JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 10 April 2019

•

Joint Publication 3-09

Joint Fire Support

10 April 2019

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning,

executing, and assessing joint fire support.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance

of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations

for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational

forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise

of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and

prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use

by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent

of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and

executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort

in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders

of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate

components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter;

however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service

publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in

coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current

and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance

or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures

ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States,

commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and

procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE

Lieutenant General, USMC

Director, Joint Force Development

Preface

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iii

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-09

DATED 12 DECEMBER 2014

• Adds ‘synchronize and integrate fires and airspace’ to the list of joint fires

processes and tasks.

• Expands the discussion of no-strike list and restricted target list to separate

the two and clarify the importance of each.

• Expands the discussion of space and cyberspace.

• Expands the discussion of the coordination between operations and

intelligence directorates during planning, execution, and assessment, and

clarifies operations responsibilities during targeting.

• Adds representation from the space component, the civil-military directorate,

and nongovernmental organizations to the typical joint fires element; reflects

the direct participation of interagency partners and the national intelligence

community.

• Adds fires deconfliction and cross-boundary coordination procedures to the

list of items addressed in the joint force commander’s guidance for joint fire

support.

• Simplifies the discussion of joint fire support planning during the joint

planning process.

• Adds a discussion on the joint targeting cycle and its use as a framework for

joint fire support planning during execution.

• Adds a section in the execution chapter on dynamic targeting, to include a

discussion of the missions used to conduct joint fire support using dynamic

targeting procedures.

• Adds a section in the execution chapter on air operations in maritime surface

warfare.

• Deletes information on lasers and laser-guided systems that is tactical in

nature and which is found in multiple Service publications.

• Modifies the definitions of ‘coordinated fire line,’ ‘fire support,’ ‘fire support

coordination,’ ‘fire support coordination center,’ ‘fire support coordinator,’

‘forward observer,’ ‘free fire area,’ ‘laser-guided weapon,’ ‘laser target

Summary of Changes

iv JP 3-09

designator,’ ‘phase line’, ‘restrictive fire area,’ ‘restrictive fire line,’ ‘shore fire

control party,’ ‘spotter,’ and ‘zone of action.’

• Moves ‘nonlethal weapon’ to Joint Publication 3-09, Joint Fire Support, as

source and modified the definition.

• Removes the terms ‘grid coordinates’ and ‘inertial navigation system’ from

the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii

CHAPTER I

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT OVERVIEW

 Introduction ................................................................................................................. I-1

 Scheme of Fires........................................................................................................... I-1

 Joint Fires .................................................................................................................... I-3

 Joint Targeting ............................................................................................................ I-3

 Target Engagement ..................................................................................................... I-4

 Assessment .................................................................................................................. I-5

CHAPTER II

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL

 Introduction ................................................................................................................II-1

 Employment Considerations ......................................................................................II-1

 Synchronization of Fires with Movement and Maneuver ..........................................II-3

 Structure and Functions .............................................................................................II-4

CHAPTER III

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

 Introduction .............................................................................................................. III-1

 Considerations.......................................................................................................... III-1

 Joint Fire Support and Force Capabilities ................................................................ III-7

 Joint Fire Support Planning ................................................................................... III-14

CHAPTER IV

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION

 Introduction .............................................................................................................. IV-1

 Considerations.......................................................................................................... IV-1

 The Joint Targeting Cycle ........................................................................................ IV-3

 Employment of Joint Fires ....................................................................................... IV-6

 Dynamic Targeting—Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess .................... IV-13

 Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare ........................................................ IV-15

CHAPTER V

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT ASSESSMENT

 Introduction ............................................................................................................... V-1

 Considerations........................................................................................................... V-1

 Process ...................................................................................................................... V-2

 Results and Products ................................................................................................. V-6

Table of Contents

vi JP 3-09

APPENDIX

A Coordination and Control Measures ......................................................... A-1

B Lasers and Laser-Guided Systems .............................................................B-1

C Points of Contact ........................................................................................C-1

D References ................................................................................................. D-1

E Administrative Instructions ........................................................................ E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-6

FIGURE

I-1 Joint Fires Processes and Tasks .................................................................. I-2

II-1 Typical Joint Fires Element ........................................................................II-7

IV-1 Joint Targeting Cycle ............................................................................... IV-4

V-1 Notional Assessment Plan Development Matrix ...................................... V-4

A-1 Fire Support Coordination and Maneuver Control Measures ................... A-4

A-2 Fire Support Coordination Line ................................................................ A-7

vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

 Provides an overview of joint fire support, scheme of fires, and the

relationship between joint fire support and joint targeting.

 Describes joint force command structure and function, component fires

command and control organizations, and support relationships employed to

conduct joint fires.

 Presents the joint fire support planning process, both pre-execution

(operations planning) and during execution (joint targeting cycle).

 Discusses considerations and factors involved during joint fire support

execution.

 Presents the process to assess joint fire support.

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT OVERVIEW

Joint Fire Support Joint fire support is joint fires that assist air, land,

maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations

forces to move, maneuver, and control territory,

airspace, space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic

spectrum, and key waters and to influence

populations. Joint fire support helps create conditions

that provide the supported commander freedom of

action. Joint fire support is achieved through coordinated

interaction of all of the elements of the fire support

system, thorough and continuous planning, aggressive

coordination, and vigorous execution.

The joint force commander (JFC) is responsible for all

aspects of joint fire support planning, prioritization,

coordination, execution, and assessment. The JFC and

component commanders, with the assistance of their

staffs, integrate and synchronize joint fire support in

time, space, and purpose to increase the effectiveness of

the joint force.

Scheme of Fires The commander communicates the joint fire support

plan through use of the scheme of fires—an integral

part of the commander’s concept of operations

(CONOPS). The scheme of fires describes how to

coordinate and synchronize the use of tactical,

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operational, and strategic fires capabilities to create the

JFC’s desired lethal and nonlethal effects and achieve the

desired objectives.

Relationship with Joint

Targeting

Fires is a joint function—related capabilities and

activities grouped together to help commanders

synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. Joint

fire support and joint targeting are fundamental tasks of

the fires function with a unique relationship. The joint

targeting process matches and integrates appropriate

joint fires capabilities to validated targets to create

desired effects and outcomes.

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command Relationships

The JFC establishes clear supported and supporting

command relationships that define the roles and

responsibilities for joint fire support planning and

execution. The JFC, though the operations directorate of

a joint staff (J-3), conducts joint fire support with forces

provided by and coordinated through component

commanders and multinational partners.

Joint Fires Element

The JFC establishes a joint fires element (JFE) to

integrate and synchronize fires planning and

coordination. The JFE is composed of representatives

from the J-3; the components (land, maritime, air, and

special operations); and other elements of the JFC’s

staff, to include representatives from space and

cyberspace operations, the directorates, interagency

partners, and the national intelligence community. The

JFE works closely with the command’s intelligence

directorate to ensure the successful execution of the joint

targeting cycle.

Component Fires C2

Components (land, maritime, air, and special operations)

provide fires to the JFC, including target acquisition,

command and control (C2), and attack and delivery

systems that collectively deliver fires where and when

needed to support the commander’s objectives.

Cyberspace Fires C2

Cyberspace forces, either local or global, deliver

cyberspace attack support to the JFC, under tactical

control or in direct support of the JFC. The cyberspace

operations integrated planning element coordinates

planning and integration of these fires.

Executive Summary

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

Joint Fire Support

Functions

The purpose of joint fire support planning is to

optimize fires by integrating and synchronizing joint

fire support.

The effectiveness of fire support planning and

coordination is predicated on the JFC providing clear

and precise guidance. From this guidance, the

commander and staff develop the scheme of fires to

support the scheme of maneuver.

All components plan for and coordinate joint fire

support.

Joint fire support is built on four basic fire support

functions:

 Support Forces in Contact. The commander

provides joint fire support to protect and enable

freedom of maneuver to forces in contact.

 Support the CONOPS. The CONOPS clearly

and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to

accomplish and how it will be done using

available resources.

 Integrate and Synchronize Joint Fire

Support. Joint fire support planning begins with

the commander’s estimate and CONOPS and

continues concurrently with development of the

scheme of maneuver. Joint fire support must

also be synchronized with other joint force

activities (e.g. air operations, cyberspace

operations, special operations, personnel

recovery, and information-related activities) to

optimize limited resources and avoid friendly

fire incidents.

 Sustain Joint Fire Support Operations. Joint

fire support planners will mitigate logistics

limitations and exploit logistical capabilities.

