MALICIOUS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA: CASE STUDIES FROM BBC

Olga Robinson

BBC Monitoring

COUNTERING

MALICIOUS

USE OF

SOCIAL MEDIA

MALICIOUS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA:

CASE STUDI

FROM BBC MONITORING

ISBN: 978-9934-564-41-3

Author: Olga Robinson

Project manager: Sebastian Bay

Text editor: Anna Reynolds

Design: Kārlis Ulmanis

Riga, November 2018

NATO STRATCOM COE

11b Kalciema Iela

Riga LV1048, Latvia

www.stratcomcoe.org

Facebook/stratcomcoe

Twitter: @stratcomcoe

This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE.

without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here are solely those of the author in his private capacity

and do not in any way represent the views of NATO StratCom COE. NATO StratCom COE does not take responsibility for the

views of authors expressed in their articles.

BBC Monitoring is a specialist unit within BBC News that tracks thousands

of international media outlets, including hard-to-reach broadcast sources, to

report news from and about the world’s media and social media.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

WHAT WE ARE SEEING: EXAMPL AND TACTICS

Confuse and rule ..............................................................7

Focus on networks .............................................................8

Tailored messages ............................................................11

Bot or not? ..................................................................12

Bot battles ..................................................................13

Inflated trends ...............................................................14

Hijacking existing campaigns ...................................................15

Comment manipulation ........................................................15

Fake jihadist propaganda .......................................................16

State control .................................................................16

CHALLENG AHEAD

Cat-and-mouse account blocking ................................................17

Private chat apps .............................................................18

Deepfake technology ..........................................................18

Proliferation of sources ........................................................19

CONCLUSION

ENDNOT

6

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INTRODUCTION

BBC Monitoring (BBCM) is a specialist unit within BBC News that tracks thousands of

international media outlets, including hard-to-reach broadcast sources, to report news from

and about the world’s media and social media.

Set up at the outbreak of World War II with the primary purpose of informing the War Ofce

about propaganda by Nazi-controlled media, BBCM has a long history of tackling disinformation

and misleading reporting. Over the past 79 years, the service has translated, explained, and

interpreted media messages, from the broadcast propaganda of the Cold War to the multiplatform

campaigns of today. The rise of social networks and instant messaging platforms has ushered

in a new and fast-changing era for open-source media monitoring.

Today, BBCM still relies on its detailed knowledge of media sources and behaviour along with

linguistic, regional, and cultural expertise to navigate the increasingly complex and muddled

information space. In addition, it uses a range of tools for social media analysis, and continues

to explore ways of using evolving technology to improve its journalists’ ability to track multiple

sources and spot media manipulation.

BBCM this year launched a new dedicated disinformation team, whose primary purpose is to

spot, collate, and investigate examples of misleading reporting and manipulation, drawing on

BBCM’s overall monitoring of global media.

This report shows some of the disinformation techniques and tactics that BBCM journalists

have come across in their recent work, and outlines the approach adopted by BBCM to rise to

the challenges of disinformation in the 21

st

century.

BBC Monitoring uses a range of tools for social media analysis, and

continues to explore ways of using evolving technology to improve its

journalists’ ability to track multiple sources and spot media manipulation

��

7

WHAT WE ARE SEEING:

EXAMPL AND TACTICS

Conse and rule

During the Cold War, Soviet propaganda—

couched in Communist ideological

language—aimed to persuade its audience

that the West, primarily the US, was failing

and that the USSR was superior to Western

democracy. Today, the Kremlin still seeks

to discredit Western values and the US. But

to do that it no longer relies on ideology

and consistency in its messaging. Instead,

it pushes multiple, at times competing,

narratives through a loose network of

ofcials, state media, and online trolls and

bots—automated computer programmes

designed to amplify messages and inflate

trends.

The aim is to reduce truth to the level

of opinion, sow discord, and confuse

audiences in order to rally support for the

Kremlin at home and hinder the response to

Russia’s actions in the West. Widely used in

the aftermath of the MH17 crash over east

Ukraine in 2014, the tactic was also deployed

this year in the fallout from the attempted

murder of former double agent Sergei Skripal

and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury.

