifetimes.Butwithcommonagreement

on looks, why don’t people alter them to meet the commonly agreed-upon

standardsofbeauty ofthesociety wheretheylive?Ifbeautycanpayoff,why

notbecomebeautiful?

Theprospectofbecomingbetter-lookingisendlesslyappealingtopeople.But

even fiction, such as the movie Face-Off with John Travolta, recognizes that

greatly changing one’s looks is exceedingly difficult. Procedures to remove

blemishes and wrinkles are done all the time, as is evidenced by actors,

actresses, and politicians who have “had a lot of work done,” using the

Hollywoodterminology.In2007,Americansreceivedover4.6millioninjections

of Botox, had 285,000nose-reshaping surgeries, and 241,000 eyelidsurgeries.

Allofthiswasgoodbusinessforplasticsurgeons,tothetuneof$12billionon

cosmeticplasticsurgery.

Citizensofotherwealthycountriesarelessweddedtotheseprocedures,but

they too devote substantial resources to them. In 2006, Britons devoted about

$800 million to cosmetic procedures, about one-third as much per capita as

Americans,butenoughtoleadtheEUonaper-capitabasis.Thiswasfourtimes

morethantheyhadspentin2001.ItaliansrankedsecondinEuropeinspending

oncosmeticsurgery,Francecamethird,closelyfollowedbyGermany.

While fictional beautification methods may convert “3” or even “1” people

into“5’s,”theirreal-worldcounterpartsdonotandcannotremovetheessential

asymmetries that detract from how their beauty is perceived by the rest of

humankind.Theeffortscanhelp,totheextentthatperceptionsofhumanbeauty

arebasedincharacteristicsotherthanthesymmetryoffacialfeatures.Weknow

thatthebeautyofyoungerpeopleisperceivedmorepositivelythanthatoftheir

elders,sothatattemptingtofindsurgicalfountainsofyouthwillhelp improve

howourbeautyisperceived.Nonetheless,thesechangesarelikelytobesmall.

Perhapsthepayoffstoplasticsurgeryaresimplynotgreatenoughtojustify

thespendingthatmightmakeonesubstantiallymorebeautiful.Perhapstheyare,

butthecostsoftheimprovement,bothindollartermsandinpainandsuffering,

are too large to get people to undergo the surgery. These possibilities are

suggestedbysomeresultsdescribingexamplesofplasticsurgeryinKorea.For

most people, the potential economic gains from the improvements in beauty

wereveryfarfromjustifyingeventhemonetarycostoftheprocedure,muchless

thepsychologicalcost—the“painandsuffering”—ofundergoinganysurgery.

If plastic surgery cannot convert usall tobeauties, orwe cannotafford the

costofsurgery,orwedon’twanttobearthepainofthesurgerythatwouldbe

requiredtoaccomplishthis,maybeasimplerapproachwouldwork:Buybetter

clothing,usemorecosmetics,getbettercoiffed,etc.Magazinesandnewspaper

columns are devoted to “dressing for success” and “beauty makeovers,”

includingrecommendationsoftheappropriateclothing,hairstyle,manicure,etc.

Doesthiskindofspendingreallywork?Canwemakeourselvesmorebeautiful

byspendingmoreonnon-surgicalmethodsofbeautyenhancement?

TheShanghaisurveycollectedinformationontheamountthateachwoman

spenteachmonthonclothing,cosmetics,andhaircare,aswellasonherlooks,

as rated by the interviewer. Comparing the woman who spent the average

amount on these items per month, to another who spent nothing, the average

woman’sspendingonlyraisedherlooksfrom3.31to3.36.Onemightthinkthat

thesewomencoulddobetterbyspendingstillmore;anditistruethatincreasing

spending to five times the average (over 20 percent of average household

income)wouldraisetheratingoftheaveragewoman’sbeautyto3.56.Butthe

datamakeitveryclearthattheextraeffectofthisspendingdiminishesthemore

onehasalreadyspent.

Many popular stories suggest that people believe that wardrobe, hairstyle,

cosmetics, and surgery will improve their economic outlook.

 The evidence

indicates that this is simply wrong: in the Chinese study each dollar spent on

improvingbeautybroughtbackonlyfourcentsonaverage.Justasmuchofour

spending on health may not increase our longevity, but may let us enjoy life

more,sotooitmaymakesensetospendonplasticsurgeryandbetterclothes.

Thebestreasonforthiskindofspendingisthatitmakesyouhappier.Itisnota

goodinvestmentifyouseekonlythenarrowgoalofeconomicimprovement.

Somedaytechnologymayallowustoreachthepointwherewecanimprove

ourbeautyeasilyandwithoutgreatcost.Rightnow,though,wearesofaraway

from that point that for most of us the beauty that we have attained as young

adults is not going to be greatly altered, compared to the beauty of our

contemporaries,bynaturalchangesthatoccurasweage,norbyanysurgicalor

cosmeticeffortsthatweundertaketoimproveit.Barringdisfiguringaccidents,

wearebasicallystuckwithwhatnatureandperhapsearlynurturehavegivenus.

THESTAGEISSET

The array of evidence presented here provides the background for discussing

howaneconomicwayofthinkingabout beautymightproceed—howwhatwe

know about human perceptions of human beauty conditions the analysis of

beauty’seffects.Themainconsistentresultsare:

1. Most important of all, there is substantial agreement among observers

aboutwhatconstitutesfacialbeauty.Beautyisintheeyeofthebeholder,

but most beholders view beauty similarly. Some people are consistently

regarded as above-average or even beautiful, while others are generally

regardedasplainorevendownrighthomely.

2.Inmanystudies,morepeopleareratedasgood-thanasbad-looking.

3. Beauty is fleeting—and youth is beauty. Even when we are asked to

accountfor individuals’agesin judgingtheir looks,wejust cannotdo it.

Peopletendtorateyoungadultsasmoreattractivethanolderpeople.

4.Peoplewhoareviewedasrelativelygood-lookingwhenyoungtendtobe

ratedasrelativelygood-lookingwhenolder.

5. While looks can be altered by clothing, cosmetics, and other short-term

investments, the effects of these improvements are minor. Even plastic

surgerydoesn’tmakeahugedifference.Theoldadage,“Youcan’tmakea

silkpurseoutofasow’sear,”appliestohumanlooksaswellastoporcine

purses. Even with today’s technology and lower costs, we are generally

stuckwithwhatnaturehasgivenusinthewayoflooks.

6.Women’slooksareperceiveddifferentlyfrommen’s—observersaremore

likelytoratewomenasbeautifulorugly,andaremorelikelytodisagree

aboutwomen’slooks.

Taking all theseconsiderations together, our agreementon what constitutes

beauty allows sufficient scope for beauty to affect behavior in many facets of

economiclife.Becausepeopleagreeaboutothers’lookstoatleastsomeextent,

marketsforlabor,mates,credit,andnodoubtothermarkets,canbeaffectedin

ways that alter how participants in those markets behave and that help to

determinethebenefitsthattheyobtain.

PARTII

BeautyontheJob:

WhatandWhy

CHAPTER3

BeautyandtheWorker

THECENTRALQUESTIONS

Everybody assumes that better-looking people make more money. But why

shouldthatbe?Isiteventrue?Andifitistrue,howmuchmoredotheymake?

Putsimply,howmuchextradoesagood-lookingworkerearnthananaverage-

looking worker? How much less than an average-looking worker does a bad-

looking worker make? These sound like simple questions, but they aren’t.

Becausebeautymayberelatedtoothercharacteristicsthatworkerspossess,we

needtoseparateouttheeffectsofbeautyonincomefromthoseofotherthings

thatmayberelatedtobothbeautyandincome.Answerstothesequestionsare

the most widely available in the burgeoning literature in pulchronomics—the

economicsofbeauty.Wehaveaprettygoodfeeltodayforthegeneralsizesof

thebeautypremiumandtheuglinesspenalty.

Does beauty affect income differently for men and women? Does it affect

income differently among older workers than among younger workers? How

aboutbyraceorethnicity?WhileIconcentrateontheUnitedStatesthroughout

mostofthisbook,onewonderswhethertheimpactsofbeautyonincomesdiffer

betweentheUnitedStatesandothercountries.Isthereaspecial“hang-up”with

beauty in the American labor market that produces unusually large effects on

incomes compared to elsewhere? How have gains in income that result from

one’sbeautychangedovertime?Areweoutgrowingafixationonlooks,ordoes

theeffectoflooksinlabormarketsloomevenlarger?

HOWCANBEAUTYAFFECTEARNINGS?

Imagineaworldwithonlytwocompanies,eachwithasinglebosswhomakes

allthehiringdecisions.CallthebossesCathyandDeb.Theircompaniesmake

completely different products—they do not compete with each other in what

they sell; and each employs half of the workersin this imaginaryworld. Both

Cathy and Deb like to surround themselves with workers whom they view as

beautiful.Doingsomakesthemfeelbetterandenhancestheirwell-beingbeyond

thetremendousprofitstheywillearnfromtheirworkers’efforts.Alltheworkers

are equally productive—each has the same set of skills, each can help the

employerproduceasmuchasanyotherworkercan.Allworkersworkthesame

numberofhoursperyear.Halftheworkersareclonedfromoneparent,Al;the

otherhalfareclonedfromanotherparent,Bob.AllAlworkerslookalike,asdo

allBobworkers;butanAlworkerlooksdifferentfromaBobworker.

HowmuchwilleachAlworkerbepaid?HowmuchwilleachBobworkerbe

paid?WeknowthateachAlworkerwillearnthesameaseveryotherAlworker

—theyareidenticalinallrespects.ThesameistrueforeachoftheBobworkers

—theytooareidenticaltoeachother.TheonlyissueishowAlworkers’wages

willdifferfromBobworkers’wages.

Becausethey,likepeoplegenerally,sharecommonstandardsofbeauty,it’s

likely that Cathy and Deb think somewhat similarly about the looks of their

potential employees. What if both Cathy and Deb think that Al workers are

beautiful,whileBobworkersarenot?IfAlandBobworkerswerepaidthesame

wage,bothCathyandDebwouldwanttohirealltheAlworkers.Butthereare

onlyenoughAlworkersforoneofthem.Theonlywaythatcompetitionforthe

AlworkerscanassignthemtoCathyorDebisifthewagesofAlworkersare

biduptothepointwheretheirextrapayjustoffsetstheextrasatisfactionthatthe

“winning”employergetsfromemployingtheAlworkers.

Towinthe competition for the(good-looking)Al workers, Cathy mustpay

them a premium,just enough to outbid Deb. Her costs are higher than Deb’s,

who is stuck with the Bob workers who both Deb and she view as ugly. But

Cathy is just as happy about her employees as Deb, since her extra costs are

offsetbythe extra satisfactionshe gets fromemployingthe Al workerswhom

Debandshebothviewasbeautiful.Withacommon standardofbeauty,labor

markets establish premium pay for the good-looking workers—or, viewed in

reverse, penalty pay for the ugly workers—based on the extent to which

employersvaluelooks.InthiscasethepremiumistheamountthatCathyhasto

paytoovercomeDeb’sdesireforthegood-lookingAlworkers.

ThisexampleassumedthatCathy’sandDeb’spreferencesfortheirworkers’

beautydeterminewhatwageswouldbe.Whatif,though,CathyandDebdon’t

reallycareabouttheirworkers’looks,buttheircustomerscareaboutthelooksof

theworkerswhomakethegoodstheybuy,ormorerealistically,aboutthelooks

of the workers who are selling to them? If both Cathy’s and Deb’s customers

prefer Al-type workers, Al-type workers will receive higher wages than Bob-

typeworkers.Theoutcomesarethesame,whetheritisCathy’sandDeb’sown

preferences that determine the effect of looks on wages, or whether their

behaviorjustexpressestheircustomers’preferences.

Whose preferences generate premium pay for beauty, and penalties for

ugliness, can’t be determined just by showing the existence and size of those

differencesinearnings—itrequiresadeeperinvestigationofunderlyingcauses.

Wemustfirstseewhetherandbyhowmuchbeautyisrewarded,aswedointhis

chapter. We need to discover how it affects people’s choices of what work to

undertake;andweneedtoseehowcompanies’salesandprofitsrelatetotheir

employees’looks.

HOWMUCHMOREDOGOOD-LOOKINGPEOPLE

MAKE?

To begin answering these questions, take the most important: To what extent

doesbeautyaffecttheearningsofthetypicalworker?Onitsfacethisseemsto

be a simple task: Find a large group of individuals, randomly chosen from a

country’s population; get measures of their looks, by one of the methods we

havediscussed;obtaininformationontheirearnings;andcomparetheirearnings

totheirlooks.

ThisisnotsoeasytodofortheUnitedStatesasonemightthinkorhope—

the most recent nationally random data that provide this information are from

surveys collected in the 1970s—the data underlying table 2.1. Regrettably, no

nationally representative set of data since the 1970s contains information on

earnings and also ratings of the respondents’ beauty. This means that these

effects are best described as what were the effects of beauty on earnings. But

using these data we can get an initial picture of how beauty and earnings are

relatedinthegeneralpopulation.

Usingtheselargerandomsamplesofwomenandmen,wecancomparetheir

earnings to the ratings of their looks. Compared to the average group (people

ratedas3onthe5to1scale),below-averagelookingwomen(rated2or1onthe

scale) earn 3 percent less, while below-average looking men earn 22 percent

less.Above-averagelookingwomen(rated 4 or 5 on the scale) earn 4 percent

morethantheaverage-looking,whileabove-averagelookingmenearn3percent

more.Thereisapremiumforgoodlooks,apenaltyforbadlooks.Exceptforthe

penaltyforthe11percentofmenwhoselooksareratedasbelow-average,these

differences in earnings are not large; but they are in the directions that you

wouldexpect.

These simple differences are interesting; but are they genuine, or do they

merely reflect the strong possibility that beauty and other things that increase

one’searningsarerelated?Thenumberof“otherthings”ispotentiallyhuge;but

a thorough approach would take anything that has repeatedly been shown to

affectearnings,andwouldthenadjustforitsimpactsinordertoisolatetheeffect

ofbeautyonearnings.Theseotherfactorsinclude:

• Education (increasing earnings)—what if better-looking people are better

educated?

•Age(increasingearningsuptosomepoint,perhapstothemid-fiftiesfora

typicalworker,thenreducingearnings)—weknowthatageandbeautyare

•Health(healthierpeopleearnmore)—beautymayberelatedtohealth

•Unionmembership(increasingearnings)

•Maritalstatus(positiveeffectsamongmen,negativeeffectsamongwomen)

—beautymayberelatedtowhetheryouaremarriedornot

•Race/ethnicity(minoritiesearnlessthannon-Hispanicwhites)

•Sizeofcity(higherearningsinbiggercitiesandinmetropolitanasopposed

tonon-metropolitanandruralareas)

•Region(higherintheEastthanintheSouth)

•Nativity(immigrantsearnlessthannatives)

•Familybackground(loweramongpeoplewhoseparentswereimmigrants)

•Sizeofcompany(higherinbigfirms)orplant(higherinlargerplants)

•Yearswiththecompany(increasingearningsuntillateinaperson’stenure

withthecompany)

Numerousstudieshaveshownthateachofthesefactorsaffectsearnings.Since

mostorevenallofthemmightdiffersystematicallywithanindividual’slooks,

toisolatetheeffectoflooksonearningsweneedtoadjustearningsusingdataon

asmanyofthemaswecan.

Table3.1showstheaverageimpactsofbeautycombiningdatafromthetwo

samplesofAmericansinthe1970s.Thepenaltiesforbelow-averagelooks,and

the premia for above-average looks, are based on statistical analyses that

adjustedearningsformostoftheseotherfactorsinordertoisolatetheeffectof

differences in beauty. An asterisk (*) denotes that the impact is statistically

meaningful—thatwecanbefairlysurethatlookshavesomeeffectonearnings.

TABLE3.1

PercentageImpactsofLooksonEarnings,U.S.,1970s(comparedtoaverage-lookingworkers,rated3),

AdjustedforManyOtherDeterminantsofEarnings

Notethatthesenumbersareinthesamedirectionsasthenumbersthatdidnot

accountforalltheotherdeterminantsofearnings.Theydochange—theseother

determinants of earnings do matter; but the basic conclusion, that there is a

penaltytoearningsforbadlooksandpremiumpayforgoodlooks,isunaltered.

Ifasked,“WhatistheoveralleffectoflooksonearningsintheU.S.?”thebest

answer, based on table 3.1, is thatthe bottom 15 percent of women by looks,

those rated as below-average (2 or 1), received 4 percent lower pay than

average-looking women. The top one-third of women by looks, those ratedas

above-average(4or5),received8percentmorethanaverage-lookers.Formen,

thecomparablefiguresarea13percentpenaltyanda4percentpremium.

There is nothing written in stone about these numbers. No doubt, if other

nationally representative data were available, the estimates of these effects

woulddiffer.Butwecanbefairlysurethattheeffectsofbeautyonearningsare

intheballparkofthefiguresintable3.1.

Thesenumbersmeanlittlebythemselveswithoutcomparisonstotheeffects

ofotherdeterminantsofdifferencesinearnings.Howdoesthe17percentexcess

of good-looking men’s earnings over those of bad-looking men’s (13 percent

penaltyplus 4percent premium)comparetotheeffects ofdifferences inother

characteristicsonmen’searnings?Howdoesthe12percentshortfallofplainor

homelywomen’searningsfromabove-averageorbeautifulwomen’s(4percent

penaltyplus8percentpremium)comparetoothereffectsonwomen’searnings?

Byfarthemostthoroughlyexamineddeterminantofearningsiseducation.A

good estimate for the United States today is that each additional year of

schooling raises the earnings of otherwise identical workers by around 10

percent.

 This effect is a bit more than that of women’s good looks; and it

impliesthatmen’sgoodlookshaveanimpactontheirearningsatleastaslarge

asanadditionalone-and-a-halfyearsofschool.

Amongtheotherfactorsthataffectearningsareworkexperienceandwhether

aworkplaceisunionized.Foraforty-year-oldmantheimpactofgoodlookson

earningsisaboutthesameasthatofanadditionalfiveyearsofworkexperience,

and also about the same as that of working in a unionized workplace.

 The

effectsofbeautyonearningsarenotimmense,buttheyarecertainlysubstantial.

Whenviewedinthecontextofanentireworkinglife,theyseemevenlarger.

In 2010, the average worker earned about $20 per hour. Averaging male and

female workers, someone employed 2,000 hours per year over a work life of

fortyyearswouldearn$1.60million.Butwithbelow-averagelookstheworker

would earn only $1.46 million, while with above-average looks, lifetime

earningswouldbe$1.69million.

A3or4percentpremiumforgood-looking

workersdoesn’tseemthatbig;butplacedintoa lifelongframework,$230,000

extra earnings for being good-looking instead of bad-looking no longer seems

small. Comparing the bad-looking to the average-looking worker the effect is

smaller—“only”$140,000overalifetime—butstillquitelarge.Comparingthe

average-lookingtothe above-averagelooking worker the effect is smallerstill

—“only”$90,000overalifetime—butstillsubstantial.

Alloftheseeffectsrefertoaverages:Theytellusthatatypicalgood-looking

malewillearn4percentmorethanthetypicalaverage-lookingmale,andthata

typicalbelow-average-lookingwomanwillearn4percentlessthanthetypical

average-lookingwoman.Thisdoesnotmeanthateachgood-lookingmalewill

earn4percentmorethaneachaverage-lookingmale.Wehaveseenthatthereare

manyotherfactorsthataffectearnings,andthesewilldifferbetweenmenwhose

looks are viewed as the same. Even more important, there is tremendous

randomnessinearningsthatisunrelatedtolooksoranyoftheotherthingswe

canmeasureandthataffectearnings.Amongarandomlychosengroupofmale

workers,orfemaleworkers,atleasthalfofthedifferencesinearningsaredueto

things that we can’t measure; and among those that we can measure, looks

accountforonlyasmallfractionofthedifferences.Looksdomatteralot;but

otherthingsmattermuchmore.

Becausesofewpeopleareclassifiedasbeautiful(rated5)orhomely(rated

1),itisnotpossibletodistinguishstatisticallytheimpactofbeingbeautifulfrom

being above-average (rated 4), or of being homely from being plain (rated 2).

Despite that, and even though the differences are not statistically meaningful,

additional analyses of these same data show that the beautiful man or woman

earns more than the above-average, and the homely earn less than the plain.

Extreme looks are uncommon, but they generally produce extreme effects on

successinlabormarkets.

Theword“generally”iskeyhere.Manypeoplebelievethata“bimboeffect”

exists—that extremely good-looking women are somehow penalized in labor

markets. In my own research I have found only one bit of evidence for this

effect:Inastudyofattorneys,theverybest-lookingfemaleattorneyswereless

likely to achieve partnership before their fifth year after graduation from law

schoolthanaverage-lookingwomenattorneys.

Liketheirbrethren,though,their

extreme beauty did give them higher earnings. There may be bimbo effects in

someinstances,buttheyareprettyrare.

There have been many efforts to measure the effect of beauty on earnings

usingdataonindividualsinothercountries.Interestinthetopicishardlylimited

to the United States. All of these have tried to adjust for many of the same

determinantsofearningsthatIhaveusedtoisolatetheeffectsofbeautyinthe

United States. The availability of information on all these measures differs

across countries and sets of data, so that the studies are neither entirely

comparabletothosefromtheUnitedStatesnortoeachother.Theyarealsonot

comparable for another crucial reason: We saw that there are international

differences in the willingness of raters of beauty to classify people as being

below-average in looks. Americans are remarkably willing to make these

relatively harsh judgments when they interview respondents or evaluate their

photographs.Thistoomightcausetheestimatedeffectsofbeautyelsewhereto

differfromthoseintheUnitedStates.

IhavefoundstudiesforAustralia;Canada;Shanghai,China;Korea;andthe

United Kingdom.

 They show that in other countries too there are significant

negative impacts on earnings of being below-average in looks. In most cases

therearealsopositiveeffectsofbeingabove-average.Nogeneralizationsabout

cross-countrydifferencesintheeffectsof beautyonearnings arepossible.But

the negative effects of being below-average in looks typically exceed the

positiveeffects of being above-average.One explanation is thatso few people

are classified as below-average in these studies that being called “below-

average”indicatesseriouslydeficientlooks.

Althoughmakingcomparisonsoftheseeffectstothoseshownintable3.1for

theUnitedStatesisdifficult,theeffectsofbeautyinothercountriesdonotseem

that different from those in the United States. Theeffects in the UnitedStates

maybe somewhatlarger, butnothugely so.As intheUnitedStates,so tooin

mostofthesecountries,goodlooksarerewarded,andbadlooksarepenalized,

evenafteraccountingforalargevarietyofotherfactorsthataffectearnings.

TheAmericandataclearlyaresomewhatoutdated.Withcurrentdatawould

wefindthesameeffects?PerhapsAmericansarenolongersoconcernedabout

looks when they react to co-workers, employees, or people selling them a

product or a service. Perhaps the opposite has occurred, so that, given the

preoccupationwithlooksintheAmericanmediatoday,withtheriseofcelebrity

magazines,andwiththegrowthofthesocialnetworkingInternetsite,Facebook,

theeffectsareevengreaterthantheywereinthe1970s.

The absence of data makes it impossible to obtain updated estimates of the

impactofbeautyonearningsforthegeneralpopulation,butbeautyratingsfrom

anationalsurveyofyoungadultsintheearly2000shavebeenusedtoexamine

this question. Looking only at male high school graduates, going from

“unattractive” (rating of 2 on the commonly used 5 to 1 scale) to “very

attractive”(ratingof4)generatedanincreaseinearningsofcloseto11percent

among young women, and 17 percent among young men.

 These effects are

remarkablyclosetothoseintable3.1,offeringahintthatperhapstheeffectsof

beautyonearningsremainsubstantialandsubstantiallyunchanged.

Withoutanyadditional evidence on thegeneralpopulation,there is no sure

way of deciding this issue. Either possibility may be correct. My best guess,

though, absent any reason to believe that labor markets have changed in one

directionortheother,isthattheeffectsofbeautytodayarenotmuchdifferent

fromthosethatprevailedintheUnitedStatesinthe1970s.

Theeffectsoflooksonearningsmightwellchangeoverthebusinesscycle,

as the economy moves between recession and full employment. From the

employer’s side of labor markets, having more unemployed workers available

allows greater choice about workers’ characteristics. In bad times, Cathy and

Deb might have more scope to indulge their desires for beautiful workers. In

discussingraceinlabormarkets,wegenerallybelievethatunemploymentgives

employers more latitude to discriminate.

 If looks are treated the same way,

beautymighthelpagood-lookingworkermoreduringarecession,whenthereis

morecompetitionfromotherjobseekers.Itseffectswillbelesswhenworkers

arescarceandemployerscannotaffordtobesochoosy.

No study has looked at this question generally. But among law school

graduateswhoenteredthelabormarketwhenjobsfornewattorneyswerevery

plentiful,theimpactofdifferencesinlooksontheirearningswassmall.Among

attorneyswhosoughtworkwhenjobswerelessreadilyavailable,earningswere

morestronglyaffectedbydifferencesintheirbeauty.Thissinglecomparisonis

not definitive, but itdoes suggestthat the effects of beautyon earnings might

riseinrecessions.

ISBEAUTYTHEREALCAUSE?

Therearealotofotherfactorsthatmightaffectearningsandthatcouldnotbe

accounted for in most of these studies. One concern is that beauty may just

reflect self-esteem. Perhaps people’s self-confidence manifests itself in their

behavior,sothattheirlooksareratedmorehighly,andtheirself-esteemmakes

themmoredesirableandhigher-paidemployees.TheCanadianstudyincludeda

setofquestionsthatpsychologistsusetomeasureself-esteem.Self-esteemand

looks were positively related—but the correlations in these data were quite

weak:Thetypicalgood-lookingpersonwasonlyslightlymorelikelytoexpress

substantialself-esteemthan the typical bad-looking person. Adjusting earnings

for the effects of self-esteem, workers who expressed greater self-esteem did

earnmore.Butthisadditionaladjustmentdidnotchangetheestimatedeffectsof

looks on earnings in the Canadian data that had information on this

characteristic. The constancy of the beauty effect suggests that its impacts on

earningsdonotarisebecausebeautyenhancesaworker’sself-esteem.

Yet another possibility is that beauty and the attractiveness of one’s

personality are positively related, and that it is the general sparkle of one’s

personality, not one’s beauty, that increases earnings. Measuring the

attractiveness of someone’s personality is more subjective than measuring

someone’s beauty, butboth have been measured for the same group of young

Americansearlyinthetwenty-firstcentury.Askingwhetheradjustingearnings

for the attractiveness of personality affected the implied impacts of beauty,

researchersfoundonlyaslightimpactonyoungAmericanadults.

TheBritish

studyofbeautydidadjustformeasuresofaperson’ssociabilityatagesixteen,

and that adjustment didn’t affect the estimates of the impact of beauty on

earnings in adulthood either. Generally, the impact of beauty on earnings is

essentiallyindependentofanyrelationbetweenbeautyandpersonality.

It might be that the beautiful are more intelligent too, so that what we

attribute to beauty is more appropriately attributable to intelligence. This is

possible;butinlightofpopulardiscussion(theuglynerd?),theoppositeseems

justaslikely—thatfailingtoaccountfordifferencesinintelligencemeansthat

wemightbeunder-estimatingtheimpactofbeautyonearnings.

None of the studies of random samples of Americans or people in other

countriescontainsagoodmeasureofintelligence,sowecan’tbesureaboutthis.

ButthedataonyoungadultsintheUnitedStatesintheearly2000sdocontaina

measure of intelligence. Adjusting for differences among individuals in both

intelligence and beauty, those data show that the effect of beauty remains

substantial even among people with similar intelligence. Interestingly, the

premium for beauty is greater if you are smarter, as is the penalty for being

unattractive.

Looking at the same question in the context of a particular occupation, the

data on attorneys included a partial measure of intelligence (the score on the

LawSchoolAptitudeTest—LSAT).Therewasnorelationbetweenastudent’s

LSAT and his or her looks. This supports my guess that there generally is at

mostatinycorrelationbetweenbeautyandintelligence;sofailingtoaccountfor

intelligencedoesn’taffecttheestimatedimpactofbeautyonearnings.

In all the studies summarized so far, the assumption has been that the

interviewers’ratingsofbeautyarebasedontheinterviewees’faces. We made

thatassumptionin chapter2,arguingthatobservers canassessthebeautyof a

face independently of the weight and height of an individual. This is an

importantproblem,foriftheycan’t,andifweightand/orheightaffectearnings,

then all the inferences made here so far would be confounding the effects of

beauty on earnings with those of height and weight. So the first question is

whether weight and height, or some combination of the two, even affect

earnings.

Fortunately,alotofresearchbyeconomistsandothersoveralongperiodof

time, both in the United States and other countries, has looked at this. The

answersseemfairlyclear,forbothweightandheight.Obesitylowersearnings,

allelseequal,andthatisespeciallytrueamongwomen.

Soifpeoplejudgethe

appearanceofobesepeopleasbeingbelowaverage—ifobesityequalsugliness

—theapparentnegative effectofbad looks on earningscould just be masking

theeffectofbeingobese.Studiesontheimpactofheightonearningshavealso

used data from many countries, including the United States, Britain, and

China.

Thegeneralresultisthatheightalsomatters,withthedifferencebeing

that,unlikeweight, thepositiveeffects ofheightonearningsarelargeramong

menthanamongwomen.

Todisentangletheeffects,weneedtolookatstudiesthatincludebothbeauty

and weight/height to describe interpersonal differences in earnings. The

Americandataunderlyingtable3.1,andtheBritishstudy,includedinformation

onbothheightandweight.Adjustingfordifferencesintheheightandweightof

theintervieweeshardlychangedtheestimatedeffectsofbeautyonearnings.A

study of job applications in Sweden similarly suggested that the impacts of

beauty on the chance of a person getting a job interview were mostly

independentoftheeffectsoftheapplicant’sweight.

Howcanweightandheightnotchangetheimpactsofbeautyonearnings,if

theythemselvesaffectearnings?Theanswerisveryclearandalsoencouraging:

Observersareabletoseparatebeautyfromphysique—therelationshipbetween

ratings of beauty and height/weight is very weak. Physiognomy and physique

bothaffectearnings,buttheyaremostlyindependentofeachother.Afaceona

talloroverweightbodyisjudgedaboutthesameastheidenticalfaceonashort

orthinbody.Beautyis,withinbounds,moreorlessindependentofphysique.

Onemightalsowonderwhetheritisaperson’sbeautythatisaffectinghisor

herearnings,orwhetherbeautyisjustratedhigheramongthosewhoarebetter

dressed. Dressing better does raise perceived beauty, but only slightly; but

perhaps those who dress better also earn more, so that some of the effect on

earnings that we have attributed to differences in beauty stems instead from

differences in dress. In several studies, earnings have also been adjusted for

differencesindress(forexamples,whetheramaninaphotographwaswearinga

coat and tie, whether a woman was wearing a blouse). Having a photograph

depictingoneselfdressedmoreformallyisassociatedwithhigherearnings.But,

becausetherelationshipbetweenbeautyanddressisquiteweak,thisadditional

adjustmenthardlychangestheinferencesaboutthesizeoftheimpactofbeauty

onearnings.Thebeautyeffectdoesnotarisefromanycorrelationofbeautyand

beingbetterdressed.

WHYAREBEAUTYEFFECTSSMALLERAMONG

WOMEN?

Thecarefulreaderwillnotethattheestimatedeffectsonearningsarelargerfor

maleworkersthanforfemaleworkers.ThisistrueintheAmericandata,andit

isalsogenerallytrueinstudiesforothercountries.Howcanthisbe?Don’tthe

beauty ratings summarized in chapter 2 suggest that people make finer

distinctionsaboutwomen’slooksthanaboutmen’s?Afterbeingpresentedwith

theresultsofsomeearlystudiesin1993,aleadingobserveroftheroleofbeauty

commented, “Women face greater discrimination when it comes to looks,”

essentially dismissing the facts that confronted her but that contradicted her

preconceptions.

AlbertEinstein’scomment,“Itiseasiertosplitanatomthana

preconception,”isrelevantinstudyingbeautytoo.

Foravarietyofreasons,someofwhichIdiscussinlaterchaptersinvarious

contexts,thisdismissal,andthesegeneralbeliefs,mayberight,eventhoughthe

inference that the earnings penalty for bad looks among women is larger than

among men is also correct. To see why, ask what we would observe if both

genders faced the same penalty on their earnings, say 10 percent for being

below-average, and the same premium for having above-average looks, say 5

percent. Assume too that all adults were working for pay. What if there were

also no differences by gender in the underlyingdistributions of beautyratings

(eventhoughweknowtheratingsofwomenaremoredispersed)?Thenitwould

bethecasethatcarefulmeasurementsoftheeffectsofbeautyonearningswould

showthattheyarethesameforwomenandmen.

Thispointsoundsreasonable,butitiswrong,becausetheassumptionthatall

adultsworkisincorrect:Evenin2008,afteralongriseinthefractionofadult

women at work or looking for work (in the labor force), only 72 percent of

Americanwomenages25–54wereinthelaborforce,comparedto86percentof

Americanmeninthatagegroup.Womenaremuchmorelikelythanmentostay

outofthelaborforce.Thisisnotsurprising,sincemassiveamountsofeconomic

evidencedemonstratethatwomen’sdecisionsaboutwhethertoworkforpayare

more responsive to pay, other incentives, and the presence of young children

thanaremen’s.

Gender differences in labor-force participation would be irrelevant here if

non-participationwererandom—ifthechoiceofstayingoutofthelabormarket

were unrelated to beauty. But it is not reasonable to expect that the choice is

random.Peoplechoosetoworkifthegainsfromworkingexceedthegainsfrom

staying at home. The gains from working are what you can earn—and beauty

affects what you earn. The gains from staying at home are the enjoyment of

leisure and the value to you and your family of what you do while at home

(cooking,cleaning,fixingtheplumbing,takingcareofkids,watchingtelevision,

etc.)andsavingsofcostsforcommutingandchildcare.

Itispossiblethatbetterlooksmightmakewomensomuchmoreproductive

athomeastooffsetthepaygainstheywouldobtain,butthatseemsunlikely.It

seemsmuchmorelikelythattheincentivesthatbeautyprovideswomentowork

for pay, and the disincentives that bad looks give women to avoid the labor

market, are more important than differences in the value of time at home by

looks. We would expect better-looking women to be working more than bad-

lookingwomen.

Intheend,thisisanempiricalissue.OneoftheAmericandatasetsfromthe

1970sandtheCanadiandataallowustoinfertheeffectsofbeautyonwhether

womenormenwillchoosetoworkornot.Inbothsetsofdata,thereisnoeffect

ofeitherabove-orbelow-averagebeautyonwhetheramanisworkingforpay.