Joint Fire Support

Capabilities

Fires planners must have a thorough knowledge of all

available capabilities and their ability to create lethal and

nonlethal effects. Joint fire support capabilities may

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include, but are not limited to, air-to-surface

capabilities (fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft,

unmanned aircraft, standoff weapons, and precision-

guided weapons), surface-to-surface capabilities

(rockets, missiles, cannon artillery and mortars, and

naval surface fire support), cyberspace operations,

offensive space control, electronic attack,

information-related activities (military deception,

military information support operations, operations

security, and special technical operations), nonlethal

weapons, and other capabilities that support joint

fires (civil affairs, electronic warfare support, and public

affairs).

Joint Fire Support

Planning

Prior to execution, joint fire support planning is

performed as part of the joint planning process. This

planning results in the joint fire support plan that is part

of the operations order (OPORD) or operations plan

(OPLAN). After OPORD/OPLAN approval and during

execution, fire support is planned as part of the joint

targeting process using the joint targeting cycle.

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION

Joint fire support execution begins when the supported

commander issues an execute order for an operation to

commence and continues until the operation is

terminated or the mission is accomplished.

Considerations

Anticipate the dynamics of combat operations. A

thorough understanding of the commander’s intent at

every level of command is essential for the successful

execution of the joint fire support plan as the operational

environment changes due to enemy response to friendly

actions.

Maintain situational awareness of the operational

environment.

Leverage interoperable fire support and C2 systems.

Digitally aided fire support enables machine-to-machine

exchange of required fire support and targeting

information for efficient and effective target prosecution

by joint and multinational forces.

Executive Summary

Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective

support.

Furnish the type of joint fire support requested.

Use the most effective joint fire support means.

Plan during execution. As the operation progresses,

joint planning generally occurs in three distinct but

overlapping time-frames: future plans, future operations,

and current operations.

Synchronize battle rhythms. The commander’s battle

rhythm enables the synchronization of current and future

operations. Subordinate and supporting commanders

synchronize their own battle rhythms with the JFC.

Determine fire support requirements. The supported

commander identifies and validates the joint fire support

requirements, and transmits those requirements to the

supporting commanders.

Allocate joint fire support resources. The supporting

commanders provide fires to the supported commander.

The Joint Targeting Cycle Commanders and their staffs integrate capabilities

that can create lethal and nonlethal effects and

synchronize the execution of appropriate fires and

activities through the joint targeting cycle. The joint

targeting cycle is a six-phase, iterative process that

methodically analyzes, prioritizes, and assigns assets

against targets to create effects that will contribute to the

achievement of the JFC’s objectives.

Joint Fires Employment

During execution, control of joint fire support forces is

normally exercised through the J-3, who integrates and

synchronizes fires with other major elements of the

operation such as maneuver, information-related

activities, special operations, and logistics. Joint fire

support execution requires operational battle tracking

of friendly forces and equipment, targets, and threats to

friendly forces.

The JFE coordinates joint fire support by employing

coordination measures, control measures, and by

coordinating airspace.

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Target Engagement

Target engagement is when forces engage targets

with fires.

Target acquisition (TA) is the detection, identification,

and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the

effective employment of weapons. Forces engaging

targets must be able to acquire and identify intended

targets prior to weapons release. TA can be

accomplished by a wide range of capabilities, from

visual identification to sophisticated electronic means.

The authority and responsibility to engage targets

rests with the JFC responsible for the operational

area. The JFC communicates engagement criteria to the

force through rules of engagement and special

instructions. The JFC may delegate target engagement

authority to subordinate commanders.

Dynamic Targeting

Targets identified too late, or not selected for action in

time to be included in targeting, are prosecuted using

dynamic targeting procedures, often referred to as find,

fix, target, track, engage, assess (or the “kill chain”)

by air and maritime component forces and the decide,

detect, deliver, and assess methodology by land

component forces. Dynamic targeting produces targets

of opportunity that include unplanned targets and

unanticipated targets.

Missions executed to specifically detect, locate, identify,

and engage targets of opportunity include strike

coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR), airborne alert

air interdiction (AI), close air support (CAS), and

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). The

timeline for engaging targets with SCAR, airborne alert

AI, CAS, and SEAD missions could be minutes, versus

hours, days, or longer for traditional joint targeting cycle

missions, but the requirements for TA and identification,

including specific combat identification procedures,

positive identification, and target validation criteria, is

still required. In some instances, a single aircrew could

perform every step in the “kill chain,” including being

designated as the target engagement authority.

Executive Summary

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JOINT FIRE SUPPORT ASSESSMENT

The JFC-level and component-level staff will assess

joint fire support. The staffs should assess how

effectively the joint fire support system supports forces

in contact, supports the CONOPS and associated fire

support plan, synchronizes joint fire support, and

sustains joint fire support operations.

Process

Operation assessment is a process that measures progress

toward mission accomplishment. The JFC may direct

the formation of a cell, whose primary function is to

develop and execute the assessment plan and to conduct

assessment. The assessment cell is a cross-functional

organization with representatives from applicable J-code

directorates, the staff judge advocate, components, and

multinational and interagency partners.

Results and Products

Results. Assessment of the joint fire support system

provides various benefits to the joint force. In addition

to measuring results and progress, assessment is used to

improve planning, support decision making, and

improve staff situational awareness of the composition

and capabilities of forces available.

Products. Assessment reports may be formal or

informal. The joint fire support assessment results will

normally be combined with the assessment results from

other mission areas to form a comprehensive operations

and intelligence assessment report.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental principles and

guidance for planning, executing, and assessing joint fire

support.

Executive Summary

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I-1

CHAPTER I

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT OVERVIEW

1. Introduction

a. This publication provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their

subordinates to plan, execute, and assess joint fire support. It also informs interagency and

multinational partners, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), and other civilian decision makers of fundamental fire support principles,

precepts, and philosophies that guide the employment of the Armed Forces of the United

States.

b. The JFC is responsible for all aspects of joint fires planning, prioritization,

coordination, execution, and assessment. The JFC and component commanders, with the

assistance of their staffs, integrate and synchronize joint fire support in time, space, and

purpose to increase the effectiveness of the joint force. The JFC provides guidance to

integrate components’ capabilities and synchronize the execution of fires. Systems for

delivering fires may be limited, and there are competing priorities for employing these

assets. Therefore, JFCs and their staffs balance resources and requirements over the course

of a joint operation to employ the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities required to

achieve the objective.

c. Fires is a joint function. Joint functions are related capabilities and activities

grouped together to help JFCs synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations, to include

joint fires tasks (see Figure I-1). This publication focuses on the joint fires task to provide

fire support. The foundation of joint fire support is based on generating and maintaining

combat power throughout an operation. Commanders plan to create desired effects through

the use of joint fires while considering the requirements and costs to project and sustain

the units that produce those effects. The principles of joint operations provide a set of time-

tested guidelines for employing fire support.

For more information on the principles of joint operations and joint functions, see Joint

Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations.

2. Scheme of Fires

The JFC communicates the concept of operations (CONOPS) in operation plans

(OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs). The commander’s CONOPS describes how

the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated,

synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission. The scheme of fires is an integral

“Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, cyberspace,

and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory,

populations, airspace, cyberspace, EMS [electromagnetic spectrum], and key

waters.”

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

Chapter I

I-2 JP 3-09

part of the commander’s CONOPS. It describes how to coordinate and synchronize

the use of tactical, operational, and strategic fires capabilities to create the JFC’s

desired lethal and nonlethal effects and achieve the desired objectives. Like the

scheme of maneuver, the scheme of fires must be updated to reflect changes in the

operational environment. Where the CONOPS scheme of fires provides the detailed plan

to integrate weapon systems and other actions over the entire operation, the updated

scheme of fires shows how tasks (on targets), and other actions, are being used to create

desired effects to achieve objectives in the current operation. The commander sets the time

frame for the period covered by an updated scheme of fires; however, it should be short

enough (e.g., an air tasking order [ATO] cycle) to clearly convey the linkage between tasks

(on targets), effects, and objectives. The JFC may provide guidance in the CONOPS

scheme of fires as follows:

a. Objectives. The JFC provides clearly defined, decisive, and achievable objectives

toward which every operation is directed. These stated objectives convey to subordinate

commanders what the JFC wants to accomplish with fires.

b. Priorities. The JFC defines priorities to focus the weight of effort and timing of

the joint force. With joint fires, this includes dedicated assets to planned component-

critical targets, high-payoff targets (HPTs), JFC-designated time-sensitive targets (TSTs),

and targets of opportunity during dynamic targeting.

c. Effects. Effects are a change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.