Russian TV pushed multiple theories about the origin of the Novichok nerve agent (Rossiya 1)

8

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After the UK authorities found that Russia

was ‘highly likely’ to be the perpetrator

of the attack, ofcials, state TV, and pro-

Kremlin actors on social media flooded the

information space with numerous narratives

and conspiracy theories. They variously

questioned the origin of the Novichok

nerve agent, dismissed the poisoning as

a staged special operation by British or

US intelligence, depicted it as an attempt

to tarnish Russia’s reputation ahead of

the FIFA World Cup, and speculated that it

was an attempt to meddle in the Russian

presidential election.

While in the West the Russian response

was widely criticised and questioned, it

appears to have been better received by

domestic audiences. A recent poll released

by the independent Levada Centre polling

organisation suggested that only 3 per

cent of Russians think that the Russian

intelligence services were behind the Skripal

poisoning, while 56 per cent think it could

have been carried out by ‘anyone’.

Focus on networks

In countries like Russia, influence operations

use a multi-spectrum approach involving

various sources—state-controlled TV, state

ofcials, foreign-facing media outlets, and

social media accounts—acting in unison as

an ‘ecosystem’.

Involving both directly controlled resources

and ostensibly independent actors, this

approach aims to create a semblance

of diversity of voices while giving the

impression of a consensus and pushing the

same talking points.

In a typical example, on Twitter in August

2018 a loose network of state-funded media,

apparent trolls, and prominent supporters

of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,

sought to promote Russian allegations

against Syrian volunteers from the White

Helmets civil defence group. The Russian

Defence Ministry said that members of the

group were planning to stage a chemical

weapons ‘provocation’in the northern Syrian

province of Idlib with the support of Western

intelligence.

Accounts that amplied allegations against the White

Helmets in August included prominent pro-Assad and

pro-Kremlin bloggers, Russian media, and apparent trolls

(via Twitter)

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9

The allegations were picked up by leading

state TV channels, including Rossiya 1 and

Channel One, as well as English-language

RT.

1

On Twitter, the Russian warnings

and conspiracy theories about the White

Helmets, including their alleged links with

terrorists and Western intelligence services,

were amplied by Russian embassies

2

,

dozens of influential pro-Kremlin accounts,

3

and pro-Assad accounts,

4

as well as through

possible troll activity.

5

One of the driving forces behind the campaign

on English-language social media appears to

have been British blogger Vanessa Beeley,

6

who has frequently accused the White

Helmets of faking their volunteering work

and having links with terrorists. Beeley is a

regular contributor to RT on Syria and has

been interviewed by Russian state TV. Her

posts are also regularly retweeted by some

accounts consistently expressing pro-Kremlin

views and echoing Kremlin media narratives.

In India, networks afliated with political

forces or religious groups have spread

misleading messages, apparently aimed at

fuelling community tensions.

In late August 2018, a random act of violence in

the northern Indian state of Uttarakhand was

cast as a communal incident on social media

by right-wing accounts, with the message

amplied by influencers and media outlets

with the same leanings. It began with a video

circulating online which purported to show a

‘Naga sadhu’—an ash-smeared naked ascetic,

being beaten up by a group of Muslims.

Vanessa Beeley’s diusion network on Twitter, which includes both pro-Assad and pro-Kremlin accounts (via Hoaxy)

10

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The police dismissed the rumours,

7

saying

that the man was no sadhu and was in

fact beaten by local residents, rather than

Muslims, for allegedly harassing a woman.

But the video went viral. It was shared on

Twitter accounts,

8

which called for a Hindu

state in their biographies,

9

and in nationalist

Facebook groups that support Indian Prime

Minister Narendra Modi.

10



In a sign of coordinated activity, on

31 August, Facebook groups supporting

Prime Minister Modi’s BJP party and right-

wing Hindu nationalist group RSS were

Identical misleading messages about a viral video were circulated on Facebook in India

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11

flooded with identical messages saying that

in the attached video clip a Muslim man was

beating up a Naga sadhu in Dehradun.