Butbeingabove-averageinlooksraisesthelikelihoodthatawomanworksby

about 5 percent compared to the average-looking woman. And the relatively

small fraction of women whose looks are rated below-average are about 5

percentless likelythan average-lookingwomen tobein thelabor market(and

that much more likely to stay at home). The effects of looks on a woman’s

likelihoodofworkingarenotsmall,giventhattheaverage-lookingwomanages

25–54todayhasonlya72percentchanceofworking.

AsigninacountrystoreinFredericksburg,Texas,read,“Houseworkmakes

youugly.”Thatmaybetrue;buttheevidencealsodemonstratesthatthereverse

is true: Being ugly causes women to do house work, because the gains to

workingforpayarelessthantheyareforbetter-lookingwomen.

Imadethispointtoagroupoffivehundredstudents,mostofthemMormons,

in a lecture at Brigham Young University. An unusually large percentage of

female Mormon college graduates do not workfor pay. Thewomen attending

the lecture were very upset with my comments, since they believed that, by

notingthatworse-lookingwomenarelesslikelytoworkforpay,Iwasimplying

that Mormon stay-at-home moms are bad-looking. Not at all! If Mormon

women’s looks are no different from other American women’s, the correct

inference from the response of women to the disincentives to ugly workers to

work, coupled with Mormon women’s preference for staying at home, is that

Mormon stay-at-home moms will be better looking on average than non-

Mormonstay-at-homemoms.

Thisdiscussion and theevidencethat supports itshow that oneexplanation

forthesurprisinglylargereffectoflooksonmen’sthanonwomen’searningsis

that women have much more latitude than men in choosing whether or not to

work for pay, and that beauty affects that choice. Part of the reason for the

gender difference in the effects of beauty on earnings is that beautyalters the

mix of female workers, so that the distribution of workers contains

proportionatelyfewerbelow-averagelookingwomen.Thatislesstrueformen.

DOBEAUTYEFFECTSDIFFERBYRACE?

The average beauty rating of African American respondents is essentially

identical to that of whites, but the dispersion of the ratings is less. Thismight

suggestthattheeffectsofbeautywithintheAfricanAmericanpopulationmight

besmaller,sincemostlywhiteemployersandcustomersdonotappeartobeable

todistinguishbeautyaswellamongblackemployeesasamongwhites.Perhaps;

butunfortunately,thereisnosufficientlylargenationallyrandomsampleofdata

onwhichtoexaminethispossibility.

A bit of light is shed on the issue by evidence on the role of African

Americans’skintoneontheirearnings.Skintonedoesnotequatetobeauty,but

typical employers or customers may treat it similarly to beauty. The evidence

from a smallrandomsampleofAfricanAmericanssuggeststhatlight-skinned

AfricanAmerican malesearn about12 percentmorethan domedium ordark-

skinned black men, after adjusting for many earnings-enhancing

characteristics.

 Perhaps beauty effects on earnings are just as large among

AfricanAmericansasamongwhites.

DOBEAUTYEFFECTSDIFFERBYAGE?

Despiteinstructionstoadjustforpeople’sages,observersareincapableofrating

olderpeople’slooks ashighlyasthoseof youngerpeople.Olderpeoplein the

labor market are on average rated as less good-looking than their youngerco-

workers. Nonetheless, older people, generally up through age fifty-five or so,

tend to earn more than younger people in the same occupation, industry, and

location.The question,though,is: Ifweadjust forthesedifferences andmany

others,doestheimpactonearningsofdifferencesinappearancegrow,staythe

same, or decline as people age and gather more work experience? In succinct

terms,howdothebeautypremiumanduglinesspenaltyinthelabormarketvary

withage?

Whatmightweexpecttheanswertothisquestiontobe?Whileaveragelooks

decline with age, the dispersion of looks—the variation around the declining

average—doesn’tchangeverymuch.Itisjustthattherearemorebelow-average

people, and fewer above-average looking people. Thinking about this issue

forces us to dig more deeply into the roots of the beauty premium in labor

markets.Earlyin theirjobs,workers aretosomeextentunknownquantitiesto

their employers. The employerhas interviewedthem, examined their resumés,

testedthem,etc.;buttheirwillingnesstoworkhard,theirattitudes,andhowthey

getalongwiththeirfellowemployeesandcustomersarelesswellknowntothe

employer. The employer, in screening them, may rely on their looks as an

indicatorofsuccessalongtheseotherdimensions.Lateron,oncetheemployee

has established a record of interacting with customers, other workers, and the

boss, looks might become less important. The degree of uncertainty about the

worker’s true productivity should diminish over time. If that is true, then the

impactofbeautyonearningswilldiminishwithageandexperience.

Ontheoppositeside,earlyinacareergoodlooksmaygivetheworkeraccess

tomoreopportunitiestobuildskills,meetcustomers,impressthebossfavorably,

and so on, than would be given to a worse-looking co-worker. The beautiful

worker would have the chance to build her skills, perhaps with only small

investmentsofher time. Skills arecreatedthrough beauty in this case,butthe

enhancedskillsare mannafromheaven, in thesensethat the workerhasdone

nothingtocreateheradditionalearningpower.Rather,theskillsarethrustupon

her by virtue of her good looks. In this case the effect of looks on earnings

wouldrisewithage,anditisarealeffect,resultingfromthegrowingskillsthat

aworker’sbeautygeneratesoverhercareer.

Theevidenceismixedonthisissue.Takingthedataunderlyingtheoutcomes

intable 3.1 andmaking the sameadjustments forotherfactors, thepremiafor

goodlooks,andthepenaltiesforbadlooks,areessentiallythesameforworkers

underandoverageforty.Thisisnottrueinthedataonattorneys.Followingthe

attorneysoverthefirstfifteenyearsoftheircareers,andadjustingformanyof

thefactorsdiscussedearlierinthischapter,thereisaclearpattern.Atthestartof

their careers, beauty has only a small effect on their earnings. The impacts of

beautyonearningsrisewithexperience,whichisveryhighlycorrelatedwithage

inthisgroupofattorneys.

Onemightthinkthatbeautyofferstheyoungattorneyadvantagesinbuilding

up a client base and that, as she acquires more experience, the work that she

performedforclientswhowereattractedtoherearlyinhercareergeneratesstill

moreclientsashercareerprogresses.ThisisthesecondpossibilitythatInoted

above. Among workers in occupations where earnings are less dependent on

generating business, the effects discussed here may offset each other, as

suggested by the absenceof anydifference in the earnings-beauty relationship

by age in the United States generally. It is unlikely that there is any uniform

patternintherelationshipbetweenearningsandbeautyacrossallcountriesand

occupations. It depends on the specific nature of the occupation and on the

specificfactorsthatcauseearningstodifferamongitspractitioners.

COMPENSATINGTHEBEAUTY-DAMAGED

WORKER?

Ifyouseverelyinjuredyourbackandcouldn’tworkforyears,yourlostearnings

would usually be compensated by the person or company whose negligence

causedtheaccident.Whatifinsteadyouwereatworkandagastankexploded,

leaving your face severely scarred? Having read this far, you now know that

yourfacialdisfigurementmeansthatyouarelikelyto beearning lessover the

restofyourcareer.Andifyouhadbeenseverelydisfiguredinchildhood,your

entirecareerwouldhavebeendifferent—yourdamagedlookswouldaffectyour

earningsfromthetimeyouleftschooluntilretirement.

Should you be compensated for your potential loss of earnings? After all,

your economic losses are just as real as if your back had been broken. My

answer on this is yes; and the only economic question is how large your

compensationshouldbe.Howmuchshouldyourecover?

AssoonasthefirstbeautystudyIwrotewasmadepublicanddrewattention

from the media, I began receiving calls from attorneys involved in personal-

injurycases.Insuchcases,plaintiffs’attorneys seekdamagesfortheimpaired

earningssufferedbytheirclientsasaresultofaccidents.Withtherecognitionof

the labor-market payoff to beauty, the attorneys realized that the earnings lost

becauseoftheplaintiffs’impairedbeautywereapreviouslyunmeasuredelement

ofdamagesthattheycouldobtainfortheirclients.

OvertheyearsIhaveconsultedincasesinvolvinganexecutiveinjuredinan

oil-field explosion; several cases involving young children severely bitten by

dogs;achildmaimedinahospitalaccident;andanumberofothers.Imaginea

damagedface,perhapsthatofaburnvictim,orofachildpermanentlyscarred

byaseveredogbite.Asaneconomist,myjobisnottoopineontheextentofthe

impairmenttothevictim’slooks,buttoassumeadropinbeautyandprovidean

estimateofthesizeoftheearningslossesthattheindividualhadsufferedbased

onthatdrop.

Typicalapproachesmightinvolveassumingthataninjuredworkerhadbeen

above-averageinlooksandthattheinjuryreducedherlookstoaverage;thatshe

had been above-average and became below-average; or that she had been

average-looking and became below-average looking. These three transitions

capturethepossibledownwardchangesamongthethreecategoriesoflooksin

table 3.1. I used the estimates in that table to infer the earnings loss that one

victim, a womanwho was thirty-six years old in 2009,suffered or willin the

futuresufferasaresultofherinjury.

Toestimatetheexpectedlifetimeearningsthatshewouldreceiveabsentthe

injury, I assumed that she is typical for someone of the same race/ethnicity,

education,andgenderwhoresidesinthesamelabormarket.Soifthevictimhad

been a white male physician in a high-wage area—say, New York City—I

would assume that his lifetime earnings would have been higher, absent the

injury;ifthevictimhadbeenaminorityhighschooldropoutworkinginafast-

foodrestaurantinSouthDakota,theywouldhavebeenlower.

Weneedtomeasuretheearningsthatshewouldreceiveinthepossiblyquite

distant future, perhaps thirty years from now, and compare them to the

compensation that she should receive in 2009. The solution is simple and

standardinfinanceandeconomics:Discountthefuturedollarsbysomerateof

interest to make them comparable to dollars today. For example, taking a

standardinterestrateof3percentafterinflation,theearningsof$52,000thatshe

mightreceivein2038,atagesixty-five,isequivalentin2009toonly$20,000.

Themagnitudeofherlossdependsontheseverityoftheimpairmenttoher

beauty.Ifshewentfrombeingabove-averagetobelow-average,thelosswillbe

greater—becausethedifferenceintheimpactonearningsofthischangeislarger

thanifshewentfromaveragetobelow-average.Inhercase,dependingonhow

oneviewstheseverityoftheimpairmenttoherbeauty,thepresentvalueofthe

lostearningsoverherremainingworkinglifeisbetween$24,000and$66,000.

In each case the size of the losses will vary. It is larger if the beauty

impairment is greater, which is unsurprising. It is greater for men than for

women, because the average unimpaired man earns more than the average

unimpairedwoman,andbecausetheeffectsofdifferencesinbeautyonearnings

arelargeramongmen.Thelossesarelowerforaseven-year-oldthanafifteen-

year-old,becausethelatter’slostearningsareinthenearerfuture.Thethirty-six

year-old woman’s losses are not much bigger than a teenage girl’s losses,

because her injuryoccurred after she hadalready had the benefit of her looks

overasubstantialpartofhercareer.

Is it worthwhile thinking about the economics of beauty in the context of

injury-basedlawsuits?Aretheseearningslossesreallywortharguingabout?By

the criterion of net benefit to the plaintiff, the answer is a clear yes. The

settlement or jury award might include one-half of the projected earningsloss

fromtheimpairedbeauty.Withmysmallfee,andtheone-thirdofthesettlement

that is typically claimed by the plaintiff’s attorney, even the smallest of the

losses incurred by the thirty-six-year-old woman would net her about $7,000

beyondwhatwouldshehavereceivedhadtheeconomiceffectofherimpaired

beautybeenignored.

LOOKSMATTERFORWORKERS

The most heavily researched issue in the economics of beauty involves

measuringthe effectsof lookson earnings.Howmuchmoredo better-looking

peopleearnthanaverage-lookingpeople?Howmuchlessdobad-lookingpeople

earn?Theevidenceonthesequestionsisbynowabundantlyclear.Beinginthe

top third of looks in America generates around 5 percent more earnings as

comparedtotheearningsreceivedbytheaveragepersonwho,exceptforbeauty,

is identical. People whose looks are in the bottom seventh earn perhaps 10

percentlessthantheotherwiseidenticalaverageperson.

Inothercountries,theimpactsoflooksonearningsmaybesmallerorlarger

thanintheUnitedStates—it’shardtosay.Butthatworse-lookingworkersearn

less than their good-looking fellows appears to be a characteristic of

industrializedcountriesgenerally.Thesamemayalsobetrueinlessdeveloped

countries, and I think it is. But therejust have notbeen enough studiesof the

impactof beautyinpoor countriestoconfirm mysuspicion.The effectsdiffer

acrosscountries;butitisfairtosaythattheimpactoflooksonpayisuniversal.

CHAPTER4

BeautyinSpecific

Occupations

BEAUTYANDCHOOSINGANOCCUPATION

Youarealmostcertainlynotgoingtochoosetobecomeanoperasingerunless

you have some natural vocal gifts; and you are not going to become a

professionaltennisplayerunlessyouhaveatleastsomebasiclevelofphysical

coordination.

 These are fairly esoteric occupations with few practitioners.

Unlikevocalabilityorphysicalcoordination,beautyisageneralcharacteristic.

How does your beauty affect the occupation you choose to enter? It seems

reasonabletobelievethatyourbeautywillhelptodeterminethecareerchoices

thatyou make asa worker. Towhat extentarebetter-looking peoplechoosing

occupationswherewethinktheirlooksmightpayoffmore?Putcrudely,does

the old saying, “A beautiful face for radio,” describe people’s behavior

generally?

If beautiful people tend to enter certain occupations, or if bad looks lead

otherstoenterdifferentoccupations,howdoesthisaffectthepayoffstobeauty

inbothtypesofoccupation?Moregenerally,aretheredifferencesacrosscareers

intheimpactsthatbeautyhasontheirpractitioners’incomes?Forexample,do

good-lookinglawyersattracthigherfees?Doprofessors’looksmatterfortheir

salaries,orforhowfavorablytheirstudentsevaluatetheirteaching?

The role of beauty is especially interesting in certain occupations.

Prostitution,forexample,isoneareawherewewouldthinkthatbeautywould

matteralot.Dogood-lookingpoliticiansdobettertoo—arepeoplemorelikely

to vote for beautiful politicians independent of their stands on the issues? In

other occupations you might think that beauty would not matter at all. Why

shoulditmatterforprofessionalathletes?Whyshouldagood-lookingcriminal

bemoresuccessfulthananuglyone?Crimemaynotalwayspay;butdoesitpay

tobeagood-lookingcrook?

At first glance the “face for radio” bon mot suggests that beauty will not

matter in radio broadcasting. Conversely, one might think that the effects of

beauty will be large in occupations like door-to-door sales, movie acting, and

electoral politics, where the “worker’s” physiognomy confronts the buyer so

directly.Ononeleveltheseassumptionsarecorrect:Mostuglypeoplewillnot

succeed as door-to-door salespeople, movie actors, or politicians, occupations

where we think that there willbe a premium on looks. Perhaps a bad-looking

actormightmakealivinginafewcharacterroles;butmostuglypeople,ifthey

were required to become screen actors, would spend much of their time

unemployed.Thebeautifulactorswouldearnmuchmorethanthehypothetical

ugly actors, and we would see huge effects of beauty on earnings in screen

acting.

Nobody is required to enter a particular occupation. We choose our

occupationsaccordingtotheadvantagesthatwebelievetheywillgiveus,both

monetarily and in terms of the non-monetary delights that they provide. Our

choiceofoccupationsisbasedonourpreferencesfordifferentactivitiesandour

abilitytoperformdifferentkindsofwork.Wesortourselvesamongoccupations

basedonthiscomplex combination of preferences andproductivities.And our

successinvariousoccupationsisbasedinpartonourcharacteristics,including

ourlooks.

One of the leading television shows of the late 1980s and early 1990s was

L.A. Law, a continuing drama centered on a group of attorneys and their

practices and romances. Two of the main characters were played by Harry

Hamlin,showninfigure4.1,andMichaelTucker,showninfigure4.2.Ithink

that most peoplewould regard Hamlinas better-looking than Tucker.

 One of

the two characters was a litigator, who spent a lot of time in court arguing in

frontofjudgesandjuries.Theotherwasataxattorney,whospentlittletimein

court. If you are not familiar with this show, guess which actor played which

attorney?

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Hamlin was cast as the litigator, while Tucker was

the tax attorney. By making these choices about casting, the series’ executive

producers implicitly recognized that people’s good looks steer them into

occupations where good looks will generate a bigger advantage, and that the

absence of good looks leads them to enter occupations where looks are less

important.

Looking at two pictures of actorsportraying attorneys ina televisionseries

representsmereanecdote;andasadistinguishedeconomistoncetoldme,“The

pluralofanecdoteisdata.”

Inthiscasethepreciselyrelevantdataareavailable

from the study of attorneys. In that survey the respondents were asked to list

their legal specialty from among twenty-four choices, which were then

summarized into four main categories.

 Litigators (like the Hamlin character)

wereratedasthebestlookingbasedonphotographstakenwhentheystartedlaw

school.Attorneysin“RegulationandAdministrative”specialtieswereratedthe

leastgood-looking,whilethosein“CorporateorFinancialLaw”or“Other”were

ratedsomewhereinbetween.TheTuckercharacter’sspecialtywouldhavebeen

classifiedasbeingin“Other”or“RegulationandAdministrative.”

Figure4.1.HarryHamlin,Americanactor,1990s.PhotobyAlanLight.

Figure4.2.MichaelTucker,Americanactor,1990s.PhotobyAlanLight.

Thisdiscussionmakesitsoundlikeonlygood-lookingpeoplewillentersome

occupations,whileonlyplainpeoplewillenterothers.Goingstillfurther,why

doesn’t the very best-looking 1 percent of workers enter the occupation that

rewardsbeauty mostgenerously?Why don’ttheugliest 10percentof workers

windup inthose occupationswherelooksmatterleast?Ifpeople behavedthis

way, the effects of looks on earnings and on other outcomes within each

occupationwouldbeimperceptible,oratmosttiny,sincethedistinctionsamong

thelooksofpeopleineachoccupationwouldbeminute.

Peopledonotchoosetoenteroccupationsbasedsolelyontheirlooksandon

thepotentialpayoffstotheirlooksinvariousoccupations.Beinggood-looking

would help an opera singer; yet not all opera singers are beautiful. Indeed,

arguably the greatest soprano of the twentieth century, Maria Callas, was no

beautyatall.Whateverherlackofgoodlooksmayhavecostinsuccesswasfar

more than compensated by her extraordinary voice and musicality. As a more

recentexample,DustinHoffman’saunttoldhim,“Youcan’tbeanactor;you’re

toougly.”YettwoBestActorOscarshavemadeitclearthatlooksarenotthe

onlythingthatdeterminessuccessinscreenacting.

We choose our occupations based on the mix of our skills, interests, and

abilities, of which looks are just one. That choice is partly based on the

importanceattachedtothesedifferentskillsandendowmentsbythemarket,and

beautyisonlyoneofthemanythingsthatarefavoredbythemarket.Anditis

favoreddifferentlyindifferentoccupations.Forthisreasonwewillfindthatthe

looks of workers within a particular occupation are not all nearly the same.

Characteristicsotherthanlooksalsodeterminepeople’schoicesofoccupation.

We will, though, see less variation in looks within an occupation than in the

workforce as a whole. On average, better-looking people will choose

occupationswheretheirlookspayoff,andworse-lookingpeoplewillshyaway

from those occupations. The evidence for attorneys in different specialties

demonstratesthisfact.

Some anecdotal evidence for the notion that beauty can pay off even with

sortingacrossoccupationsisprovidedby a recent example of an Italian priest

who was organizing a web-based beauty pageant for nuns, hardly a calling

wherewewouldthinkthatbeautyisrewardedorevenrecognizedbyworkersor

“consumers.”

 Nuns could submit photos, and web-users would vote for their

favorites.Theorganizersaid,“Thiscontestwillbeawaytoshowthereisn’tjust

thebeautyweseeontelevision,butalsoamorediscreetcharm.”

HOWBIGAREBEAUTYEFFECTSWHERE

BEAUTYMIGHTMATTER?

A rapidly growing number of researchers have focused on how differences in

looks affect the outcomes that incumbents in various occupations experience.

We have already discussed a study of the effects of beautyon the earnings of

attorneys, so let’s look at what the payoffs to beauty are in a variety of other

occupations. In many cases the payoffs that have been measured are purely

monetary.Inothers, though,theresearch looksathow workers’beautyaffects

theirchanceofsuccess,asindicatedbypromotionsorothermeasuresof“getting

ahead.”

Oneoccupationwherebeautymightmatteralotisprostitution.Forthesame

serviceperformedinthesamekindoflocation,doesabetter-lookingprostitute

receive a higher price? This question has been studied by a number of

economists who have interviewed street prostitutes, obtained information on

their earnings and the kinds of activities performed, and had the prostitutes’

looksratedbyinterviewersorpanelsofraters.

Aregrettablyunpublishedolderstudyisbasedonadetailedsurveyofstreet

prostitutesinLosAngelesthatinterviewedmorethan1,000women.

Thelarge

majorityofthemwerenon-whiteorHispanic,withfewcurrentlymarried,most

nevermarried,andonly20percentwithanycollegeeducation.Thewomenwho

wereratedattractiveearnedabout12percentmorethanthe(majorityof)women

whowereratedaslessthanattractivebytheinterviewers.Thisbeautypremium

is based on the price that the prostitute charged, after adjusting for all the

women’s other characteristics, as well as for the duration of their interactions

withtheclientsandthekindsofsexualactivityperformed.

AstudyofprostitutesinseveralMexicanstatescompileddataonthepriceof

thetransactionanda rating of the woman’s beauty (assessed attheendofthe

interview,andmeasuredonthecommon5to1scale).

About20percentofthe

workers were rated asattractive (4or 5) by their interviewer.These relatively

attractive prostitutes obtained a price 19 percent higher than their fellow

workers,evenafterthepricewasadjustedforthekindsofservicesperformed,

the other characteristics of the prostitute, and even her clients’ characteristics.

Thisseemslikeahugeeffect,inlightofalltheotherestimatespresentedinthis

and the preceding chapter. But maybe, even after women select into this

occupationpartlybasedontheirlooks,thereisalargeimpactofbeauty.

Oneoftheauthorsofthatstudytook theMexicandata andcombinedthem

withdataonstreetprostitutesinEcuador.Theinterviewsandtheassessmentsof

beautywereobtainedthesamewayasintheMexicansurvey.

Whilethereturns

tobeautywerenotaslargeasthosefortheMexicanprostitutes,theEcuadoran

ratersweremuchmoregenerousinassessingbeauty,leavingmuchlessroomfor

variations in looks to affect earnings. Taken together, the two studies

demonstratethat,evenwithinthisoccupationwhereyouwouldthinkthatbeauty

iscrucial,selectionintotheoccupationbasedoncriteriaotherthanlooksallows

differencesinbeautytoaffecttheamountthatpeopleearn.

Street prostitution is a risky business, as atleast the initial contact between

clientand suppliermust be made in public and with great uncertaintyon both

sidesofthemarket.Therisksinvolvedaresubstantial,anditispossiblethatonly

those women who desperately want the income will be attracted to the

occupation.Ifforwhateverreasontheirattitudestowardriskarerelatedtotheir

looks,estimatesoftheimpactoflooksonprostitutes’earningswillbeincorrect.

Asimilar butmuchless riskyoccupationis thatofescort. Inthatbusiness the

assignations are made more formally, more information is available to the

purchaser,andtheremaybefewerriskstotheescort.Earningsperhourarefar

higher than those obtained by street prostitutes, and the workers appear to be

much better educated. With higher-income clients too, one might expect that

workersinthisoccupationwillbeespeciallylikelytobegood-looking—richer

clients will be able to purchase more beauty from the women providing the

service.

Theevidencesuggeststhatthis isexactlywhathappens.These sexworkers

are very young—over half under age twenty-six—and are disproportionately

quite good-looking, at least as based on appraisals by their customers.

 Yet

evenwithinthisgood-lookinggroup,thebetter-lookingamongthemearnmore

per hour for an identical set of services than do their less good-looking

colleagues.Withamovefromtheaveragetothe84thpercentileoftheirlooks

comes an increase of 11 percent in the price charged (presumably also in the

earnings that the escort retains from her services).

 Here is an occupation

where, perhaps more than anything except cinema or national television,

customersareconcernedabouttheworkers’looks.Yeteveninthisjobthereis

anextrapayofftoespeciallygood-lookingworkers.

Influence over events, honors, and monetary rewards are the benefits of

success in an occupation—politician—where we would also think looks will

matter. Today’s candidates must appear on television and presumably need to

lookgoodtoattractvoters.Onewonders,forexamples,howGeorgeWashington

would have fared speaking on television with his wooden false teeth; how

AbrahamLincolnwouldhavedone withhis saturninelooks;orhowTheodore

Roosevelt’shigh-pitchedvoicewouldhavebeenreceivedbytelevisionorradio

audiences.Incontemporarypolitics,oneRepublicanpoliticaladvisornoted,“If

Sarah Palin looked like Golda Meir, would we even be talking about her

today?”

 Clearly, as the photographs of Nikki Haley and Barbara Mikulski

showninchapter2demonstrate,looksaren’teverythinginpolitics.Butdolooks
evenmatteratalltoapolitician’ssuccess?
This question has been examined in a number of studies. For the United
States,someresearchersshowedsubjectsbriefflashesofvideosofgubernatorial
debates.
13
 Based only on watching the videos, with the sound turned off, the
subjects were able to predict the outcomes of the elections involving the two
candidates fairly well. When sound was added, their ability to predict actually
fell, suggesting that voters in the elections were at least in part focusing on
differencesinthecandidates’looks.
A more direct approach was taken in a study of elections to office in the
NorthernTerritoryofAustralia.
14
Therethecandidates’photographsaccompany
thepaperballots.Usingbeautyraterswhosedemographicsmirroredthoseofthe
votingpopulation,theauthorsshowedthatbeautyhadastatisticallysignificant
positiveeffectontheshareofvotesobtainedbynon-incumbents.Theeffectwas
also positive among incumbents, but not statistically significant. Once one
accountsforcandidates’partyaffiliations,however,thebeautyeffectessentially
disappears. But skin color, which may be correlated with beauty ratings, and
whichwesawaffectsearningsofAfricanAmericans,thenbecomesanimportant
predictor of electoral success. The bottom linehere is thatbeauty matters,but
thatbeautyratings arecomplexcombinationsofavariety ofcharacteristics,as
wealreadyknew.
Whiletheeffectofbeautydidnotseemlargeintheseterritorialelections,the
same author also analyzed voting for seats in the Australian national
parliament.
15
 Here voters are presented with “How-to-Vote” cards by party
workers,showingthenameandalmostalwaysapictureoftheparty’sentryin
theconstituencyelection.Withapanelofevaluatorsofthepictures,theauthors
ofthestudywereabletorelatetheaveragebeautyratingofeachcandidatetohis
orhershareofvotes.Adjustingforthenationalstrengthofthecandidate’sparty
and for the candidate’s incumbency and gender, the authors found that better-
looking candidates, both incumbents and challengers, were more likely to be
elected.Perhapsmostinteresting,itdidn’tmatterhowgood-lookingacandidate
was, but only how much better-or worse-looking than the opponents the
candidate was. Implicitly, voters compared the characteristics of candidates—
bothwhattheystoodfor(onehopes)andtheirlooks.
A similar study was conducted on candidates for the German Bundestag
(nationalparliament)intheelectionof2002.
16
Forcandidatesineachofalarge
numberofparliamentarydistricts,theauthorshadapanelofobserversratethe

photographsthatthecandidateshadsuppliedtothemedia.Giventhesourceof

thephotographs,thesewerepresumablythemostflatteringpossibledepictions,

suggesting that there would be less variation in looks among the candidates’

photos than existed in reality or that would exist among a random sample of

Germans. Nonetheless, even after adjusting for party affiliation, the authors

foundthatcandidateswhoselookswerehigher-ratedobtainedsubstantiallyand

statisticallysignificantlyhighersharesofthevote(andwerethusmorelikelyto

wintheelection).

WhiletheeffectofbeautyintheGermanelectionwassubstantial,inastudy

ofalargenumberofFinnishelectionstheimpactsofdifferencesinbeautywere

extremely large for non-incumbent candidates. Going from the 50th the 84th

percentile of looks (as rated by a very large panel of raters) would increase a

candidate’snumberofvotesrelativetotheaverageinaconstituencybyover15

percent, even after adjustment for age, gender, and assessors’ ratings of the

candidates’competenceandtrustworthiness.InTaiwantheeffectsofdifferences

in candidates’ beauty were similarly large, especially among independent

candidates,whosesuccessdidnotdependonanyhelptheymayhavereceived

frompoliticalpartiesandmayhavebeenmoretiedtotheirlooks.

Inallthesestudiesitisclearthatbeautymattersforpoliticians.Politicosare

righttodowhattheycantolookbetter,tohiremediaconsultants,tousethebest

possible photographs, etc. The media even give the better-looking candidate

more publicity, and this pays off in elections.

 Despite these efforts—despite

what is probablyselection into this occupation disproportionately from among

better-lookingcitizens—westillfindthatthereisenoughvariationinlooks,and

that beauty matters enough to voters, that being better-looking substantially

enhancesacandidate’schancesofwinninganelection.Thefrequentlyobserved

smaller effects of looks onincumbents’electoral success suggest, though, that

bad looks are less of an electoral impediment when voters have gained

confidenceinapolitician.

AnearlystudyexaminedtheearningsofasmallgroupofrecentMBAsover

thefirsttenyearsoftheircareers,relatingtheirearningstotheirbeautyasrated

from pictures taken while they were in business school.

 Better-looking men

receivedhigherstartingsalariesandexperiencedfasterearningsgrowthoverthe

decade. Among female MBAs, looks were unrelated to starting salaries, but

better-looking women did see their earnings grow more rapidly (suggesting a

risingeffectofbeautywithage).

Prostitutes, attorneys, politicians, and business executives all work in

occupationswherewewouldthinkthatbeautywillmatter.Peopledoselectinto

theseoccupationsbasedonlooks,butthelooksofpeopleintheoccupationare

not all the same—not all attorneys are good-looking. That variation in beauty

withineachoccupationallowsdifferencesinbeautytopayoffinhigherearnings

oragreaterchanceofgettingahead.

HOWBIGAREBEAUTYEFFECTSWHERE

BEAUTYMIGHTNOTMATTER?

Myfavoriteoccupationsareuniversityteacherandeconomist—theoccupations

Iclassifymyselfin.Doesbeautyaffectoutcomesinoccupationslikethis,where

we practitioners pride ourselves on valuing intellect over appearance? Take

universityteachersfirst.Wesawinchapter2thatstudentsratingthelooksofa

groupofprofessorsinwhoseclassestheyhadneverbeenenrolledtendedtorate

them as being pretty bad-looking on average. The question is whether, within

thisless-than-pulchritudinousgroup,thebetter-lookingpeoplearemorelikelyto

getahead.

Wecanmeasuretheimpactofbeautyamongprofessorsinseveralways.The

firstisthesamewaythatwehavemeasureditsimpactsinotheroccupations—

by looking at its effects on earnings. A study of more than four hundred

economicsprofessorsinOntario,Canada,relatedtheirsalariesto ameasureof

their“hotness”:Whetherornotstudentshadassignedthemchilipeppersonthe

websitewww.ratemyprofessors.com.

Chilipeppersareassignedwhenstudents

think the professor is unusually good-looking, and in the Ontario study were

“awarded”to about 10 percentofthe professors. Afteradjustingfor numerous

otherfactorsthatmightraiseaprofessor’ssalary, includinghisorherage and

publicationproductivity,theauthorsfoundthat“hot”professorsearnedatleast6

percentmoreperacademicyearthantheirotherwiseidenticallessgood-looking

peers.

Anotherwayis to ask whether students liketheircourses—whether student

evaluations are more positive for better-looking professors. The link between

these evaluations and pay or promotion may not be direct or very strong. But

universityadministratorsdoclaimthattheyrewardprofessorsforgoodteaching,

and,rightlyorwrongly,mostuniversitiesuseteachingevaluationsasthemain

measureofteachingquality.Thatbetterteachingperformancegenerateshigher

pay is a mantra among university administrators—after all, they need to

convincethecustomersthattheiropinionsabouttheservice-providersmatter.

In a study of professors at the University of Texas at Austin, whose looks

wereratedbystudentswhohadnevermetthem,Ifoundthattheaveragestudent

evaluation of the instructor’s success in the course differed sharply by the

professors’ looks.

 Going from the 84th to the 16th percentile of professors’

looksinlower-divisioncoursesdroppedtheprofessor’sratingfrom4.4to3.6on

a5to1scale.Sincetwo-thirdsoftheprofessors’ratingswerebetween3.5and

4.5, this effect of differences in their looks was very large. The impacts were

smaller in upper-level classes, perhaps because those students were more

focused on substantive issues than students in introductory classes. This

distinction seems similar to the difference in beauty effects between electoral

incumbentsandchallengers.

Onemightbeconcernedthatbetter-lookingteachersareassignedtocourses

wherestudentsappreciatebeautymore—wherethestudentevaluationsaremore

likelytobeaffectedbythegoodlooksoftheirinstructor.Perhapsinstructorsin

arthistoryarebetter-lookingthanthoseinelectricalengineering.Inthisstudy,a

largenumberoftheclassesweresectionsofthesamecourse,sothatformany

coursesthesamekindsofstudentsevaluatedprofessorswhoselooksdifferedbut

whotaughtthesamematerial.Whenweaccountfortheparticularcoursebeing

taught, the impacts of looks on evaluations are actuallya bit larger thanthose

shownintable3.1.Thereisnoevidencethatprofessorsareassignedtocourses

orchoosefieldswithinacademebasedontheirlooks.

A similar approach was undertaken using instructional ratings of German

university professors.

 As in the American study, the ratings of beauty by a

group of students (who were not in the professors’ classes) were statistically

significantlyrelatedtotheevaluationsthattheGermaninstructorsreceivedfrom

the(different)studentsintheirclasses.Whiletheimpactswerenotaslargeasin

the United States, they were still substantial. No doubt the results would be

different in other countries, for other kinds of students, and using different

methods.Buteveninanoccupationlikecollegeteaching,wherewedon’tthink

beauty will be very important, differences in beauty produce impacts on an

outcomethatisarguablylinkedtoeconomicrewards.