Effects are categorized as lethal or nonlethal in nature and are normally articulated using

words such as destroy, delay, deny, neutralize, suppress, or influence.

d. Munitions. Munitions are used to create desired effects on targets. The JFC may

issue guidance on the use or restricted use of unique weapons (e.g., directed energy) or

certain munitions types (e.g., cluster munitions or mines) and may prioritize the allocation

or use of joint operations area (JOA)-wide systems like the Tomahawk missile or the Army

Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) for specific purposes.

Figure I-1. Joint Fires Processes and Tasks

Joint Fires Processes and Tasks



Conduct joint targeting.

Provide joint fire support.

Counter air and missile threats.

Interdict enemy capabilities.

Conduct strategic attack.

Employ information-related activities.

Synchronize and integrate fires and airspace.

Assess results of employing fires.

Joint Fire Support Overview

I-3

e. No-Strike List (NSL). The NSL is a list of objects or entities characterized as

protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or rules of

engagement (ROE). The NSL is not a target list. Deliberately engaging or not taking

sufficient precaution to avoid these objects or entities may violate the law of war.

f. Restricted Target List (RTL). The RTL is a list of valid military targets that could

be on the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) that have restrictions placed upon

their engagement by the JFC or directed by higher authorities.

g. Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs). Employment of FSCMs can

permit or restrict the use of fires in the JOA.

3. Joint Fires

a. Fires are the use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or

nonlethal effects on a target. Fires are normally synchronized and integrated to achieve

synergistic results. Fires can be delivered by air, land, maritime, cyberspace, space, or

special operations forces. Employing fires in conjunction with other activities, such as

information-related activities, to create desired effects is a particularly important factor in

maintaining or reestablishing a safe and secure environment.

b. Joint fires are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or

more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a

common objective. Developing policy, guidance, and plans to employ operational and

strategic fires are primarily joint activities. Joint fires assist conventional forces and special

operations forces (SOF) in conducting military operations. Commanders employ fires to

open windows of opportunity, ensuring freedom of action for friendly forces. Fires

leverage joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities at decisive

points in time and space to achieve common objectives.

c. Joint fire support is joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, space,

cyberspace, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory,

airspace, space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and key waters and

to influence populations. Effective integration, synchronization, and employment of joint

fire support and joint targeting is essential to creating conditions that provide the supported

commander freedom of action. Joint fire support is enhanced by interoperable systems, a

broad understanding of the strengths and limitations of each component’s capabilities, and

a clear understanding of how they might be applied and integrated. Joint fire support is

achieved through coordinated interaction of all of the elements of the fire support system,

thorough and continuous planning, aggressive coordination, and vigorous execution. The

joint fire support system includes target acquisition (TA), command and control (C2), and

attack/delivery systems that collectively deliver fires where and when needed to support

the commander’s objectives.

4. Joint Targeting

a. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the

appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.

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Targeting systematically analyzes and prioritizes targets and matches appropriate actions

to targets to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects that achieve the JFC’s objectives,

accounting for operational requirements, capabilities, and the results of previous

assessments.

b. Joint targeting is a fundamental task of the fires function that encompasses

many disciplines and requires participation from all joint force staff elements and

components. The purpose of joint targeting is to integrate and synchronize joint fires into

joint operations by utilizing available capabilities to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect

on a target. Detailed joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and

country assessments, performed by JFCs within their JOAs, set the stage for detailed

targeting within the joint targeting cycle. Many products used to support a contingency or

military operation are developed, maintained, and continuously updated as foundational

intelligence for specific targets. Joint targeting focuses on both future and current operations

planning. It is executed through the joint targeting cycle, which is composed of the following

six phases:

(1) Commander’s objectives, targeting guidance, and intent.

(2) Target development and prioritization.

(3) Capabilities analysis.

(4) Commander’s decision and force assignment.

(5) Mission planning and force execution.

(6) Combat assessment.

See JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the

Operational Environment, for more detailed information.

c. The Relationship Between Joint Targeting and Joint Fire Support. Joint

targeting and joint fire support are fundamental tasks of the fires function. The joint

targeting process enables the JFC to identify joint fire support requirements (tasks to

subordinate and supporting commands) by matching available capabilities to validated

targets to create the JFC’s desired effects. Supported and supporting fire support elements

refine and execute fire support requirements from joint targeting to respond to dynamic

combat operations and enable the JFC’s freedom of action.

5. Target Engagement

a. Target engagement is when forces engage targets with fires. Supported

commanders may grant engagement authority to supporting commanders. Forces engaging

targets will carefully analyze JFC objectives and strictly adhere to higher headquarters

(HQ) restrictions. Supporting commands conduct combat identification (CID) prior to and

during target engagement. Engaging forces maintain vigilance on the location and

movement of friendly forces throughout the engagement―friendly force tracking (FFT) is

Joint Fire Support Overview

I-5

inextricably linked to CID and paramount to mitigating the risk of friendly fire incidents.

Observed changes to the operational environment that affect target engagement should be

quickly transmitted between supported commands and forces providing joint fires.

b. Relationship with Joint Fire Support. If target engagement authority is

delegated, it remains with the commander assigned the target during the joint targeting

process. Controlling agencies integrate and synchronize joint fires between the supported

and supporting commanders and transmit engagement orders to other (including

subordinate) controlling agencies. Controlling agencies should also create procedures and

mechanisms to enhance integration and synchronization of joint fires support requests for

assigned targets to meet all legal and operational joint targeting functions. While joint fire

support provides assigned commanders with an alternative to organic fires, nothing relieves

the supported commander of the legal obligations associated with targeting.

6. Assessment

a. Assessment is a commander-centric process, integral to the joint fire support

planning process. Assessments assist in determining the effectiveness of the joint fire

support system as it relates to forces in combat, the CONOPS, synchronization, and

sustainment operations.

b. Assessment of joint fire support requires the development of an assessment plan,

which includes, but is not limited to, metrics to be monitored during execution, evaluation

of joint fire support activities, and recommended adjustments to future fire support

activities.

c. Effective assessments enable the commander and staff to measure progress,

enhance situational awareness (SA) and knowledge, and, as necessary, continually adjust

direct actions to achieve objectives.

A detailed discussion on assessment can be found in Chapter V, “Joint Fire Support

Assessment.”

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II-1

CHAPTER II

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Introduction

This chapter reviews the joint force command structure and the fire support functions

employed to control joint fires. It includes the roles, responsibilities, and some of the C2

and fire support systems available to the joint force. The successful application of joint

fire support depends on the close coordination of these functions. Joint fire support

functions in a coordinated and integrated manner to support the JFC’s objectives.

2. Employment Considerations

a. C2 in Operational Areas―Supported and Supporting Joint Fire Support

Relationships. To meet the JFC’s objectives, the joint force synchronizes diverse fires

assets from US and multinational forces. Joint fire support requires planning and detailed

coordination to integrate and synchronize the supporting commander’s joint fire support

into the supported commander’s operation. Clear JFC-designated supported and

supporting command relationships define the roles and responsibilities for joint fire support

planning and execution. The supported commander provides joint fire support

requirements to the supporting commander(s). The supporting commander(s) allocates

resources based on joint fire support requirements. Staffs and C2 agencies then coordinate

to synchronize joint fire support to optimize effects and mitigate risks to friendly forces

and civilians in the supported commander’s operational area.

(1) Fire support relationships may be long-term, frequently repeated, or a one-

time occurrence.

(a) Long-term support relationships should develop enduring joint fire

support planning processes and procedures. The land, maritime, and SOF commanders are

the supported commanders within the areas of operations (AOs) designated by the JFC.

Within their designated AOs, component commanders not only integrate and synchronize

maneuver, fires, and interdiction but also designate target priority, effects, and timing of

fires. Close air support (CAS) is an example where decentralized execution nodes (air

support operations center [ASOC], tactical air control party [TACP], and joint terminal

attack controllers [JTACs]) are embedded with ground forces to plan and control joint fire

support.

(b) Components should also anticipate frequently repeated temporary

command relationships such as land component suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)

fires in support of air component actions.

“A superiority of fire, and therefore a superiority in directing and delivering fire

and in making use of fire, will become the main factors upon which the efficiency

of a force will depend.”

Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch

Precepts and Judgments, 1919

Chapter II

II-2 JP 3-09

as TSTs, the JFC may delegate planning and execution C2 to a component because of

efficiencies in detection and sensor control to support positive identification (PID).

However, the JFC delineates the supported and supporting relationships facilitating another

component’s ability to provide more effective or rapid engagement.

(2) Land and Maritime AO. Commanders designated by the JFC to execute

theater- and JOA-wide functions (e.g., joint force air component commander [JFACC])

plan and execute theater- and JOA-wide operations in coordination with the respective

commanders. If the theater- or JOA-wide operations present a potential adverse impact

within a land or maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute discusses the potential

risks with the land or maritime component commander to resolve prior to execution or

elevates any unresolved issues to the JFC for resolution.