To track messages spread across such

loose networks and better understand how

they operate, BBCM has over the past few

years explored and used tools that help

its journalists visualise large amounts

of data derived from social media. It has

also invested in analysis tools that collate

information from social media channels in

numerous languages.

Tailored messages

Some influence campaigns target specic

groups and demographics with carefully

crafted content, tone, and messages.

Researchers investigating Russian attempts

to influence the 2016 election in the US,

11

have found that trolls targeted users in

discussions about potentially controversial

issues, such as gun rights and the Black

Lives Matter movement, to sow discord and

stoke anger.

The past two years have seen the rise of

several online projects linked to the Russian

government-funded RT that focus on the

younger generation of voters. ICYMI, or

In Case You Missed It, is an online video

project that mixes commentary on topical

political stories with flashy images, jokes,

and catchy graphics. Since its launch in early

2018, the project—which now has 116,000

followers on Facebook—has satirised the

Cambridge Analytica scandal, the murder

of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the

Skripal poisoning, and climate change. Its

dismissive take on the Russian meddling

accusations

12

and the Skripal case,

13

as

well as open mockery of Western values,

appear to be consistent with Kremlin media

narratives.

While ICYMI has a strong focus on politics,

a similar online project, In the Now, has a

different approach. Its Facebook page, which

has more than 3.7 million followers, mixes

purely human interest and entertaining

stories with occasional political or social

stories that push messages similar to those

promoted on Russian state television.

14

Apart from messaging consistent with the

Kremlin media line, another feature that

makes In the Now and ICYMI stand out from

other Russian-linked media projects is their

focus on creating highly emotional, sharable,

and engaging content full of light-hearted

jokes and satire. Judging by their steady

following on Facebook, this approach to

content production seems to resonate well

with internet users.

Projects like In the Now and ICYMI also

highlight the importance of understanding

the intricacies of media ownership in

different parts of the world. BBCM has done

a lot of work in this eld over the past 15

years, producing regularly updated and

detailed media guides that provide essential

insight into regional media ecosystems and

the way they operate.

12

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B or n?

Internet trolls and bots have become a

staple of modern information warfare

online.

Researchers traditionally identify bots by

looking for a set of characteristics that

highlight their automated nature, such

as anonymity and a high level of activity

combined with no original content or no

interaction with other users.

During this year’s anti-government protests

in Iran, dozens of such Twitter bots were

deployed to brand widely shared videos

of rallies as fake, or to discourage people

from joining the demonstrations. Most of

the accounts had unusual prole names

and pictures,

15

and were created during

the protests. They also had only a handful

of similar-looking followers and spread

the exact same messages below videos of

rallies between 1 and 4 January.

But harder to spot are semi-automated

accounts, or ‘cyborgs’, that look more like

humans in their online behaviour. In the run-

up to this year’s midterm elections in the

US, some Twitter accounts that promoted

highly partisan content in support of US

President Donald Trump exhibited some of

the tell-tale signs of bots partly moderated

by humans. Several accounts analysed by

BBCM in late October 2018 posted pro-

Trump memes and even ‘conversed’ with

other accounts to appear more natural.

But the sheer volume and quality of their

output suggested at least some level of

automation.

According to the Twitonomy social media

analysis tool, one of these accounts

tweeted over 500 posts a day between

23and 29October. Most of the posts were

retweets of Donald Trump, his family,

and conservative news outlets such as

Breitbart.

The curated content was written in broken

English with odd punctuation and looked

repetitive; it was heavy with pro-Trump

hashtags, emojis, memes, and links to

external websites. The quality of the tweets

suggested that either English was not the

user’s rst language or that the account

used an algorithm to put words together to

create rough sentences.

The account also interacted primarily with

similar-looking accounts (for example,

George Washington’s Axe—now suspended)

and had large follow-to-follower ratios. 

The growing sophistication and proliferation

of bot activity points to a need to exercise

extra caution in identifying automated social

media accounts and avoid labelling. Over

the past few years, BBCM journalists have

had to revise their approach to spotting and

analysing possible bots. In many cases,

the process now requires more time, effort

and use of analysis tools that detail users’

activity patterns in addition to general prole

information.