Whilewedon’thavestudiesofeconomists’beautyandtheirsalaries,wedo

knowsomethingabouttheimpactoftheirlooksonnon-monetaryoutcomes.Ina

profession that pays well, but that does not offer immensely higher monetary

rewards to the top people, the distinctions offered by various honors become

important.Onesuchmeasureofdistinctionistheesteeminwhichtheyareheld

by their colleagues. In one study I examined how success in competitive

elections to office in the American Economic Association, the leading

professional organization in the field, is affected by the economists’ looks.

Eachvoter(memberoftheassociation)receivespicturesofthecandidatesalong

withtheballot,justasdidthevotersinAustralia’sNorthernTerritory,sothatthe

candidates’looksconfrontyouwhenyoucastyourvote.

Clearly,insuchelectionssomeonewillwin.Sotherelevantconsiderationis

not the looks of the candidates alone, but instead, as with the Australian

parliamentarians, how their looks compare to those of other candidates. The

resultsshowthatmovingfromthe84thtothe16thpercentileoflookslowersa

candidate’s chance of winning the election—of obtainingthis honor—from 56

percent to 44 percent. This effect adjusts for measures of the candidates’

scholarly productivity, their gender, and other characteristics. It suggests that

eventhechoicesofeconomists,manyofwhomliketothinkthattheyandtheir

fellowsareamongthemostrationalpeopleintheworld,areaffectedbylooks.

As a university professor and an economist, these studies do not make me

happy.Ona5to1scaleIobtainteachingevaluationsaveraging4.4inmyclass

of introductory economics, a score that is considered very good for a large

coursethatisrequiredformanyfreshmen.Yetifmylookswererated9onthe

10to1scaleusedinthatstudy,theevidencesuggeststhatmyaverageteaching

evaluationwouldbenearly5.WiththathighascoreImightbeearningahigher

salary!Similarly,ifIwerebetter-looking,Iwouldhaveamuchbetterchanceof

receivingoneofthenon-monetaryrewardsthatmyprofessionhastooffer.

Arecentstudyexaminedanoccupationwherewethinkthatlookswouldnot

mattermuchatall—NationalFootballLeaguequarterbacks.

Havingapplieda

computer program that measured facial symmetry in the quarterbacks’

photographs, the authors related the symmetry measure to the athletes’ annual

salariesandbonuses,adjustedfortheirproductivity(mainlypassingyardageand

years in the league). Going from the 84th to the 16th percentile of facial

symmetryinthisgroupofathletesreducedearningsbynearly12percent.That

change is not far from the effect of decreasing beauty on men’s earnings

generally in the United States. This seems to be a pretty large effect for an

occupationwhereyouwouldthinkthatonlyonething—pureathleticprowess—

woulddetermineearnings.

In some occupations it might be possible that being bad-looking could

actually give you an advantage, for example, in some criminal specialties. An

ugly robber or thief might be more frightening to his potential victim than a

good-looking one and might obtain the money and goods that he seeks more

quicklyandwithlessneedforviolence.Looksmightbeneutralinothercriminal

specialties.Forexample,sinceburglarsdonotexpecttheirvictimstoseethem,

looksshouldnotmatteratalltoaperson’schoiceofbecomingaburglar.Inyet

othercriminalspecialties,goodlooksshouldbequiteimportant.Agood-looking

confidence man might have an advantage in conning his marks out of their

savings.Thediversityofillegalactivitiesmeansthatthereisnoreasontoexpect

thatcrookswillbeworse-orbetter-lookingthantheaveragecitizenofthesame

age. Just as with attorneys, it depends both on the type of activity and, as is

always true when people are making choices about occupations, on how

beneficialgoodlooksareinalternativeoccupations.

Based on a national survey that included beauty ratings, two economists

examined how a young person’s looks affected the chances that he or she

engaged in criminal activities.

 They considered the determinants of whether

the young person had been involved in property damage, burglary, robbery,

theft,assault,non-drugcrimes,orsellingdrugs.Lookshadverylittleimpacton

thechancethatayouthhadengagedinmanyofthesecriminalactivities.Butthe

smallpercentageofveryunattractiveyouthsweresignificantlyandsubstantially

morelikelytohavecommittedrobbery,theft,orassaultthanwereotheryouths.

Theseareexactlythecriminalactivitieswhereyouwouldthinkthatbadlooks

mightleadtogreatersuccess.Theirbeautywasratedveryearlyintheirlives,so

it appears that their ugliness led them into those criminal activities where it

might have helped them; and it induced them to shun other, legal activities

whereitwouldhavehurttheirchancesofsuccess.

Even within occupations where you would think beauty doesn’t matter, it

does. Better-looking professors get higher teaching evaluations, better-looking

economistsgetelectedtoofficesintheprofessionalsociety.Althoughithasn’t

beenstudied,Iwouldbetthatbetter-lookingradioannouncersanddiskjockeys

(the“facesforradio”)earnmorethantheirbad-lookingcounterparts.

SORTINGBYBEAUTY

Beautyaffectswhoworksatwhat,andhowmuchtheyearn.Butthereisnothing

unusual in this discussion about how personal characteristics affect people’s

choices of occupations and the returns to their skills and abilities. A similar

discussion would apply if we were to analyze such characteristics as physical

strength or musical ability. The same would be true about the impacts of

workers’preferences,forexamples,suchastheirattitudestowardriskordislike

ofcoldweather.Whatisspecialhereishowpervasivetheroleofbeautyisin

labor markets. There aren’t many occupations where tastes for weather really

matter,forexample,wherethosewhodislikecoldweathermightearnmoreor

less. Similarly, in most occupations one’s musical ability has no impact on

earnings.Beauty,though,canhaveimportanteffectsinmanyoccupations.And

itdoes.Italtersthechoicesthatpeoplemakeaboutwhatoccupationtopursue.

Despitethis,withineachoccupationyoufindsomepeoplewhoaregood-looking

andsomewhoarebad-looking;andwithinmostoccupations,thebetter-looking

earnmore.Notimmenselymore,butsubstantiallyandsignificantlymore.

Theessenceofthischapterisconveyedinthefollowingexchangefromthe

November16,2004,episodeofthetelevisionseriesHouse:

House: Wouldthatupsetyou,really,tothinkthatyou

werehiredbecauseofsomegeneticgiftof

beauty,notsomegeneticgiftofintelligence?

Cameron: IworkedveryhardtogetwhereIam.

House: Butyoudidn’thaveto.Peoplechoosethepaths

thatgrantthemthegreatestrewardsfortheleast

amountofeffort.That’sthelawofnature,and

youdefiedit.That’swhyIhiredyou.Youcould

havemarriedrich,couldhavebeenamodel,you

couldhavejustshownupandpeoplewouldhave

givenyoustuff.Lotsofstuff,butyoudidn’t,you

workedyourstunninglittleassoff.

Dr. Cameron chose to go to medical school because she wanted to—being a

doctor mattered most to her. The evidence here suggests that her choice of

emergencymedicine—withlotsofpatientcontact—isagoodoneforhertotake

advantage of her beauty. Dr. Cameron’s good looks will benefit her in her

medicalcareertoo.

CHAPTER5

BeautyandtheEmployer

THEPUZZLES

Inmany occupationsbetter-lookingworkers earnmorethan others,while bad-

looking workers do worse than average. Across the entire economy, good-

looking workers earn more on average than their otherwise identical but less

well-endowedcolleagues.A crucial puzzle is how employersoftheseworkers

cansurviveinacompetitivemarket,iftheirworkers,whoarenodifferentfrom

othersexceptfortheirlooks,arepaidmore.Howcantheycompeteagainstother

employersinthesameindustrywhoarewillingtosettleforthelessexpensive,

uglierworkers?

Take, for instance, Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the U.S. Federal

Reserve Board. Before his full-time public service, he headed an economics

consulting company for which he hired mostlyfemale economists. He did not

institutethishiringpolicyoutofanyparticulardesiretosurroundhimselfwith

women,noroutofcharityaimedatwomengenerally.Instead,whenaskedabout

it,hepointedoutthatthewomenwerejustasgoodworkersasmenand,because

they were cheaper to hire due to discrimination in the labor market, he could

makemoremoneyforthecompanybyemployingthem.Hewaswillingtotake

advantage of the discriminatory behavior of other employers toward female

economistsinordertomakehisowncompanymoreprofitable.Buthowcould

those other consulting companies survive when bidding for contracts against

Greenspan’s company, which could offer equally high-quality services at a

lowerpricebecauseitslaborcostswerelower?Movingfromanecdotetodata,

somerecentevidenceshowsthatstart-upcompaniesthatemployedmorewomen

survived longer than others.

 More generally, how can companies that fail to

employ otherwise identical but lower-paid female, minority, or ugly workers

survive?

Adifferentpuzzleishowthebeautyoftheentrepreneursthemselvesaffects

their companies’ success. How do employers’ looks affect the performance of

thecompaniestheyhead?Thinkingaboutandobtainingevidenceonthispoint

might allow us to understand better the sources of the economic impacts of

beauty.

Idocumentedtheeffectsofdifferencesinbeautyonpaywithalargenumber

ofresearchstudiesconductedbymanyauthors.Evidenceonthepuzzleshereis

muchsparser.Thatmeansthattheconclusionsarenecessarilymorespeculative

andrestonthestrengthoftheargumentsasmuchormorethanonalargebody

ofcarefullyobtainedevidence.

DOGOOD-LOOKINGEMPLOYEESRAISESALES?

Idiscussedthisquestionwithaclassoffreshmenandaskedwhethertheycared

about the looks of employees at the companies they dealt with. One young

womansaidthatshe certainly does care, and that, for example, she would not

buycosmeticsfromasalespersonwhowasnotwellgroomedandatleastdecent-

looking. The brand of cosmetics that she chooses to buy may be the same no

matter who sells it. But presumably the saleswoman’s looks will convey

somethingtomystudentandothersabouttheproductthatwouldmakebuyingit

moreorlessdesirabletoher.

Cosmeticsmanufacturersrecognizethelinkbetweentheirproducts’salesand

beauty and make special efforts to obtain unusually attractive spokeswomen.

Indeed,someof thegreatestbeautiesofthepastfiftyyearshavebeenseenon

television,movieadvertisements,andbillboardsasrepresentativesofcosmetics

lines. The succession of beautiful women includes such stars as Catherine

Deneuve, Isabella Rossellini, Kate Winslet, and Anne Hathaway—all

presumably recruited because the companies believe that customers will find

themattractive,identifywiththemandpurchasetheproductstheyendorse.

Agood-lookingattorneymightbeabletoattractmoreclientsandbillmore

hours,athigherhourlyfees,ifpotentialclientsbelievethatheismorelikelyto

be successful on their behalf. The attorney may be no better at writing briefs,

doinglegalresearch,ordevelopingoralarguments,butclientsmaybelievethat

hewillbemorelikelytoprevailbeforeajudgeorjury,orinnegotiationswith

other attorneys. In a very real sense the legal service is tied to the attorney’s

looks,justasthecosmeticsproductwastiedtotheendorsers’.

If we think of looks as part of a product or service, and if we assume that

potential customers value looks, then it is clear how better-looking employees

can raise a competitive company’s sales. At the same average cost of all the

otherinputsintotheproduct and at the same price charged, customers willbe

morelikelytobuytheproductand/orwillbewillingtobuymoreofit.Morewill

besold; and thecompany willexpandat theexpenseof itscompetitors.If the

company has some control over the prices it charges, the argument is even

stronger:Tyingitsproductorservicetoabetter-lookingproviderwillenableit

to sell at a higher price and/or sell more, even though the product is little

differentfromtheoneofferedbyanothercompany.Butregardlessofthekindof

marketwhereitoperates,acompanythatcantieitsgoodsandservicestobetter-

lookingworkers willbeabletoincreaseitsprice,theamountitsells,or both,

andthusincreasethetotalvalueofitssales.Thebeautyofthesellerbecomesan

integralpartofwhatthecompanyoffers.

All of these examples imply that beauty is somehow productive to the

company—thatitraisessalesbecausecustomersarewillingtopaymoretobuy

products and services provided by beautiful workers. An alternative is that

beauty is unproductive to the company—that it doesn’t affect the company’s

sales,andthatitisinsteadacharacteristicthatbossesarewillingtopayforin

ordertohavethepleasureofinteractingwithgood-lookingemployees.AsJade

Jagger,jewelrydesigneranddaughterofMick,exclaimed,“God,whatgorgeous

staff I have. Ijust can’t understand people whohave ugly people working for

them.”

Toexaminewhetherinfactbeautyraisessales,onestudylookedattheeffect

of Dutch advertising executives’ beauty ontheir companies’revenues.

 At the

time covered by the data (the mid-1980s through mid-1990s), the Dutch

advertising industry included many companies, with most of them, including

nearly all the larger ones, located in the area covering the major cities of

Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague. While the industry was

competitive,inthesensethatthereweremanyfirms,withnosinglefirmhaving

ashareofthemarketevenapproaching10percent,manyofthecompanieshad

nicheswheretheyhadsomeabilitytodetermineprice.

The companies’ executives (directors in local parlance) run their company,

engageincreativeactivities,andmarkettheirproducts.Theirbeauty,basedon

their photographs, was rated by a panel of four adults on the 5 to 1 scale.

Combiningallcompaniestogether,movingfromthe84thtothe16thpercentile

of average looks of executives across the companies was associated with a

decrease in sales of 7 percent. Clearly, having better-looking executives in a

companyinthisindustrygeneratesfairlysubstantialincreasesinsales.

This study inspired a cartoon in a Dutch newspaper, showing a grossly

deformed woman looking at a pretty executive and thinking, “If that’s how

things go, then even I can do it!”

 But the evidence would suggest that she

cannot, if “it” is bringing in more business and inducing subordinates to work

harder. She may have the same education and the same tangible skills as the

good-looking incumbent seated at the desk, but her obviously deficient looks

would make her less productive to the company—she would not generate as

muchrevenue.

Onedifficultywiththisstudyisthatthepeoplewhosebeautyislinkedtothe

companies’ sales are not just the companies’ employees—they are also its

managers.Theymayfunctionasentrepreneursinthesefirmsaswellasdrawing

salariesasemployees.Sopartoftheeffectoftheirbeautyisnotonlytoincrease

their company’s revenue directly, butperhaps also to change its directionin a

waythatraisessales.

Nostudiesareavailableofworkerswhofunctiononlyasemployeesofprofit-

makingcompaniesandwhoseworkasanemployeemightraisetheircompany’s

sales. But one study did examine the ability of employees in a non-profit

organizationtogeneraterevenue.

The researchexaminedthesuccessofdoor-

to-doorsolicitors,typicallylower-skilledpart-timeworkers,inraisingfundsfor

aparticularcharity.Oneofitsaimswastoestimatetheeffectsofthesolicitors’

looksontheamountsoffundsraised,and forthatpurposetheresearchers had

picturesofeachsolicitorratedbymanyindividualsona10to1scale.

Thedifferences insuccessrates arisingfromdifferences inthe looks ofthe

male solicitors were tiny. But among female solicitors beauty mattered a lot,

withanincreasefromthe16thtothe84thpercentileoffemalesolicitors’looks

nearly doubling the likelihood of receiving a contribution, and increasing the

expectedcontributionbynearlytwo-thirds.Better-lookingfemalesolicitorsgot

morepeopletocontribute,althoughtheadditionalcontributorswerethosewho

hadbeenonthefencebetweengivingnothingandgivingonlyasmallamount.

In an extension of this study, one of the authors used the same data to see

whethercertainaspectsrelatedtolookshavedistinctiveeffectsonthesolicitor’s

success.

Holdingconstanttheratingofthesolicitor’slooks,heaskedwhethera

femalesolicitor’shaircoloraffectedhersuccess.Itclearlydid:Blondesolicitors

were substantially more likely than other female solicitors to elicit a

contribution, and the average amount raised per contact was higher too. Their

greatersuccess occurred becauseof their greaterappeal to Caucasiancontacts.

Theseresultsunderscorethecentralroleofinteractionsbetweentheworkerand

thecustomerthatwereillustratedinthediscussionsofattorneys,politicians,and

prostitutes.

Theinferencefromthesestudiesisthathavingbetter-lookingemployeesdoes

increase a company’s sales. Advertising firms’ customers apparently prefer to

deal with better-looking ad executives, allowing the latter to charge more for

theirservices.Ordinaryhome-dwellersprefertocontributetoacharitablecause

whenapproachedbyabetter-lookingfund-raiser.Generalizingfromtwostudies

toanentireeconomyisproblematic;buttheevidencedoessuggestthattheextra

coststhatacompanyincurswhenitpaysforbetter-lookingworkersareatleast

partlyoffsetbythegreatersalesthatthoseworkerscangenerateforit.

HOWDOESBEAUTYAFFECTPROFITS?

Withitsworkers’beautyraisingacompany’srevenueandcosts,thequestionthe

companyfacesiswhethertheincreasedrevenuejustifiestheincreasedcosts.A

company should keep adding workers, presumably in descending order of

beauty,untilthelastworkerhiredgeneratesjustenoughextrasalestooffsetthe

extrapaythathisgoodlooksrequire.Theaverage(basedonlooks)employeein

the firm might add more to sales than to wage costs—we might find that the

average worker’s looks do raise the employer’s profits. But the beauty of the

ugliest worker hired should be a wash—the company should be indifferent

betweenhiringhimandaworse-lookingworker.

This discussion assumes that companies understand the role of beauty in

affectingtheirrevenueandtheircosts.Ofcourse,nobodywouldarguethatevery

employer or even many employers make explicit calculations comparing the

gains resulting from a particular worker’s beauty to the extra labor costs his

beauty may engender. They do not need to. As long as some companies

implicitly account for how beauty affects costs and revenue, they will make

extraprofits.Employersintheirindustrywhofailtomakethecorrectdecisions

abouttheeffectsofbeautyon theirsalesand costswillmakelessprofit.They

will lose out to their competitors, and, in the end, only those companies that

accountfortheroleofbeautywillsurvive.

Does this economic approach really describe the implied benefit-cost

calculationsthatemployersmake?Thereisnowayofknowingwhetheritdoes

foremployersingeneralor,indeed,formostemployersinspecific.Asalways,

all we can do is provide examples for a few companies; and in this case the

evidenceisagainsparse.

Employersdoexplicitlyseemtobelievethattheywillbehelpediftheyhire

better-looking workers. In countries where, unlike in the United States, help-

wantedadvertisementscanspecifypersonalcharacteristics,includingbeauty,we

see employers specifically mentioning beauty in seeking applicants. In China,

for example, a recent study of these advertisements showed a requirement for

looks being mentioned nearly 10 percent of the time, with a much greater

prevalence in lower-skilled jobs.

 Some ads in Mexico even require that job

applicants submit photographs to demonstrate that they have a “nice

appearance.”

Toexaminetheimpactofbeautyonprofits,taketheDutchadvertisingdata.

Movingfromthe16thtothe84thpercentileofexecutives’looksraisedsalesby

about $60,000 in 2009 U.S. dollars. Assume, following the evidence on the

effects of beauty on earnings, that this large a difference in beauty raises

executivepayby15percent.In1994,aDutchworkerearningtheequivalentof

$175,000 would have been among the top 1 percent of earners. That earnings

level is an upper limit to the earnings of the average-paid executive in the

sample, since there are proportionately many fewer very high earners in the

Netherlandsthanin the United States.

Themaximumimpact of beauty in the

average firm could have been no larger than $25,000—less than half of the

averageimpactofbeautyonfirms’sales.Inthis,theonlystudyoftheissue,the

effectoflooksoncompanies’salesfarexceedsitsimpactsontheircosts.

Since profit is the excess of revenue over cost, this evidence implies that

good-lookingworkersraisedthefirms’bottomlines.Fine,buthowcanthisbe

true? If I were a good-looking worker, and I realized that the company was

makingprofitsoffmygoodlooks,IwouldfeelthatIwasbeingexploitedand

would insist on being paid what I was worth. If my demands were not met, I

wouldtakemygoodlookselsewheretogetpaidtheamountthatIamaddingto

mycompany’srevenue.Imightnotdothisimmediately,buteventuallyIwould.

EvenifIdidnotleavethecompany,potentialnewgood-lookingworkerswould

realize the value of their looks and insist on being paid what they are worth.

Why doesn’t this appear to happen? Why don’t workers compete away the

profitsthattheirbeautyseemstogenerate?

Onepossibilityisthatmostworkerssimplyarenotawareofthecontribution

of their looks to their company’s revenue, and they allow themselves to be

exploited. This explanation not only assumes some ignorance on the part of

workers, but also that their employers are smart enough to take advantage of

them. Perhaps so, but this is not a very satisfying explanation—claims of

irrationality or poor information are not very appealing and imply that

companiesand/orworkersaretoodumbtobeawareoftheirowninterests.

One explanation that is consistent with companies and workers possessing

good information about the impact of the workers’ beauty is that beauty,

especiallyofaseniorworker,growsintoanassetthatissharedbytheworker

andthecompany.Agood-lookingworkerjoinsacompanyandhelpstobuildup

ateamofotherworkers.Likeallofus,theotherworkersarecharmedbytheir

fellow employee’s good looks and are themselves spurred to greater

productivity. Were the good-looking worker to leave, her team would

disintegrateandloseitsesprit,sothattheremainingworkerswouldbecomeless

productive than before. But if the good-looking worker went elsewhere, she

wouldhavetostartanewinbuildingupagroupofworkerswhoseproductivity

would be enhanced by her looks. According to this explanation, the worker’s

looks essentially represent hers and the company’s beauty capital. It is

somethingwhosebenefits,eventhoughtheyareembodiedinthegood-looking

worker,arepartlyspecifictothecompanywhereshehasbeenworking.

The returns to this beauty capital are shared by the company and the

worker.

Shecannotaskfortheentirereturnstothiskindofcapital,because,if

sheleavesthecompany,thevalueofthebeautycapitalthatshetakeswithheris

diminished.Thecompanycouldgraballthereturnsandpayhernothingforthe

extravaluecreated.Butindoingso,theemployerwouldincreasethechancethat

shewouldsimplyquit,killingthebeautifulgoosethathaslaid goldeneggs.A

solutionistosharethereturnstothisasset,whichistheresultoftheworker’s

inherentgoodlooksandthecompany’shavingassembledateamofco-workers

whoseproductivityisenhancedbythosegoodlooks.

Thisexplanationonlyworkstotheextentthatthegood-lookingworkerisina

positiontoinspireherco-workers.Ifsheworksalone,shecouldnotcreatethis

kindofsharedcapital.Thisapproachsuggeststhatopportunitiesforthemutually

advantageoususeofgood-lookingworkersaregreaterinjobswherethegood-

lookingworkerhasmoreco-workersandalsohasmorecontactwiththem.This

maybeonemorereasonwhygoodlookspayoff:Supervisoryjobs,wherethe

workermustexplicitlydealwithotherworkers,paybetter.Theinspirationalrole

of beauty in the workplace is a reason why better-looking workers are more

likelytobepromotedintosupervisorypositions.

Can companies take advantage of differences in their executives’ looks to

increasesalesandraiseprofitsstillfurther?Askyourself:Wouldacompanythat

hadtwoexecutivesrated3onthe5to1scalehavehigherorlowersalesthana

companywithoneexecutiverated5,theotherrated1onthatscale?

WhenIwasworkingonthestudyofDutchadvertisingcompanies’sales,my

Dutch coauthor and I started wondering about this question. I bet him five

guilders(lessthan$3—hardlyaVegas-sizebet)thatgreaterdispersionoflooks

among a company’s executives would be associated with additional sales. My

reasoningwasthat,withonehomelyandonebeautifulexecutive,thecompany

could increase sales byhaving the good-looker outbringing in clients andthe

homelyexecinthebackofficedesigninglayoutsforadvertisements.Withtwo

average-looking executives the company cannot profit from the comparative

advantagespossessedbytheexecutivesalongthedimensionsoftheirappearance

and other skills. I won the bet: Companies whose executives’ looks differed

more from eachother had highersales. It’s not only having good-lookers that

raises sales and profits; it’s having a beneficial mix of executives ranked by

looks and making sure that they specialize in tasks that take advantage of

differencesintheirlooks.

HOWCANCOMPANIESPAYFORBEAUTYAND

SURVIVE?

Theanswertothetitularquestioninthissectioniseasy:Theysurvivebecause

their workers’ good looks enhance their profits. The extra wages paid to the

good-looking workers are more than offset by the extra revenue that the

workers’ looks help to generate.This conclusion is, as noted earlier,based on

onestudy,theonlyoneavailable;butitdoesanswerthequestionaboutsurvival.

Theproblemisthatitanswersittoowell:Ifgood-lookingworkersraiseprofits,

why aren’t firms that employ a disproportionate number of good-looking

workers driving out the other firms in their product markets that choose, for

whateverreason,torelyonuglierworkers?

One answer to this question is to conclude that one study does not a proof

make. We really don’t know very much about whether a worker’s beauty

generates enough extra sales to more than cover the extra wage costs that it

imposesontheemployer.Intheendwedonotyetknowwhethercompaniesthat

employbetter-lookingworkersareexpandingattheircompetitors’expense,are

breakingeven,orarelosingouttocompetitorswhohavechosentheugly-worker

routeinhiring.Therejustisnotenoughresearchtoanswerthequestion.What

wedoknow,though,isthatitisperfectlyreasonabletothinkthatcompaniesthat

employbetter-lookingworkersmaynotonlysurvive—theymayflourishatthe

expenseoftheircompetitors.

DOCOMPANIESWITHBETTER-LOOKINGCEOS

PERFORMBETTER?

In1996,theeditorsofaweekly Swissbusiness newspaper,Cash,havingseen

some of the earlier research on beauty, decided to hold a contest among their

readers. Each reader could cast a vote for the best-looking CEO in

Switzerland.

Thisresultedinninehundredvotes,withtheamazingresultthat

theCEOofthecompanythatpublishedthenewspaperwasratedbest-looking!

The newspaper apologized profusely for the seeming phoniness of the contest

results, and it did point out that the second-, third-, and fourth-most favored

CEOs headed three of the biggest companies in the country, including the

international pharmaceutical giant Novartis and the food conglomerate Nestlé.

Theothertopwinnerchangedjobsshortlyafterthecontestandrapidlyroseto

becomeCEOofDeutscheBank,oneoftheworld’slargestbankingcorporations.

Exceptforthetopvote-getter,thewinnersheadedcompaniesthattendedto

belargerthanthoseheadedbytheCEOsofmostofthecompaniesincludedin

the contest. This was hardly a scientific study, but it does suggest a positive

correlationbetweenacompany’ssuccessanditsCEO’slooks.Thismayjustbe

theresultofsorting:Boardsofdirectorsofalreadysuccessfulcorporationsmay

prefertohaveaprettyfacerepresentingthecorporationandmaybewillingto

pay for it. But it could just as likely show a causal relationship—the good-

lookingCEOmayraisetherevenueofthefirmheorsheheads.

ApairofpsychologistsshowedpicturesoftheCEOsofthetop25firmsin

theFortune500, andofCEOsofthefirmsranked476through500,toalarge

group of undergraduate students.

 The students rated the executives’ facial

features along a number of criteria, including their overall attractiveness.

Appraisalsofthepowerimpliedbythefacesweremorepositiveforexecutives

in the larger companies. Although the faces of the CEOs of the largest and

smallest companies did not differ statistically in theirattractiveness, the larger

companies’CEOswereratedassomewhatbetter-looking.

This evidence provides only very weak support for the anecdotal evidence

from the Swiss survey. Why isn’t the support stronger? First, while there are

substantialagreementsonwhatconstituteshumanbeauty,thoseagreementsare

by no means perfect; and a set of undergraduates is hardly the group whose

views on beauty are likely to match well those of the typical Fortune 500

company’s customers, whose tastes presumably affect corporate boards’

appointmentsofCEOs.AsecondproblemisthesameasthatnotedfortheSwiss

beauty contest: This kind ofstudy saysnothing about causation. Even if there

were a strongpositive relationship between looksand company size, the most

thatwecouldsayisthattherelationshipmightbecausative,oritmightsimply

resultfromthebetter-lookingexecutivesbeingsortedintothelargercompanies.

As much as one would like to claim that beauty leads to CEOs generating

extraprofitsfortheircompanies,theonlyevidenceonthispointissuggestive.

Therealproblemhereisthecommononeinthenowimmenseliteratureonthe

productivityofCEOs.Itisdifficultenoughtodemonstrateastrongcorrelation

between a company’s profits and its CEO’s compensation. Demonstrating a

causalrelationshipfromCEOpaytoacompany’ssalesand/orprofitsismuch,

muchharder.

Thatbeingthecase,howmuchmoredifficultisitthentoshow

thataparticularcharacteristicthatCEOsmaypossess—theirlooks—iscausally

linked to their firm’s performance? Even with substantially more than the

currentsparseresearch,wearenotlikelytobeabletounderstandtheeffectsofa

boss’sbeautyonacompany’ssuccesswithasmuchprecisionastheimpactof

workers’beautyontheirearnings.

BEAUTYHELPSCOMPANIES—PROBABLY

The best guess based on research on the relation of employees’ and bosses’

lookstotheircompany’ssuccessisthathavingbetter-lookingworkershelpsthe

companychalkupgreatersales.Itevenseemspossiblethattheimprovementin

sales is so great as to overcome, and possibly even exceed, the extra costs

createdbytheextrapaythatacompanymustofferitsbetter-lookingemployees.

Becauseofthisatleastoffsettingeffectonrevenues,companiescansurviveand

perhaps even make extra profits by employing more costly, better-looking

workers. From the typical company’s narrow point of view its employees’

beautycanbeproductive—itcanraiseprofits.

Whatisthebottom-lineimplicationforcompanies—shouldtheyactivelyseek

outbetter-lookingworkersinthebeliefthattheirextracostismorethanoffset

by the extra revenue that their looks will help generate? More than in most

discussions, the academic caveat—more research is needed—applies here.

Nonetheless,the sparse evidencedoestell employers thattheyshould look for

better-looking workers, since the good-lookers appear to generate more extra

revenuethantheirextrapaycoststheiremployers.Ifenoughemployersfollowed

thissuggestion,though,theworkingsofthemarketwouldsoonmakethisadvice

worthless. Companies would move to the point where the marginally good-

lookingworkerswouldbepaidjustenoughmorethanworse-lookingworkersto

offsetanyadditionstosalesproducedbytheirlooks.Theimplicationisclear:Be

thefirstoneinyourindustrytohirethegood-lookers.Butwatchout:Eventually

your competitors may do so too and compete away the advantages you had

gainedforyourself.

CHAPTER6

LookismorProductive

Beauty,andWhy?

WHATTHEBEAUTYEFFECTMEANS

Beautyraisesearnings,inthepopulationingeneralandamongpractitionersin

particularoccupations.Thereisnoquestionthatitbenefitsthebeautiful;andwe

saw how it increases companies’ sales, and perhaps even their profits. Beauty

providesextramoneyforthosewhopossessitandisproductiveforthosewho

hire them; but is it productive for society? How can we discuss the effects of

beauty in terms that economists, attorneys, and the general public might find

useful? Do they result from discrimination, and if so, who is discriminating?

What does it mean for beauty tobe productive?Underlying these questions is

thecentralone:Whydoesbeautymatterforindividuals,companies,andeventhe

economyasawhole?

Onepossibilityislookism—purediscriminationinfavorofthegood-looking

and against the bad-looking—that should concern every citizen. By this view,

companies benefit by hiring the beautiful because they can cater to people’s

discriminatory preferences, but their behavior harms society. The other

possibility is that it not only benefits companies to hire the beautiful; it is

sociallyproductive.Bythisview,beautyisnodifferentfromanyotherinherent

characteristic, such as intelligence, physical strength, or musical or artistic

ability, that makes workers more appealing to potential employers and that

makes their product inherently better. But before attempting to distinguish the

ultimatecauses of thebeautyeffects, we needtounderstand what ismeantby

the economic categories—discrimination and socially productive. Both have

various meanings in different contexts, but we need to give them precise

meaningsinordertoallowustodifferentiateamongthepossiblesourcesofthe

effectsofbeautyonworkersandcompanies.

HOWCANBEAUTYEFFECTSBE

DISCRIMINATION?

Onedictionarydefinesdiscriminationas,“a.Theact,practice,oraninstanceof

discriminating categorically rather than individually. b. A prejudiced or

prejudicial outlook, action, or treatment.”

 One crucial term here is

“categorically,”whichinthiscasesuggeststhat people are being classified by

their looks rather than by their other, individual characteristics. The other is

“treatment”—disparatebehaviortowardworkersthatleadstoadisparateimpact

on them, in this case, to outcomes in labor markets that are different and that

depend on workers’ looks. The central paradigm in the discussion of labor-

marketdiscriminationineconomicsstartswithoutlook—preferences,essentially

the second definition. It then moves, to impact, essentially the first definition.

Theideagoesbackto1957tothedoctoraldissertationofGaryBecker,Nobel

laureateineconomicsin1992.

Following Becker’s basic theory, economists view discrimination as a

preferenceagainstbuyingfrom,employing,orgenerallydealingwithpeopleina

particulargroup.PreferencesagainstmembersofGroupU(Ugly)differacross

employers(assumefornowthatwearetalkingaboutemployers`choices).Some

employersmightnotcareabouttheiremployees’looks—mightnotdiscriminate.

Afterall,theUworkersproduceasmuchasBworkers;buthowareallofthe

Ugly workers going to find jobs if there are only a few non-discriminatory

employers?Theonlywayisiftheycanmakehiringthemselvesadvantageousto

otheremployers.Andtheonlywaytodothatisbyacceptinglowerwages,by

bribingemployerstoovercometheirprejudicesagainsttheugly.

Howmuchwill it take toconquerotheremployers’ prejudices? With justa

few more U workers than non-discriminatory employers, the wage difference

betweenUandBworkerswillbesmall.EventhelastUworkertogetajobwill

be working for an only slightlybigotedemployer.Butas the sizeof Group U

expands relative to the number of non-prejudiced employers, U workers will

needtoacceptjobsfromanincreasinglyprejudicedgroupofemployersifthey

wanttowork.

Intheend,thepayofUworkerswillbedeterminedbytheprejudiceofthe

employerwhoisthemostprejudicedamongthoseemployerswhoarewillingto

hire U workers. Prejudice among the most bigoted employers of all will not

affect the pay of U workers—the U workers won’t bother approaching those

employers.Instead,itisthepreferencesofemployerswhoarewilling,atsome

reasonableprice,toacceptabribeintheformoflowerlaborcoststoovercome

theirdistasteforhiringUworkerswhichdeterminetheUworkers’payshortfall.

Thepenalty(the wage discrimination) suffered byUworkersis determined

byemployers’preferencesaboutthetypeofworkerstheywishtoemployandby

therelativesizeofGroupU.Howdoesthisrelatetothewagepenaltysuffered

by bad-looking workers and the wage premium received by good-looking

workers? Assume first that all workers are identical along every dimension

except that of looks. Also assume that employers can divide workers into the

threegroups—good-looking,average,andbad-looking—thatmoststudieshave

lookedat.