(3) Air interdiction (AI) operations are conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or

destroy the enemy’s military surface capabilities before they can be brought to bear

effectively against friendly forces or to otherwise achieve objectives that are conducted at

such distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the

fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. The JFACC is normally the supported

commander for the JFC’s overall AI effort; however, within their operational areas, the

joint force land component commander (JFLCC), joint force maritime component

commander (JFMCC), and joint force special operations component commander

(JFSOCC) remain the supported commanders.

See JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction; JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support; JP 3-31, Joint Land

Operations; and Appendix A, “Coordination and Control Measures,” for a more detailed

discussion of AI and the fire support coordination line (FSCL).

(4) Joint Special Operations Areas (JSOAs). A JSOA is an area of land, sea,

and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint special operations force to

conduct special operations activities (e.g., a discrete, direct action mission or longer-term,

unconventional warfare operations). JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate

simultaneous conventional and special operations. Within the JSOA, the JFSOCC is the

supported commander.

(5) Amphibious Objective Areas (AOAs). An AOA is a geographical area

(delineated for C2 purposes in the initiating directive) within which is located the

objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area should be of sufficient size

to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission and must provide sufficient

area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. Within the AOA, the

designated amphibious force commander is the supported commander.

(6) Space Joint Operating Area (SJOA). The SJOA extends the existing

doctrinal operational area framework to space. Commander, United States Strategic

Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM), leads Department of Defense (DOD) space operations

planning and ensures planning supports, and is synchronized with, combatant command

plans. CDRUSSTRATCOM plans for the defense and protection of the SJOA (which lies

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-3

in the space domain) and for the creation of space effects. The Joint Force Space

Component Commander is responsible for conducting space operations to defend the SJOA

and for creating theater and global space effects on behalf of CDRUSSTRATCOM.

Consequently, with the exception of missile defense operations to defeat enemy ballistic

missile attacks in their area of responsibility, actions and fires that have the potential to

generate unintended effects in the SJOA should be coordinated between the executing

combatant commander and CDRUSSTRATCOM.

For additional information, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for a more detailed discussion on operational areas. See JP

3-03, Joint Interdiction, for a more detailed discussion on joint fires in interdiction. See

JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, for a more detailed discussion of an AOA. For

additional information on the SJOA, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.

b. Unity of Effort. Component forces’ planning, execution, and TA capabilities often

overlap. Due to the diversity of systems capable of providing joint fire support, C2, and

TA, the JFC should strive for unity of effort throughout the joint and multinational force.

c. C2 of Multinational Forces. Nations participating in multinational operations

rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating

in multinational operations will almost always have at least two distinct chains of

command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command.

Synchronizing the operations of multinational forces and forces that include other

nonmilitary mission partners requires considerably more coordination and planning. There

are three doctrinal command structures when working with multinational forces:

integrated, lead nation, or parallel. A robust liaison network and coordination centers are

two key structural enhancements designed to improve the coordination efforts of

multinational forces.

See JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for more information on multinational C2

relationships.

3. Synchronization of Fires with Movement and Maneuver

a. Coordinate Maneuver and Fires. Joint fire support and maneuver are coordinated

through teamwork; unity of effort; and synchronization of capabilities in time, space, and

purpose. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain

positional advantage, usually to deliver—or threaten delivery of—the direct and indirect

fires of the maneuvering force. Maneuver positions forces at decisive points to achieve

surprise and to create psychological effects and physical momentum. Maneuver may also

enable or exploit the effects of massed or precision fires. The focus of maneuver is to

render enemies incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion

(their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole).

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for a more detailed discussion on maneuver.

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II-4 JP 3-09

b. Movement, maneuver, and fires are complementary functions that are

essential to achieving JFC objectives. The principal purpose of movement and maneuver

is to gain positional advantage relative to the enemy. Maneuver of forces relative to enemy-

critical capabilities can be key to the JFC’s operation. Through effective maneuver of

friendly forces, the enemy can be placed into a position of disadvantage. Chances of

successful maneuver are improved with fire support and movement. Commanders use

joint fire support separately from, or in combination with, maneuver to destroy, neutralize,

degrade, or suppress enemy forces and disrupt enemy maneuver, thus influencing the

enemy to act in ways that better enable friendly force operations. In addition, commanders

can achieve strategic objectives or influence populations using joint fires. If the enemy

remains in position, their forces may be isolated and destroyed by fires delivered by the

joint force. If the enemy withdraws; attempts to establish new, defensive positions; or

maneuvers their forces for counterattack, they may be exposed to unacceptable losses

caused by the effective use of joint fire support. When exploiting the effects of maneuver,

commanders use joint fire support to neutralize the enemy’s forces and destroy their will

to fight. Maneuver and fires are complementary dynamics of combat power. Although

one might dominate a phase of the battle, their synchronization is a characteristic of

successful military operations. The synchronization of fires and maneuver makes the

defeat of larger enemy forces feasible and enhances the protection of friendly forces.

4. Structure and Functions

a. JFC and Staff

(1) The JFC is responsible for all aspects of joint fires planning, execution, and

assessment. The JFC should plan joint fires to reduce duplicate fires, implement

procedures and coordination measures to prevent friendly fire incidents, and synchronize

fires across all components. Additionally, the JFC synchronizes strategic fires with other

higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders to avoid conflicts with national military

strategic operations occurring inside or outside the JFC’s JOA. The JFC’s primary

targeting responsibility is to establish the objectives, priorities, and desired effects for

component commanders. The subordinate component commanders will create the desired

effects through the application of joint force capabilities (e.g., joint fire support). In

addition, the JFC provides guidance on munitions usage and restrictions, restricted targets,

and the NSL. The JFC will seek to overwhelm the enemy and destroy the enemy’s will to

resist through near-simultaneous application of fires.

(2) The Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-3)

(a) The J-3 is the JFC’s principal staff advisor to coordinate the interaction

of all fire support system elements, including TA, C2, and attack/delivery systems. The J-

3 must ensure these elements function collectively to deliver fires where and when the

commander requires them. Additionally, the J-3 will integrate and synchronize joint fire

support with other joint functions of C2, information, intelligence, movement and

maneuver, protection, and sustainment. The J-3’s joint fire support responsibilities may

include:

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-5

1. In coordination with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2)

and the civil-military operations directorate of the joint staff, developing joint targeting

guidance, objectives, and priorities for JFC approval.

2. In coordination with the J-2, managing the joint target list (JTL),

RTL, and NSL.

3. Coordinating and assessing joint operations.

4. Coordinating ROE.

5. Developing and employing coordination measures (e.g., FSCMs,

airspace coordinating measures [ACMs], and maneuver control measures [MCMs]) to

support CONOPS. This includes using target restrictions found in the RTL to create

FSCMs. (See Appendix A, “Coordination and Control Measures.”)

6. Coordinating with the airspace control authority to ensure joint

airspace planning is integrated with joint fires planning. An Army digital liaison

detachment, if established, can enhance interoperability among all stakeholders.

7. Conducting joint fire support and directing, coordinating, and

synchronizing fires. The J-3 requires a broad understanding of the strengths and limitations

of each Service and functional components’ capabilities, as well as interagency,

international, and multinational capabilities, and a clear understanding of how they might

be applied and integrated.

8. Monitoring munitions supply status and logistic concerns affecting

joint force fires. Considering ammunition management, ammunition distribution, and

triggers for resupply.

9. Organizing and serving as a member of a joint targeting coordination

board (JTCB), if established by the JFC.

10. Coordinating with the operations divisions of the established

functional component commands (land, air, maritime, and special operations), the space

coordinating authority, and the supporting joint force headquarters-cyberspace (JFHQ-C).

Coordinating with the naval component commander when submarine operational authority

is not held by the JFMCC.

11. Developing, publishing, and executing a fires deconfliction process

during planning and execution that considers interagency and multinational partners,

intelligence community members, and NGOs with equities in the JOA. These

organizations are responsible for providing relevant operational liaisons in theater to

support joint fires element (JFE) deconfliction processes.

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II-6 JP 3-09

(b) JFE

1. The JFE is a staff element established by the JFC and composed of

representatives from the J-3; the components (land, maritime, air, and special operations);

and other elements of the JFC’s staff, to include space and cyberspace operations

representatives and the directorates (e.g., intelligence, logistics, plans, and civil-military

operations). See Figure II-1. The JFE integrates and synchronizes fires planning and

coordination on behalf of the JFC and should be near the joint force joint operations center

(JOC) and co-located with the information operations cell, if possible. The JFE works

closely with the command’s J-2 to ensure the successful execution of the joint targeting

cycle. JFE responsibilities generally include:

a. Developing JOA-wide joint targeting guidance, objectives, and

priorities. This is normally accomplished in conjunction with component planners as part

of the joint planning group (JPG).

b. Coordinating component input to validate target nominations.