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13

B battles

Disinformation is often primarily associated

with state-sponsored campaigns. But

misleading messages can be disseminated

by players on both sides of a political divide.

In October 2018, a BBCM investigation

found that both supporters and opponents

of the Iranian government had been

pushing misleading messages on currency

fluctuations on social media for political

or financial gain. Exploiting the volatility

of the foreign exchange market following

a currency crisis, different factions

deployed automated and semi-automated

social media accounts to either amplify

the sense of instability or suggest that the

rial was set for more gains against foreign

currencies.

Since the campaigns did not use hashtags

to disseminate misleading messages, a

combination of keywords and advanced

Twitter searches were used to analyse online

content. An analysis of the search results of

two weeks’ worth of tweets pointed to an

unusual number of previously unknown or

lesser-known accounts with vague identities

that were spreading identical messages,

images, memes, and videos.

One popular meme widely-shared by pro-government users warned that greed ‘makes you blind’

14

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A separate linguistic and semantic analysis

of tweets suggested that they were pushed

by actors from opposing sides. Among

the most active accounts promoting the

message that the rial would continue

gaining against the dollar was a popular

account supportive of Iran’s political

hardliners. It was also one of the most

prominent demonstrating automated

behaviour.

A close inspection of its activity suggested

that the account tweeted an average of

350 tweets per day—or every few minutes.

In addition, its timeline consisted almost

entirely of retweets, with almost no

engagement with other users—another sign

of possible automation.

On the other side, an account set up in

Julyappeared to be one of the most active

in spreading anti-regime tweets. Similar

to accounts used in the pro-government

campaign, it also exhibited some signs of

automated behaviour. Since its creation, it

has tweeted 24,000 times, almost 185times

a day. Its timeline also mostly consisted of

retweets and showed no engagement with

other users.

Inated trends

Twitter trends can be a litmus test of

changing sentiments, growing discontent,

or the level of support for a country’s

authorities. But in some states viral

hashtags and campaigns are designed to

create a semblance of popular consensus

around sensitive issues.

Following the disappearance of Saudi

journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul on

2 October 2018, suspected bot accounts

attempted to shape the social media

narrative around the rapidly developing

story. Arabic hashtags expressing support

for de facto Saudi leader Crown Prince

Mohammed Bin Salman, condemning news

organisation Al Jazeera and urging users to

‘unfollow enemies of the nation’ were among

those amplied by bot networks, alongside

genuine users.

Routine monitoring of social media trends

on 14 October suggested that the top

global topic was the Arabic ‘We all have

trust in Mohammed Bin Salman’ with some

250,000 tweets. The second trend, also in

Arabic and referencing Saudi Arabia, was

‘We have to stand by our leader’ with over

60,000 mentions.

Trafc analysis showed hundreds of

postings per second for ‘We all have trust

in Mohammed Bin Salman’, suggesting that

large numbers of those posting were bot

accounts. While some of the trafc was

undoubtedly from genuine Twitter users,

analysis suggested large numbers of brand

new users, mixed with previously inactive

accounts that had suddenly burst into life,

all of which pointed to an articially inflated

trend.

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15

Hijacking existing campaigns

Fake online campaigns are often designed to

give the appearance of popular consensus

on a topic. But there are times when genuine

campaigns can be manipulated in order to

mislead audiences.

In late August, pro-Kremlin media in Russia

actively promoted and distorted a relatively

partisan #BBCSwitchOff campaign on UK

Twitter to boycott BBC output over its alleged

support for the government, presenting it

as a general revolt against the broadcaster

among the wider British public. Commenting

on the campaign, one of the leading state

TV channels, Rossiya 1, alleged that ‘the

BBC’s main audience has united against it’.

Despite the impression given by the channel,

an examination of the tweets generated

by the hashtag made it clear that it was

overwhelmingly driven by online supporters

of Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn.