The outcomes in the labor market are clear: Whatever the good-looking

workersearn,theaverage-lookingworkersmustacceptlowerearningsinorder

to compensateemployersfortheirinferiorlooks;andthebad-lookingworkers

must acceptstillless.Whethergood-lookingworkersreceivepremiumpay,or

theirpayisthebasisagainstwhichtocalculatepaypenaltiesintheothergroups,

isirrelevant.Wecan’ttellifgood-lookingworkersarebeingfavored,orifbad-

looking workers are being penalized. Regardless, we can view the pay

differencesasreflectingdiscrimination.

Talkingaboutthiskindofdiscriminationasifitssourceweretheprejudices

of employers who choose which workers to hire is just an expositional

convenience.Itcouldequallywellsteminsteadfromtheprejudicesofworkers

generally:The average workermightrefuse to work nextto a bad-looking co-

worker and only be willing to work if compensated, in the form of a higher

wage, for looking at an ugly colleague for eight hours per day. The outcome

would be the same as if employers’ prejudices were responsible. Bad-looking

workers would earn less than average-looking workers; and good-looking

workers would command premium pay, as they make the workplace more

appealing to other workers and so enable employers to hire other workers for

lesspay.

Thephenomenoncouldequallywellstemfromconsumers’prejudices.Even

if people do not discriminate in their roles as workers or employers, if they

discriminateasconsumers—iftheyprefertodealwithbetter-lookingprofessors,

salespeople, television-presenters, athletes, or entertainers—better-looking

peoplewhoareotherwiseidenticalwillearnmoreinanyactivityinwhichthey

contactconsumers.Bad-lookingworkerswillshyawayfromthoseoccupations

andmoveintootheroccupationswherelooksdonotmatterasmuch.Thatwill

reduceearningsfor everyone in those other occupations,butthe effect will be

biggest for the bad-looking workers, since they would constitute a

disproportionateshareofworkersinthoseotheroccupations.

This discussion has been based on the most widely accepted theory of

discrimination—that discriminatory outcomes arise from preferences against

individuals who differ from others along the dimensions of certain

characteristics,suchasrace,gender,ethnicity,religion,sexualpreference,or,in

this case, looks. Economists have developed other theories of discrimination.

Whether these additional ideas are useful in discussing the inferior outcomes

experiencedbybad-lookingworkersisworthconsidering,sincetheymightshed

additionallightontheroleoflooksinlabormarkets.

One variant of the basic theory of discrimination ignores preferences and

instead assumes that we categorize other people into groups about which we

havestereotypesthat leadustoexpectdifferentbehavior.Thisidea,knownas

statisticaldiscrimination,and owing originally to the work of Edmund Phelps,

economics Nobel laureate in 2006, and others, suggests that members of the

groupthatisdiscriminatedagainstareassumedtobelessproductiveonaverage

thanotherworkers.

Whileafewgroupmemberscanovercomethestereotype

bydemonstratingtheirhighproductivity,mostcannot,andtheyarealllumped

together as being less productive than members of other groups. A few group

members might do well, but most will earn less than other workers because

employers and perhaps others too assume that their membership in the group

signalsthattheyarelessproductivethanotherworkers.

Statisticaldiscriminationisvery appealingasadescriptionofhowweview

groups of people generally; but it is not a satisfactory way of describing the

lower earnings of bad-looking workers. Employers or others may lump good-

looking workers into one group and bad-looking workers into another, and

assume that the latterare on average less productive thanthe former. But this

view seems far-fetched as compared to a simple preference-based approach.

Instead,itseemsmorereasonabletoassumethat,withoutsomecompensationin

theform oflower wagecosts, employerswouldnotwantbad-lookingworkers

around;andcustomerswouldnotbuyfromthematthesamepriceoftheproduct

or service. This view fits the preference-based theory of discrimination more

closelythanatheoryofstatisticaldiscrimination.

A second variant on the basic theory of discrimination is that there is

crowding into some occupations. The notion is that employers get together to

force members of the discriminated group into certain occupations (or

alternatively, keep them out of other occupations). This keeps wages in these

occupations artificially low due to the crowding of workers into them.

 The

occupations might be such now-antiquated ones as clerk-typist, in the case of

women,orrailroad sleeping-carporter,in thecaseof AfricanAmericans.This

approach requires some kind of collusion among employers to force group

membersintoparticularoccupations.Aswithstatisticaldiscrimination,itmaybe

useful generally; and we know that beauty matters more in some occupations

thanothers.But,sinceitseemsunlikelythatemployersgettogetherandplotto

force ugly workers into certain occupations, it is not as desirable a way of

describing discrimination based on looks as the simpler preferences-based

approach.

HOWCANBEAUTYBESOCIALLYPRODUCTIVE?

Thesparseevidencesuggeststhatbeautyisprivatelyproductive—itraisessales

inthecompaniesthathiregood-lookingworkers.Preferencesforbeautybenefit

the beautiful and help their employers sell more. That is productivity in a

narrow, private sense—it says nothing about whether society is better off

because of people’s preferences for beauty in theireconomic transactions. But

that is the issue—is the benefit of beauty to good-looking people and their

employersofanyvaluetosocietyasawhole?

First consider intelligence. There are numerous kinds of intelligence, be it

skillsatmathematics,abilitytosolvepuzzles,socialskills,orothers.

Possessing

anyofthesemightraiseanindividual’sproductivity,nodoubtmoresoinsome

jobs than in others. Your mathematical skills might enable you to calculate

trajectoriesofrocketsmorerapidly,arguemorelogicallyinalegalcase,oreven

provetheoremsinmathematicaleconomics.Yourabilitytosolvepuzzlesmight

makeyouabetterengineer.Yoursocialskillsmightenableyoutoinduceother

peopletoagree to your requests, ortomanage the skills ofotherpeople more

successfullyandthusraiseacompany’ssales.

Each of these forms of intelligence is to a large extent inherent in the

individualwhopossessesit.Eachraisesaperson’sproductivityintheworkplace

—the amount that the person adds to his or her company’s sales. This added

productivity is marketable and induces employers to bid for the person’s

services,sothatthosewhopossesstheskillwillreceivehigherpaythanthose

whodonot.Webelievethattheintelligentarepaidmorebecausetheyproduce

morefortheiremployers.Butwealsobelievethatthisextraproductionbenefits

society,intheformoftechnologicaladvances,moreefficientorganizations,and

evenbettereconomicresearch.

Good-looking people also earn more and also create more sales for their

employers. Does this mean that they are socially productive too? Yes, if you

believe that society benefits because the product sold by the good-looking

salespersonissomehowinherentlybetter.No,ifyouthinkitisthesameproduct

regardlessofwhosellsit.Thecosmeticsexamplewouldarguethatbeautyisnot

productive socially—the quality of the perfume or the makeover is the same

regardlessof thebeauty ofitsseller.Whataboutprostitution,movie-acting,or

some other service? The item being “sold” is inherently different depending

uponwhoissellingit,andbothitsprivateanditssocialvalueareenhancedby

thelooksofthepersonprovidingtheservice.

Beautyisclearlyprivatelyproductive;butthinkingaboutitthisway,insome

cases it might be viewed as socially productive too—as benefiting society as

well as those who are fortunate enough to be born beautiful or the employers

whoobtaintheirservices.Itisreasonabletoarguethatsomeservicesofferedby

the beautiful are inherently different from those offered by the ugly, and that

societyisbetteroffbyhavingthebeautifulprovidetheseservices.

A fair conclusion is that the effect of beauty on earnings, choice of

occupation, and sales or profits is privately productive. The answer to the

question, “Lookism or productive beauty?” is a clear YES! if we are talking

about productivity at the level of a person or company. In many cases our

preferences against the ugly are no different from our socially unproductive

discrimination against minorities. Indeed, in those cases our discriminatory

preferences are counterproductive. There is no gain to society; and by

channelinguglypeopleintocertainroles,societyislessefficienteconomically

thanitwouldbeifpeopleworkedinjobsthatusedtheirskillsmostefficiently,

independentoftheirlooks.Asimplecalculation,analogoustooneseconomists

have made to measure the cost to society of discrimination against African

Americans, suggests that the loss in economic efficiency due to lookism is

equivalenttoone-quarterof1percentoftotalcompensationofemployees,about

$20billionintheUnitedStatesin2009.

Notlarge,butnottiny.

Inothercases,ourpreferencesforbeautyarepreferencesforservicesthatare

inherentlybetterthantheywouldbeifprovidedbytheugly.Humanbeautyin

some of its activities is no different from artistic beauty. It would be hard to

argue that Daniel Hamermesh singing “La donna è mobile” is as socially

productiveasLucianoPavarottisingingthataria.Musicalabilityisinherentand

shouldbeviewedassociallyproductive.Itisequallyhardtoarguethatsociety

wouldbeaswellofflookingatDanielHamermeshonthebigscreenperforming

asJamesBondasitislookingatDanielCraiginthesamerole,evenifIcould

act as well as Craig. Some of what we might view as lookism is also socially

productive.Thesepotentialpositiveeffectsmeanthatthe$20billioncalculation

isanupperlimittothecosttoAmericansocietyoflookism.

Tosomeextentourpreferencesforbeautyarepurelydiscriminatory—areno

differentfromthedistastesofcitizensinthemajorityforbuyingfrom,working

with,oremployingworkersinsomeminoritygroup.Thiskindofdiscrimination

benefitsthediscriminator,butit hurtssocietyoverall.Tosome extent,though,

and in certaincases, our preferences for beauty representtastes for idealsthat

enhance human well-being generally and that are socially productive. Which

cases are which is hard to say; but most people, if they think about it, can

identifyindividualcases,canviewsociallyproductivebeautythesamewaythat

JusticeStewartviewedpornography—andcan“knowitwhen[they]seeit.”

WHATARETHESOURCESOFBEAUTYEFFECTS?

Regardless of the extent to which our preferences for beauty are socially

productiveornot,possiblysimplerquestionstoanswerare:(1)Whosebehavior

causesthebeautyeffects?Asthediscussionofthestandardeconomictheoryof

discriminationmadeclear,preference-baseddiscriminationcouldarisefromthe

tastesoftheemployersthemselves,fromanindividual’sfellowworkers,orfrom

consumers of the products or services to whose production the worker

contributes.(2)Isthereany directevidence—ontheamountactually produced

insteadofdollarsofsalesrevenue—thatbeautyisevenprivatelyproductive?

Combiningtheeffectsoflooksonsales,profits,andpay,youwouldinferthat

discriminationbyconsumersismostconsistentwiththeevidence.Ifemployers

wereatfault,andconsumersdidn’tcareaboutthelooksofthosesellingtothem,

therecouldbenoeffectonsales.Thesameholdsiffellowemployeeswerethe

discriminators. But if consumers are discriminating, employers will profit by

cateringtotheirpreferences,byhiringthebeautifulandpayingforthescarcity

ofbeauty,therebyincreasingsalesandperhapsevenprofits.

The difficulty with this inference is that it is indirect—one would like

somethingthatidentifiedthesourceofthediscriminationmoredirectly.Ifyou

could set up an experiment that would allow you to distinguish among these

sources of the beauty premium, how would you do it? One possibility is to

imagine a set of unexpected and naturally occurring disfiguring injuries that

occur differentially across members of the labor force. Perhaps a plague

randomly strikes adults, independent of their demographic or economic

characteristicsoranypriorexperiencesthattheymighthavehad,anditrenders

theirfacespermanentlyandseverelyscarred.Thesedisfigurementsmakesome

unfortunate workers worse-looking; and we can assume that some companies

andsomeoccupationshademployedmoreofthedisfiguredworkersthanothers.

Asimpletestwouldcomparewagesbeforeandnottoolongaftertheplaguehas

struck in relation to the degree to which the workers have contact with

customers. If the source of the pay difference is customer discrimination, you

wouldexpecttoseeabiggerdropinwagesamongthosedisfiguredworkerswho

havemorecustomercontact.

Going still further with this same “natural experiment,” how do the before-

afterpaydifferencesvarywiththenumberoffellowemployeeswhoworkwith

thedisfiguredindividuals?If,forexample,youfindthatthesuddenlydisfigured

workers who come into contact with many other employees in their company

sufferlargerwagedeclinesthanthosewhohavefewfellowworkers(or,indeed,

ifthelatterexperiencenochangeinwages),youcanbeprettysurethattheugly

worker’s fellow employees are the source of the beauty effect in the labor

market.

Whatifneithercomparison,amongworkerswhosejobsdifferbytheextent

of customer contact, or among workersdistinguished bythe numberof fellow

employees, shows any difference in the before-after differences in earnings

between disfiguredworkersand those who were more fortunate? Despite their

absence, though, you observe that the typical disfigured worker has suffered a

declineinearningscomparedtothoseworkerswhowerenotdisfigured.Ifthat

werethecase,youwouldhavetoinferthatthesourceofthebeautypremiumis

the employer. You would conclude that employers just prefer to surround

themselveswithbetter-lookingemployees.

No such naturally occurring plague has occurred; and fortunately there has

notevenbeenaman-madedisasterthathasrandomlydisfiguredenoughworkers

to allow researchers to make the kinds of comparisons needed to isolate the

sources of the beauty effect. Minor beautifying efforts, like better clothing,

cosmetics, and beauty treatments, have little effect on how your beauty is

perceived;butperhapsexaminingchangesintheexperienceofpeoplewhohave

undergonemajorfacialplasticsurgerymightallowdeducingthepathsbywhich

beautyaffectsearnings?

There are two problems with considering the effects of plastic surgery on

earnings. First, the number of uninjured workers undergoing major

reconstructivesurgery ontheir facesis minute.Second,itisvery unlikelythat

thosefewwhodoobtainthiskindofsurgeryarearandomsampleofallworkers.

Given that the surgery is elective, most beneficiaries have had above-average

incomesbeforehandandareinjobswhere,sotheybelieve,animprovementin

theirappearancemightmattermost.Thetreatment—majorfacialsurgery—isfar

fromwhatwouldbenecessarytoconsiderthisacontrolledexperiment.

Absentacarefullycontrolledexperiment,oranywayofusinginformationon

major surgery, we cannot look at people before and after their looks have

changed and hope to infer the causes of the beauty effect. This puts us at a

disadvantage compared to a huge and still burgeoning literature in economics

thathasevaluatedsocialandeconomicprogramsbyexaminingoutcomesbefore

and after the program began among those people, geographic areas, or

demographic groups who were or were not treated by the program. We are

thrown back on non-experimentalsituations,where we compare peoplewhose

othercharacteristicsthatcouldaffecttheoutcomeofinterestcanbecontrolledto

asgreatanextentaspossible.Thisapproachisclearlyfarfromideal;butitisthe

bestthattherealworldoffersus,absentunethicalinterventionsthatmight,for

example,allowustodisfiguresomerandomlychosengroupofworkersinorder

theconductthenecessaryresearch.

WHATISTHEDIRECTEVIDENCEONTHE

SOURCES?

Thebeststudytoexaminethisquestiontriedtocircumventtheabsenceofdata

thrownupbyreal-worldexperimentsbycreatingalaboratoryexperiment.

The

researchersusedArgentineuniversitystudents,withsomerandomlydesignated

as “employers,” and with others randomly designated as “workers.” Each

worker’sphotograph was ratedon the usual5 to 1scale by alarge number of

highschoolstudents,aswaseachemployer’sphotograph.

Bygivingdifferentgroupsdifferenttreatments,theauthorsdesignedawayto

inferhowmuchofthebeautyeffectwasduetopreference-baseddiscrimination

and how much to payoffs to characteristics that could raise a worker’s

productivity.The“employmentsituation”wasthateachworkerhadtocomplete

asmanymazesaspossibleinashortperiodoftime.Thepayoffwasbasedon

the number completed, on what the worker expected to complete based on a

brief trial maze, and on what the employer expected that the worker would

complete. By using the trial maze the researchers allowed for a correlation of

beauty and self-confidence—based on the worker’s estimate of his or her

eventual “productivity” after the trial—and what the employer was willing to

payforcompletedmazes.Thesevariationsenabledtheresearcherstodistinguish

discriminationfromdifferencesarisingfrompossiblecorrelationsamongverbal

self-confidence,employers’stereotyping,andproductivity.

Themainconclusionofthestudywasthatthemajorityoftheeffectofbeauty

wasnotduetopreference-baseddiscrimination.Instead,muchoftheimpactof

beautywasthroughthechannelofgreaterself-confidenceontheworkers’part

and better verbal skills. The translation of these measures to the real-world

analogoflaborproductivitymaynotbeperfect;butthestudydoessuggestthat

employers’ treatment of bad-looking workers is not entirely unproductive

socially.

In another laboratory study, researchers tried to discover whether more

informationaboutactual“productivity”wassufficienttomodifytherelationship

between the amounts received by people and their beauty.

 This was not

designedto mimicthe employmentrelationship. Instead,it waspartofawell-

knownlaboratorygame,inwhichmembersofagroupofpeoplearegivensome

moneyandtoldthat,iftheycontribute$1tothecommonpool,membersofthe

groupasawholewillreceivemoneybacktotalingmorethan$1.Tounderstand

thegame,askyourselfhowmuchyouwouldcontributetothepoolifyouwere

in a group with three average-looking strangers; then ask yourself how much

with a group of three good-looking strangers; then with three of your closest

friends.

Again using university students, the authors had other students rate the

participants’looks(fromphotographs),thistimeona9to1scale.Studentswho

wereratedasbetter-lookingelicitedlargercontributionstotheirgroup’sgeneral

pool than did other students. But after their fellow participants were told how

muchthebetter-lookingstudentsthemselveshadcontributedtothegeneralpool,

they then contributed less than did participants in other groups that contained

fewer good-looking participants. There appeared to be preference-based

discrimination in favor of the good-looking students, but that favoritism was

implicitlybasedonexpectationsthatthosestudentswouldbemore“productive”

for the society consisting of participants in this game. Once the good-looking

studentswereshowntobenomoresociallyproductivethanothers,thebeauty

premiumbecameapenalty.

Another study used a different kind of game to examine the same

phenomenon. Each of a group of students was shown photos of a group of

studentsfromanotheruniversityandaskedhowmuchmoneyeachwouldoffer

toeachofthepicturedindividuals.Asecondgroupofstudentswasshownthe

samephotosandaskedhowmuch money they would insist on receiving from

the pictured individuals.

 Pictures wererated by yet a third group of students,

thistime onan 11to1 scale.Good-looking peoplewere offeredmoremoney;

but when students were responding to photos of good-looking students, they

expected the good-lookers to offer more themselves. This study is consistent

withtheviewthatbeautyisatleastsomewhatsociallyproductive,solongaswe

arewillingtomakethegiantleapfromlabexperimentstotherealworld.

Laboratory experiments allow researchers to isolate factors that would be

difficult to adjust for statistically even with the best available data describing

actuallabormarkets,orthatforpracticalreasonssimplycouldnotbegenerated

intherealworld. They are increasingly popularresearchtoolsfor economists.

But my guess is that you are wondering whether they really tell us anything

about behavior outside the laboratory—and your wonderment is well-founded.

Theanalogybetweenthelaboratoryexperimentandthereal-worldlabormarket

is always imperfect—the games cannot be perfect reflections of employment

relations.Thismakesitdifficult,asthediscussionherehasshown,totranslate

laboratory results to inferences about behavior in real-world labor markets.

Anotherdifficultyisthatthestakesofthesegamesaregenerallymuchsmaller

thanthoseinactualemploymentsituations—inonestudytheaveragepayoffwas

$3.84, infinitesimal compared to the $230,000 difference in lifetime earnings

between the good-looking and the bad-looking in the United States. Also, the

relationships are much shorter-lived. Finally, the participants in these

experimentsarealmostalwaysuniversitystudents,hardlytypicalofreal-world

employersandworkers.

While missing certain aspects of these nicely controlled laboratory

environments,astructuredgameplayedbyrandomlychosencontestantscan,if

properlyanalyzed,providesomeinformationabouthowbeautypaysoffinlabor

markets.Itcan,moreover,avoidsomeofthedifficultiesjustnoted,includingthe

use of students as laboratory subjects. In a study of a Dutch television game

show,Britishresearcherstriedtoinfertherelativeimportanceofpreferencesfor

beauty from the contestants’ behavior, and to test whether there was a causal

relationship between beauty and social productivity.

 Each gameconsisted of

fivecontestantswhoansweredquestionsposedbythemoderator.Ineachofthe

firstthreerounds,thecontestantwhobuzzedfirstwouldplacepartofhisorher

initial endowment of money and/or prior winnings in play, and receive that

amountifthequestionwasansweredcorrectly,orforfeititifnot.Aftereachof

these rounds the person who did best in the round would choose a fellow

contestant for elimination, with the person eliminated losing all of his or her

winnings.In the final,fourthround, the two remainingcontestants would play

anothergamethatbasedthepayoffsonhowmuchthetwotogether(asamini-

society)hadearneduptothatpoint.

Theauthorshadalargenumberofadultsratethecontestants’beautyona7to

1 scale based on photographs. The ratings were characterized by the same

genderandagedifferencesasusual—moredispersionamongwomen,andlower

average ratings of older players. The research questions were whether the

decisionofthewinnerofaroundtoejectafellowcontestantwasrelatedtothe

contestant’s beauty, and whether the contestants’ beauty was related to their

productivity—totheirabilitytoanswerquestionsandthusincreasethewinnings

ofthegroupofcontestants,the“society.”

Ineachroundtheaveragebeautyofthoseeliminatedwaslessthanthatofthe

averageplayer.Asaresult,theaveragebeautyofthesurvivingplayersroseas

thegamesprogressed.Thesuccessofthebad-lookingcontestantsinanswering

questions,however,wasnolessthanthatoftheothercontestants:Therewasno

apparentrelationbetweenbeautyandsocialproductivity.

The greater success of better-looking contestants on the show was due

entirely to their fellow contestants’ preferences for good looks. Given the

structure of the game,it is difficult toanalogize the result tolabor markets in

order to infer whether it represents employer, employee, or customer

discrimination. But the result strongly indicates the importance of tastes for

beautyabsentanyrelationbetweenbeautyandsocialproductivity.

Even a television game show, one that involves substantial amounts of

money,isveryfarremovedfromactuallabormarkets.Wecanlearnabitmore

aboutthesourcesofthebeautyeffectinactuallabormarketsbyconsultingthe

studies of beauty in specific occupations. Although we did not link them

specificallytosourcesofbeauty,theydo tellussomethingaboutthistopic.In

the study of attorneys, for example, the fact that litigators were better-looking

than transactional attorneys (those less likely to appear in front of a judge or

jury)suggeststheimportanceofcustomers’preferences.

Additional evidence from the study of attorneys makes this point more

strongly. Good-looking attorneys who spent their early careers in the public

sector,andwhothusdidnotneedtoattractclients,weremorelikelythanworse-

lookingpublic-sectorattorneystomovetotheprivatesector,wheretheirlooks

mighthelpthemattractclients.Amongattorneysintheprivatesector,theeffect

ofgoodlookswasgreaterontheearningsofthosewhowereself-employed,who

neededtoobtainclientsanddidnothaveanemployer,thanontheearningsof

attorneyswhowereemployedinlawfirms.Thislastresultinparticularsuggests

that discrimination by employers, or by fellow employees, is a less important

sourceofthebeautyeffectthandiscriminationbycustomers.

The studies of professors also suggest the importance of customer

discrimination. After all, the students who are evaluating professors are

customersinaveryrealsense.Sinceatleastsomesmallamountofpayinmost

universitiesisrelatedtohowwelltheinstructorisappreciatedbystudents,there

is an indirect translation from customers’ (students’) higher instructional

evaluationsofgood-lookingfacultytotheirhigherpay.

Additional,albeitanecdotal,evidenceisprovidedbythecomplaintsofsome

femaletennisplayersinthe2009Wimbledontournament.Duringmanyofthe

tournament’s rounds, Centre Court, the focus of fans’ attention and the most

likely to be shown on television, featured matches between players noted for

their beauty as well as their tennis prowess. The BBC, which broadcast the

tournament, denied being responsible for the assignment of players to Centre

Court, but a spokesperson implicitly acknowledged the role of consumers’

preferences when he noted, “It’s advantageous to us if there are good-looking

womenplayersonCentreCourt.”

Thinking about these examples illustrates the difficulty of inferring when

beauty is socially productive. The tennis example seems to be the least likely:

ThequalityoftennisisgenerallynobetterwhenprovidedbyMariaSharipova

thanbyalessgood-looking,equallyablecompetitor,butsponsorsmightbenefit

from showing off Sharipova’s beauty. The professors’ example is tougher:

Students may learn more because the good looks of the professor lead the

studenttoattend classmorefrequentlyand,perhaps,paymoreattentiontothe

substance of the professor’s lecture. The attorneys’ example seems more

difficultstill.Certainly,ifonesidewinsacivilsuitbecauseitsattorney’sbetter

looks influenced the jury, the other side loses. Her beauty is privately but not

socially productive. But, like the beautiful professor, if her looks also get the

jury to pay more attention to her sensible arguments and render a fairer

judgment,herbeautyisalsosociallyproductive.

THEIMPORTANCEOFBEAUTY

Beautymattersineconomictransactionsbecausepeoplecareaboutthelooksof

thosewithwhomtheyinteract.Becausepeopleprovideservicesandsellgoods,

theirlooksbecomepartofthegoodsandservicesthatcustomersbuy.Ifyoubuy

something from a bad-looking person, you are buying a product or service

whosepurchasemakes you lesshappy and lesswillingto pay asmuch.Being

ugly means beingless productive to your employer in many jobs. Your lower

productivityresultsfrompeoplediscriminatingagainstyou—youareharmedby

the prejudices of all of your fellows. Consumers’ preferences for beauty

discriminatorilyappeartomakebad-lookingpeoplelessproductiveintheeyes

of employers. But in some of these cases beauty is socially productive—it

doesn’tjustraisesales,andperhapsprofits;italsomakesanarguablyinherently

betterproductor,morelikely,aninherentlybetterservice.

Sowhocausestheinferiortreatmentofbad-lookingpeopleinlabormarkets,

the discriminatorily lower earnings that they receive, the lowerproductivity in

themindsoftheiremployers,andtheoccasionalfilliptotheinherentqualityof

what we consume? We all do. As suggested by the classic comic strip, Pogo,

“Wehavemettheenemyandheisus.”

PARTIII

BeautyinLove,

Loans,andLaw

CHAPTER7

BeautyinMarketsfor

Friends,Family,andFunds

Whatgoodisbeautyifnobodylikesyou?

—Signcarriedbystreetperson,Austin,Texas,February12,2009

BEYONDTHELABORMARKET

Beauty matters in labor markets—and it surely also matters in an immense

varietyofnon-economicactivities.Ifyouagreetospendtimewithfriends,you

are exchanging something with them—your time—and getting their time in

return, even though no money is exchanged. Time is scarce, and each party

couldspenditwithsomeoneelse—oralone;youhavealternativeusesofyour

time.Yourchoicemeansthatyouaregivinguptheopportunitytobewithother

peopleinfavoroftimespent with these friends. How beauty affects even this

most rudimentary non-monetary exchange is an economic question, since the

sharinginvolvesyourscarcetime.

MuchofwhatIdiscussherehastodowithmatching—howgroupsofpeople

form,howindividualsmatchone-to-onewitheachotherindatingandmarriage,

and how theyobtain monetary preferment when they match withlenders. The

marriage market is especially interesting and important. In most modern

societiesnothingotherthantokenringsareexchanged.Nodowryorbrideprice

is paid. Yet a marriage implicitly involves the exchange of a promise of a

lifetime spent together—doing things together and, most important for our

purposes,lookingateachother andsharingagenepooltopass onto thenext

generation. These latter two considerations involve each spouse’s looks, so in

this most important of transactions, we should expect beauty to play an

importantrole.

HOWISBEAUTYEXCHANGED?

Exchanging beauty for non-economic returns is not that much different from

exchanging beauty for pay at work. But there are a few differences, mostly

because,unlikeajobwhereitisjusttheworker’sbeautythatisbeingexchanged

formoney,hereatleasttwopartiesarebothexchangingtheirbeautywitheach

otherandexchangingbeautyfortheirpartner’sothercharacteristics.

Whatwouldtwo-personpartnershipslooklikeiftheonlytraitthatpeoplehad

was their beauty, everybody appraised human beauty the same way, and

everybody valued beauty? The most beautifulperson would be partnered with

thenextmostbeautiful,thethird-mostwiththefourth-most,allthewaydownto

a partnership between the ugliest and second-most ugly person. We saw that

agreementaboutbeautyisimperfect,sothissetofpairsisanextremecase;but

solongastherearecommonstandardsofbeauty,asweknowthereare,better-

lookingpeoplewilltendtobematchedwithotherbetter-lookingpeople—there

willbegood-lookingcouplesandbad-lookingcouples.

Beautyisn’ttheonlythingpeoplecareabout.Whatifthereisanothertrait,

sayintelligence,thatpeoplevalueintheirpartners.Inthinkingaboutwhomto

partner with, I desire their beauty and their intelligence, and they want mine.

Assume,astheevidenceshowed,thatthereisnocorrelationbetweenbeautyand

intelligence—a woman supermodel is just as likely to be very bright or quite

stupid,andsoisamalesuperstar.Informingpartnerships,solongasbothtraits

arevalued,thosewhoarebeautifulcanusethatdesiredcharacteristictoattract

partners who have both beauty and intelligence to offer. Beautiful people will

attractotherbeautifulpeople;buttheywillalsobeabletotradetheirbeautyfora

partner’sintelligence.Theoutcomewillbethatbeautifulpeoplewillbematched

together; they will also be matched with people who are not so beautiful, but

whoinsteadcanoffertheirintelligenceintheexchange.

Intelligenceisjustoneofmanycharacteristicsasidefrombeautythatpeople

mightdesireinapartner.Othersmightbeheight,goodhealth,education,family

connections, a good name, and, no doubt, many others. The beautiful can

exchangetheirbeautyfortheseotherdesirablecharacteristics;andtheir ability

todosowillleadtogood-lookingpeoplebeingpartneredwithpeoplewhoare

themselves good-looking and who possess many of these other desired

characteristics.Beautywillbeassociatedwithpartner’sbeauty,anditwillalso

be associated with partner’s intelligence, education, family name, and other

characteristics. Most generally, beauty will be associated with any partner’s

characteristicthatbringsmoretothepartnership,includingthepartner’sability

toprovidematerialthings—hisorherabilitytoearnmoney.

HOWDOESBEAUTYAFFECTGROUP

FORMATION?

This discussion has been totally general—it could apply to the formation of

groups of people or to two-person relationships. It could apply to short-term

relationships or to longer-term, even lifetime relationships. The general

principlesofexchangearethesameinallofthesecases,buttherearespecific

differencesthatmakeeachunique.

You start life off engaging with people you didn’t choose, such as your

parentsandotherolderrelatives.Evenherebeautyplaysapart.Mostbabiesare

viewedascute,andtheirperceivedcutenessinducestheirparentsandothersto

bondwiththem—totreatthembetter.Bythetimewestartschool,though,we

mustchoosewhotospendourscarcetimewith.Whomwillweinviteforplay

dates from among the choices in our pre-school class? Who will be our “best

friend”inthirdgrade?Whatsocialgroupwillwesortintoinmiddleschooland

high school? Even this last question misses the essential point: We do not

usuallysortintopreexistinggroups—weformgroupswithothers.Middleschool

or high school groups are not like college sororities or fraternities that one

attempts to join. They are formed anew based on individuals’ preferences for

beingwithoneanother,andforavoidingspendingtimeoutsidethegroup.

Evenafterdecadeshavepassed,mostofusrememberfromourhighschool

yearstheparticulargroupstowhichwedidordidnotbelong.Ifwehaveagood

memory, we can even recall the names of classmates who belonged to the

various groups. In Willowbrook High School in suburban Chicago, class of

1961,thereweretheathletes/cheerleaders(agrouptowhichImostdefinitelydid

not belong), the intellectuals (my group), the “hoody” kids (a 1950s term

denoting D.A. haircuts and denims), and no doubt others. (These terms are

extremelyantiquated,andIleaveittothereadertodiscoverwhataD.A.haircut

looked like and whence the appellation came.) The groups were not rivals—

thesewerenotgangs.But wespenttimemostlywithothersinour group.The

groupscontainedbothboysandgirls,andtypicallyevendatingwaswithinthe

groupandinfacthelpedtodefinethegroup.

Doesbeautyplayaroleintheformationoftheseandothergroups,andhow

doesitaffecttheirformation?Eventhoughbeautyisjustonecharacteristicthat

matters, if people value thelooks of others, they willvalue looks in choosing

membersofagrouptoassociatewith.Abetter-lookinggroupmemberenhances

thestatusofthegroup,creatingpleasureforexistinggroupmemberswhogetthe

chance to associate with her. Perhaps at least as important, a better-looking

groupmembermakestheentiregroupmoreattractivetooutsiders.Shemakesit

easier for the group to attract more, and more desirable, members. It benefits

others, raising the value of group membership for everyone. The effect is the

sameaswhenareligiouscultobtainsanotheradherent,whoseattendancemakes

jointprayermoreenjoyableforbothexistingandprospectivemembers.

Social psychologists have created an immense literature examining the

formationof groups, particularlyamongadolescents.Theissueisofparticular

interestinthatagegroup,becausethenyouhavethefreestchoiceaboutgroup

adherence.Earlierinlifeoptionsarelimitedbytheverysmallsocialcircleyou

havecontactwith.Lateronyouareconcernedmorewithone-to-onematching—

datingandmarriage—thanwithbecomingpartofapossiblylargergroup.

The psychologists’ evidence, which typically considers many factors and

occasionally even beauty, is that group members tend to resemble each other

along a variety of dimensions, just as thegeneral discussion predicted.

 These

dimensions include intelligence, athleticism, economic background (in those

schools that do not obtain a student body from an already homogeneous

population), ethnicity, and religion. The three groups from Willowbrook High

Schoolreflectedexactlythiskindofsorting.

Economists have tried to get at the role of beauty in group formation with

experiments.Usingnon-studentadults,economicexperimentersexaminedhowa

groupofPeruviansbehavedwhenfacedwithincentivestocontributepartofan

initialendowmentgivenbytheresearchertoagroupfund,whichinturncould

paybackmorethancontributedtotheinitialamount.Butthatadditionalamount

waspaidoutonlywhenothergroupmemberscontributed,withthetotalofthe

extra contributions split among the group’s members.