During future plans, nominate targets to the JTL/RTL for planning. During future

operations, nominate targets to the JIPTL.

c. Deconflicting targets with all components, multinational

partners, interagency partners, intelligence community members, and NGOs with equities

in the JOA. This process is separate from the target vetting process conducted by the J-2

to confirm the characterization of targets.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3370.01, Target

Development Standards, for more information on the target vetting process.

d. Forwarding the draft JIPTL to the JTCB for review and then

managing the JFC-approved JIPTL.

e. Coordinating, maintaining, and disseminating a complete list of

FSCMs and operational areas within the JOA to avoid friendly fire incidents and conflicts

with other current or future operations. This includes applying restrictions found on the

RTL and NSL to building FSCMs in joint fires and C2 systems.

f. In coordination with the J-2, developing the roles, functions, and

agenda of the JTCB for JFC approval.

g. In coordination with the J-2, organizing a planning team to

address targeting efforts to bridge the gap between current and future operations.

h. Recommending intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR) collection requirements, to include assisting the J-2 and components in developing

targets.

i. Developing the joint fires estimate and courses of action (COAs).

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-7

j. Monitoring sensitive target, TST, and component-critical target

actions for the J-3. Recommending procedures to engage TSTs and component-critical

targets.

k. Recommending HPTs to the JPG.

Figure II-1. Typical Joint Fires Element

Typical Joint Fires Element

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

J-6 communications directorate of a joint staff

J-8 force structure, resource, and assessment

directorate of a joint staff

J-9 civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff

provides input to

direct participation

* Other required elements (e.g., space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum)

standing

organization

group formed

as required

Joint Force

Commander

Joint Fires Element

Director

Tar ge ti ng

Section

Operations

Section

Plans

Section

Component/Service

Liaisons -

Representatives

Headquarters Staff

Liaisons -

Representatives

Joint Fires Element

Joint Force

Special Operations

Component Commander

Interagency

Partners

J-2

Joint Force Air

Component Commander

National

Intelligence

Community

J-3*

J-5

J-6

Joint Force Land

Component Commander

Joint Force Space

Component Commander

Multinational

Partners

Nongovernmental

Organizations

J-4

J-8

J-9

Joint Force Maritime

Component Commander

Joint Targeting

Coordination

Board

Legend

Chapter II

II-8 JP 3-09

l. Coordinating joint fires and targeting ROE issues with mission

partners.

m. Developing procedures to minimize collateral damage based on

commander’s guidance and higher-level directives.

See CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology, for a

more detailed discussion on collateral damage.

n. Conducting assessments of joint fires and targeting in coordination

with higher HQs and components.

2. JFE director responsibilities include the following:

a. Advising the JFC and staff on joint fires.

b. Planning, coordinating, and facilitating the JTCB meetings, to

include administrative support.

3. JFE plans section responsibilities normally include the following:

a. Providing the principal JFE representative to the JPG.

b. Preparing the fires portion of all plans, orders, branches, and

sequels.

c. Drafting JOA-wide joint targeting guidance, objectives, and

priorities for JFC approval.

4. JFE operations section responsibilities normally include the following:

a. Providing the principal representative to the JOC for all matters

pertaining to ongoing joint fires operations.

b. Producing and disseminating updates to the fires and targeting

situation and guidance (including JTCB updates).

c. Recommending the employment of joint FSCMs. Conferring

with the JFE targeting section for a list of restrictions from the RTL and NSL that require

FSCMs.

d. Monitoring joint fires and fire support in the JOA, to include

contact with the components, as necessary.

e. Developing processes and procedures to identify and attack TSTs.

f. Developing processes and procedures to deconflict fires that are

separate and distinct from the target vetting process.

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-9

5. JFE targeting section responsibilities normally include the following:

a. Assisting the J-2 in maintaining and refining the JTL.

b. Maintaining the RTL and NSL and publishing changes to these

lists as needed.

c. Identifying restrictions on the RTL and NSL that require the

generation of FSCMs and informing the JFE operations section of the requirement to

establish and employ joint FSCMs.

d. Providing the J-3 representative to collection management.

e. Providing the J-2 with J-3 targeting priorities and other inputs as

required.

f. Compiling and deconflict target nominations from the staff and

higher HQ.

g. Maintaining liaison with the information operations cell.

h. Maintaining liaison with the civil-military operations staff.

i. Coordinating the tactical and operational assessment efforts with

the staff and components.

j. Coordinating with other combatant command JFEs on issues that

impact more than just the JFC’s operational area.

(3) Joint Force Staff Functions. Planners build joint fire support to help

accomplish the commander’s intent. Joint fire support priorities and objectives are

typically listed as part of the overall priorities and objectives within the CONOPS. The

commander’s estimate and the CONOPS focus planners to efficiently employ all assets,

including joint fires.

(a) Commander and Staff Estimates. Estimates help the commander

clearly understand the situation and select the best COA. Building estimates sharpens the

staff’s focus on the current enemy and friendly situation, helps the commander articulate

the objective or mission, and clearly expresses COAs. Commander and staff estimates

continuously evaluate how to employ joint and component fires.

(b) CONOPS. The CONOPS describes how the commander anticipates the

operation will unfold. The CONOPS discusses joint force maneuver and the application

of joint fire support. The joint fires discussion should reflect the JFC’s concept for

application of available fires. Guidance for joint fire support should address:

1. Joint force policies, procedures, and planning cycles.

Chapter II

II-10 JP 3-09

2. Joint fire support assets.

3. Priorities for employing TA assets.

4. Areas that require joint fires to support operational maneuver.

5. TSTs.

6. High-value targets (HVTs) and HPTs.

7. Anticipated joint fire support requirements.

8. FSCMs.

9. Fires deconfliction.

10. Cross-boundary coordination procedures.

of the joint targeting process. To coordinate targeting, the JFC normally establishes a

JTCB and appoints the deputy JFC or a component commander to chair it, to provide

experience and focus. When a JTCB is not established and the JFC decides not to delegate

targeting oversight authority to a deputy or subordinate commander, this task may be

performed at the joint force HQ. The JFC coordinates with subordinate commands, other

agencies, and multinational partners. Joint targeting is an iterative process that requires

close coordination. If the JFC delegates authority for joint target planning, coordination,

and deconfliction to a subordinate commander, that commander should have sufficient C2

infrastructure, facilities, and expertise to manage and lead the JFC’s joint targeting

operations. When a specific agency is charged with joint functional command

responsibilities, a joint targeting mechanism may be needed to facilitate this task at the

component level. All components are normally involved in targeting and should establish

procedures and mechanisms to manage their part in joint targeting. In a multinational

environment, the JTCB may be subordinate to a multinational targeting coordination board.

(d) Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG). To assist in the

coordination and integration throughout the joint targeting process, the JFC may approve

the formation of a JTWG. The JTWG supports the JTCB by conducting initial collection,

consolidation, and prioritization of targets and synchronization of target planning and

coordination on behalf of the JFC. The JTWG is an action officer-level venue that meets

as required to consolidate and prioritize the draft JIPTL and discuss targeting integration

and synchronization issues raised by the JFC, staff, planning teams, and the JFC’s major

subordinate commands.

See JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information on the JTCB and JTWG.

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-11

(e) Multinational Operations and Collaborative Information Environment

(CIE)

1. When conducting multinational operations, some contributing

nations may not have connectivity and access to the joint force information systems.

Additional communications systems may be needed to enable interoperability between all

contributing nations. A CIE provides and supports mission partner information sharing.

2. The JFC can facilitate information sharing by coordinating with the

supported commanders to establish a multinational partner local area network.

3. The establishment of a CIE with partner nations facilitates information

sharing within a multinational force. Operations require US forces and partner nations to

understand the tactics, techniques, and procedures for establishing and operating a

collaborative network that is enabled by the technical capabilities that each partner nation

brings to an operation. Within a CIE, the US commander should balance the need to know

with the responsibility to share and understand the associated risk. Multinational information

and intelligence sharing should be facilitated by establishing a shared local area network

using systems such as CENTRIXS [Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange

System] or another multinational mission network.

See JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, for more information.

(4) Synchronizing C2 Assets. The JFC exercises C2 to synchronize ISR and

associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. Joint, Service, and

national agencies conducting ISR activities support the integration and synchronization of

fires. Synchronizing fires requires C2 systems that are interoperable and capable of real-

time data exchange.