There was some evidence of possible

Russian troll involvement in promoting the

#BBCSwitchOff hashtag too. A British journalist

known for promoting pro-Kremlin views

tweeted a link to a YouTube clip in which he

accused the BBC of propaganda under the

hashtag. The post was retweeted by several

accounts that showed a combination of some

of the hallmarks usually associated with

Russian trolls, such as the presence of the

Russian language, an unusually high level of

tweets or ‘likes’, anonymity, and a near total

preponderance of retweets over active tweeting.

Comment manipulation

While comment and ‘like’ manipulation is

well-documented on platforms such as

Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, there is

evidence to suggest that it is also used on

lesser known, indigenous platforms in some

parts of the world. For example, in South

Korea, a recent opinion-rigging scandal

showed how online comments could be

manipulated on popular web portal and

search engine Naver.

In April, a group of individuals led by influential

blogger ‘Druking’ was accused of articially

boosting the number of clicks on ‘agree’—

Naver’s equivalent of ‘like’—for comments on

political news stories. The portal, one of the

most popular news outlets in South Korea,

automatically promotes comments with

the most ‘likes’ to the top of its comments

section, giving them more public exposure.

According to South Korean media reports, it

was revealed that multiple—mostly fake—IDs

were used to boost a certain keyword search

and to agree with comments, by means of

a programme that allowed thousands of

‘likes’ to be registered at once. The aim

was reportedly to lead people to believe

that certain comments about the actions of

President Moon’s administration reflected

popular opinion. The scandal provoked a

mass outcry and pushed Naver to introduce

several changes in its design and operation

to prevent comment manipulation from

happening in the future.

16

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Fake jihadist propaganda

When it comes to jihadist media, the

proliferation of fake content and accounts

presents a considerable challenge that

requires constantvigilance and verication.

Since the team’s launch in 2006,

BBCM’s jihadist media specialists have

seen a range of apparent attempts by both

governments and anti-jihadist activists

to spread fake propaganda purporting to

be issued by a particular jihadist group.

Militant groups, particularly in Syria, are

also reportedly behind the spread of some

bogus material. The aim of such actions

is to undermine the credibility of the

‘ofcial’media outlets of the targeted group,

to sow confusion and mistrust among its

supporters, and in some cases to encourage

inghting between militant groups.

In one recent example, on28 June2018,at

least three fake editions of Islamic State’s

(IS) flagship newspaper al-Naba surfaced

online around the same time of al-Naba’s

expected release time. What caused further

confusion was that the publication was

disseminated by Telegram channels that

mimicked IS’s ofcial outlets.

Faced with such challenges, BBCM has

developed a variety of ways to ensure it is

dealing with authentic material, including

careful verication techniques, attention to

detail, language expertise, and extensive

background knowledge.

State control

In some parts of the world, governments

use the concept of fake news as an excuse

to crack down on freedom of speech and

tighten control over the internet.

This year Egypt has seen independent

journalists, activists, and bloggers critical of

the government being arrested on charges

of ‘spreading false news’. The authorities

have also adopted a controversial law that

allows them to block social media accounts

and punish journalists for spreading false

information. The legislation does not,

however, make it clear what exactly it means

by ‘fake news’.

In China, media and social media are

tightly controlled, with the government

seeking to determine what people see

and comment on. Government censors

routinely monitor online discussions and

ban terms and phrases—even seemingly

innocuous ones—they consider could be

critical of the authorities. In justication

of this, the government’s stance is that it

deletes and takes action where it feels that

there is evidence of disinformation or fake

news. It will sometimes publicise how it has

ned companies or individuals who have

propagated fake or misleading news, but

without providing much in the way of detail.

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17

CHALLENG AHEAD

Cat-and-mouse account blocking

Over the past two years, Twitter and Facebook

have intensied their efforts to stop the

spread of disinformation on their platforms,

leading to hundreds of accounts and pages

being suspended for disseminating hate or

exhibiting inauthentic behaviour.

Although suspensions may help decrease

the overall volume of disinformation at a

certain point in time, the effect in most cases

appears to be temporary. For example, most

of the Iranian users who were suspended as

part of Twitter’s concerted efforts to stop

the spread of malicious misinformation

ahead of the US midterms, simply switched

to new accounts.