 In a final round of the

game the participants were allowed to choose members of a group that they

would want to belong to. People who were rated as better-looking by an

independentpanelofraters(whowerenotparticipantsintheexperiment)were

morelikelytobechosentojoinagroup.Beautyprovedtobeimportantingroup

formation, even after the authors adjusted for how much each participant had

contributedinearlierroundsofthegame.

HOWDOESBEAUTYAFFECTDATING?

Mostoftheinterestinnon-marketexchangeofbeautyisinitsroleintwo-person

relationships. Aside from how widespread such relationships are and their

importanceforprocreation,theyhavetheadditionaladvantageofbeingeasyto

analyze—we only need to consider two people’s preferences and abilities, not

three or more people’s behavior. Gender differences are especially interesting

here,withthecrucialpointperhapscapturedinSamCooke’ssong,“Wonderful

World”:

NowIdon’tclaimtobean“A”student

ButI’mtryingtobe,

Somaybebybeingan“A”studentbaby

Icanwinyourloveforme.

This1960 song, whichhas been usedin movies(Witness)and isstillheard in

elevatorstoday,expressesasetofcommonbeliefsaboutthedatingmarket:The

man believes that the woman wants success (being an “A” student), while

nothing is mentioned of her skills other than the man’s implied infatuation,

perhaps with her looks. The central question in this section is how beauty is

exchangedindatingrelationships—whateachpartyislookingfor,andhowthat

differs by gender. That in turn lays the foundation for the more important

questionofthenextsection—howbeautyisexchangedincreatingamarriage.

There is nothing unique to homo sapiens in the potential for exchange of

characteristicsindatingandmating.Similarexchangesoccurwithvariationsin

the animal world too. Assuming thatthe goalis topass one’s genes on to the

nextgeneration,eachpartywouldliketodemonstratereproductivefitnessinthe

formofhealthandstrength.Male dung beetles grow ever larger horns, whose

displayattractsfemalesbecausethemalecanusehishornstodefendthetunnels

where the females will lay their eggs. One mightview the maledung beetle’s

horns as analogous to the songwriter’s desire to become an “A” student.

Presumablythefemaledungbeetlewhoseemshealthiest(prettiest)willattract

themaledungbeetleswiththelargesthorns,maximizingeachparty’schanceof

reproductivesuccess.

Thepossibilityof exchange of characteristics, andbeautyinparticular, was

madeespeciallyvividformeinmyintroductoryeconomicsclasswhenIasked

studentsforexamplesofactionsundertakenbyothersfortheirowngainbutthat

affected the student indirectly. One described the following situation. Her

roommate,whoshesaidisverypretty,hadahugeposterofherboyfriendover

herbed,andeverydaymystudenthadtolookatitfromherownbed.“Whydid

this poster impose a negative effect on you?” I asked. She answered, “The

boyfriend is really ugly.” After the uproar in the lecture hall subsided, I then

asked why, if the roommate is so pretty, she dated this bad-looking guy. My

student’sanswerwas,“HegoestoHarvard.”Theremaybeotherreasonsforthe

match;butperhapstheyounggentlemanwasexchanginghisearningspotential

(under the assumption that his acceptance by Harvard signaled his earnings

potential, or perhaps even that a Harvard education might make him more

productive)fortheroommate’sgoodlooks.

Socialpsychologistshavelongbeeninterestedinthedeterminantsofdating

preferencesandmatcheddates,andafewhavefocusedontheroleoflooksin

thisexchange.

Economistshaverecentlygottenintothisbusinesstoo,andwe

haveaddedsomenewtwiststotheresearch.Theresearchershaveinsomecases

availedthemselvesoftheimmenseamountsofdataavailablefromonlinedating

sites, going far beyond small samples of student participants. Also, the

preferences are placed into a framework of rationality and are inferred from

actualbehavior,notfromexpressionsofwhatpeoplemightdesireaselicitedin

surveys.

Theroleofscarcityandsomehintsaboutgenderdifferencesintheexchange

ofbeautyareprovidedbyarecentmediacontroversy,popularmusic,andoneof

my favorite jokes. All illustrate how supply and demand interact to affect the

chancesofamatchbeingmadeandthenatureofwhatthepartiesexchange.The

roleofscarcitywhenthereisanexcessofwomenwassuggestedin2008bythe

mayor of a small North Queensland, Australia, town, who commented, “with

fiveblokestoeverygirl,mayIsuggestthatbeauty-disadvantagedwomenshould

proceedtoMountIsa.”

Theeffectofashortageofmenissuggested by Jan and Dean’s 1963 song

“SurfCity,”whichtalkedaboutboysgoingtoSurfCitybecausetherewere“two

girlsforeveryboy.”Attheotherendofthelifecycle,awomanstoodupafter

dinner in an old-age facility and announced to thediners (among whom, asat

most such residences, men were very scarce), “Whoever can guess what I’m

holdingbehindmybackcanhavesexwithmetonight.”Onegentlemanyelled

out,“Elephant.”Thewomanreplied,“Closeenough.”

A recent study conducted at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill

offersmorethananecdoteonthissubject.

UsingthirtycoeducationalSouthern

colleges,whosepercentagesoffemale students in 2006 ranged from 47 to 85,

theauthorhadstudentsatherschoolratethebeautyofnearly1,500Facebook

photographsofwomenona10to1scale.Thehypothesiswasthatcompetition

fordateswouldleadtobetter-lookingwomenattendingschoolswheremenwere

relativelyscarce.Thismightariseifhighschoolgirls,beingawareofconditions

in different schools, sorted themselves in part by the sex ratio (the number of

menperwoman)atprospectivecolleges.Oritmightoccurbecausethecollege

women, finding dates scarce, made special efforts to enhance their physical

attractiveness,andtheseeffortsshowedupintheirFacebookpictures.

Asitturnedout,theschools’sexratiosdidaffecttheaveragelooksofwomen

at different colleges, but not quite as expected. Increases in the percentage of

womenupto60percent(wellabovethenationalaverage)wereaccompaniedby

increases in the average attractiveness of a campus’s coeds. Above that, the

beauty of the women decreased as the campus became even more heavily

female.Sothereissomerecognitionbywomenoftheroleoflooksinthedating

exchange;butitisdifficulttoexplainwhy,whenmenbecomeespeciallyscarce,

the effect disappears. Perhaps with extremely low percentages of men the

womenjustgaveup;orperhapspre-collegesortingdisappearsatsomeverylow

sexratios.

To examine the issue more closely, several economists have analyzed the

resultsofspeed-datingfestivals,inwhichseriesofmenandwomenarematched

briefly and then asked whether they would be interested in pursuing the

relationshipfurther.Onesetofresearcherscreatedtheirownsmall-scalespeed-

datingevents,inwhichseveral(9to21)graduatestudentsspentafewminutes

with each of a number of others of the opposite sex.

 “Successful” outcomes

occurredwhenparticipantsaskedforcontactinformationonindividualswhom

they had met during the brief speed-dating encounters. Each respondent rated

his/herownbeautybeforetheevent,andeachhadhis/herbeautyratedbyothers

whoparticipatedintheevent.Intelligence,takenasacharacteristicthatmightbe

exchangedforbeauty,wasmeasuredbytheaverageSATscoreofthestudent’s

undergraduateschool.

The authors found gender differences in the effects of attractiveness and

intelligenceonthelikelihoodofaperson’ssuccesswiththeoppositesex.Men

putmoreweightonawoman’sattractiveness,andwomenputmoreweightona

man’s intelligence. These results are consistent with the belief that beauty

mattersmoretomen,andpotentialeconomicsuccessmattersmoretowomen’s

datingchoices. Thegenderdifferences intheresponses, particularlytobeauty,

were not large,though: The responses of women to men’sattractiveness were

over four-fifths as big as men’s responses to women’s attractiveness. Beauty

seemedtomatterforbothgendersinthisstudy.

Amuchbroaderstudywasconductedonthedatingbehaviorofpeoplewho

were involved in an Internet-based dating service.

 Success was defined as

occurring when one registrant sent an email seeking to contact another.

Attractivenesswasratedbygroupsofundergraduatesbasedonphotographsof

thelargenumberofregistrants.Thebeautymeasuresthuscorrespondcloselyto

best-practicestandardsforratingbeauty.

Bothmenandwomenrespondedmorepositivelytomoreattractivemembers

oftheoppositesex;buttherewasnoevidenceofanydifferenceintheresponse

bygender.Norwerebetter-lookingmenorwomenmorelikelytorespondmore

or less strongly to better looks in the opposite sex. Despite this similarity

between men and women in their responses to looks, the authors did observe

that, as in most of the research, women’s preferences for a man rise as his

education level increases, but that this effect was not so strong in men’s

preferencesforwomen.Relativetotheirvaluationsofbeauty,womenputmore

weightoncharacteristicsthatindicateanabilitytoearnmoremoney.

HOWDOESBEAUTYAFFECTMARRIAGE?

The results from studies of dating are interesting and informative; but the

expressions of preferences about dates, and even the actual choices of dates,

reflect low-cost decisions. A bad date might cost you several hundred dollars

and one unpleasant evening. Marital choices are not low-cost: They are

expressionsofpreferences for amatchthat is expectedto last for manyyears.

Thesematchesareusuallynotmadewithoutverycarefulconsiderationoftheir

long-termcostsandbenefits.Inmostcountriestheyinvolvehugeinvestmentsof

timeandmoneyevenbeforethemarriageoccurs.

Formostpeopletheultimatepurposeofdatingismarriage.Economistsview

datingandmarriageasanalogoustojobsearchandlong-termemployment.Both

dating and job search are ways of gathering information about prospective

matches that, one hopes, will eventually lead to a match that is more or less

permanent. The exchange of information about jobs is two-way: Employers

learnaboutyou.Youlearn what you like about jobs and also learn something

aboutyourreal-worldcapabilities.Similarly,prospectivemates,thepeopleyou

date,discoverwhatyouarelikeinarelationship,andyoudiscoverwhattheyare

like—and more generally what your preferences are about prospective mates.

Theendresultinmostcasesisalong-termmatch,ofaworkerwithanemployer,

orofonespousewithanother.

Long-term marriages (and jobs) create surpluses for the partners. In both

casesthe match enablesboth partiestobe betteroffthan ifthematch hadnot

beenmade.Ifthatwerenottrue,thenthematchwoulddisappear.Onepartyor

bothwouldinitiatetheendofthematch—aworkerwouldquitorbelaidoff,and

the couple would divorce. The interesting economic questions in analyzing

marriage are how large a surplus is created, and how the spouses share that

maritalsurplus.

Solongasasurpluscanbecreated,itwillbe.Intermsofthefocusonbeauty,

thissuggeststhatthereisnoreasontoexpectanydifferenceinthelikelihoodof

marriageasindividuals’looksvary.Solongasaprospectivespouse,evenavery

unattractive one, can find someone to whom he or she can offer something

advantageousalongsomeotherdimension(s)—intelligence,height,strength,sex

appeal, family name, or whatever—a match will take place, as some marital

surpluscanbecreated.

Is this correct? Are bad-looking people as likely to be married as good-

lookingpeople?Anoldjokearguesno:

Awomanwalksintoastoreandpurchases1smallboxofdetergent,1bar

ofsoap,3individualservingsofyogurtand2oranges.Thecashiersays,

“Youmustbesingle.”Sheresponds,“YoucantellthatbywhatIbought?”

Thecashiersays,“No,you’reugly.”

Seventy-two percent of the respondents in the two American data sets that

underlay some of the analyses of chapter 3 were married. Among the above-

average-lookingpeople,itwas73percent,andamongthebelow-average,itwas

69 percent. The differences by looks in the percentage married were not

statistically significant. At least within the broad ranges of below-average,

average,andabove-average looks,thisdiscussion describesbehaviorcorrectly.

Bad-looking people are not much less likely than good-looking people to be

married.Thejokeisfunny,butwrong.

Theexchangeofbeautyforaspouse’sothercharacteristicsisshownbydata

onownbeautyandspouse’seducationfromtheAmericansurveyscollectedin

the 1970s and from data on Shanghai, China, from 1995. Except for the

comparison of good-looking to average-looking wives in the United States,

beauty has the expected effect on the education level of the spouse you have

matchedwith.Below-average-lookingindividualsmatchwithspouseswithless

education.IntheAmericandatathisisespeciallytrueforwomeninthebottom

15percentoflooks:Theirhusbandshaveonaverageonelessyearofschooling

than other husbands. A husband’s bad looks are less strongly related to his

wife’seducation.

Theeffectsarenotsmall.Thediscussionofbeautyinlabormarketsshowed

thatanextrayearofschoolingisassociatedwithabout10percentextraearnings

among men. As compared to an average-looking woman, a below-average-

looking woman is married to a man who will bring about 11 percent less

earnings into the household.

 If men on average earn 50 percent more than

women,thismeansthatthis isthesameeffectasherbad lookscausingherto

earnover15percentlessthananaverage-lookingwoman.

Althoughmeasureddifferently,the Chineseresultsareverysimilartothose

fromtheUnitedStates.Fifty-ninepercentofabove-average-lookingwiveshave

husbandswithatleastahighschooldiploma,whileonly50percentofaverage-

or below-average-looking women do. As in the United States, the differences

between their wives’ education of men classified by looks are smaller.Again,

educationseemstobetradedforlooks;anditismen’seducation,inparticular,

whichincreasestheirearningspotential,thatistradedforfemininebeauty.

These calculations help to explain the apparent anomaly that the impact of

badlooksonwomen’searnings appears to be smaller than on men’s. We saw

thatbad-lookingwomenarepaidlessthanotherwomen;andwehaveseenthat

they are not much less likely than their sisters to be married. Their major

additional income disadvantage arises because the husbands they match with

earnsubstantiallylessthanthehusbandsofbetter-lookingwomen.Good-looking

womencantradetheirlooksforahusband’sbetterabilitytoprovide,andbad-

lookingwomencan’t.

Additionalevidenceofgenderdifferencesintherelativeimportanceoflooks

andeducationisshowninastudyofanonlinedating/marriageserviceinKorea.

In addition to all the usual information, the service provided photos that were

usedtomeasuretheparticipants’looks.

Thecomparisonsshowedthatwomen

weremuchlesswillingtoreducetheirrequirementsforadditionaleducationina

prospectivematethanweremen.

That the exchange of beauty for desirable characteristics tends to be quite

one-sided is shown explicitly by matrimonial advertisements in Indian

newspapers.

 Women in a study of ads in one paper described themselves in

three categories of looks. Men seeking brides wanted potential brides with at

least above-average looks in over two-thirds of the ads. Women mentioned

men’slooksonlyrarely.

All of these findings demonstrate clearly what has long been celebrated in

DuBoseHeyward’ssong,“Summertime,”fromPorgyandBess:

Oh,yourdaddy’srich

Andyourmamma’sgoodlookin’

Sohushlittlebaby

Don’tyoucry.

Acceptingthecharacterizationofdating/matchingaswomentradinglooksfor

men’searningspotential,whydoesthisparticularsetofvaluationsarise?What

underlyingconditionsmightexpectustoobservethiskindoftrade?Onecould

simplyassertthatmen prefer looks more than do women, but thatassertionis

bothadhoc and sexist. But aslongas full-time female workersearnless than

full-timemaleworkers,orevenifpeoplemistakenlybelievethisisso,itwould

pay women to trade off their looks for men’s earnings capacity when these

matchesaremade.

Whatifwomenhadthesameearningscapacityasmen,everybodyknewthat

thereisequalityofpotentialearnings,andtherewasnogenderdiscriminationin

labor markets? Would we still observe this trade-off in marital matching? The

answer is yes. Even when workers’ skills and their preferences for beauty are

identicalbygender,itisstillpossibleforasocialnormtopersistthatleadsone

gender(men)totradeofftheirearningspowerfortheothergender’s(women’s)

looks.Asocietycanremaininaworldwheregenderdifferencesinthetrade-off

of beauty for earnings exist long after gender differences in earnings have

disappeared.

I have dealt with the trade-offs within marriage that are created by the

spouses’looks.Butwhataboutthelooksthemselves?Thetheorypredictedthat

good-looking husbands will have good-looking wives, and vice-versa. Is this

trueinreality—arespousessortedalongthedimensionofbeauty?

Psychologistshaveexaminedthisissueformanyyears,withresultsthathave

repeatedly demonstrated that better-looking men tend to be married to better-

looking women. Most of these studies have taken a few couples, have had

outsideobserversratethelooksofthespousesbasedonphotographs,andhave

shown that there is a positive relation between the ratings of wives and their

husbands.

Otherstudieshaveaskedraterstomatchphotosofmenandwomen

—toguesswhichonesaremarriedtoeachother—withtheresultthat,because

theratersassumedthatgood-lookingpeoplematchtoeachother,theirguesses

werefarmoreaccuratethaniftheyhadpickedrandomly.

To examine couples’ looks on a larger sample, take the data on the

Shanghainesehouseholdsfrom1995.ThesearetheonlydataIamawareofona

broad sample of households in which both husbands’ and wives’ looks were

rated. With random matching, we would expect only 12 percent of couples to

containbothagood-lookinghusbandandwife;butinfact25percentofcouples

contained two good-looking spouses. We wouldexpect only45 percentof the

couples to have both partners average or below-average in looks, not the 58

percentthatoccurred.

Couplessortevenalongthesingledimensionoflooks,

justasweexpected.

COULDTHEREBEAMARKETFORBEAUTIFUL

CHILDREN?

Beautycanbeexchangedformoneyandothercharacteristicstoday,andtoday’s

exchange can produce long-term benefits, perhaps reaching into future

generations.Indeed,today’sexchangeofbeautycanlinkgenerations.Itisillegal

to sell your children—you cannot produce a child and then shop around for

buyers.Whatif,however,youcouldchooseyourchild’sbeauty,oratleasthave

some influence over it beyond yours and your spouse’s genetic endowments?

ThisisnotanightmareoutofBraveNewWorld.Wearenotyetabletodecant

Alphasupondemand.Itisperfectlylegalandpossible,though,foracouplein

which fertilization cannot occur, but implantation of a fertilized ovum can, to

obtainadonatedovumthatwasfertilizedinvitrobythehusband’ssperm.

Ifyouseekunfertilizedovayoumaytakewhatyoucanget—youmaynotbe

able to choose how good-looking the donor is. Although it apparently never

materialized, an attempt at commercializing the saleof ovato generate better-

lookingchildrenappearedontheInternetintheearly2000s.Theownerofthe

website was trying to create an auction of the ova of a set of models whose

photographsweredisplayed,andadvertised:

Manymenhavesubstantialfinancialresources,yetareunabletofindthe

genetic combinations that would impart beauty to their offspring. . . . If

youcouldincreasethechanceofreproducingbeautifulchildren,andthus

givingthemanadvantageinsociety,wouldyou?Anygiftsuchasbeauty,

intelligence, or social skills, will help your children in their quest for

happinessandsuccess.

Theownerrecognizedthatbeautyandmoneycanbeexchangedoutsidelabor

markets, and was attempting to profit from creating a market that would

stimulatethiskindofexchange.

Theideaofthisauctionisappalling,butitdoesallowaninterestingexercise.

What would be the price of an auctioned ovum produced by one of these

women?Howmuchshouldacouplebewillingtopayforoneoftheauctioned

ova?Thewebsitelistedstartingbidsbetween$15,000and$150,000.Dothese

pricesreflectwhatsensiblepeopleshouldbewillingtopayintheopenmarket?

The calculation of an appropriate price in some ways resembles the

calculations in chapter 3 of the lost earnings that resulted from facial

disfigurement,exceptherewearetalkingaboutthegainstobeautyratherthan

thelossesarisingfromimpairedlooks. Presumably the child who results from

the auction of ova will, as the advertisement suggests, have “an advantage in

society.” The child will be able to earn more during adulthood; but since

earnings typically do not materialize until at least nineteen years after

fertilization, the extra benefits ofbeauty occur far intothe future and must be

discountedbacktothepresent.Theoutcomeforthechilddependsonwhatthe

childwouldearnwithoutthefilliptobeautythatisperhapsmadepossiblebythe

purchasedovum.

Thinkingaboutthegeneticsofprocreation,weknowthathalfthegeneswill

comefrom the fatherand willbethe same regardlessof the choiceof the egg

donor. The question is whether a child’s looks can be inferred by the casual

observerasacombinationofthefather’slooksandthatofarandomeggdonor,

or whether they will be expressed in ways not visible from the biological

parents’ physiognomies. This is an impossible question to answer, one that is

linked to the general question of heritability. While many people believe that

parentalexpressionsofsuchtraitsaslongevity,height,andintelligencearefully

heritable,thisisnottrue.

Randomnessplaysanimportantroleinallofthese

outcomes. If this is also true for looks, but we assume that looks are fully

heritable,wewillover-estimatethevalueofapurchasedovum.

Let’sassumethatthemodelisintheupper10percentoflooks.Thelargest

possible economic gain, which would occur if looks are fully heritable, if the

childwouldeventuallyobtainagraduatedegree,andifarandomlychosenovum

donor would have been in the bottom 15 percent of looks, is $105,000. Even

this,thebestgainonecouldhopeforfromthisauction,isbelowthetopamount

listed as the starting bid. If you obtain as much pleasure from your children’s

economicwell-beingasyourown,payingmorethan$105,000isjustifiedonlyif

thereisasubstantialnon-economicvalueofproducingunusuallygood-looking

children. No couple should pay a huge amount for an ovum donated by a

gorgeousmodelmerelyforthepossibilityofproducingachildwhosepossible

goodlooksmightoffereconomicadvantageslaterinlife.

The same calculations could be made if we were to imagine a commercial

sperm bank that would charge different prices to couples with an infertile

husbanddependingonthelooksofthespermdonor.Pricesatspermbanksare

currentlyverylow:Oneleadingbankchargesaround$500pervialofsperm.

The maximum prices that a buyer should be willing to pay are, as these

calculations show, substantially above that. My guess is that this kind of

differential pricing hasn’t yet appeared in the sperm bank market because the

readysupplyofpotentialdonorskeepspricessolow.

DOESBEAUTYMATTERWHENYOUBORROW?

One of the best Saturday Night Live skits was Eddie Murphy’s “White Like

Eddie.”

Thecomedianmasqueradesasawhitemanandgoestoabanktogeta

loan.WhentheAfricanAmericanassistantleaves,Eddieistoldbythebankvice

president that he can have as much money as he wants, can re-pay the loan

wheneverhewants,orsimplynotre-payitatall.Thisskitunderscoresacrucial

and much-debated issue in personal finance—whether and to what extent

ethnic/racialminoritiesarediscriminatedagainstincreditmarkets.

Whilethere

is no skit to illustrate this possibility for beauty instead of race, one wonders

whether credit markets treat beauty the same way as Eddie Murphy suggests

theytreatrace.

Why might an applicant’s beauty affect success in obtaining credit? The

possiblereasonsarethesamethatmightaffectsuccessinlabormarkets.Lenders

mighttakebadlooksasasignalthatthepersonisapoorcreditrisk—badlooks

might signal negative characteristics that are good predictors of a person’s

likelihoodofdefaultingonaloan.Inthatsense,pooroutcomesforbad-looking

applicants would indicate statistical discrimination. Another possibility is the

purepreference-baseddiscriminationthatcharacterizescustomers’attitudesand

givesrisetothepenaltiesthatbad-lookingworkersexperienceinlabormarkets.

Alargeonlinelendingmarket,Prosper.com,providesinformationonwhether

a loan was granted and its terms, the interest rate obtained, the person’s

demographic characteristics, and a photograph. Three recentstudies haveused

these data to determine whether looks matter in loan markets.

 The most

relevantfoundthatabove-average-lookingborrowersweremorelikelytoobtain

loans, even with the same demographic characteristics and credit histories as

worse-looking applicants. They also paid lower ratesof interest on their loans

thanotherborrowers.Thisisanear-perfectreflectionofthe“WhiteLikeEddie”

phenomenon.Butdespitegettingbettertermsontheirloans,thebetter-looking

applicants were more likely to be delinquent on those loans. So beauty was a

very poor predictor of performance, suggesting that lenders were not using

beautyasadevicetoinfersomethingaboutpotentialborrowers,butratherthat

theysimplypreferreddealingwithbetter-lookingborrowers.

Thisdiscussionofcreditmarketsillustratesyetanotherareawhereaperson’s

beautymodifiesaneconomicexchange.Researchinthisareaisjustbeginning,

andtheevidenceisveryfarfromconclusive.Itdoesseem,though,thatlenders

arewillingtoexchangemoregeneroustermsonloansforthepleasureofdealing

withgood-lookingborrowers.Theydothisnotbecausegoodlookspredictthat

theloanwillperformbetter,butbecausetheyareprejudicedagainstbad-looking

applicants.Theyexhibitthe same preference-based discrimination that appears

toexistsociety-wideandthatfindsexpressioninavarietyofothermarkets.

TRADINGBEAUTYINUNEXPECTEDPLACES

Muchofthefocusofeconomistsisjustifiablyonincomeanditsdeterminants,

becausepeoplederivemuchoftheirhappinessfromconsumingwhattheyhave

usedtheirincomestopurchase.Butwealsoderivemuchofourhappinessfrom

thepleasuresthatweobtaininnon-monetaryexchanges.Wegetsomeofthese

pleasuresbecauseofourgoodlooks—orwefailtogetthembecauseourlooks

aresomehowdeficient.Ourlooksbuyusfriendshipandeconomicsupportfrom

ourpeers;and,especiallyforwomen,theybuyeconomicsupportfromaspouse.

The difference between the genders in markets for matching with prospective

marital partners is striking. Men are more concerned with women’s looks,

womenmoreconcernedwithotheraspectsoftheprospectivepartner,including

hisabilitytogenerateanincome.The2009movieTheUglyTruthadvertisedthe

centralrelationshipbyshowingthefemaleleadholdingaheartnexttoherhead

andthemaleleadholdingoneoverhispants.

Ourbehaviorallowsustomonetizeourlooks—totradeourbeautyfornon-

monetary benefits that in turn have some monetary value. It enhances the

economic importance of looks beyond areas that are obviously economic. Put

morebluntly,theepigraphtothischapterhasgotitexactlywrong:Yetonemore

reasonwhybeautypaysisthatitinducesmorepeopletolikeyou.

CHAPTER8

LegalProtectionfortheUgly

FAIRNESSANDPUBLICPOLICY

Fairisnotawordthateconomistsusealot.Wearemoreconcernedwithhow

people’scharacteristicsaffectmarketoutcomes,predictingtheeffectsofchanges

onthoseoutcomes, examiningincentives,andsoon,thanwithaskingwhether

anoutcomemeetssomecriterionoffairness.Buthavingdemonstratedthatthere

isabeautypremium,andanuglinesspenalty,insomanyareasofdailylife,itis

worthaskingthequestion:Isitfairthatsomepeople,whohappentobebornand

grow up bad-looking, are disadvantaged in so many ways compared to others

whoare,forexamples,nomoreintelligent,strong,orphysicallyfit?

Most industrialized societies have instituted policies designed to protect

disadvantaged citizens in a variety of areas. These include labor markets,

housingmarkets,andaccesstopublicfacilities.AtthefederallevelintheUnited

States,protectedgroupsincluderacial,ethnic,andreligiousminorities;women;

older citizens; and disabled citizens. Most other industrialized countries have

similarprotections.InsomecountriesandsomeAmericanstatesandlocalities,

protection is also provided based on sexual orientation. The question here is

whetheritwouldmakesensetooffersimilarhelptowhatonejournalistItalked

with called the “looks-challenged” citizen—perhaps the 10–15 percent of

citizens whose looks are considered by their peers to be below average, or

perhapsonlythe1–2percentwhoareconsideredhomely.

One can easily imagine policies that would offer bad-looking people

protections similar to those now offered to other disadvantaged citizens. Are

theregoodargumentsforprovidingtheseprotections?Dothepotentialbenefits

outweighthepotentialcosts?Thattherearelikelytobebenefitsseemscertain,

sinceproposedpoliciesinanyareaalmostalwaysconfersomebenefitonatleast

somepeople.Whetherothercitizensmightbedisadvantagedbythosepolicies—

whetherthepoliciesgenerateunintendednegativeconsequencesforsocietyasa

whole—is always a more difficult question to answer. But it needs to be

addressedwhenanypolicyproposalispresented.Thatisespeciallytrueinthe

caseofbeauty,giventhenoveltyoftheideaofprotectingthisparticulargroup.

WHATKINDSOFPROTECTIONAREPOSSIBLE?

Before delving into specific existing policies that mightbe used toprotect the

ugly,itisworthdiscussingthemoregeneralpoliciesthathavebeenenactedto

aidcertain“protectedclasses.”IntheUnitedStates,theseclassesofcitizenare

typically helped by two types of policy. The first is legislation—be it federal,

state,orlocal—thatexplicitlymandatesprotectingspecificgroupsofpeoplein

certainspecifiedactivities.Thesecondisthroughgovernmentpurchasing,again

atalllevelsofgovernment,throughwhichprotectedgroupsmustreceivecertain

typesofpreferencesinemploymentbygovernmentcontractors.

Manystates hadlonghad anti-discriminationlaws coveringvarious groups,

particularly minorities, before legislative protection at the federal level began

with the Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963. The EPA required employers to offer

femaleandmaleemployeesthesamepayiftheywereperforming“equalwork

onjobstheperformanceofwhichrequiresequalskill,effortandresponsibility,

and which are performed under similar working conditions” within an

establishment. This legislation outlawed genderdiscrimination in employment,

fairlynarrowlydefined,withincompaniesengagedininterstatecommerce.

State laws were to a large extent superseded by the passage of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, whose Title VII prohibited employment discrimination

basedonthenowwell-knownprotectedcategoriesof“race,color,religion,sex

or national origin.” These protections were to be overseen by the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Its purview soon came to

include the protection of workers ages forty and up under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967. In 1990, Title I of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) added “qualified individuals with

disabilities”tothelistofprotectedgroups.

TheADAwouldseemtobethemostobviousexistingvehicleatthefederal

levelthroughwhichtooffer generalizedprotectiontobad-lookingworkers. Its

Section 12102 defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities,” with the latter term

defined as including, “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,

hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending.” None of these

limitations appears to apply to the bad-looking—the language would seem to

excludetheugly.Butthesectiongoesontodefinedisabilitytoincludepeople

“regardedashavingsuchanimpairment,”definedasexisting“iftheindividual

establishesthatheorshehasbeensubjectedtoanactionprohibited...whether

ornottheimpairmentlimitsorisperceivedtolimitamajorlifeactivity.”One

mightarguethatbadlookscouldbeincludedunderthislatterextensionofthe

definitionofdisabilityandthusthattheuglyarealreadyprotectedbytheADA.

Alloftheseprotectionsareaimedatlabormarkets.In1968, TitleVIIIwas

addedtotheCivilRightsActtoofferrentersandbuyersexplicitprotectionsin

housingmarkets.Overtheyearsithasbeenexpandedtodefineasprotectedthe

same characteristics that are covered by the panoply of federal anti-

discrimination laws covering employment. With state and local analogs to the

federallegislation,thereisaready-madevehicleforprotectingtheuglyinother

areas,includinglendingmarkets,wheretheyarealsodisadvantaged.

The other possible general avenue for protecting the ugly is affirmative

action, first introduced by President Kennedy under Executive Order 10925in

1961, and linked to federal contracting by President Johnson in 1965 under

ExecutiveOrder11246.Theideawastousethefederalgovernment’sroleasa

purchaser of goods and services, and as a provider of subsidies, to induce

employerstoadoptandimplementpoliciesthatwouldaidprotectedgroups.In

areas such as hiring, promotion, access to education and others, the program,

monitoredbyanofficeintheU.S.DepartmentofLabor,requiresemployersto

file“affirmativeactionplans.”Thesemustshowpastprogressandpromisesof

additional efforts to meet stated “goals and timetables” for future progress in

enhancingopportunitiesforracialandethnicminoritiesandforwomen.

Nearly fifty years after its inception, affirmative action remains highly

controversial,tothepointthatthereisnotevenmuchagreementonwhetherit

hasbeenbeneficialonnetforthegroupsithasbeenaimedat,muchlessabout

its overall desirability. Affirmative action would hardly seem to be an ideal

vehicletowhichtoattachstilladditionalprotections,butitcouldbeused.One

couldincludethebad-lookingasanotherprotectedclass,requiringanemployer

toofferplansthatwouldindicatehowhomelypeoplewouldbehiredintoentry-

andupper-levelpositions,advanceupjobladders,etc.,inordertoachievegoals

describingtheireventualpositioninthecompany.

Numerous states and localities have enacted protections that extend federal

legislation to some of the relatively few companies that are not covered by

federallawsbecauseoftheirsizeorlineofbusiness.Manyhavecreatedstateor

local affirmative action programs, essentially mandating compliance by those

companiesandorganizationsthatdobusinesswiththestateorlocalgovernment.

These sub-federal extensions become binding, and are most relevant for this

chapter, where they include additional groups that are not subsumed under

federalprotections.

Michigan and San Francisco have laws that expand protection to include

weight and height explicitly. The City of San Francisco Human Rights

Commission, which monitors the treatment of members of an unusually large

varietyofprotectedgroups,describesitstaskas:

Theinvestigation...[and mediationof]complaintsofdiscriminationin

employment by businesses . . . based on a person’s race, color, creed,

religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender

identity, domestic partner status, marital status, disability or AIDS/HIV

status,weightandheight.

Thelocallegislationdoesnotexplicitlyprotectagainstdiscriminationbasedon

looks, but it would not be a large step to add this additional group to those

alreadycovered.

In a very few jurisdictions, that protection does exist. These include Santa

Cruz, California; Urbana, Illinois; Madison, Wisconsin; and Howard County,

Maryland.

 Most recently, the District of Columbia has enacted fairly broad

protectionsforemployees,bymakingitillegal“todiscriminate...onthebasis

of outward appearance for purposes of recruitment, hiring, or promotion”

(Section512ofTitle4—HumanRights—oftheDCMunicipalCode).Inanother

section, protection is offered on the basis of personal appearance in rental

housing, mortgage lending, and numerous other aspects of housing markets.

Thesearetheonlyjurisdictionsthatasof2008hadlegislatedexplicitprotection

inemploymentbasedonappearanceindependentofheightorweight.Thestate

of California does, though, prohibit discrimination in housing on the basis of

“personalcharacteristics,suchasaperson’sphysicalappearance...thatarenot

relatedtotheresponsibilitiesofatenant.”

Oneofthebroadest-basedlegislativeprotectionsbasedonlookscanbefound

inFrance.Itslaborcodestates:

Concerning recruitment; access to a placement or in-company training

program; pay; training; redeployment within a company; posting;

qualifications;job classification;promotion;transferfrom oneworkplace

to another; and renewal of contract, provides that no person can be

eliminatedduetotheir...physicalappearance.

Thisprovisionoffersanextremelybroadprotectiontoemployees,althoughthe

codemakesitclearthattheinitialburdenofproofisbornebytheemployee.