See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, for additional

information.

b. Component Fires C2. Components provide fires to the JFC. This includes

providing available elements of the joint fire support system, such as target acquisition,

C2, and attack and delivery systems that collectively deliver fires where and when needed

to support the commander’s objectives as outlined in the CONOPS and the scheme of fires.

(1) Joint Force Land Component. If the JFC chooses not to retain control of

land forces at the JFC level, the JFC designates a JFLCC. When forces of significant size

and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation, the JFC

designates a Service component (normally the component commander with the

preponderance of forces) as the JFLCC to achieve unity of command. The primary

responsibility of the JFLCC regarding joint fire support is to advise the JFC on the best use

of available land component fires capabilities, provide land component joint fire support

requirements to the supporting commander(s) (if designated the supported commander),

conduct component planning, and execute the OPORD.

See JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations, for additional information.

Chapter II

II-12 JP 3-09

(a) US Army Fire Support C2 Agencies. Army commanders ensure the

coordinated use of indirect fires, air and missile defense (AMD), and joint fires to create

windows of opportunity for maneuver and put the enemy in a position of disadvantage.

This is accomplished through the operations process, fire support planning, and targeting.

These processes ensure the proper detection and delivery assets, capable of producing the

desired effects on the enemy, are allocated against targets to enable friendly maneuver.

The processes also enable the rapid and responsive delivery of fires by developing

permissive and restrictive MCMs, FSCMs, and ACMs. Commanders use long-range fires

(rocket, naval surface fire support [NSFS], and rotary-wing and fixed-wing air support) to

engage the enemy throughout the depth of their AO. Units focus operations in their deep

areas to set conditions that enable their subordinate units’ success within their respective

AOs. A corps coordinates and synchronizes joint fires as its primary tool to shape an

engagement in its deep area. Staffs, liaisons, and other C2 elements assist the commander

in these processes.

For additional information, see Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations.

1. Chief of Fires. The chief of fires is the senior fires staff officer at the

theater level who advises the commander on the best use of available fires resources and

provides input to the necessary orders.

For additional information, see Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-09, Fires.

2. Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD). The FSCOORD is the

senior field artillery (FA) commander for the corps, division, and brigade combat team.

The FSCOORD executes the tasks of the fires function to create effects to achieve the

commander’s objectives. The FSCOORD is the maneuver unit commander’s primary

advisor to plan, coordinate, and integrate FA and fire support in the execution of assigned

tasks. The FSCOORD provides guidance and direction to develop annex D (Fires). The

FSCOORD translates the commander’s guidance for fires into clear and concise fire

support tasks. Fires support planning adheres to the principle of top-down planning with

bottom-up refinement. The fires cell takes this guidance and develops annex D to support

the scheme of maneuver.

For additional information on the FSCOORD, see ADRP 3-09, Fires.

3. Fires Cell. At the operational level of warfare, this cell coordinates,

integrates, and assigns joint, interagency, and multinational fires to targets. It synchronizes

fires, to include Army, joint, interagency, and multinational component air assets; SOF;

NSFS; cyberspace operations; and EMS operations. Conversely, within the tactical-level

echelons, the fires cells plan, prepare, execute, and assess fires in support of current and

future operations. These fires cells back brief targeting guidance to the commander in

accordance with the commander’s intent for fires and maneuver; develop high-priority

targets; and prioritize targets for attack, matching them to a wide range of targeting and

delivery systems.

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-13

For additional information on the Army fires cell, see ADRP 3-09, Fires, and FM 3-09,

Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support.

4. Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD). A BCD is a

specialized, regionally focused Army element that serves as the senior Army operational

commander’s liaison with the air component. A BCD is co-located with the joint or

combined air operations center (AOC). The BCD is the Army’s interface for systems

connectivity to the joint air operations center (JAOC) and for personnel integration with

their JAOC counterparts. BCD tasks include facilitating the exchange of current

intelligence and operational data, processing air support requests, monitoring and

interpreting the land battle situation, coordinating AMD, coordinating airlift, and

integrating airspace requirements. When a US Army HQ is designated as the joint forces

land component command, the BCD may serve as the land component commander’s

liaison to the air component commander when augmented with other unique land force

representatives.

For additional information on the BCD, see Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-09.13,

The Battlefield Coordination Detachment.

5. Other Liaisons. The Army provides liaisons to integrate Army

requirements with other components and multinational partners. Typically, Army ground

liaison detachments are located at supporting fighter and bomber wings, airlift wings, and

reconnaissance liaison detachments at supporting reconnaissance squadrons. The Army

provides representatives to the JFE/JTCB; other joint working groups; and supporting

elements such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance

Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and the control and reporting center (CRC).

Liaison elements from other Services are found at Army units. In addition to the Air Force

TACP and ASOC, common liaison elements include air-naval gunfire liaison company

(ANGLICO) and special operations command and control element (SOCCE).

6. Joint Fires Observer (JFO). A JFO is a certified and qualified

Service member who, from a forward position, requests, adjusts, and controls surface-to-

surface fires; provides targeting information in support of CAS; and performs terminal

guidance operations (TGO). JFOs cannot perform terminal attack control of CAS missions

and do not replace a qualified JTAC/forward air controller (airborne) (FAC[A]).

7. Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). An

AAMDC, as the Army’s operational lead for AMD, plans, coordinates, integrates, and

synchronizes the operational elements of theater AMD. Normally co-located with the

JAOC, an AAMDC operates in direct support (DS) of the area air defense commander

(AADC) and is fully integrated into the AADC’s AMD C2 system. An AAMDC attack

operations cell, and the intelligence section, conducts analysis and targeting focused

specifically against the ballistic missile threat. Analysis includes actions to develop missile

information requirements, build operational patterns and profiles, identify trigger events,

analyze launch events, conduct countermobility analysis, and identify electronic warfare

(EW) vulnerabilities. Missile targeting actions include nominating attack means and

submitting target nominations to the draft JIPTL. When appropriate, an AAMDC

Chapter II

II-14 JP 3-09

commander or representative participates in the JTCB. Also, an AAMDC and BCD will

coordinate and synchronize their operations at the JAOC.

For more information on countering air and missile threats, see JP 3-01, Countering Air

and Missile Threats, and JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations.

(b) United States Marine Corps (USMC) Joint Fires C2 Agencies.

USMC forces may be employed as, or part of, the joint force land component; as, or part

of, the joint force maritime component; or as the joint force air component. Marine Corps

forces will operate as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) consisting of a command

element, a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and a

logistics combat element (LCE). Various agencies and elements within MAGTFs help

commanders to execute fires. These agencies may be used for either landing force (LF) or

sustained land operations. The MAGTF command element organizes a fires and effects

coordination center (FECC), which coordinates overall fires. At each level below the

command element (division, regiment, and battalion), a fire support coordination center

(FSCC) is established to advise and coordinate fires within the GCE. The FECC and each

FSCC are staffed with subject matter experts and representatives of the various Marine

Corps and Navy supporting arms.

1. The FECC, under staff cognizance of the operations directorate, is

the senior MAGTF fire support organization and assists the MAGTF commander in

planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of MAGTF fires and effects. Normally

located in the MAGTF combat operations center (COC) during operations, the FECC’s

primary effort is fighting the single battle, focused on shaping the battlespace. The FECC

directs the MAGTF targeting methodology and counterfire actions and assists with

coordinating fire support in the close and rear fight. The FECC coordinates and integrates

fires and effects with MAGTF organizations, to include the GCE FSCC, ACE Marine

tactical air command center (Marine TACC), LCE’s COC, and rear area operation center

(if established). In addition, the FECC coordinates MAGTF fires with higher and adjacent

fires agencies and may provide liaisons to agencies to maintain close and continuous fires

and effects coordination. During amphibious operations, fires and effects personnel from

both the amphibious task force (ATF) and LF integrate and operate the supporting arms

coordination center (SACC) while afloat. The FECC may incrementally assume

responsibility for fires and effects planning and coordination from the Navy SACC if C2

is passed ashore.

See Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-31, Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Fires, for more information on USMC fires integration and coordination.

2. FSCC. The FSCC is a single location that centralizes communications

facilities and personnel for the coordination of all forms of fire support for the GCE. An

FSCC exists at the Marine division; Marine regiment; and within infantry, tank, and light-

armored reconnaissance battalions. The USMC employs a designated ground combat officer

as a fire support coordinator (FSC), who acts as the direct representative of the GCE for the

planning and coordinating of all available fire support. The FSCC is organized and

supervised by the FSC. The FSCC is co-located with, and in support of, the operations

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-15

officer. A USMC FSCC normally includes an air section, naval gunfire liaison section, and

artillery section to plan and execute fires in support of the scheme of maneuver. Additionally,

a mortar section may be included in the FSCC for an infantry battalion but will not be found

at any other level of C2 for fire support coordination. In amphibious operations, FSCCs are

initially subordinate to the SACC and, if the FFCC is established ashore, subordinate to that

agency.