Some of the suspended Iranian bloggers switched to new accounts following the ban (Twitter)

18

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The new Twitter proles made it clear who

they were and openly said that they had

been among the suspended accounts. Some

proles were even set up months before,

which fuelled analysts’ suspicions that the

suspended users ran multiple accounts.

The effect of account suspensions on instant

messenger services appears to be equally

temporary. After Facebook and WhatsApp

moved against what they saw as misuse of

their platforms during the 2018 presidential

campaign in Brazil, daily newspaper Folha

de Sao Paulo reported that many supporters

of then front-runner Jair Bolsonaro had

migrated to Telegram,

16

another secure

messaging app.

Private chat apps

As a recent report from the Reuters Institute for

the Study of Journalism highlighted, audiences

increasingly use private messaging apps to

share and discuss news ‘away from the toxicity

of political debate’ on social media.

17

On the one hand, according to the BBC’s

Social Media Editor Mark Frankel, this

offers journalists an opportunity to ‘seek

out new stories and forge essential new

community relationships’.

18

But the closed

nature of these services can also turn them

into fertile ground for disinformation and

misleading rumours. This is exemplied in

India and Mexico,

19

where rumours shared

on WhatsApp about child kidnappers have

resulted in multiple deaths.

In Iran Telegram has been used to spread

misleading messages about currency rates,

despite a recent ban by the authorities. In

September, pro-Kremlin Russian accounts

on Telegram spread near-identical CCTV

images of the Skripal poisoning suspects

from Gatwick airport wrongly claiming they

were identical.

For journalists, the privacy and end-to-end

encryption of messaging apps present

signicant challenges, as well as complex

editorial and ethical questions. Journalists

can, of course, monitor open-source

platforms and public channels on such

platforms as Telegram to see if misleading

claims surface there, and can seek tip-offs

from members of the public. This approach

was successfully used by journalists from

Comprova (Prove it), a Brazilian verication

project, during the 2018 presidential election

campaign and resulted in numerous wrong

claims and rumours being debunked.

BBCM is considering the challenges of

working with closed conversations, whilst

also paying close attention to local media

and social media reporting of misleading

claims spread via messaging services.

Deepfake technology

Deepfake technology uses machine learning

and Articial Intelligence, or AI, to create

convincing videos of events that never

happened.

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19

In response, engineers from the BBC’s

‘Blue Room’ team and Research and

Development department are looking at how

machine learning can help journalists spot

manipulated digital media.

So far BBCM has only observed instances of

this technology being used for entertainment

and amusement purposes. But it may

be only a matter of time before such

sophisticated fakes start cropping up as

part of influence campaigns. To stay abreast

of developments, BBCM maintains close

contact with BBC engineers and researchers

working in the eld.

Proliferation of sources

The huge growth in the number of sources

spreading false information represents a

major challenge. In Russia, for example, it is

no longer enough to routinely monitor news

bulletins on the main state TV channels, as

misleading narratives are also widely pushed

through popular political talk shows.

Monitoring such programmes, which may

last up to four hours, on a daily basis,

requires signicant effort and resources.

BBCM is looking at ways of automating the

transcription of long programmes that could

potentially contain disinformation, using

speech-to-text software.

20

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CONCLUSION

In a rapidly changing digital world, disinformation is a truly global problem, as no country

appears to be immune from false claims and manipulation. It challenges democracies across

the globe and affects societies where reliable information is in short supply. From Egypt to

India and from Iran to Mexico, an increasing number of players use new media platforms and

communication technologies to sow discord and manipulate public opinion.

Russia, in particular, is now widely seen as a key exponent of a new kind of information warfare,

which relies on loosely-dened networks of pro-Kremlin actors using traditional and social

media to influence opinions both at home and abroad.

Long-established methods of censorship and propaganda are still in evidence, but disinformation

is becoming more sophisticated in terms of coordination, use of networks and advanced

technology. Proliferation of sources, and the use of automation and closed communication

channels by various actors also present new challenges to journalists and societies.

To operate successfully in such an environment, it is no longer enough to simply debunk individual

claims. It is also important to raise awareness of disinformation tactics and manipulation

techniques to help the public navigate and understand the increasingly complex and crowded

information space.