HOWHAVEEXISTINGPOLICIESBEENUSED?

Evenunderfederal,state,orlocallegislationthatdoesnotexplicitlyprotectbad

looksinlabor,housing,orothermarkets,asubstantialnumberoflawsuitshave

beenbroughtseekingcase-lawprotectionforpeoplebasedontheirlooks.

Many

ofthemhavelinkedsomeaspectofappearancetoexistingprotectionsbasedon

theirrace,gender,orreligion.Forexample,inHollinsv.Atlantic,188F.3d652

(6th Cir. 1999), anAfrican Americanwoman claimedracialdiscrimination on

groundsthatapolicyconcerninghairstylesapplied onlyto her.Her claimwas

rejected.Twomenarguedthat theiremployer’spreventingthemfrom wearing

earrings constituted sex discrimination (Kleinsorge v. Island Corp., 81 F.E.P.

Cases (BNA) 1601 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). Their claim was denied, with the court

arguing that gender differences in standards of appearance are permissible. In

Swartzentruberv.GuniteCorp.,83F.E.P.Cases(BNA)181(N.D.Ind.2000),

theplaintiffarguedthathisfiringforhavingatattoodepictingaKlansmanwith

aburningcross violated protections of hisreligiousbeliefs. His claim toowas

rejected.

Courtshavebeenunwillingtoincludeappearance,asmanifestedindressor

decoration,asaprotectedexpressionofracial,religious,orgenderidentity.The

treatmentofappearance,asmanifestedinweight,isadifferentstory.

Anumber

of successful claims have been brought under EEO (Equal Employment

Opportunity) protections, for example, Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845

(9th Cir. 2000), with female flight attendants arguing that weight restrictions

were applied differently by gender. Most weight cases, however, have been

broughtundertheADA,withtheargumenttypicallybeingthatobesity,oreven

overweight,isitselfadisability.AplaintiffwhosimplyasksforADAprotection

for being overweight, without claiming it is a disability, does not generally

obtainrelief(e.g.,Colemanv.GeorgiaPowerCo.,81F.Supp.2d1365(N.D.

Ga.2000)).If,however,aplaintiffcandemonstratemorbidobesity,tothepoint

whereitrestrictsa“majorlifeactivity,”thepersoncanreceiverelief—havethe

disability accommodated by the employer—under the ADA (Cook v. Rhode

Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17

(1stCir.1993)).

While successful ADA cases have involved claims that morbid obesity

qualifies as a disability, a number of cases havebeen brought underthe ADA

andotherstatutesthathavearguedforprotectionbasedonclaimsthatbadlooks

aloneconstituteadisability.In2003,theEEOCsuedMcDonald’sonbehalfof

anemployee who hada port winestain coveringmuchof her face.In another

case,amanagerrefusedtofireaKentuckyFriedChickencounterworkerwhom

he had hired and who was missing his front teeth, which the manager’s own

supervisor found potentially offensive to customers. The district and circuit

courts ruled for KFC, arguing that the absence of front teeth hardly limited a

majorlifeactivity.Nonetheless,itseemsafairlysmallstretchtoargue,basedon

alltheevidenceinthisbook,thatreducedearningsarealimitationproducedby

thiskindofdisfigurementandconsistentwiththeADA.

Thecaselawinthejurisdictionsthatexplicitlybandiscriminationbasedon

looksisextremelysparse.InacasebroughtundertheDistrictofColumbiacode

in2008(Iveyv.DistrictofColumbia)thatisstillinthecourts,theAppealsCourt

reversed the case’s dismissal by the trial court and allowed some of the

plaintiff’s claims to be re-heard. Ivey, a local bureaucrat, argued that her

supervisor“toldhershewoulddoabetterjobifsheweremoreattractive...and

thathewouldlikeherbetterifshelookedlikeherattractivecoworker.”Thecase

is not over, but it is nearly unique in that the argument is based mostly on

physicalappearance, not genderandnot weight norevenlooks as a disability.

Assuch,itcouldillustratethepathsby whichabroadexpansionof protection

forthebad-lookingmightoccur.

ISITPOSSIBLETOPROTECTTHEUGLY?

Therearetwoquestionsthatneedtobediscussedinordertoaddressthisissue.

Viewing protection for a group of individuals as a benefit that is supplied by

society:(1)Couldweevenagreeonwhichpeoplearesufficientlybad-lookingas

tomeritprotection undersomepolicy designedtoaidthisparticulargroup?In

otherwords,cantherebeagreementamongthosewhomightsupplyprotection

under legislative or other provisions about whoshouldbe protected, given the

inherentsubjectivityofviewsofbeauty?(2)Wouldthosepeoplewhoweagree

shouldbethefocusofprotectioneverbewillingtocomeforwardanddemand

its protection? In other words, would those who might potentially wish to be

helped under laws or administrative provisions be motivated to seek help—to

askforredressfromthecourtsifnecessary?

Thefirstquestionwouldrequiresomelegislature,executiveagency,judge,or

jury to agree on what constitutes denial of a right because people’s looks are

sufficientlybelowtheaveragetohavesingledthemoutfordisparatetreatment.

Observersdonotagreeperfectlyonwhatconstitutesbad(orgood)looks,oron

what is sufficiently far below-average as to constitute ugliness. One attorney

commentingonthisissueclaimed:

Effortstoban discrimination against employeesbasedon their “personal

appearance”areevenmoreproblematic.Whileheightandweightcanbe

measured,aperson’soverallappearancecannot.Thereis,bydefinition,a

profoundlysubjectiveelementtotheinquiry.Whatattributes,forexample,

shouldbeconsideredindeterminingone’spersonalappearance?

People’sviewsofbeautyaresubjective;buttheevidencehasmadeitabundantly

clear that people’s views are highly correlated. Somebody who is viewed as

unusuallyuglybyoneobservertendstobeviewedthesamewaybymostother

people.Whilesubjective,perceptionsofbeautyarefarfromrandom.Aperson’s

beautycanbemeasured.

Therewillundoubtedlybedisagreementsbythesuppliersofprotectionabout

exactlywhoistobeprotected,butthosedonotseeminsurmountable.Theissue

is not as simple as determining who might possibly be subject to gender

discrimination—by and large that is a yes-no issue. These disagreements are

qualitativelynodifferent,though,fromdisagreementsovertheextenttowhich

somebodywhohassomeAfricanAmericanancestrymightqualifyforprotection

under various anti-discrimination laws. That particular issue has arisen in a

varietyofcases.WhileIfinditsdiscussionrepugnant,reminiscentoftheracial

lawsinNaziGermany,ithasbeendealtwithandmustbeconsideredifwewish

toprotect thisparticularclass.

The dividingline betweenthose whomight be

includedinthiskindofclassandthosewhowouldnotisasarbitraryasitisin

distinguishingonthebasisoflooks.Ithasbeensurmountedinthosecases,and

couldbehandledinlawsuitsbroughtonthebasisofdiscriminationagainstthe

ugly.

Wouldtherebeanydemandforprotection?Wouldpeoplebewillingtoadmit

thattheyarebad-lookingifthereweresomeforumforobtainingcompensation

forthedisadvantagesthattheirlookshavecausedthem?Withouthavingtested

the demand for protection by a newly entitledclass, we cannot becertain that

offeringprotectionwouldelicitthatdemand.Butthehistoryofcasesunderthe

ADAofferssomeguidanceonthisissue.TheADAwasenactedin1990,andthe

EEOC did not start enforcing it until July 1992. By 1997, the EEOC was

receivingover20,000casesperyearundertheADA.

Disabilitymaybeamore

clear-cutissuethanbadlooks,buteventhatisnotobvious.Organizationssuch

as the Body Image Task Force have as their stated goal fighting against

prejudicebasedonphysicalappearanceandwould,Ibelieve,behappytohelp

organize plaintiffs to take advantage if legislative protection of the ugly were

instituted.

Ihaveshownthatbadlookscangenerateanearningsdisadvantageofperhaps

$140,000 over a lifetime compared to the earnings of an average-looking

worker. Add to this amount reasonable punitive damages, and there is a clear

monetaryincentiveforanindividualtosuehisorhercurrentemployer,oreven

a prospective employer in the caseof hiring discrimination. With an incentive

amounting to more than three years of earnings, I doubt that people will be

unwillingtoacknowledgetheirbadlooks.

Legalactiontakesmoney—thecostoffilingandpursuingalegalcasebased

onlookswouldprobablyfarexceedthelikelyrecoveryfromalawsuitbrought

byasingleindividual.Justasinthecaseofsuitsclaimingdiscriminationbased

ongender,race,orethnicity,though,onecanimaginethattriallawyerswillseek

to form classes of individuals and pursue class-action lawsuits. Obtaining

certification of a class spreads the cost of bringing the lawsuit over enough

plaintiffstomaketherecoverysufficienttoattractclassmembers—andtomake

itpotentiallyworthwhileforplaintiffs’attorneystopursuelegalactionontheir

behalf. Class certification is often quitedifficult, sothat ofall the pitfalls that

mightstandinthewayofthisextensionofprotectiontobad-lookingindividuals,

this might be the most severe. But with a large enough class, and with the

potentialforlargerecoveriesforeachperson,theselawsuitswillbefiled.

In 2005, a class of ethnic/racial minorities and women who argued that

promotionswereoffereddisproportionatelytowhitemensuedAbercrombieand

Fitch. The retailer agreed to a settlement of $40 million with members of the

class. Since then individual employees have alleged that the company rates

potential sales workers on their looks and offers existing workers more

opportunities if managers rate them higher on a scale of “hotness.”

 The

aggrievedindividualsacknowledgethattheyhavenocurrentlegalrecourse.But

youmightinferfromtheircurrentclaimsthat,iftheydid,theywouldhaveno

qualmsabouttakingadvantageofit.

Whenpeoplearewillingtosupplyagoodorservice,andothersdemandit,if

governments don’t intervene to prohibit the exchange, some price will be

established,eitherinavisiblemarketorimplicitly,andexchangewilltakeplace.

Asyet there isno generalizedformalprotection forbad-lookingindividuals in

laborandothermarkets.Governmentsimplicitlylimitlawsuitsbasedonclaims

oflooksdiscrimination.Thepotentialsupplyofanddemandforlegalprotection

is there, but exchange is not allowed. But what if it were—if legal protection

were explicitly granted to below-average-looking individuals? The returns to

protection, indicated by the probability of those cases succeeding and the

amounts recovered in successful cases, would be demonstrated over time

through the case law and would determine the number of cases that people

wouldfile.Amarketofsortsforlooks-basedlawsuitsiswaitingtobeborn.

WHATJUSTIFIESPROTECTINGTHEUGLY?

Imaginethefollowingbook:Itstartsoffbyshowing thata particulargroup of

people has a characteristic that remains essentially unchanged over their

lifetimes unless they incur huge expenditures to alter it artificially. That

characteristicmakesitsmemberslesslikelythanothercitizenstobeworkingfor

payandearningmoney.Whentheydoworkforpay,membersofthegroupearn

less than other workers, even after adjusting for the amount and kind of

education that they have obtained and for numerous other earnings-enhancing

characteristics.Whentheymarry,theeducationandthustheearningsabilityof

their spouses is less than that of others’ spouses. Companies that employ

members of this group do not generate as much sales revenue as others. The

group’s members typically date and marry other group members. Finally,

members of the group occasionally sue and recover for deficiencies in their

earnings.

Ihave essentiallydescribedthisbook, withthe groupbeing below-average-

lookingindividuals.Yetif Ihad substitutedAfrican Americans,the discussion

would, with minor changes, have been very much the same. Changing race is

verydifficult. Theemploymentrate ofAfricanAmericans—the fractionof the

populationworkingforpay—islessthanthatofnon-Hispanicwhites,andthatis

especiallytrueamongmen.Sixty-sixpercentofnon-Hispanicwhitemaleswere

employedin2008,butonly57percentofAfricanAmericanadultmaleswere.

Amongwomen,thediscrepancyisinthesamedirectionbutismuchsmaller,54

percentto53percent.

GiventhelevelofeducationofAfricanAmericanmen,

theirearningsareabout20percentlowerthanthoseofnon-Hispanicwhitemen,

with the difference among women being nearly 10 percent.

 Indeed, African

American men’s earnings disadvantage, adjusted for the earnings-enhancing

characteristics that they bring to labor markets, is similar to the disadvantage

experienced by below-average compared to above-average-looking male

workers generally. While not much attention has been paid to the issue, the

researchthathaslookedatitsuggeststhatanAfricanAmericanaddslesstohis

or her company’s revenue than does a non-Hispanic white.

 Since their

educational attainment is lower, and they generally marry other African

Americans, the educational attainment of their spouses is less than that of the

spouseofatypicalnon-Hispanicwhite.

In short, every specific research result about beauty could, with some

alterations,applytoAfricanAmericans.Indiscussingapparentlydiscriminatory

outcomesthatharmAfricanAmericans,Ibelievethesameproblemexistsabout

theultimatesourceoftheirdisadvantage:Employersappeartodiscriminate,but

dotheiractionssimplyresultfromtheirpreferencesagainstAfricanAmericans,

orisitthattheyaretheproximateagentsofharmbecausetheircustomersprefer

not to deal with African Americans? No doubt some of the apparently

discriminatory outcomes experienced by African Americans result from

employers’exercisingtheirownpreferences;andcertainlymuchofthethrustof

public policy has targeted employers. But much also results from customers’

refusal to deal with African Americans without the equivalent of a monetary

bribe.

The situationofAfricanAmericansisobviouslymuchdifferenthistorically

fromthatofbad-lookingpeople.Butthecurrentsimilaritiesinthesituationsof

the two groups may provide as much logical justification for protecting ugly

workersthroughpublicpolicyasforprotectingAfricanAmericans.Inbothcases

—among African Americans and among bad-looking workers—the negative

outcomesthatoccur in many markets aretheresult of the preferences thatthe

majority has imposed on those markets. If we protect one group whose

disadvantages arise from those preferences, why not protect the other? On

economicgroundstheargumentsforprotectionseemthesameforboth.

With the exception of the discussion of dating and marriage, the same

argumentscouldbemadeifweweretoreplacebad-lookingcitizens,orAfrican

Americans,withwomen.Giventheirlevelofeducation(onaverageidenticalto

men’s in the United States), their earnings are lower, with the earnings

disadvantage being about 15 percent after numerous adjustments for other

determinantsofearnings.

Companies thatemployotherwiseidenticalwomen

havelowersales,andsoon.

Whilethereobviouslyisnoinherentprejudiceby

customers against women generally, the most useful theory of discrimination

thatunderliesstudiesofthedisadvantagesthatwomenfaceinvariousmarketsis

based on societal views about women’s roles. One can readily interpret those

views as reflecting consumers’ preferences—the same as the sources of the

apparentdiscriminationagainsttheugly.

WHATJUSTIFIESNOTPROTECTINGTHEUGLY?

The arguments in favor of protection seem very powerful. A leading legal

scholarhasarguedpassionatelyonfairnessgroundsthatlegalprotectionsshould

beextendedtobad-lookingpeopleandthatthoseprotectionsshouldbeenforced

vigorously.

 Why not? After all, absent any logical basis for distinguishing

amonggroupstobeprotected,whyshouldmembersofonegroupbenefitfrom

government aid while others whose situations seem similar do not? The only

possibleargumentsagainstprotectionmustbebasedonthepotentialharmdone

to other groups by adding protections for the group proposed here—the bad-

looking. Otherwise, protecting the bad-looking would seem likely to benefit

societyoverall.

Onemightarguethattheaveragecitizen—arepresentativeofthemajority—

is harmedwhenanadditionalgroupofdisadvantagedcitizens is protected. To

the extent that the labor of the two groups is substitutable in employment,

additional protections for the ugly would reduce wage rates and/or lower

employmentopportunitiesforbetter-lookingworkers,particularlythosewhojust

missqualifyingforprotection—thenear-ugly,inthiscase.Evenifprotectionof

theuglydoesn’taffectothers’employmentopportunities,suchprotectionwould

still require the majority to pay taxes to finance the bureaucracy that would

enforceanyregulations.Whilecorrect,thisobjectioncouldberaisedagainstthe

protections afforded to any minority group. Indeed, because the disadvantages

experiencedbyprotectedgroupsareproducedbythepreferencesofthemajority

behavingasconsumers,membersofthemajorityarepreciselythosewhoshould

be made to bear the costs of protecting the minorities whom they have

disadvantaged.

If the costs of protection are only to be borne by the majority whose

preferencesgeneratethedisadvantagesfortheugly,whatcouldbetheargument

againstgrantingpreferencesforbad-lookingworkersinthelabor,housing,and

othermarkets?Onepossibilityis that lookism is so socially productive that to

enforce legal protections against it would reduce its social productivity. It is

socially productive; but I doubt that the social productivity of preferences for

goodlooks issufficienttoovercometheireconomiccosts.And,even ifit did,

thefairnessissuearguablywouldtrumpanyconcernsaboutsocialproductivity.

Thereisanotherargument,alsobasedonfairness,thatseemsmuchstronger.

Consideringasinterestedgroupsonlymajoritycitizensandbad-lookingcitizens

leaves out all the other non-majority groups that are currently offered legal

protection. The crucial economic issue here is the extent to which offering

protection for bad-looking workers might reduce the labor-market and other

opportunities of minority and other citizens whom we might choose to aid

throughlegislationandregulation.

Thereisnoevidenceonthedegreetowhichemployersareabletosubstitute

bad-looking for minority workers, and thus on the extent of job or earnings

losses that minority and other protected workers might experience if special

preferencesweregrantedtouglyworkers.Afewstudies,though,haveexamined

whetherworkersinonedisadvantagedgroup—forexample,low-skilledAfrican

Americans—tend to be substituted for or against by workers in other

disadvantaged groups—for example, low-skilled Hispanics.

 The evidence is

not dispositive, but it does suggest that employers tend to treat as substitutes

workers in different low-skilled and disadvantaged groups, including some of

thosewhichareprotectedbyU.S.policy.

Putinstarkterms,aidingworkersinonedisadvantagedgrouptendstoreduce

wagesandtakejobsawayfromthoseinotherdisadvantagedgroups.Whatifthe

same phenomenon characterizes how employers treat bad-looking workers

compared to other disadvantaged workers? We would then have to infer that

offering protection to bad-looking workers would harm workers who we have

already determined deserve protection, and who already receive it through

legislationandregulations.

What if this economic argument is incorrect, so that helping bad-looking

workers does not cause economic harm to other disadvantaged workers? We

wouldstillhavetomakethepoliticaldecisiontospendscarcepoliticalresources

—legislativeactionandregulatoryandadministrativeeffortandmoney—tothe

benefitofonegroupinsteadofanother.Unlessyoubelievethatpoliticalwilland

administrativebudgetsareunlimited,whichhardlyseemslikely,aidingthebad-

looking means offering less aid to other groups which we currently protect or

mightwishtoprotectinthefuture. Publicfundsandenergyarenotunlimited.

Evenifdifferentdeservinggroupsarenoteconomicsubstitutes,theyarelikely

tobepoliticalsubstitutes—aidingonewillreducetheamountofeffortdevoted

toaidinganother.Andthatsubstitutionwillproduceeconomicharmtomembers

ofotherdisadvantagedgroups,astheamountofaidofferedtothemisreduced

bycompetitionfromtheaidtothebad-looking.

WHATISTHEAPPROPRIATEPOLICY?

The causes of mistreatment of the bad-looking, and their results—inferior

outcomesinalargevarietyofareas—seemlittledifferenteitherqualitativelyor

quantitatively from the mistreatment of other groups. Those include other

minorities,betheyracial,religious,orethnic,andevenagendermajority.Inall

instancesonecanarguethatthedisadvantagedgroupisharmedbythemajority

of citizens, or the most powerful citizens, who, for whatever reason, would

prefertodealwithpeoplewhoaremorelikethemselvesthandealwiththosein

thedisadvantagedgroup.

In the end, the decision about whether to aid bad-looking citizens in labor

markets,housingmarkets,andelsewheremustbe political.Ithastoweighthe

relativemeritsofdifferentgroupsthatmightbecompetingforhelp.Eachgroup

arguablyhasthesamekindofeconomicclaimonthesympathiesofthemajority,

asthedisadvantagesofeachhavebeengeneratedbytheirinabilitytoalterthe

characteristicsthatthepreferencesofthemajoritytreatasinferior.Sincesome

substitution,perhaps economic but surelypolitical,exists betweenbad-looking

andotherdisadvantagedgroups,eachofushastomakeavaluejudgmentabout

how deserving different groups are. Those views need to be translated into

policy—ornot—throughthepoliticalprocess.

Judgments about this issue depend on how large a weight you put on the

demonstrablegaininfairnessthatwouldcomefromprotectingthebad-looking

comparedtothepotentialimpactsonother,currentlyprotectedgroups.Onthese

considerations,thecentralityofraceinAmericanhistoryandthepoliticsofthe

past sixty years suggest that we need to pay special attention to any potential

reduction in protections for African Americans when we contemplate offering

additionalprotectiontobad-lookingAmericans.

Regardingotherprotectedgroups,theconcernsarelessclear.Likethebad-

looking, women and some ethnic minorities have an essentially immutable

characteristic with which they were born. While religion is not immutable,

Americanattitudes toward religiousfreedomsuggest that theeaseof changing

your religion should not detract from arguments for its protection. Also,

ethnicity,religion,andgenderhave been protected by federal law for nearly a

halfcentury.Ifwebelievethatthereiseithereconomicorpoliticalsubstitution

ofprotectionforonegroupagainstprotectionforanother,concernsaboutthese

groupsshouldmakeusthinkevenharderaboutextendingprotectiontotheugly.

Ourwillingnesstoprotectdisabledworkers,embodiedintheAmericanswith

Disabilities Act, is the most recent extension of the protections offered at the

federallevel. Protectioncouldbe extendedtoinclude badlooksas adisability

withaslightlybroaderinterpretationoftheADA,onethatgoesbeyondabasis

inlimitationsondailyactivities.Thismightbemoreacceptableifonlythevery

worst-looking people, people whoare generally agreed to be“1’s”—including

those with explicit facial disfigurements, either congenital or acquired—were

protected.Whetherprotectingeventhisnarrowlydefinedgroupisdesirableisa

less difficult question, but still one that requires thinking about the costs to

groupsthatarecurrentlyprotected.

Thedifficultiesinconsideringthisextensionareillustratedinstarktermsby

thefollowingexample.Compareaperson,nowreleasedfromprison,wholost

bothlegsinanautomobileaccidentthatwascausedbyhisdrunkendrivingand

that killed another driver, and another person who has been unusually bad-

lookingsincebirth.UndercurrentinterpretationsoftheADA,thedisableddrunk

drivermustbe offeredaccommodationinemploymentandotherareas,butthe

bad-lookingpersonwillreceivenosuchprotection.Thiscomparisonleavesone

wondering what the appropriate policy might be. I would argue in favor of

protectingtheuglypersonratherthanthedrunkdriver;butIwouldalsorealize

thattodosowouldmeancreatingasetofrulesthatmightreduceprotectionfor

disabledindividualsgenerally.

Extending protection to the bad-looking in hiring and promotions in labor

markets,andinaccesstorentalsandtomortgagesinhousingmarkets,maybe

worth consideration. Bad-looking people should command the sympathy of

othersalongasensibleRawlsiancriterion—essentially,therebutforthegraceof

GodgoI,andthatpossible“I”deservesprotection.Yettheuglyareonlyoneof

many groups of individuals who are deserving of protection. The scarcity of

politicalenergyforofferingprotection,andthedistinctpossibilitythatprotected

groupsaresubstitutesinemployment,shouldbeconsideredseriouslybeforewe

addthebad-lookingtothelist.

PROTECTINGTHEUGLYINTHENEARFUTURE

I would not be surprised if bad-looking Americans are eventually included

among those citizens protected by anti-discrimination and related legislation.

Thisextensionwouldbeespeciallylikelyifthedefinitionofbadlookswerekept

very narrow. This might come in the form of an expansion from the small

numberofjurisdictionsthathaveenactedlegislationtoprotecttheuglytomany

more local and even state protections, and perhaps even to federal legislation.

Morelikely,itcouldcomethroughan expansionof protectionsunderthecase

law, particularly under the ADA. But given how willing America has been to

expandprotectiontoadditionalgroupssincethefirstbroad-basedlegislationwas

enacted,predicting the inclusionofthe bad-looking underlegalprotection is a

reasonablebet.

PARTIV

TheFutureofLooks

CHAPTER9

Prospectsforthe

Looks-Challenged

THEBEAUTYCONUNDRUM

Beautypervadesspecificaspectsofeconomicbehavior.Butdoesitaffecthow

wefeelaboutourlivesgenerally?Willtheimpactsofbeautycontinueoverthe

nearandeventhemoredistantfuturethatshouldconcernallofus?Atleastas

important,shouldbeautycontinuetomatter:Doesanyevolutionarybasisforour

continued preoccupation with people’s looks remain? What could we as a

societydotolessenthenegativeimpactsofbadlooksonpeople’slives?Ifwe

do nothing and if the impacts of beauty do not disappear, what can looks-

challengedindividualsdotohelpthemselves?

AREBEAUTIFULPEOPLEHAPPIER?

Uglypeopleearnlessthanaverage-lookingpeople;andaverage-lookingpeople

earnlessthanthebeautiful.Uglypeoplefindentryintocertainoccupationsmore

difficult;andiftheychoosethoseoccupations,theirearningsarepenalized.Bad

looksevenaffectourchoicesaboutwhetherornottoworkforpay.Beingbad-

lookingmeansyouenterthedatingandmarriagegamewitha“weakerhand”—

lesstotradeforthecharacteristicsthatyouseekinapartner.Youhavelessofa

chancetoobtainloansforhousingandotherdurables.

So what? These are specific considerations. They involve how well people

fareinparticularaspectsoftheirlives,includingtheirworklives,theirlivesas

consumers, and their family lives. What if, taking all these specifics together,

beautifulpeoplearenohappierthanaverage-lookingorevenuglypeople?One

could even imagine a “Richard Cory” phenomenon where, despite all these

superficialadvantages,beautifulpeopleareactuallyunhappierthanothers.

Thisisjustnotso;quitethecontrary.Beautifulpeoplearealsohappierthan

their less good-looking counterparts. Two of the surveys used in this book

contain information on both beauty and happiness—people’s responses to

questionslike,“Howsatisfiedareyouwithlifeasawhole?”Fifty-fivepercent

ofthepeopleinthetopone-thirdoflooksstatedthattheywereverysatisfiedor

satisfiedwiththeirlives;53percentofpeopleinthemiddlehalfoflookssaidthe

samething;butonly45percentoftheworst-lookingone-sixthofthepopulation

saidtheyweresatisfied.

Badlooksandunhappinesswithlifegotogether;and

thatisespeciallytrueforpeoplewhomostotherswouldviewashomely.Taken

together,thenegativeeffectsofbadlooksonapanoplyofspecificeconomicand

social outcomes reduce people’s overall happiness. As Dorothy Parker said,

“Beautyisonlyskindeep,butuglygoescleantothebone.”

Thatunhappinessandbadlooksarerelatedisprobablynotsurprising.What

might be surprising is that the relationship is just as strong for men as for

women.

Thediscrimination against ugliness andthefavoritism toward beauty

thatcharacterizemodernsocietiesarenotatallagenderissue;theyareanissue

facingbothmenandwomen.

WHATWILLBEBEAUTIFUL?WHATSHOULDBE?

Perhaps the importance of differences in human beauty that produce all these

negativeimpactswilldeclineinthefuture.Afterall,fewerandfewerpeopleare

disfigured.And,whileourbeautyisdifficulttochange,withincreasingincomes

and improved surgical and other technologies, maybe people’s looks will

improveonaverage.Ifso,perhapswewillpaylessattentiontowhatwillhave

becomelessobviousdifferencesinpeople’slooks.

Oneauthornoted,“There’snoreasonforustothinkthatbeautifulpeopleare

good and ugly people evil, yet we do.”

 Although we still view beauty as a

signalofdesirabilityinapotentialmate,worker,orborrower,itscontinueduse

for these purposes does not seem justified. In rich societies today, beauty and

health—reproductive fitness—are not generally correlated, although there may

exist a minuscule minority of individuals whose bad healthis signaledby bad

looks.Theevolutionarybasisfortheroleofbeautyinvariousmarketsnolonger

effectivelyexists.

A recent study offers a glimpse of change.

 Women in a wide range of

countries were shown pictures of men’s faces, all of which matched the

symmetrystandardsofbeauty,butwhichdifferedintheirdegreeofmasculinity

(jawline,nosesize,andotheraspects).Thestudyshowedthatwherepeopleare

generallyhealthier,womenpaylessattentionto thedegree ofmasculinityina

man’sface.Itsuggestedthataswegetricher,ourcriteriaabouthumanbeauty

mightchange.Butwilltheychangetothepointthatwedon’tcareaboutlooks

anymore?

Perhaps;butevenifdistinctionsamongpeople’sbeautybecomefiner,itmay

beyourbeautyrelativetoothers’thatdeterminesyourpayoffs.Givenpeople’s

remarkable willingness and ability to make narrow distinctions among

themselves,it isquite possible,with anincreaseinaveragebeauty andgreater

homogeneityinlooks,thatthepenaltyforbeingjustslightlyworse-lookingthan

otherpeoplemightincreaseovertime.

Wecannotknowwhatfuturestandardsmightbe,butpeoplehaveimplicitly

speculatedonthem.Oneexampleiscontainedinthescience-fictionseriesFlash

Gordon,originallyacomic-bookseriesinthe1930s.Flash“lived”inthethirty-

third century CE, and, along with his love interest, Dale Arden, has been

depicted often over the past three-quarters of a century. As depicted in the

originalcomicbooksfromthe1930s,Flashwasblond,squared-jawed,andmid-

American. In the 2007 television series the actor who played Flash was again

blond, square-jawed, and mid-American. The forward-looking depictions have

been remarkably constant over these seventy-five years. In both cases the

individuals qualify as being above-average in looks. Now their looks may be

determined by the artists’ or producers’ desire to appeal to the standards of

beautyheldbypotentialcontemporary(withtheartist,notwithFlashandDale!)

readersorviewers.Buttosomeextenttheycanbeviewedaspredictionsabout

what might be beautiful in the future. Taken as such, and to the extent that

forecastingbeautystandardsispossible,theysuggestthatwebelievethatwhat

constituteshumanbeautyisunlikelytochangeanytimesoon.

Taking all these considerations together, I doubt that our perceptions of

human beauty will diminish in importance in our lifetimes. Industrialized

societiesarestuckinalow-levelequilibrium.Ourbehaviorisarelicofasetof

responsesthatnowlackabiologicalbasis.Inotherareasofeconomiclife,there

arenumerousexamplesoflow-levelequilibriathatwereestablishedasaresult

of some past characteristics and that remain in existence long after underlying

conditionshavechanged.

Sotoowithbeauty:thebeautifulwillbeadvantaged,

theuglywillbedisadvantaged,formanyyearstocome.

WHATCANSOCIETYDO?

Evenifsomeformsofprotectionforsomebad-lookingworkerseventuallycome

about,eitherthroughnewlegislationornewcaselaw,mostbad-lookingworkers

willnotfindprotection.Perhapsonlytheveryworst-looking,thosewithsevere

disfigurements,mightbehelped.Ifthathappened,peoplemightfeelthatenough

had been done and that the relevant problems had been solved. Yet the

disadvantagesofbadlooksnotonlyimpingeontheworst-looking1or2percent

of the population, but also on the one-sixth to one-eighth whose looks are

viewedasbelow-average.Theharmthatmostbad-lookingpeoplesufferwillnot

beremovedbylegislationorlawsuitsthatprotectatinyminority.Withoutlegal

protection, what would eliminate the discrimination that the rest of society

imposesonitsbad-lookingmembersinsomanyareasoflife?

One solution is to try to keep unemploymentas low as possible.We know

that employers cannot afford to indulge consumers’ preferences for workers’

beautyatatimewhenlaborisgenerallyscarce.Asidefrombeingdesirableon

macroeconomicgrounds, a policy ofthelowest possible unemploymentwould

create the additional benefit of reducing the earnings disadvantage of bad-

lookingworkers;anditmightevenspillovertotheirtreatmentinotherareas.

Discussionsoflow-levelequilibriainothercontexts—addictiontocigarettes

isagoodexample—suggestthatmaintainingapolicythattemporarilymovesa

system far away from an undesirable equilibrium can alter the nature of the

system.

 Even if underlying conditions revert to the status quo ex ante, the

systemmaynotreverttothedetrimentaloutcomeifthechangedconditionshave

beenmaintainedlongenough.Lowunemploymentandtheresultingreductionin

the disadvantages in employment opportunities experienced by bad-looking

workersmight,iftheyprevailedlongenough,accustomconsumerstodealwith

bad-looking people in different contexts and reduce underlying prejudices

againstthem.Obviously,lowunemploymentandtightlabormarketsareunlikely

to persist indefinitely; but they are generally socially desirable, and their

potential beneficial impacts on bad-looking citizens offer one more basis for

them.

WHATCANYOUDOIFYOU’REBAD-LOOKING?

Persistent low unemployment that induces employers and customers to deal

equally with people regardless of their looks is not likely to be sufficient to

remove or even greatly reduce the disadvantages that bad-looking citizens

experience in so many endeavors. It is also not likely that legislation or

administrativeactionswillbebroadenoughtohelpmostbad-lookingcitizens.A

social solution, be it imposed orevolutionary, isunlikely tosolve mostof the

problemsofthelooks-challenged.

Intheend,abad-lookingpersonwillcontinuetofacethequestionofhowto

adjust to societal discrimination in work, dating, and marriage, choice of

housing, and other areas. The burden will, as it always has been, be on bad-

looking people to make the most of their advantages and to minimize the

impacts of the disadvantages caused by their looks. Substituting “less

intelligent”or“uncoordinated”forbad-looking,thisisthesameprescriptionthat

you would offer people who experience disadvantages arising from their

diminishedintellectualabilityorlackofathleticism.

In my media appearances discussing beauty I often get questions like, “If

somebodyisbad-looking,isthereanyhopefortheminthelabormarket?”The

answer is no and yes. No, in the sense that the research that I have presented

makes it clear that bad-looking people generally do worse in a wide range of

areasof dailylife.Ihavepresented evidenceon manyofthese; andI haveno

doubt that there are others that I have not discussed where the same kinds of

disadvantageswillbedemonstratedbyfutureresearch.

Theanswerwouldbeyes,though,inthesensethatlooksareonlyoneofthe

many appealing characteristics that people possess. As the title of an advice

articleinamagazineformiddle-agedwomensuggests,“MaketheMostofYour

Looks.”