3. Marine TACC. The Marine TACC is the senior agency of the

Marine air C2 system. It provides the facilities for the commander of the ACE and the

battlestaff to plan, supervise, coordinate, and execute MAGTF air operations. The Marine

TACC is usually established ashore incrementally, beginning with a tactical air direction

center. When the commander of Marine Corps forces is also the JFACC, the commander

will augment the Marine TACC with elements from other components to create a JAOC.

4. Direct Air Support Center (DASC). The DASC is the principal

Marine air C2 system agency responsible for the direction of air support activities affecting

the GCE commander’s operations and those air missions requiring close coordination with

the ground combat forces. The DASC processes immediate requests for air support,

coordinates aircraft employment with other supporting arms, manages terminal control

assets supporting GCE forces, and procedurally controls aircraft transiting through DASC-

controlled airspace. When control is afloat, the Navy tactical air control center (Navy

TACC) supervises the ashore DASC’s operation. When control is ashore, the Marine

tactical air direction center or Marine TACC supervises the DASC’s operations. The

DASC is normally the first major air control agency to land in an amphibious operation.

The DASC becomes operational when control of the operation is passed ashore and co-

locates with the senior FSCC.

5. Marine Corps TACP. The Marine Corps TACP establishes and

maintains facilities for liaison and communications between supported units and

appropriate control agencies. An air officer leads the TACP, normally assigned to

maneuver battalions. Their mission is to inform and advise the supported ground unit

commander on the employment of supporting aircraft and to request and coordinate air

support and surface-to-surface fire support missions. In addition, the TACP provides

forward air controllers and JTACs for terminal attack control for CAS and initiates casualty

evacuation missions.

6. Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC). The Marine TAOC is

subordinate to the Marine TACC. Among its duties, the TAOC provides safe passage,

radar control, and surveillance for offensive air support aircraft en route to and from target

areas.

7. Shore Fire Control Party (SFCP). The supporting Marine Corps

artillery battalions provide SFCPs to supported units. The SFCP consists of an NSFS

liaison team and an NSFS spotting team. The NSFS liaison team is specifically organized

to handle NSFS liaison matters for the supported commander, while the spotting team is

charged with requesting and adjusting fires of assigned DS ships and general support (GS)

ships.

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8. ANGLICO. The ANGLICO provides the MAGTF commander a

liaison capability to plan, coordinate, and conduct the terminal control of fires in support

of joint and multinational forces operating within or adjacent to the MAGTF battlespace.

Each ANGLICO contains Marine and Navy personnel qualified to plan, coordinate, and

integrate all fire support assets available to the MAGTF, as well as joint and multinational

forces.

For more information on the ANGLICO, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, and MCWP 3-

31, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fires.

9. Marine Liaison Element (MARLE). The MARLE is the Marine

Corps forces commander’s representative within the JAOC and is responsive to the JFACC

on matters pertaining to Marine Corps operations. The MARLE provides feedback to

organizations within the JAOC on current and future joint air operations concerning

integration of force requirements.

See JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations, for additional information.

(2) Joint Force Maritime Component. The JFC may designate a JFMCC to

conduct joint maritime operations. The JFMCC is the supported commander for operations

within the JFC-designated maritime AO (including airspace above the AO). When

designated the supported commander, the JFMCC has authority to designate target

priorities, effects, and timing of fires within the AO. The primary responsibilities of the

JFMCC regarding joint fire support are to advise the JFC on the best use of available

maritime component fires capabilities, provide maritime component joint fire support

requirements to the supporting commander(s) (if designated the supported commander),

conduct component planning, and execute the OPORD.

See JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations, for additional information.

(a) Maritime Operations Center (MOC) Fires Element (FE). Fires and

targeting personnel who contribute to the various MOC fires functions are organized in the

FE for standardization and coordination. The FE is led by the fires lead, who coordinates

all fires functions. Fires personnel may be assigned from another organization (e.g.,

intelligence targeting personnel to the FE for deliberate targeting) or may perform duties

under the direction of other MOCs and cells (e.g., maritime dynamic targeting chief to

current operations battle watch captain). The FE is organized in three operational-level

targeting areas: deliberate targeting, dynamic targeting, and operational planning. The FE

may also have a Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM) cell assigned, which provides

expertise for operational-level planning and targeting in addition to their principal

responsibilities for TLAM strike mission planning and coordination for organic and joint

TLAM execution. Warfare commanders develop and publish tactical procedures, similar

to ATO special instructions (SPINS), defining how other component assets join (check in)

and operate in their naval operations. The composite warfare commander or JFMCC

should integrate these warfare commander-specific SPINS into one common maritime

special instruction for simplicity and ease of use by other components. The JFMCC should

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-17

also address the maritime SPINS in the JFMCC’s supporting plans provided to the other

component commanders.

See JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations, and Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

(NTTP) 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center, for additional detailed guidance on MOC.

(b) SACC. In amphibious operations, the SACC plans, coordinates, and

controls all fires within the operational area, in support of the amphibious force, if control

is not ashore. It is located aboard a ship configured with the requisite C2 facilities, enabling

coordination of all forms of supporting fires (land-, air-, and sea-based).

For additional information on the SACC, see JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, and NTTP

3-02.2M/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-31A, Supporting Arms

Coordination in Amphibious Operations.

agency afloat. During amphibious operations, and before control is passed ashore, Navy

TACC controls all air operations within the AOA. The Navy TACC plans and conducts

air operations, including CAS. Typically, the Navy TACC is onboard the ATF flagship.

If the JFACC’s command operations center is afloat, the Navy TACC may support

operations as the JAOC. The Navy TACC has two sections that control and integrate CAS:

1. Air Traffic Control Section (ATCS). The ATCS provides initial

safe passage, radar control, and surveillance for CAS aircraft within or traversing the AOA,

to include those not assigned to the amphibious force. The ATCS can also provide early

detection, identification, and warning of enemy aircraft.

2. Air Support Control Section. The air support control section

supports the Navy TACC by controlling, supporting, or transferring control to subsidiary

tactical air direction controllers. The section is located in the SACC to deconflict air

missions, routes, and requests for fires.

(d) Maritime AMD Command. AMD consists of those measures taken to

defend the force against air and ballistic missile attacks. The maritime AMD command

collects, evaluates, and disseminates AMD surveillance information to the force and also

plans, directs, monitors, and assesses the employment of AMD resources.

(3) Joint Force Air Component. JFCs normally designate a JFACC, whose

authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s

CONOPS. The JFACC’s role will normally reside with the component commander who

has the preponderance of air assets and the ability to C2 them. The JFACC typically

exercises tactical control over forces made available for tasking and fulfills requirements

of established supported/supporting relationships. The primary responsibilities of the

JFACC regarding joint fire support are to advise the JFC on the best use of available air

component fires capabilities, provide air component joint fire support requirements to

designated supporting commander(s), and conduct component planning in support of the

OPORD. If designated by the JFC, the JFACC also performs the duties of the airspace

control authority, the AADC, and the space coordinating authority. The following

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discussion is based upon US Air Force fires C2 capabilities when the commander, Air

Force forces, is designated as the JFACC. In this instance, the JAOC is the focal point for

tasking and exercising control of these forces.

See JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations, for additional information.

(a) JAOC. The JAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated command

center and should be staffed by members of all participating components, to include key

staff positions, to fulfill the JFACC’s responsibilities. A JAOC provides the capability to

plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute, monitor, and assess the activities of assigned or

attached forces. Through the JAOC, the JFACC monitors execution of joint air operations

and directs changes as the situation dictates. As the lead C2 mechanism of the theater air-

ground system, the JAOC should have secure and redundant communications with

operations, logistics, weather, intelligence centers, and higher and lateral HQs, as well as

subordinate units, to preclude degradation in its ability to control joint air forces.

See JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations, for additional detailed guidance on JAOC operations.

(b) ASOC. The ASOC is the primary control agency within the theater air

control system (TACS) for execution of air operations that directly support land operations

within division-assigned airspace. The ASOC is an extension of, and directly subordinate

to, the JAOC. Normally co-located with the senior Army FE, the ASOC performs a current

operations function, while planning and execution functions are performed by members of

the TACP. ASOC and TACP personnel at the Army division may be integrated with the

division fires cell and airspace element to form a joint air-ground integration center

(JAGIC). A JAGIC is designed to fully integrate and coordinate all fires and air operations

over and within a division commander’s AO.