The BBC—which has a long history of tackling misleading claims and verifying social media

content—sometimes in collaboration with other independent open-source investigators, reports

on these issues and helps bring them to the public’s attention. In one recent example, the BBC’s

Africa Eye in September uncovered the truth behind the killing of women in Cameroon through

Russia, in particular, is now widely seen as a key exponent of a new kind

of information warfare

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21

forensic analysis of open-source data.

20

By also describing in detail how this was done, an

awareness of what to look for when coming across such stories was simultaneously promoted.

As well as this sort of forensic reporting and open source analysis, the BBC is helping to promote

media literacy in the UK and internationally through initiatives such as its Young Reporter

scheme.

The role of BBCM, as a specialist unit observing hundreds of media each day, reporting on

misleading narratives and providing the context necessary to understand them, is perhaps now

both more necessary and more challenging than ever. BBCM’s specialist journalists will need

to continue to deploy both their linguistic and cultural expertise honed by constant observation

of the sources, and technical expertise and support to help them cope with the complexity and

scale of the challenge, which ultimately has the potential to undermine the very concept of

truth.

22

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ENDNOT

1 RT. “MORE: After Attack People Dressed as White Helmets

Members Planning to Film Themselves Helping ‘Victims’ to

Be Shown in Intl Media - Russian Defense Ministry

https://On.Rt.Com/9d3g

#Syria.” Tweet. @RT_com (blog), August 26, 2018.

https://twitter.com/RT_com/status/1033653777239298048.

2 UK, Russian Embassy. https://twitter.com/

EmbassyofRussia/status/1034793520706539521

3 Мордора, Голос. “Американцы предупредили Асада, что

если в Идлибе их подопечные ‘Белые каски’ по приказу

ЦРУ устроят провокацию с химическим оружием, то

Асад будет немедленно и жёстко наказан.”

Tweet. @spacelordrock (blog), August 25, 2018.

https://twitter.com/spacelordrock/

status/1033250045267779584.

4 Pujji, Nardeep. “Dozens of Children in #Idlib and #Aleppo

Kidnapped to Be Involved in Chemical Attack False

Flag Snuff Movies by US UK Sponsored #WhiteHelmets

Stop White Helmets from Sacricing Children Again for

Staged #ChemicalAttack in Order to Pin Blame on Assad

#BreakingNews @mfa_russiapic.Twitter.com/0221DaftJB.”

Tweet. @AWAKEALERT (blog), August 28, 2018.

https://twitter.com/AWAKEALERT/

status/1034664350324326400.

5 Евгения. “Так они ж ‘эвакуировали’ белые каски. Кто

им про ‘химическую атаку’ докладывать будет? Кто за

финики с рисом ‘пострадавших людей’ ледяной водой

поливать будет на камеру? Может они туда Скрипалей

на разведку заслали?” Tweet. @hasenbraut1 (blog),

August 25, 2018.

https://twitter.com/hasenbraut1/

status/1033251191516536832.

6 Beeley, Vanessa. “1. Staging of Chemical Attack in #Idlib

Reportedly Prepped by Olive Grp Who James Le Mesurier

Used to Work for, Founder of #WhiteHelmets, OG Merged

Wth Constellis in 2015 Who Hve Blackwater in Portfolio.,

August 25, 2018.

https://twitter.com/VanessaBeeley/

status/1033292865517105152.

7 Dehradun, S. S. P. “सोशल मीडिया पर एक व्यक्ति जिसे नागा साधु बताते

हुए कुछ लोगों द्वारा पीटने का एक वीडियो वाइरल किया जा रहा है। उक्त संबंध

में ज्ञात हो कि उक्त व्यक्ति एक बहुरूपिया है, जिसके विरुद्ध नशे की हालत में

छेछा की एक घटना में संलिप्त होने की शिकायत पर वैधानिक कार्यवाही की गयी

है। pic.twitter.com/GB9uoDlsMs.” Tweet. @DehradunSsp

(blog), August 30, 2018. https://twitter.com/DehradunSsp/

status/1035195417758056449.