IfIambad-looking,Iwillavoidoccupations(movieactor?)wheremy

badlookswillpenalizemegreatly.Instead,Iwillchooseanoccupationwhere

the skills that I possess in abundance have a chance to bring me the biggest

rewards,bothmonetaryandnon-monetary,andwheretherewardsforthegood

looksthatIlackarelessimportant.Soyes,plainpeoplearepenalized;butthey

can and should structure their careers to avoid the worst effects of those

penalties. Remember, too, that although differences in beauty have large

impacts, they account for only small parts of the differences in outcomes that

peopleexperienceatwork.

Similarly, in dating and marriage looks do matter initially. As the Beatles

sang,“Wouldyoubelieveinaloveatfirstsight?YesI’mcertainthatithappens

all the time” (“With a Little Help from My Friends”). But most bad-looking

peoplehaveothercharacteristicsthatcangivethemaromanticadvantagethat,

with careful nurturing, can help remove the initial disadvantages that their

physiognomiesinflictonthem.Onecouldmakethesameargumentsaboutcredit

and other markets. In the end, bad looks hurt us and will continue to hurt us.

Looks are fate; but so are many other things. But bad looks are not a crucial

disadvantage, not something that our own actions cannot at least partly

overcome, and not something whose burden should be so overwhelming as to

crushourspirit.

NOTES
CHAPTERONE:THEECONOMICSOFBEAUTY
1
 The dataonthetimeinputs are from the American Time Use Survey,2003,categoryt6_10201. There
were5,240marriedmeninthesample,5,763marriedwomen,and1,087singlewomenageseventyorover.
2
FromtheConsumerExpenditureSurvey,asreportedinhttp://www.bls.gov/cex/csxstnd.htm#2008,table
3.
3
Calculatedbytheauthorfromthe1991–92Zeitbudgeterhebung.Thecategoryiszh031,“waschenoder
anziehen.”
4
InternationalHerald-Tribune,August13,2008.
5
 Nancy Etcoff, Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty (New York: Doubleday, 1999); Naomi
Wolf, The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used Against Women (New York: Anchor Books,
1992).
6
Vogue,September2009;Men’sHealth,December2008.
7
TimurKuranandEdwardMcCaffery,“ExpandingDiscriminationResearch:BeyondEthnicityandtothe
Web,”SocialScienceQuarterly85(September2004),pp.713–30.
8
 Daniel Hamermesh, “An Economic Theory of Suicide,” Journal of Political Economy 82
(January/February 1974), pp. 83–98; Mark Duggan and Steven Levitt, “Winning Isn’t Everything:
Corruption in Sumo Wrestling,” American Economic Review 92 (December 2002), pp. 1594–1605; Jeff
Biddle and Daniel Hamermesh, “Sleep and the Allocation of Time,” Journal of Political Economy 98
(October 1990), pp. 922–43; Lena Edlund and Evelyn Korn, “A Theory of Prostitution,” Journal of
PoliticalEconomy110(February2002),pp.181–214.
9
Oneofthebestnon-economicanalysesofbeautyanditsroleinhumanbehaviorisbymycolleagueDavid

Buss,TheEvolutionofDesire:StrategiesofHumanMating(NewYork:BasicBooks,1994).
CHAPTERTWO:INTHEEYEOFTHEBEHOLDER
1
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/.
2
OwntranslationofBernhardSchlink,SelbsBetrug(Zürich:Diogenes,1994),p.9.
3
TheNewYorker,August30,2010,p.36.
4
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3429903.stm.
5
In2008,itsGDPpercapitarankedit143rdoutof180countriesstudiedbytheInternationalMonetary
Fund:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita.
6
Genesis,29:17.
7
AngusCampbell,PhilipConverse,andWillardRodgers,QualityofAmericanLife,1971.Availablefrom
Inter-universityConsortiumforPoliticalandSocialResearch,StudyNo.3508.RobertQuinnandGraham
Staines,QualityofEmploymentSurvey,1977.AvailablefromICPSR,StudyNo.7689.
8
 Daniel Hamermesh and Amy Parker, “Beauty in the Classroom: Instructors’ Pulchritude and Putative
PedagogicalProductivity,”EconomicsofEducationReview24(August2005),pp.369–76.
9
 Daniel Hamermesh, “Changing Looks and Changing Discrimination: The Beauty of Economists,”
EconomicsLetters 93(2006), pp.405–12. Ina two-wayanalysis ofvariance ofthe standardizedaverage
looks ratings and the economists’ identification numbers, less than one-third of the variance was within
individuals.
10
 Formal statistical testing of the independence of the ratings within each pair sharply rejects the
hypothesisthattheratingsarerandom.Thechi-squarestatisticsareallhighlysignificantlydifferentfrom
zero.
11
Fromatwo-wayanalysisofvarianceofthe5-pointlooksratingsandtheinterviewernumbers.
12
Allofthedifferencesbyagearesignificantstatistically.
13
NancyEtcoff,SurvivalofthePrettiest,1999.
14
ElaineHatfieldandSusanSprecher,Mirror,Mirror...(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,
1986),p.283.
15
 Judith Langlois, Jean Ritter, Lori Roggman, and Lesley Vaughn, “Facial Diversity and Infant
Preferences for Attractive Faces,” Developmental Psychology 27 (January 1991), pp. 79–84; Judith
LangloisandLoriRoggman,“AttractiveFacesAreOnlyAverage,”PsychologicalScience1(March1990),
pp.115–21.

16
AmericanSocietyofPlasticSurgeons,2008Reportofthe2007StatisticsoftheNationalClearinghouse
ofPlasticSurgeryStatistics.ArlingtonHeights,IL:ASPS,2008.
17
www.cosmeticsurgerybible.com/2008/news/uk-tops-table-for-european-cosmetic-surgery-spending.
18
 Soohyung Lee and Keunkwan Ryu, “Returns to Plastic Surgery in Marriage and Labor Markets,”
unpublishedpaper,UniversityofMaryland–CollegePark,2009.
19
Therelativelysmalleffectsarebasedoncalculationsthataccountfordifferencesinthewomen’sfamily
incomes and ability to spend. To the extent that the data allow, problems of endogeneity in the
determinationofspendingonbeautyhavebeenaccountedfor.
20
 For China, see http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-07/05/content_345598.htm. Stories
about the United States abound, for example, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30112465/ and More, April
2009,p.78.
CHAPTERTHREE:BEAUTYANDTHEWORKER
1
 The 10 percent figure comes from a multivariate regression estimated over a large random sample of
Americans in 2007 (from the Current Population Survey, Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups). The true
figureisprobablymuchhigherforthegainsfromfinishinghighschool,orfromfinishingcollege.
2
Author’scalculationsfromCurrentPopulationSurvey(ibid.).
3
In2009,menaccountedfor52.5percentofemployees.Usingthatfigure,thesecalculationsarebasedon
weightedaveragesofthebeautyeffectslistedintable3.1.
4
 Jeff Biddle and Daniel Hamermesh, “Beauty, Productivity and Discrimination: Lawyers’ Looks and
Lucre,”JournalofLaborEconomics16(January1998),pp.172–201.
5
 Andrew Leigh and Jeff Borland, “Unpacking the Beauty Premium: Is It Looks or Ego?” unpublished
paper, Australian National University, 2007; Daniel Hamermesh and Jeff Biddle, “Beauty in the Labor
Market,”AmericanEconomicReview84(December1994),pp.1174–94;DanielHamermesh,XinMeng,
and Junsen Zhang, “Dress for Success—Does Primping Pay?” Labour Economics 9 (October 2002), pp.
361–73;SoohyungLeeandKeunkwanRyu,“ReturnstoPlasticSurgeryinMarriageandLaborMarkets,”
unpublished paper, University of Maryland–College Park, 2009; Barry Harper, “Beauty, Stature and the
LaborMarket:ABritishCohortStudy,”OxfordBulletinofEconomicsandStatistics62(December2000),
pp.771–800.
6
JasonFletcher,“Beautyvs.Brains:EarlyLaborMarketOutcomesofHighSchoolGraduates,”Economics
Letters105(December2009),pp.321–25.
7
 At the very least, there are more claims of discrimination by workers when the unemployment rate is
higher:JohnDonohueandPeterSiegelman,“LawandMacroeconomics:EmploymentDiscriminationover
theBusinessCycle,”UniversityofSouthernCaliforniaLawReview66(March1993),pp.709–45.

8
PhilipRobins,MichaelFrench,andJennyHomer,“Non-CognitiveTraitsandLaborMarketEarningsof
YoungAdults,”unpublishedpaper,UniversityofMiami,2009.
9
Fletcher,“Beautyvs.Brains.”
10
SusanAverettandSandersKorenman,“TheEconomicRealityoftheBeautyMyth,”JournalofHuman
Resources 31 (Spring 1996), pp. 304–30. John Cawley, “The Impact of Obesity on Wages,” Journal of
HumanResources39(Spring2004),pp.451–74;ChristianGregoryandChristopherRuhm,“WhereDoes
theWagePenaltyBite?”inEconomicAspectsofObesity,ed.MichaelGrossmanandNaciMocan(Chicago:
UniversityofChicagoPress,2011).GiorgioBrunelloandBéatriced’Hombres,“DoesBodyWeightAffect
Wages:EvidencefromEurope,”EconomicsandHumanBiology5(March2007),pp.1–19.
11
 Nicola Persico, Andrew Postlewaite, and Dan Silverman, “The Effect of Adolescent Experience on
Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height,” Journal of Political Economy 112 (October 2004), pp.
1019–53.WenshuGaoandRussellSmyth,“Health,HumanCapital,HeightandWagesinChina,”Journal
ofDevelopmentStudies46(2010),466–84.
12
 Dan-Olof Rooth, “Obesity, Attractiveness, and Differential Treatment in Hiring,” Journal of Human
Resources44(Fall2009),pp.710–35.
13
WallStreetJournal,Friday-Saturday,November26–27,1993,page1,quotingindirectlyNaomiWolf,
authorofTheBeautyMyth.
14
Thequote,asitappearsinvariousplaces,is“EsistleichtereinAtomzuspalten,alseinVorurteil.”
15
Compare,forexample,thesurveysofempiricalevidencebyJohnPencavel,andbyJamesHeckmanand
MarkKillings-worth,inOrleyAshenfelterandRichardLayard,eds.,HandbookofLaborEconomics,Vol.1
(Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986); and the survey by Richard Blundell and Thomas MaCurdy in
Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3A (Amsterdam: North-Holland,
1999).
16
ArthurGoldsmith,DarrickHamilton,andWilliamDarity,“FromDarktoLight:SkinColorandWages
amongAfrican-Americans,”JournalofHumanResources42(Fall2007),pp.701–38.
CHAPTERFOUR:BEAUTYINSPECIFIC
OCCUPATIONS
1
 In the case of opera, the career of the soprano Florence Foster Jenkins early in the twentieth century
providestheexceptionthatprovestherule.
2
ThetabloidsofthetimereferredtoHamlinandoneotherattorneyontheshowas“L.A.Lawhunks.”
3
ThelateZviGrilichesofHarvardUniversity,personalconversationsometimeinthe1980s.
4
 Jeff Biddle and Daniel Hamermesh, “Beauty, Productivity and Discrimination: Lawyers’ Looks and

Lucre,” Journal of Labor Economics 16 (January 1998), pp. 172–201. The twenty-four underlying
categorieswerecombinedintofourgroupsbyanexperiencedattorney—mywife.
5
AbigailPogrebin,StarsofDavid(NewYork:BroadwayBooks,2005),p.10.
6
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7581039.stm.
7
 Lee Lillard, “The Market for Sex: Street Prostitution in Los Angeles,” unpublished paper, RAND
Corporation,1995.
8
 Paul Gertler, Manisha Shah, and Stefano Bertozzi, “Risky Business: The Market for Unprotected
CommercialSex,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy113(June2005),pp.518–50.
9
RajArunachalamandManishaShah,“TheProstitute’sAllure:TheReturntoBeautyinCommercialSex
Work,”unpublishedpaper,UniversityofMichigan,2009.
10
 www.theeroticreview.com offers detailed information for members on the characteristics of a huge
numberofescorts,alongwithpriceschargedforvariousservices.
11
 Lena Edlund, Joseph Engelberg, and Christopher Parsons, “The Wages of Sin,” unpublished paper,
UniversityofNorthCarolina–ChapelHill,2009.
12
MikeMurphy,quotedbyMaureenDowd,NewYorkTimes,July29,2009.
13
 Daniel Benjamin and Jesse Shapiro, “Thin-Slice Forecasts of Gubernatorial Elections,” Review of
EconomicsandStatistics91(August2009),pp.523–36.
14
 Andrew Leigh and Tirta Susilo, “Is Voting Skin-deep? Estimating the Effect of Candidate Ballot
PhotographsonElectionOutcomes,”JournalofEconomicPsychology30(February2009),pp.61–70.
15
AmyKingandAndrewLeigh,“BeautifulPoliticians,”Kyklos62(November2009),pp.579–93.
16
MarkusKleinandUlrichRosar,“PhysischeAttraktivitätundWahlerfolg:EineEmpirischeAnalyseam
Beispiel der Wahlkreiskandidaten bei der Bundestagswahl 2002,” Politische Vierteljahresheft 46 (2005),
pp.266–90.
17
NiclasBerggren,Henrik Jordahl,andPanu Poutvaara,“TheLooksofaWinner:BeautyandElectoral
Success,”JournalofPublicEconomics94(February2010),pp.8–15;Cheng-DaLiandMing-ChingLuoh,
“BeautyPremiumsinPolitics—TheCaseofthe2004LegislatorElectionsinTaiwan,”TaiwanEconomic
Review36(March2008),pp.67–113.
18
 Marcus Maurer and Harald Schoen, “Der Medial Attraktivitätsbonus: Wie die Physische Attraktivität
vonWahlkreiskandidatendieMedienberichterstattunginWahlkämpfenBeinflusst,”KölnerZeitschriftfür
SoziologieundSozialpsychologie62(June2010),pp.277–95.
19
IreneFrieze, Josephine Olson,andJune Russell, “AttractivenessandIncome for Men andWomenin
Management,”JournalofAppliedSocialPsychology21(July1991),pp.1039–57.
20
 Anindya Sen, Marcel Voia, and Frances Woolley, “The Effect of Hotness on Pay and Productivity,”
unpublishedpaper,CarletonUniversity,October2010.

21
Statisticalevidence infavorof thenotionthat teachingqualityaffects salaryisoffered byWilliamJ.
Moore,RobertNewman,andGeoffreyTurnbull,“DoAcademicSalariesDeclinewithSeniority?”Journal
of LaborEconomics16 (April 1998), pp. 352–66, whodemonstratethe link between receipt ofteaching
awards and salary. The evidence on the impact of teaching evaluations is less direct, but my personal
experiencesinevaluatingyoungfacultyfortenureandteachingawardssuggestthatevaluationsreceivea
lot,perhapseventoomuchattentionintheseprocesses.
22
 DanielHamermeshand Amy Parker,“Beautyin the Classroom: Instructors’Pulchritude and Putative
PedagogicalProductivity,”EconomicsofEducationReview24(August2005),pp.369–76.
23
BerndSüssmuth,“BeautyintheClassroom:AreGermanStudentsLessBlinded?”AppliedEconomics
38(February2006),pp.231–38.
24
 Daniel Hamermesh, “Changing Looks and Changing Discrimination: The Beauty of Economists,”
EconomicsLetters93(December2006),pp.405–12.
25
 DavidBerri,RobSimmons, Jennifer van Gilder, andLisleO’Neill,“What Does It Mean to Findthe
FaceoftheFranchise?”unpublishedpaper,SouthernUtahUniversity,2009.
26
 Naci Mocan and Erdal Tekin, “Ugly Criminals,” Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (February
2010),pp.15–30.
CHAPTERFIVE:BEAUTYANDTHEEMPLOYER
1
 Andrea Weber and Christine Zuhlehner, “Female Hires and the Success of Start-up Firms,” American
EconomicAssociation,PapersandProceedings100(May2010),pp.358–61.
2
 Quoted in an interview reported at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/fashion/3302299/You-can-always-get-
what-you-want.html.
3
GerardPfann, Jeff Biddle,CiskaBosman, and DanielHamermesh, “Business SuccessandBusinesses’
BeautyCapital,”EconomicsLetters67(May2000),pp.201–7.
4
DeTijd,July28,2000,p.32.
5
CraigLandry,AndreasLange,JohnList,MichaelPrice,andNicholasRupp,“TowardanUnderstanding
of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121
(May2006),pp.747–82.
6
MichaelPrice,“Fund-RaisingSuccessandaSolicitor’sBeautyCapital:DoBlondesRaiseMoreFunds?”
EconomicsLetters100(September2008),pp.351–54.
7
 Peter Kuhn and Kailing Shen, “Employers’ Preferences for Gender, Age, Height and Beauty: Direct
Evidence,”unpublishedpaper,UniversityofCalifornia–SantaBarbara,2009.

8
ReportedinAustinAmerican-Statesman,July19,2004,p.A1.AstoryinaChinesenewspaperin2005(in
Mandarin)evenreportedthatonegovernmentagencypostedahelp-wantedadvertisementsuggestingthat
onlywomenwithlargebreastsneedapply.
9
 This difference has been shown for various years for many northern European countries by numerous
authors, with one of the clearest demonstrations being by Dan Devroye and Richard Freeman, “Does
Inequality in Skills Explain Inequality in Earnings Across Advanced Countries?” National Bureau of
EconomicResearch,WorkingPaperNo.8140,February2001.
10
See,forexample,GeorgeBorjas,LaborEconomics,4thedition(New York:McGraw-Hill,2008),pp.
277–79,foradiscussionoftheideaoffirm-specifichumancapital,aconceptthatgoesbacktotheearly
1960s.
11
Cash8,no.34(August23,1996),p.1.
12
 NicholasRuleand Nalini Ambady, “The FaceofSuccess: Inferences from ChiefExecutiveOfficers’
AppearancePredictCompanyProfits,”PsychologicalScience19(2008),pp.109–11.
13
Fortherelationshipbetweenpayandcompanyprofits,seeKevinJ.Murphy,“ExecutiveCompensation,”
inHandbookof LaborEconomics,vol.3B,ed.OrleyAshenfelterandDavidCard(Amsterdam:Elsevier,
1999),pp.2485–2563.
CHAPTERSIX:LOOKISMORPRODUCTIVE
BEAUTY,ANDWHY?
1
Merriam-WebsterOnlineDictionary,http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary.
2
GaryBecker,TheEconomicsofDiscrimination(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1957).
3
 Edmund Phelps, “The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism,” American Economic Review 62
(September 1972), pp. 659–61; Dennis Aigner and Glen Cain, “Statistical Theories of Discrimination in
LaborMarkets,”IndustrialandLaborRelationsReview30(January1977),pp.175–87.RolandFryerand
MatthewJackson,“ACategoricalModelofCognitionandBiasedDecisionMaking,”BerkeleyElectronic
JournalContributionstoTheoreticalEconomics8(2008),goastepbeyondthistoanalyzetheeconomics
oftheformationofgroupsthatunderliethestatisticaltheories.
4
 Barbara Bergmann, “The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination in Employment,” Journal of
PoliticalEconomy79(March–April1971),pp.294–313.
5
Amongthemanydiscussionsofthisapproach,HowardGardner,FramesofMind:TheTheoryofMultiple
Intelligences(NewYork:BasicBooks,1983),isperhapsthemostwellknown.
6
 This is a standard Harberger-triangle calculation. Take the extent of wage discrimination against the
worst-looking workers as 10 percent as compared to all other workers, and figure their fraction in the

workforceis10 percent.Both ofthesefigures accordwiththe evidencein chapters2and 3,asdoes the
assumptionthattheuglyareonaverageasskilledastherestofthelaborforce.Then,evenifthedemand
elasticityforthelaborofthisgroupofworkersisashighastwo(seeDanielHamermesh,LaborDemand,
Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993),thecosttosocietyofmisallocatingtheirlaborwouldbe
about0.25percent (.1 ×.1 × .5×.5) of totalcompensation. In 2009,compensationof employeesinthe
United States was about $8 trillion, so that the loss to society of this kind of socially unproductive
discriminationis$20billion.
7
 Markus Möbius and TanyaRosenblat,“WhyBeautyMatters,” American Economic Review 96 (March
2006),pp.222–35.
8
 James Andreoni and Ragan Petrie, “Beauty, Gender and Stereotypes: Evidence from Laboratory
Experiments,”JournalofEconomicPsychology29(2008),pp.73–93.
9
 Sara Solnick and Maurice Schweitzer, “The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on
Ultimatum Game Decisions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 79 (September
1999),pp.199–215.
10
 Michèle Belot, V. Bhaskar, and Jeroen van de Ven, “Beauty and the Sources of Discrimination,”
unpublishedpaper,UniversityCollege–London,2008.ThegameshowwasentitledShafted,andtheauthors
usedallepisodesfrom2002.
11
 “Wimbledon Puts Tennis Babes Front and ‘Centre’, ”
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,529865,00.html.
CHAPTERSEVEN:BEAUTYINMARKETSFOR
FRIENDS,FAMILY,ANDFUNDS
1
SeeLaurenceIannaconne,“SacrificeandStigma:ReducingFree-RidinginCults,CommunesandOther
Collectives,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy100(April1992),pp.271–91.
2
SeeAlanFeingold,“MatchingforAttractivenessin RomanticPartnersandSame-sexFriends:A Meta-
Analysis and Theoretical Critique,” Psychological Bulletin 104 (September 1988), pp. 226–35, for a
summaryofalargenumberofstudiesofthisissue.
3
 Marco Castillo, Ragan Petrie, and Maximo Torero, “Beautiful or White? Discrimination in Group
Formation,”unpublishedpaper,GeorgeMasonUniversity,2010.
4
NewYorkTimes,March24,2009,p.D1.
5
Feingold,“MatchingforAttractiveness.”
6
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7567239.stm is among the many websites discussing this
statement.

7
 Susan Fisk, “Competition and Social Exchange: Female Attractiveness as an Object of Exchange in
DatingMarkets,”unpublishedpaper,DepartmentofSociology,StanfordUniversity,2008.
8
RaymondFisman,SheenaIyengar,EmirKamenica,andItamarSimonson,“GenderDifferencesinMate
Selection:EvidencefromaSpeedDatingExperiment,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics121(May2006),
pp.673–97.
9
 Günter Hitsch, Ali Hortaçsu, and Dan Ariely, “Matching and Sorting in Online Dating,” American
EconomicReview100(2010),pp.130–63.Hitsch,Hortaçsu,andAriely,“WhatMakesYouClick?”Mate
PreferencesandMatching:OutcomesinOnlineDating,”unpublishedpaper,UniversityofChicago,2006.
10
Forexample,themedianworkerages25–34in2008hadbeenatthejobfor2.7years,whilethemedian
workerages55–64hadbeenwiththesameemployerfor9.9years.U.S.DepartmentofLabor,Bureauof
LaborStatistics,EmployeeTenurein2008.
11
Theseestimatesarebasedonregressionsthataccountforspouses’ages,differencesintheirhealth,and
othercharacteristics.
12
Calculatedas10percentperyeartimes1.1(12.4–11.3)years.
13
SoohyungLee,“MarriageandOnlineMate-SearchServices:EvidencefromSouthKorea,”unpublished
paper,UniversityofMaryland,2009.
14
 AbhijitBanerjee,EsterDuflo, Maitreesh Ghatak, and Jeanne Lafortune,“Marryfor What? Caste and
Mate Selection in Modern India,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 14958,
2009.
15
 David Bjerk, “Beauty vs. Earnings: Gender Differences in Earnings and Priorities over Spousal
CharacteristicsinaMatchModel,”JournalofEconomicBehaviorandOrganization69(March2009),pp.
248–59.
16
SeeFeingold,“MatchingforAttractiveness,”whichsummarizesstudiesofspouses’looks.DavidBuss,
TheEvolutionofDesire:StrategiesofHumanMating(NewYork:BasicBooks,1994),discussesthismore
generally.
17
 Liliana Alvarez and Klaus Jaffe, “Narcissism in Mate Selection: Humans Mate Assortatively, as
Revealed by Facial Resemblance, Following an Algorithm of ‘Self Seeking Like,’ ” Evolutionary
Psychology2(2004),pp.177–94.
18
Atestoftheentiredistributionshowsthatitishighlynon-random,withaX
2
(4)=413.8,wherethe99
percentcriticalvalueis13.28.
19
http://www.ronsangels.com/index2.html.
20
Onlongevity, see DanielHamermeshand Frances Hamermesh,“Does Perception ofLifeExpectancy
ReflectHealthKnowledge,”AmericanJournalofPublicHealth73(August1983),pp.911–14.Thestudy
oftheintergenerationalrelationofheightsisthemotivationforregressionanalysis,asStephenStigler,The
HistoryofStatistics:TheMeasurementofUncertaintyBefore1900(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity
Press, 1986), so beautifully discusses. Although there are many other works, I find Leon Kamin, The
ScienceandPoliticsof IQ(NewYork:HalstedPress,1974),tobeaparticularlyuseful discussionofthe

issuesintheheritabilityofintelligence.
21
 http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=CNG.33f98480
869b474b6d10cafcf0b1de64.7c1&show_article=1.
22
http://snltranscripts.jt.org/84/84iwhitelikeeddie.phtml.
23
AliciaMunnell,GeoffreyTootle,LynnBrowne,andJamesMcEneany,“MortgageLendinginBoston:
InterpretingHMDAData,”AmericanEconomicReview86(March1996),pp.25–53.
24
 Enrichetta Ravina, “Love and Loans: The Effect of Beauty and Personal Characteristics in Credit
Markets,” unpublished paper, New York University, March 2008; Jefferson Duarte, Stephan Siegel, and
LanceYoung,“Trust andCredit,”unpublished paper,RiceUniversity, November2008.Devin Popeand
Justin Sydnor, “What’sinaPicture?Evidence of Discrimination from Prosper.com,” unpublishedpaper,
WhartonSchool,UniversityofPennsylvania,2008.
CHAPTEREIGHT:LEGALPROTECTIONFORTHE
UGLY
1
http://www.sfgov.org/site/sfhumanrights_index.asp?id=4583.
2
SeeDeborahRhode,TheBeautyBias:TheInjusticeofAppearanceinLifeandLaw(NewYork:Oxford
UniversityPress,2010),chapter6,foralongerdiscussionoftheseprovisions.
3
 Discussion of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Department of Consumer
Affairs,isat(http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/landlordbook/discrimination.shtml).
4
http://wallis.kezenfogva.iif.hu/eu_konyvtar/projektek/
vocational_rehabilitiation/france/fra_rap/leg.htm.
5
Foradiscussionofthecaseshere,aswellasmanyothers,seeJenniferFowler-Hermes,“Beautyandthe
Beast in the Work-place: Appearance-based Discrimination under EEO Laws,” Florida Bar Journal 75
(April2001).
6
ThecasesdiscussedhereandthelegalissuesgenerallyarepresentedbyElizabethTheran,“LegalTheory
on Weight Discrimination,” in Weight Bias: Nature, Consequences and Remedies, ed. Kelly Brownell,
RebeccaPuhl,LeslieRudd,andMarleneSchwartz(NewYork:GuilfordPress,2005),pp.195–211.
7
JamesMcDonald,“CivilRightsfortheAesthetically-Challenged,”EmployeeRelationsLawJournal29
(Autumn2003),pp.118–29,discussesthedevelopmentoflawinthisarea.
8
 Timothy Van Dyck, Edwards, Engell, Palmer & Dodge, July 17, 2008,
http://www.employmentlawalliance.com/en/node/2393.
9
 The case of the Malone twins, Boston firefighters whose claim to be African American on their job

applicationswaseventuallychallenged,isthemostwell-knownexampleofthedifficultiesinclassification
and with self-classification (New York Times, October 9, 1988;
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/09/us/boston-case-raises-questions-on-misuse-of-affirmative-action.html?
pagewanted=all). Other cases have arisen. In Washington State, when individuals who had listed
themselves as being members of various protected racial/ethnic groups were asked to provide some
supporting evidence, 3 percent switched their self-description to Caucasian
(http://aad.english.ucsb.edu/docs/proof.html).
10
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html.
11
See,forexample,http://www.radiancemagazine.com/kids_project/body_image.html.
12
Foradiscussionoftheseevents,seehttp://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/fea/lifetravel/
stories/082708dnmetabercrombie.4027698.html.
13
CalculationsarebytheauthorfromtheCurrentPopulationSurvey,MergedOutgoingRotationGroups,
2008.
14
Ibid.Calculationsusingdatafor2008basedontheusualearningsofmenwiththesameeducation,age,
hoursofwork,location,andmaritalstatus.
15
 Judith Hellerstein, David Neumark, and Kenneth Troske, “Wages, Productivity, and Worker
Characteristics:EvidencefromPlant-LevelProductionFunctionsandWageEquations,”JournalofLabor
Economics 17 (July 1999), pp. 409–46; and John Haltiwanger, Julia Lane, and James Spletzer, “Wages,
Productivity,andtheDynamicInteractionofBusinessesandWorkers,”LabourEconomics14(June2007),
pp.575–602.
16
Foradiscussionoftheverylow,butrisingintermarriageratesintheUnitedStates,seeRolandFryer,
“GuessWho’sBeenComingtoDinner?TrendsinInterracialMarriageoverthe20thCentury,”Journalof
Economic Perspectives 21 (Spring 2007), pp. 71–90. In 2008, 21 percent of African Americans had not
completed high school, while only 12 percent of non-Hispanic whites had that little education. Only 17
percentofAfricanAmericanshadatleastgraduatedfromcollegeoruniversity,while29percentofnon-
Hispanicwhiteshaddoneso.Computedusingthesamemethodsanddataasprovidedinnote13.
17
SeeClarkNardinelliandCurtisSimon,“CustomerRacialDiscriminationintheMarketforMemorabilia:
TheCaseofBaseball,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics105(August1990),pp.575–95;OrleyAshenfelter
and Timothy Hannan, “Sex Discrimination and Product Market Competition: The Case of the Banking
Industry,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics101(February1986),pp.149–73.
18
Computedusingthesamemethodsanddataasprovidedinnote13.
19
 See Hellerstein et al., “Wages, Productivity, and Worker Characteristics,” and Haltiwanger et al.,
“Wages,Productivity,andtheDynamicInteractionofBusinessesandWorkers.”
20
Rhode,TheBeautyBias.
21
 An early study of this issue is George Borjas, “The Substitutability of Black, Hispanic and White
Labor,” Economic Inquiry 21 (January 1983), pp. 93–106. See also most of the studies in Daniel
Hamermesh and Frank Bean, eds., Help or Hindrance: The Economic Implications of Immigration for
African-Americans(NewYork:RussellSageFoundation,1998),particularlythosebyGeorgeJohnsonand
byBorjas.

CHAPTERNINE:PROSPECTSFORTHELOOKS-
CHALLENGED
1
...heflutteredpulseswhenhesaid,
“Good-morning,”andheglitteredwhenhewalked
...
AndRichardCory,onecalmsummernight,
Wenthomeandputabulletinhishead.
EdwinArlingtonRobinson
2
Calculationsfrom the1971and 1978 QualityofAmerican Lifesurveys.The only scholarlystudythat
seems to have examined this issue using a nationally representative sample employed the 1978 data to
summarize a happiness measure in each of the five categories of beauty: Debra Umberson and Michael
Hughes, “The ImpactofPhysical Attractiveness on Achievement and PsychologicalWell-Being,”Social
PsychologyQuarterly50(September1987),pp.227–36.SeealsoDanielHamermeshandJasonAbrevaya,
“‘BeautyIsthePromiseofHappiness’?”,IZADiscussionPaperNo.5600,2011.
3
Calculationsfromthesamesourcesasinnote2.
4
AnthonySynott,sociologist,quotedinInternationalHerald-Tribune,November4,2008.
5
 S. Michael Kalick, Leslie Zebrowitz, Judity Langlois, and Robert Johnson, “Does Human Facial
AttractivenessHonestlyAdvertiseHealth?”PsychologicalScience9(January1998),pp.8–13.
6
 Lisa DeBruine, Benedict Jones, John Crawford, Lisa Welling, and Anthony Little, “The Health of a
NationPredictsTheirMatePreferences:Cross-culturalVariationinWomen’sPreferencesforMasculinized
MaleFaces,”ProceedingsoftheRoyalSociety,PartB,277(August2010),pp.2405–10.
7
 The idea goes back at least to Richard Nelson, “A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium Trap in
Underdeveloped Economies,” American Economic Review 46 (December 1956), pp. 894–908. John
Dagsvik and Boyan Jovanovic, “Was the Great Depression a Low-Level Equilibrium?” European
EconomicReview38(December1994),pp.1711–29,discussitinthecontextofmacroeconomics.
8
 Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy, “A Theory of Rational Addiction,” Journal of Political Economy96
(August1988),pp.675–700,istheleadstudyexpoundingthisidea.TheapplicationtocigarettesisbyGary
Becker,MichaelGrossman,andKevinMurphy,“AnEmpiricalAnalysisofCigaretteAddiction,”American
EconomicReview84(June1994),pp.396–418.
9
More,October2008,p.143.