8 Shaikh , Afra. “Indian Muslim in Poor Bager Hindupic.

Twitter.Com/OrUS3fktCN.” Tweet. @Afraoo7 (blog),

September 1, 2018.

https://twitter.com/Afraoo7/status/1036107281492889600.

9 परिवारशाखा. “देवों और ऋषि मुनियों की भूमि उत्तराखंड के देहरादून में एक

नागा साधू को एक मुस्लिम युवक बेरहमी से पिटता रहा बाबा:”मुझे क्यों मार

रहे हो,” “मुझे मा कर दो...)” वो दया की भिख मांगता रहा, भी तमाशबीन

बनी रही !! तसवीर और वीडियो बनाना याद है, इंसानियत भूल गए !!pic.

twitter.com/xdmzoRT0Uf.” Tweet. @sakhaparivar (blog),

August 30, 2018. https://twitter.com/sakhaparivar/

status/1035232706760650752.

10 “Rajeshwar Dubey.” Accessed December 4, 2018.

https://www.facebook.com/groups/1277876175606583/

permalink/1922380411156153.

11 @DFRLab. “#TrollTracker: Twitter Troll Farm Archives.”

DFRLab (blog), October 17, 2018.

https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-twitter-troll-farm-

archives-8d5dd61c486b.

12 “ICYMI.” Accessed December 4, 2018.

https://www.facebook.com/ICYMIvideo/

videos/960971037436435.

13 “ICYMI.” Accessed December 4, 2018.

https://www.facebook.com/ICYMIvideo/

videos/177623516129431.

14 “ICYMI.” Accessed December 4, 2018.

https://www.facebook.com/inthenow/

videos/1914191838659398.

15 UlτrαRεbεl. “جهت اطلاعتون از روش کار سایبریا فقط

بلاک کنید pic.twitter.com/mFQ5ADOjzi.” Tweet. @

Amirhoseen_ (blog), January 2, 2018.

https://twitter.com/Amirhoseen_/

status/948196533475954689.

16 “Apoiadores de Bolsonaro começam a migrar grupos do

WhatsApp para o Telegram.” Folha de S.Paulo, October

19, 2018. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/

apoiadores-de-bolsonaro-comecam-a-migrar-grupos-do-

whatsapp-para-o-telegram.shtml.

17 “The Changing Face of Social Media and the Rise of

Messaging Apps for News | Reuters Institute for the Study

of Journalism.” Accessed December 4, 2018.

https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/risj-review/

changing-face-social-media-and-rise-messaging-apps-news.

18 Frankel, Mark. “Journalists Have an ‘Open Invitation’ to an

Interesting and under-Used Beat.” Medium (blog), July 10,

2018. https://medium.com/@markfrankel29/journalists-

have-an-open-invitation-to-an-interesting-and-under-used-

��

23

beat-5c3d739e16ae.

19 Martínez, Marcos. “Burned to Death Because of a Rumour

on WhatsApp,” November 12, 2018, sec. Latin America &

Caribbean.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46145986.

20 Africa, BBC News. “THREAD July 2018, a Horrifying Video

Began to Circulate on Social Media. 2 Women & 2 Young

Children Are Led Away by a Group of Soldiers. They Are

Blindfolded, Forced to the Ground, and Shot 22 Times.

#BBCAfricaEye Investigated This Atrocity. This Is What We

Found...Pic.Twitter.Com/OFEYnTLT6z.” Tweet. @bbcafrica

(blog), September 24, 2018. https://twitter.com/bbcafrica/

status/1044186344153583616?lang=en.

Prepared and published by the

NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) is a

NATO accredited multi-national organisation that conducts research, publishes studies,

and provides strategic communications training for government and military personnel.

Our mission is to make a positive contribution to Alliance’s understanding of strategic

communications and to facilitate accurate, appropriate, and timely communication

among its members as objectives and roles emerge and evolve in the rapidly changing

information environment.

Operating since 2014, we have carried out signicant research enhancing NATO nations’

situational awareness of the information environment and have contributed to exercises

and trainings with subject matter expertise.

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