INDEX
AbercrombieandFitch,159
actors,13–15,32,67–71,110,176,179
advertising,88–93,96,139,142–43,146,191n8
aesthetics,12
affirmativeaction,151–52,199n9
AfricanAmericans,144
affirmativeactionand,151–52,199n9
educationand,200n16
employmentand,58–59,76,108,110
legalissuesand,154,157,161–62,165
Malonetwinsand,199n9
standardsofbeautyand,29–30
age:AgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct(ADEA)and,150
AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA)and,150–51,155,158,167–69
attorneysand,60–63
datingand,133
earningsand,44,52,56,59–63,75–79,83,118,190n21
employmentand,44,52,56,59–63,75–79,83,118,190n21
groupformationand,129
legalprotectionand,148,150,153
prostitutesand,75
standardsofbeautyand,11,22–23,27–34
vanityand,3–4
AgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct(ADEA),150
AmericanEconomicAssociation,81–82
AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA),150–51,155,158,167–69
analysisofvariance(ANOVA),183nn9,11

Arden,Dale,176
artisticability,103,110,176
AsianAmericans,15–16,29
assistedlivingfacilities,4
athletics,66,82–83,120,127–30,179
attorneys,188n4
administrative,71
ageeffectsand,60–63
compensatingbeauty-damagedworkerand,63–64
corporate,71
employmentand,48–52,60–64,67–68,71–72,78–79,83,88,91,102,119–20
financial,71
L.A.Lawand,68–71
LawSchoolAptitudeTest(LSAT)and,52
legalissuesand,157,159(seealsolegalissues)litigators,68
lookismand,102,119–21
productivebeautyand,102,119–20
regulation,71
tax,68
Australia,15,49,76,82,133
bad-lookingpeople,5,35
affirmativeactionand,151–52,199n9
AgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct(ADEA)and,150
agreementonrightsof,156–60
AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA)and,150–51,155,158,167–69
appropriatepolicyfor,166–68
BodyImageTaskForceand,158
CivilRightsActand,150–51
datingand,132
earningsand,155,158–64,173–74
employmentand,39,41,46–47,51–52,56–57,64,67,71,83–89,97,102–10,113–21
EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission(EEOC)and,150,155,158
ExecutiveOrder10925and,151
ExecutiveOrder11246and,151
fairnessand,148–49
futureissuesfor,158–59,173–80
happinessand,173–77
homelinessand,22,27,29,31,35,46–48,96,149,152,174
legalprotectionfor,148–69
legislationfor,149–52
aslooks-challenged,149,173–80
marriageand,137–39
nerdsand,19,52

prejudiceand,15,103–6,121,146,158,162,178
productivebeautyand,102–10,113–21
prospectsfor,173–80
protectedclassesand,149–52
publicpolicyand,148–49
strategiesfor,178–80
taxburdenand,163–64
useofexistingpoliciesand,154–56
Baldwin,Alec,xi
Beatles,180
beauty:asaggregateofpersonalqualities,11
bimboeffectand,48
clothingand,3–4,12,20,33–35,54,113,154
compensatingbeauty-damagedworkerand,61–64
cosmeticsand,3,33–35,88,109,113
coworkerinspirationand,95–97
culturaldifferencesand,4,16,21–27,30–31
definitionsof,11–18
earningsand,18,29,40–55,58–67,71–79(seealsoearnings)economicsof,3–10(seealsoeconomics)
exchangeof,126–27
facial,12–15,19–20,31,33,35,53–54,61–62,66–67,82–84,98–99,112–14,142,155,167,175–76
fleetingnatureof,35
futureissuesfor,173–80
groomingand,153–58
groupformationand,125–26,128–30,146
hairand,3,12,33–34,91,128–29,154,176
happinessand,173–75
heightand,12,53–54,127,137,143,152–53,157
help-wantedadvertisementsand,93,191n8
hotnessand,79–80,159
increasing,32–35
internal,12
marketforbeautifulchildrenand,141–44
measurementof,19–24(seealsoscaleofbeauty)
modernobsessionwith,3
personalityand,51–52
plasticsurgeryand,32–35,113–14
premiumfor,7,18,39–52,55,59,67,73,89,105,112–13,116,148
asproduct,88–89
profiteffectsfrom,92–97,100–1
scarcityof,6,8–9,24,28,50,133–34
scholarlypaperson,x

skinand,12,58,76,174
sociallyproductive,103,108–11
sortingby,84–85
specificoccupationsand,66–85
symmetryand,31–33,82–83,175
timespentprimpingand,3–4
weightand,12–13,16,21,53–54,152–57
youthand,31,33,35,83–84(seealsoage)beautyeffect:ageand,59–61
clothingand,54
constancyof,51
datingand,129–35
discriminationand,103–8(seealsodiscrimination)
meaningof,102–3
raceand,58–59
salesand,87–92,100–1
sizeofimpactof,72–84
smallereffectsamongwomenand,55–58
sourcesof,111–21
beautypageants,72
Becker,Gary,ix,103
behavior,4–6,147,182n9
consumerpreferenceand,106,112,120–21,163–64,177–78
datingand,126–35,139
economic,7–8,173(seealsoeconomics)employmentand,42,51,66,87
futureoflooksand,173,177
groupformationand,125–26,128–30,146
happinessand,34,41,82,121,142,146,158,173–75,201n2
marriageand,137
personalityand,51–52
productivebeautyand,102–3,106,111,117–18
psychologistsand,9–10,31,33,51,98,129–32,140
romantic,28,68,180
self-confidenceand,51,115
standardsofbeautyand,13,18,21,36
sympathetic,12,166,168
Bible,18
Biddle,Jeff,x
bimboeffect,48
biology,5,143,177
blondes,91,176
BodyImageTaskForce,158
bodypaints,4
Bond,James,110

books,5
Bosman,Ciska,x
Botox,32
Boyle,Susan,5
boys,3–5,129,132–33
BraveNewWorld(Huxley),141
breasts,191n8
brideprice,125
California,152–53
Callas,Maria,71
Canada,25–27,49,51,57,79
Cash(newspaper),98
CEOs,98–100
cheerleaders,128
children,56,61–62
boys,3–5,129,132–33
girls,3–5,16,19,64,129,133
infants,4,128,184n15
intelligenceand,142–43
marketforbeautiful,141–44
ovaauctionsand,141–43
spermdonorsand,141,144
teenagersand,3,64
China,5
breastsizeand,191n8
employmentand,49,53,93,191n8
marriageand,137–38
Shanghaistudiesand,23,27–28,30,34,49,137–38,141
standardsofbeautyand,23,30,34
chi-squarestatistics,183n10
cigarettes,178
CivilRightsAct,150–51
Clooney,George,13,15
clothes,3–4
employmentand,54,113
legalissuesand,154
standardsofbeautyand,12,20,33–35
successand,33
ColemanV.GeorgiaPowerCo.,155
competition:datingand,133
employmentand,40–41,50,77,81,86–89,93–94,97,101,120

legalissuesand,165–66
Cooke,Sam,131
Cookv.RhodeIslandDepartmentofMentalHealth,Retardation,andHospitals,155
Cory,Richard,174
cosmetics,3,33–35,88,109,113
cosmeticsurgery.Seeplasticsurgery
cost-benefitanalysis,93
Craig,Daniel,110
crewcuts,3
criminals,83–84
culturaldifferences,4
earningsand,49
help-wantedadvertisementsand,93,191n8
standardsofbeautyand,16,21–27,30–31
customers,80
beautyeffectonsalesand,87–92,100–1
CEOappointmentsand,99
legalissuesand,155,162
loansand,145
preferencesof,106,112,120–21,163–64,177–78
productivebeautyand,107,113
workers’looksand,41–42,58–60,75
D.A.haircuts,128–29
dating,125
ageand,133
bad-lookingpeopleand,132
beautyeffectson,129–35
behaviorand,131–35
competitionand,133
earningsand,132,139–40
easeofanalyzing,130–31
economicsof,135
excessoffemalesand,133
exchangeofbeautyand,126–27
futureoflooksand,174,179–80
genderdifferencesin,130–35,139,146
asinformation-gathering,136
intelligenceand,127,134
Koreaand,139
legalissuesand,162
marriageand,135–36,139(seealsomarriage)matcheddatesand,132
menand,133–35

online,132,139
photographsand,133,135
preferenceand,130–32,135
purposeof,136
reproductivefitnessand,131
scarcityofbeautyand,132–33
sexratiosand,133–34
shortageofmalesand,133
skillsand,131
speed,134–35
successand,131,134–35
womenand,133–35
Deneuve,Catherine,88
discrimination:AgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct(ADEA)and,150
AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA)and,150–51,155,158,167–69
beautypremiumand,39–52,55,59,67,73,105,112–13,116,148
BodyImageTaskForceand,158
CivilRightsActand,150–51
consumer,106,112,120–21,163–64,177–78
EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission(EEOC)and,150,155,158
EqualEmploymentOpportunity(EEO)and,155
EqualPayAct(EPA)and,150
ethnicityand,5,39,44,63,106,130,144,148,152,159,166–67
ExecutiveOrder10925and,151
ExecutiveOrder11246and,151
futureissuesand,174–79
gameshowcontestantsand,118–19
Greenspanand,86–87
height,152–53
intermarriageand,200n16
labor-marketand,55,86–87,102–12,115–16,119–20
legalprotectionfrom,148–69
loansand,144–46
lookismand,103–8,114–21
lower-paidwomenand,86–87
Malonetwinsand,199n9
marriageand,140
preferenceand,10,41–42(seealsopreference)prejudiceand,15,103–6,121,146,158,162,178
productivebeautyand,102–12,115–16,119–20
raceand,144–45(seealsorace)
sexismand,140
stereotypesand,30,106–7
treatmentofappearanceand,153–58

wage,105(seealsoearnings)
weight,152–53,198n6
disfigurement,35
compensationfor,61–64
earningsand,142,158
futurepoliciesand,175,177
legalissuesand,155,167
lookismand,112–14
DistrictofColumbia,153
divorce,136
dolls,3
door-to-doorsales,67,91
dowry,125
Dr.Faustus(Marlowe),19
Dr.Seuss,6
earnings,29
ageand,44,52,56,59–63,75–79,83,118,190n21
bad-lookingpeopleand,155,158–64,173–74
beautypremiumand,7,18,39–52,55,59,67,73,89,105,112–13,116,148
clothesand,54,113
compensatingbeauty-damagedworkerand,61–64
competitionand,40–41,50,77,81,86–89,93–94,97,101,120
culturaldifferencesand,49
datingand,132,139–40
disfigurementand,61–64,158
educationand,46,199n14
EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission(EEOC)and,150
EqualPayAct(EPA)and,150
executivesand,7,62,68,78,89–99
futurepoliciesand,173–74,178
legalissuesand,155,158–64
lower-paidwomenand,86–87
marriageand,18,44,138–43
obesityand,53
offsettinghigher-paidgood-lookingemployeesand,88,91–97,105,109
otherfactorson,44,51–55
personalityand,51–52
productivebeautyand,100,102,105–7,110,113,117–21
raceand,39–40,44,58–59
self-esteemand,51
skillsand,40,60,71,84,90–93,96,108–10,115,131,140,150,165,179,192n9,193n6

smallerbeautyeffectsamongwomenand,55–58
specificoccupationsand,66–67,71–79,82–85
unionsand,44,46
economics,6–7
AmericanEconomicsAssociationand,81–82
beautyeffectonprofitsand,92–97
beautypremiumand,18,39–52,55,59,67,73,89,105,112–13,116,148
bottom-lineand,100–1
clothingand,3–4,33–35,113
compensatingbeauty-damagedworkerand,61–64
consumerpreferenceand,106,112,120–21,163–64,177–78
customersand,41–42,58–60,75(seealsocustomers)datingand,135
earningsand,18,29,40–55(seealsoearnings)fairnessand,148–49
asfun,ix
Greenspanand,86–87
higherpricesand,18,73,89
highersalesfromgood-lookingemployeesand,87–92
loansand,14–46
marketforbeautifulchildrenand,141–44
marriageand,136
offsettinghigher-paidgood-lookingemployeesand,88,91–97,105,109
ovaauctionsand,141–43
plasticsurgeryand,32–35
productivebeautyand,102–21
salesand,7,42,67,87–102,106–12,121,159–60,162
scarcityofbeautyand,6,8–9,24,28,50,133–34
skillsand,40,60,71,84,90–93,96,108–10,115,131,140,150,165,179,192n9,193n6
specificoccupationsand,81–82
spermdonorsand,141,144
taxesand,163
unemploymentand,50,67,177–78,186n7
Ecuador,74
education:;AfricanAmericansand,200n16
bimboeffectand,48
employmentand,43,46,63,73,90,199n14
enjoymentofcoursesand,80
legalissuesand,151,160–62
marriageand,137–38
MBAsand,78
professorsand,24,26,29,67,79–84,106,120–21
SATscoresand,134
socialissuesand,127,132–39
successand,131

Egypt,4
elections,76–78,81–82
employers:advertisingand,88–93,96,191n8
beautyeffectonprofitsand,92–97
better-lookingCEOsand,98–100
bottom-lineand,100–1
cost-benefitanalysisand,93
coworkerinspirationand,95–97
Dutchadvertisingstudyand,89–90,93–94
Fortune500companiesand,98–99
lookismand,102–21
marketsurvivalpuzzlesand,86–87,97
offsettinghigher-paidgood-lookingemployeesand,88,91–97,105,109
productivityand,89–90,95,99–100,102–3,107–11,115–21
salesand,87–101
sociallyproductivebeautyand,108–9
employment:affirmativeactionand,151–52,199n9
ageand,44,52,56,59–63,75–79,83,118,190n21
antiquatedoccupationsand,107–8
applicantphotographsand,48,54,71,75–78,82,90,93
bad-lookingpeopleand,39,41,46–47,51–52,56–57,64,67,71,83–89,97,102–10,113–21
beautypremiumand,18,39–52,55,59,67,73,89,105,112–13,116,148
behaviorand,42,51,66,87
bimboeffectand,48
choosinganoccupationand,66–72
compensatingbeauty-damagedworkersand,61–64
customersand,41–42,58–60,75,80,88–91,99,107,112–13,119–21,145,155,162,178
earningsand,18,29,40–55(seealsoearnings)educationand,43,46,63,73,90,199n14
employersand,86–101
EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission(EEOC)and,150,155,158
EqualEmploymentOpportunity(EEO)and,155
ExecutiveOrder10925and,151
ExecutiveOrder11246and,151
executivesand,7,62,68,78,89–99
incumbentsand,72,76–80,90
intelligenceand,52–53,79,85,102,108–9
jobinterviewsand,48,53–54,59,73–74
laborunionsand,44,46
legalissuesand,150–65,168
marriageand,44,73,85
menand,39,43–47,49,50,53,55–58,64,78,86,185n3,199n14
Mormonsand,57

personalityand,51–52
productivebeautyand,40,56,60,68,79–82,89–90,95,99–121
raceand,58–59
salesand,7,42,67,87–102,106–12,121,159–60,162
self-esteemand,51
sizeofbeautyeffectsand,72–84
skillsand,40,60,71,84,90–93,96,108–10,115,131,140,150,165,179,192n9,193n6
specificoccupationsand,66–85
successand,48,60,67–68,71–81,84,87–88,91,98,100
unemploymentand,50,67,177–78,186n7
UnitedStatesand,39–42,46–53,61,65,76,81,83,93–94,110,117
U.S.DepartmentofLaborand,151–52
womenand,39,43–50,53–58,64,73–75,78,86–88,184n19
EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission(EEOC),150,155,158
EqualEmploymentOpportunity(EEO),155
EqualPayAct(EPA),150
ethics,114,148–49
ethnicity,5,63,106
affirmativeactionand,151–52,199n9
appropriatepolicyfor,166
earningsand,39–40,44
KuKluxKlanand,154
legalissuesand,148,152,159,166–67
loansand,144
lookismand,130
evolution,31,173,175,179
ExecutiveOrder10925,151
ExecutiveOrder11246,151
executives,7,62,68,78,89–99
eyeofthebeholder.Seestandardsofbeauty
eyes,12
Facebook,49,133
Face-Off(film),32
faces,202n6
bodyweight/heightand,53–54
CEOsand,98–100
compensatingbeauty-damagedworkerand,61–64
disfigured,61–64,112,155
focuson,11–15,19–20,31–32
genderand,55,175–76
mirrorsand,3
physiognomyand,12–13,20–21,54,67,143,180

plasticsurgeryon,113–14
forradio,66–67
standards ofbeautyand,12–15, 19–20, 31, 33, 35, 53–54, 61–62, 66–67,82–83,84,98–99, 112–14,
142,155,167,175–76
symmetric,32,175–76
Western,15
fairness,148–49
family,4,44,56,127,137,174,184n19
fatfarms,16
5to1scale,19–25,43,50,73,80,82,90,96,115
FlashGordon(comic-bookseries),176
Fortune500companies,98–99
France,4,32,153–54
Frankv.UnitedAirlines,155
friends,4,132
groupformationand,125–26,128–30,146
lookismand,116
gender,5,175
appropriatepolicyfor,166
datingand,126–35,139
employmentand,55–58,63,77,82,106,118
EqualPayAct(EPA)and,150
husbandsand,3–4,8,18,138–41,144
legalissuesand,146,150,153–59,166–67
standardsofbeautyand,11,22,27–32,36
studentratiosand,133–34
wivesand,3–4,8,18,137–41.Seealsomen;womenGermany,4,32,77,81,158
girls,3–5,16,19,64,129,133
Gordon,George(LordByron),xii
Greenspan,Alan,86–87
grooming:clothingand,3–4,12,20,33–35,54,113
employersand,88
hairand,3,12,33–34,91,128–29,154,176
legalissuesand,153–58
groupformation,125–26,128–30,146
hair,3,12,33–34,91,128–29,154,176
Haley,Nikki,16,75
Hamermesh,Daniel,ix-xii,110
Hamermesh,FrancesW.,xi–xii
Hamermesh,Madeline,xi
Hamlin,Harry,68,69f

happiness,146
beautifulchildrenand,142
employmentand,41,82,121
futureprospectsand,173–75,201n2
legalissuesand,158
standardsofbeautyand,34
Harberger-trianglecalculation,193n6
Harvard,132
Hathaway,Anne,88
health,34,44,127,131,175–76,196n11
height,12,53–54,127,137,143,152–53,157
Heyward,DuBose,139
Hispanics,73,165,200n16
Hoffman,Dustin,71
Hollinsv.Atlantic,154
Hollywood,13,32,68–71,110
homeliness,22,27,29,31,35,46–48,96,149,152,174
hoodykids,128–29
hotness,79–80,159
House(TVshow),85
HowardCounty,Maryland,153
“How-to-Vote”cards,76–78
husbands,3–4,8,18,138–41,144
incumbents,72,76–80,90
infants,4,128,184n15
intelligence,179
attorneysand,52
bimboeffectand,48
datingand,127,134
educationand,137–38(seealsoeducation)
employmentand,52–53,79,85,102,108–9
groupformationand,128,130
LawSchoolAptitudeTest(LSAT)and,52
legalissuesand,148
marketforbeautifulchildrenand,142–43
marriageand,137
SATscoresand,134
intermarriage,200n16
internalbeauty,12
Internet,49,135,142
interviews:job,48,53–54,59,73–74
photographsand,20–21

scaleofbeautyand,20–30,34,183n11
invitrofertilization,141
Italians,32,72
Iveyv.DistrictofColumbia,156
Jacob(Biblicalpatriarch),18
Jagger,Jade,89
Jagger,Mick,89
JanandDean,133
jewelry,4,89
Johnson,LyndonB.,151
judgment.Seephysiognomy
JunsenZhang,x
Kennedy,JohnF.,151
KentuckyFriedChicken(KFC),155
Korea,33,49,139,196n13
KuKluxKlan,154
labormarket.Seeemployment
LakeWobegoneffect,23
L.A.Law(TVshow),68–71
Langlois,Judith,xi,31
LawSchoolAptitudeTest(LSAT),52
legalissues,177
affirmativeactionand,151–52,199n9
ageand,148,150,153
AgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct(ADEA)and,150
agreementonrightsofuglyand,156–60
AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA)and,150–51,155,158,167–69
appropriatepolicyand,166–68
BodyImageTaskForceand,158
CivilRightsActand,150–51
Colemanv.GeorgiaPowerCo.,155
compensatingbeauty-damagedworkerand,61–64
competitionand,165–66
Cookv.RhodeIslandDepartmentofMentalHealth,Retardation,andHospitals,155
datingand,162
disfigurementand,61–64,155,167
employmentand,150–65,168
EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission(EEOC)and,150,155,158
EqualEmploymentOpportunity(EEO)and,155
EqualPayAct(EPA)and,150

ethnicityand,148,152,159,166–67
ExecutiveOrder10925and,151
ExecutiveOrder11246and,151
fairnessand,148–49
Frankv.UnitedAirlines,155
futurepoliciesand,158–59
genderidentityand,146,150,153–59,166–67
governmentlegislationand,149–60,166–69
heightdiscriminationand,152–53
Hollinsv.Atlantic,154
intelligenceand,148
Iveyv.DistrictofColumbia,156
Malonetwinsand,199n9
marriageand,160–62
menand,154,159,161
minoritiesand,148
protectedclassesand,149–52
protectionforbad-lookingpeopleand,148–69
publicpolicyand,148–49
raceand,150,153–54,159,161,166
religionand,148,150,153–54,167
Swartzentrubev.GuniteCorp.,154
taxburdenand,163–64
treatmentofappearanceand,153–58
UnitedStatesand,148–49,162
useofexistingpoliciesand,154–56
weightdiscriminationand,152–53,155–57
Levitt,Steve,ix
Lincoln,Abraham,87
loans,144–46
lookism:defined,102–3
discriminationand,103–8,114–21
legalissuesand,164
meaningofbeautyeffectand,102–3
productivebeautyand,102–21
socialproductivityand,103,108–11
societalcostsof,109–11
sourcesofbeautyeffectsand,111–21
McDonald’s,155
Madison,Wisconsin,153
magazines,5,33,49,179
Malonetwins,199n9

manicures,3,33
Marlowe,19
marriage,131
bad-lookingpeopleand,137
beautyeffectson,135–41
behaviorand,137
bridepriceand,125
Chinaand,138
divorceand,136
dowryand,125
earningsand,18,44,126,129,138–40
economicsof,136
educationand,137–38
employmentand,44,73,85
exchangeofbeautyand,126–27
futureoflooksand,174,179–80
intelligenceand,137
intermarriageand,200n16
Koreaand,139
legalissuesand,160–62
long-term,136
asmarket,8–9
matchedbeautyand,140–41
menand,138–40,146
preferenceand,135–36,140
ringexchangeand,125
standardsofbeautyand,18
UnitedStatesand,137–38
womenand,138–40,146
Mauritania,16
media,5,9,33,49,62,77–78,132,179
Meir,Golda,75
men,5
actorsand,13–15,32,67,68–71,176,179
blond,176
datingand,126–35,139
door-to-doorsalesand,91
employmentand,39,43–47,49–50,53,55–58,64,78,86,185n3,199n14
facialbeautyand,55,175–76,202n6
futureoflooksand,174–75
legalissuesand,154,159,161
marketforbeautifulchildrenand,142
marriageand,138–40,146

sexiest,13–15
shortageof,133
spermdonorsand,141,144
standardsofbeautyand,13–15,18,22–30
superstarsand,127
Mexico,73–74,93
Michigan,152
Mikulski,Barbara,16,17f,75
Moore,Melinda,xi
Mormons,57–58
mouth,12
multivariateregression,185n1,196n11,197n20
Murphy,Eddie,144–45
musicalability,71,84,103,110
NationalBureauofEconomicResearchLaborStudies,xi
NationalFootballLeague,82–83
Nazis,158
nerds,19,52
nuns,72
nursinghomes,4
obesity,53,155
occupationalchoices,66–72,84
Oettinger,Gerald,xi
Olympics,5
onlinedating,132,139
operasingers,66,71,187n1
ovaauctions,141–43
Palin,Sarah,75
Parker,Amy,x
Parker,Dorothy,174
Pavarotti,Luciano,110
pedicures,3
personality,51–52
Pfann,Gerard,x–xi
Phelps,Edmund,106–7
photographs:datingand,133,135
employmentand,48,54,71,75–78,82,90,93
help-wantedadvertisementsand,93
“How-to-Vote”cardsand,76–78
lookismstudiesand,116–17

marketforbeautifulchildrenand,142
marriageand,140
obtainingloansand,145
productivebeautyand,115–18
scaleofbeautyand,20–26,29
physiognomy,54,67,180
biasand,24,27
marketforbeautifulchildrenand,141–44
photographsand,20–21
standardsofbeautyand,12–13,20–21
plasticsurgery,32–36,113–14
Pogo(comicstrip),121
politicians,75
electionsand,76–78,81–82
“How-to-Vote”cardsand,76–78
standardsofbeautyand,15–17
PorgyandBess(opera),139
preference:10,145–46
consumer,106,112,120–21,163–64,177–78
datingand,130–32,135
earningsand,41–42(seealsoearnings)
groupformationand,128–29
legalissuesand,150,161–66
marriageand,135–36,140
occupationalchoicesand,68,84
productivebeautyand,102–12,115–21
sexual,5,106,149,153
smallerbeautyeffectsofwomenand,57–58
primping,3–4
productivebeauty:attorneysand,102,119–20
behaviorand,102–3,106,111,117–18
discriminationand,102–12,115–21
Dutchadvertisingstudyand,89–90
employmentand,40,56,60,68,79–82,89–90,95,99–100,102–3,107–11,115–21
lookismand,102–21
meaningofbeautyeffectand,102–3
photographsand,115–18
social,103,108–11
societalcostsof,109–11
sourcesofbeautyeffectsand,111–21
successand,109,119
uglinessand,104–5,108,110,113,121
womenand,107–8,118,120

professors,24,26,29,67,79–84,106,120–21
profits.Seesales
prostitutes,9,67,73–75,78,91,109
protectedclasses,149–52
psychology,9–10
datingand,130–32
employersand,98
groupformationand,125–26,128–30,146
matchedbeautyinmarriagepartnersand,140–41
standardsofbeautyand,12,31,33
workerbeautyand,51
QualityofAmericanLifesurveys,201n2
race:affirmativeactionand,151–52,199n9
AfricanAmericans,29–30,58–59,76,108,110,144,154,157,161–62,165,199n9,200n16
appropriatepolicyfor,166
changing,161
Chinese,5,23,30,34,49,53,93,137–38,191n8
CivilRightsActand,150–51
earningsand,39–40,44,58–59
educationand,200n16
Hispanics,73,165,200n16
intermarriageand,200n16
KuKluxKlanand,154
legalissuesand,150,153–54,159,161,166
loansand,144–45
Nazisand,158
prostitutestudiesand,73–75
standardsofbeautyand,28–32
Rachel(Biblicalcharacter),18
radiobroadcasting,66–67,84
religion,72
appropriatepolicyfor,166
discriminationand,106,148,153–54
easeofchanging,166
groupformationand,129–30
legalissuesand,148,150,153–54,166–67
Mormonsand,57
Renoir,13
reproduction,131
ovaauctionsand,141–43
spermdonorsand,141,144

invitrofertilizationand,141
successin,131,142,175
romance,28,68,180
Roosevelt,Theodore,75
Rossellini,Isabella,xi,88
Sacks,Oliver,12
sales:beautyeffecton,87–92,100–1
consumerpreferenceand,106,112,120–21,163–64,177–78
cosmeticsand,88
employersand,87–101
haircolorand,91
raisingofbygood-lookingemployees,87–92
salespeople,67,88,91,106,109
salons,4
samples,x
analysisofvariance(ANOVA)and,183nn9,11
Argentinestudyand,114–15
biasand,24,27
Canadianstudyand,25–27
comparisonofdeterminantsand,46
consistencyand,25–26
datingand,132
Dutchadvertisingstudyand,89–90
employmentenvironmentand,43–44,52,58,77,94,113–14
Harberger-trianglecalculationand,193n6
lookismstudiesand,114–21
marketforbeautifulchildrenand,141
multivariateregressionand,185n1,196n11,197n20
prostitutestudiesand,73–75
QualityofAmericanLifesurveysand,201n2
random,5,27–28,42–43,52,56,58,77,112–14,117,141,157,183n10,185n1,196n18
Shanghaistudiesand,23,27–28,30,34,49,137–38,141
speed-datingand,134–35
standardsofbeautyand,24,28–29
statisticsand,24,27,45,47,76–77,81,99,106–8,117,137,145,183nn10,12
telephonesurveysand,5.Seealsointerviews
SanFrancisco,152–53
SantaCruz,153
SATscores,134
SaturdayNightLive(TVshow),144
scaleofbeauty,xi

culturaldifferencesand,23–24
datingand,133–34
5to1scale,19–25,43,50,73,80,82,90,96,115
hotnessand,79–80,159
intellectualizingand,22
interviewsand,20–30,34,183n11
LakeWobegoneffectand,23
legalissuesand,159
lookismand,115–18
meaningofscoresand,20–24
photographsand,20–26,29
10to1scale,19,24,26,82,91,133
uglinessand,23–24,193n6
scarcebeauty,6,8–9,24,28,50,133–34
self-confidence,51,115
sex:datingand,133
genderand,5,11,22,27–32,55–58,63,77(seealsogender)legalprotectionsand,150,153–54
marriageand,137
prostitutesand,9,67,73–75,78,91,109
reproductivefitnessand,131,142,175
standardsofbeautyand,13,22,30
sexism,140
sexratios,133–34
sexualpreference,5,106,149,153
Sharipova,Maria,120
skills:employmentand,40,60,71,84,90–93,96,108–10,115,131,140,150,165,179,192n9,193n6
EqualPayAct(EPA)and,150
help-wantedadvertisementsand,93,191n8
social,108,131,142
skin,12,58,76,174
Sneetches(Dr.Seuss),6
socialissues:affirmativeactionand,151–52,199n9
AgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct(ADEA)and,150
CivilRightsActand,150–51
culturaldifferencesand,4,16,21–27,30–31,49
datingand,126(seealsodating)
discriminationand,5(seealsodiscrimination)
educationand,43,46,63,73,90,127,132–39,151,160–62,199n14,200n16
EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission(EEOC)and,150,155,158
EqualPayAct(EPA)and,150
ExecutiveOrder10925and,151
ExecutiveOrder11246and,151
fairnessand,148–49

groupformationand,125–26,128–30,146
legalprotectionfortheuglyand,148–69
marketforbeautifulchildrenand,141–44
marriageand,126(seealsomarriage)
politiciansand,15–17,75,78
positivestrategiesfor,177–80
religionand,106,130,150,153–54,167
sociallyproductivebeauty,103,108–11
socialnetworks,49,133
socialskills,108,142
specificoccupations:actors,13–15,32,67–71,176,179
athletes,82–83
attorneys,48–52,60–64,67–68,71–72,78–79,83,88,91,102,119–20,159,188n4
choosing,66–72,84
criminals,83–84
economists,81–82
operasingers,66,71,187n1
politicians,15,17,67,75–78
preferenceand,68,84
professors,24,26,29,67,79–84,106,120–21
prostitutes,9,67,73–75,78,91,109
radiobroadcasters,66–67,84
requirementsand,67–68
salespeople,67,88,91,106,109
sizeofbeautyeffectsand,72–84
skillsand,71,84
sortingbybeautyand,84–85
speed-dating,134–35
spermdonors,141,144
spokespersons,88,120
standardsofbeauty,10
ageand,11,22–23,27–34
agreementon,11–13,15,18–21,24–28,31–32,35–36,99,126,156–57
behaviorand,13,18,21,36
bodyweight/heightand,53–54
culturaldifferencesand,4,16,21,23,26–27,30–31
definitionsofbeautyand,11–17
executivesand,7,62,68,78,89–99
facesand,12–15,19–20,31,33,35,53–54,61–62,66–67,82–84,98–99,112–14,142,155,167,175–
76
futurechangesin,173–80
genderand,28–32,36
importanceof,18–19

increasingbeautyand,32–35
marriageand,18
measurementfor,19(seealsoscaleofbeauty)
menand,13–15,18,22–30
raceand,28–32
uglinessand,23–24,28,31–32,36
UnitedStatesand,15–16,23,27,30,32
universal,15–16,21,27
womenand,13–15,18,22–25,28–30,34,36
start-upcompanies,87
statistics:ageand,183n12
analysisofvariance(ANOVA)and,183nn9,11
chi-square,183n10
Harberger-trianglecalculationand,193n6
employmentand,45,47,76–77,81,99,106–8,117
loansand,145
marriageand,137
multivariateregressionand,185n1,196n11,197n20
standardsofbeautyand,24,27
stereotypes,30,106–7
strength,84,103,131,137
success:beautifulchildrenand,142
datingand,131,134–35
dressingfor,33
educationand,131
employmentand,48,60,67–68,71–81,84,87–88,91,98,100
legalissuesand,155,160
obtainingcreditand,145
productivebeautyand,109,119
reproductive,131,142,175
standardsofbeautyand,13,31,33
“Summertime”(operaaria),139
supermodels,127
superstars,127
“SurfCity”(JanandDean),133
Swartzentruberv.GuniteCorp.,154
Switzerland,98
symmetry,31–33,82–83,175
sympathy,12,166,168
Taiwan,77–78
taxes,163–64

teenagers,3,64
telephonesurveys,5
10to1scale,19,24,26,82,91,133
time:employmentand,6–7,40,56,60,67–68,89,125
groupformationand,128–29
primping,3–4
marriageand,136
matingand,31
spentonbeauty,3–4,7,9,181n1
standardsofbeautyand,13,25,31
transplants,3
Travolta,John,32
Trejo,Steve,xi
Tucker,Michael,68,70f
ugliness,126,146
datingand,132
employmentand,41,52,57,67,71,83,87,89,97,104–5,108,110,113,121
houseworkand,57
legalprotectionfor,148–69
marriageand,137
productivebeautyand,104–5,108,110,113,121
scalefor,23–24,193n6
standardsfor,23–24,28,31–32,36.Seealsobad-lookingpeopleuglyducklings,31
UglyTruth,The(film),146
unemployment,50,67,177–78,186n7
unions,44,46
UnitedKingdom,49,52–53,118
UnitedStates,3–5,176,200
AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA)and,150–51,155,158,167–69
employmentand,39–61,64–65,76,81,83,93–94,110–11,117
legalissuesand,148–50,154,162,166–69
marriageand,137–38
standardsofbeautyand,15–16,23,27,30,32
UniversityofMichigan,21–22
UniversityofNorthCarolina,133
UniversityofTexasatAustin,xi,31,80
Urbana,Illinois,153
U.S.DepartmentofLabor,151–52
U.S.FederalReserve,86
Valentino,Rudolf,13,14f
vanity,3

Washington,George,75
weight:BodyImageTaskForceand,158
Colemanv.GeorgiaPowerCo.and,155
Cookv.RhodeIslandDepartmentofMentalHealth,Retardation,andHospitalsand,155
employmentand,53–54
fatfarmsand,16
Frankv.UnitedAirlinesand,155
legalissuesand,152–57,198n6
obesityand,53,155
standardsofbeautyand,12–13,16,21
“WhiteLikeEddie”(Murphy),144–45
WillowbrookHighSchool,128–30
Wimbledon,120
Winslet,Kate,88
Witness(film),131
wives,3–4,8,18,137–41
women,3–4
actressesand,32
bimboeffectand,48
blond,91,176
datingand,126–35,139
donatedovumand,141–43
door-to-doorsalesand,91
employmentand,39,43–50,53–58,64,73–75,78,86–88,184n19
EqualPayAct(EPA)and,150
excessof,133
facialbeautyand,55
futureoflooksand,174–76,179
Greenspanand,86–87
largebreastsand,191n8
legalissuesand,148,152,159,161–63,167
lower-paid,86–87
magazinesfor,5,33,49,179
marketforbeautifulchildrenand,142
marriageand,138–40,146
asmorebeautiful,28–30
Mormonsand,57
productivebeautyand,107–8,118,120
smallerbeautyeffectsamong,55–58
standardsofbeautyand,13–15,18,22–25,28–30,34,36
start-upcompaniesand,87
supermodelsand,127
“WonderfulWorld”(Cooke),131

wrinkles,32
XinMeng,x
youth,31,33,35,83–84