TACPs are under the operational control of the ASOC and have two primary missions: to

advise ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of air operations (the

responsibility of the air liaison officer) and provide terminal attack control of CAS aircraft

(the responsibility of the JTACs).

(d) CRC, AWACS, and JSTARS. Other elements of the TACS include the

CRC, AWACS, and JSTARS. The CRC and AWACS provide battle management, early

warning and surveillance, weapons control, and data link management. The CRC is a

ground-based mobile radar system, while AWACS is an airborne radar system. The

JSTARS is an airborne, wide-area surveillance, ground-moving target indicator and

synthetic aperture radar. It provides battle management, early warning, and surveillance

of ground targets, weapons control, and ISR support.

(e) Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE). The JFACC

may establish one or more JACCEs with other functional component commanders’ HQs

(e.g., JFLCC, JFSOCC, JFMCC) to better integrate joint air operations with their

operations. When established, the JACCE is a component-level liaison that serves as the

direct representative of the JFACC. A JACCE is normally made up of the liaison

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-19

element(s) of the Service designated to provide the JFACC. The JACCE does not perform

any C2 functions and the JACCE director does not have command authority over any air

forces. The JACCE may be provided to the supported joint task force (JTF) HQ (if the

theater JFACC is designated in support to a JTF) to better integrate air component

operations within the overall joint force.

(4) Joint Force Special Operations Component. The joint force special

operations component coordinates all fire support in support of special operations and,

when tasked, fire support using SOF assets in support of other elements of the joint force.

Special operations coordinate fire support through both external and SOF channels. Within

SOF channels, various elements are established to assist commanders in the execution of

their fire support responsibilities. SOF organizations and elements that provide C2

capabilities include:

(a) Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF). A SOJTF is the

principal organization designed to meet all special operations requirements in major

operations, campaigns, or a contingency. The SOJTF commander plans, integrates, and

executes all special operations in a designated operational area. The SOJTF is a general

officer-/flag officer-led modular, tailorable, and scalable special operations task force

(SOTF) designed to integrate and enable joint SOF made available to geographic

combatant commanders and JFCs. The SOJTF is the principal joint SOF organization

tasked to meet all special operations requirements in major operations, campaigns, or

contingencies. A SOJTF is a JTF-capable HQ and can be designated a supported or

supporting JTF. The SOJTF commander may also serve as the JFSOCC. The SOJTF is

normally responsible for all SOF in the operational environment. As appropriate, the staff

can form a SOF JFE. The JFACC provides a JACCE to the JFSOCC to assist in

coordinating joint air operations. The JACCE will typically be located with the SOF JFE

at the senior SOF echelon. The JACCE will be active in planning both future and current

operations and will work closely with the SOF JFE to pass the most responsive assets to

immediate engagements that require fire support.

(b) Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). The JSOTF is formed

to execute special operations in support of a campaign or other operations. The JSOTF is

normally an O-6-led modular, tailorable, and scalable SOTF designed to provide a

capability to C2 multiple SOTFs or a SOF JTF consisting of both conventional forces and

SOF. The JSOTF staff establishes a SOF JFE and joint air coordination element (JACE)

to coordinate joint fire support with other components of the joint force and other United

States Government (USG) departments and agencies. In the absence of a SOJTF, the

JSOTF may be responsible for all SOF in the operational environment. If the JSOTF is the

senior SOF echelon, then the JFACC will provide a JACCE, if required.

1. The JSOAC plans and executes joint special operations air activities

and ensures effective coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction of such activities

with conventional air operations. Another key responsibility of the JSOAC is to ensure

close liaison is accomplished with other SOF components. The JSOAC also has direct

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II-20 JP 3-09

liaison with the special operations liaison element (SOLE). The JSOAC commander will

normally be the commander with the preponderance of aviation assets or the greatest

capacity to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support assigned and attached

special operations aviation assets.

2. Special tactics teams (STTs) are usually included with US Air Force

SOF under the JSOAC. STTs are a task-organized element that may include combat

control, pararescue, select TACP personnel, and special operations weather personnel.

Weather personnel provide forecasting and environmental reconnaissance in the form of

terrain, route, riverine, avalanche, and littoral assessments. Depending on mission

requirements, STTs can be employed by both SOF and conventional forces. To prevent

potential confusion, command relationships should be clearly articulated.

(d) SOTF. An SOTF is a grouping of SOF assets formed to carry out a

specific operation or a continuing mission. SOTFs are scalable organizations built around

the nucleus of Army SOF, Marine Corps special operations units, or naval special warfare

units. An SOTF establishes a fire support element for targeting coordination and for

integrating fires delivered on surface targets by fire-support means, under the control, or in

support, of the tactical-level force.

(e) SOCCE. The SOCCE synchronizes special operations with land and

maritime operations. The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conduct operations in

conjunction with a conventional force. It co-locates with the command element of the

supported commander and performs C2 or liaison functions directed by the special

operations commander. The focus of fires coordination is on the synchronization and

deconfliction of joint fires.

(f) SOF Fire Support Coordination. Liaison between SOF and other

elements of the joint force is critical to both effective support and the prevention of friendly

fire incidents. SOF liaison elements provide special operations expertise to coordinate,

synchronize, and deconflict operations in support of conventional forces and when special

operations are conducted unilaterally. SOF C2 organizations, such as a SOCCE, may

provide (or act as) liaison elements to coordinate fire support with their respective Service

components. Additionally, the following elements provide fire support coordination and/or

liaison for SOF:

1. SOLE. The SOLE is a team provided by the JFSOCC to the JFACC

(if designated) or appropriate Service component air C2 organization to coordinate,

deconflict, and synchronize special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with

conventional air operations. The SOLE director places SOF ground, maritime, and air

liaison personnel in divisions of the JAOC to coordinate with the air operations staff. The

SOLE coordinates appropriate FSCMs to help avoid friendly fire incidents. Through the

SOLE, the JFSOCC ensures special operations aviation activities are coordinated,

synchronized, and deconflicted with the JFACC’s operations to ensure airspace

coordination, flight safety, operations security, and unity of effort.

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-21

2. SOF JFE. The SOF JFE plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and

executes fire support to safeguard both friendly ground and air units while expediting joint

fires. Together with the JACCE/JACE, the SOF JFE will monitor and rapidly respond to

SOF joint fires requests and can efficiently determine the most responsive resource and

delivery means to respond to immediate support requests. The SOF JFE consolidates

FSCMs for SOF and tracks team locations and reports them to the SOLE to aid the air-

ground deconfliction process.

3. JACE. The JACE locates with the SOF JFE at the JSOTF. The

JACE provides the JSOTF with air operations expertise. The JSOAC and JACE will

exchange the necessary liaisons and information to maintain a common operational picture

(COP). The JACE functions as the focal point for preplanned air support requests and

advises the JSOTF commander on effective use of air operations.

4. Fire Support Element. At the tactical operations center echelon,

typically the SOTF, the fire support element is responsible for targeting coordination and

for integrating fires delivered on surface targets by fire-support means under the control,

or in support, of the tactical-level force.

5. Fires Employment. Although all SOF operators are capable of

employing surface fires and aviation fires from AC-130 aircraft, current and qualified SOF

JTACs are recognized across all components of US Special Operations Command as the

primary fires employment capability at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These

personnel are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special

operations. SOF JTACs are carefully selected to conduct special operations using modified

equipment and trained in irregular warfare activities to achieve strategic and operational

objectives in austere environments worldwide. SOF also employ SOF aviators as FAC(A).

The SOF FAC(A) is an airborne extension of the JTAC in support of special operations.

See JP 3-05, Special Operations, for more information on SOF C2 and liaisons.

(5) Additional Entities for CAS

(a) FAC(A). The FAC(A) is a specifically trained and qualified aviation

officer who exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in CAS of ground troops.

The FAC(A) is normally an airborne extension of the TACP. The FAC(A) also provides

coordination and terminal attack control for CAS missions, as well as locating, marking,

and attacking ground targets using other fire support assets.

(b) Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC[A]). The TAC(A) is an

officer who coordinates, from an aircraft, the actions of other aircraft engaged in air support

of ground or sea forces. The TAC(A) also expedites CAS aircraft-to-JTAC handoff during

heavy-traffic CAS. For the Marine Corps, the TAC(A) is an airborne extension of the

DASC.

a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and other offensive

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II-22 JP 3-09

air operations. A qualified and current JTAC will be recognized across DOD as capable

and authorized to perform all types of terminal attack control.

See JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, for more detailed information about C2 of CAS.

c. Cyberspace Fires C2. Cyberspace forces, either local or remote, deliver

cyberspace attack support to the JFC, under the tactical control or in DS of the JFC. The

cyberspace operations-integrated planning element supporting the JFC coordinates

planning and integration of these fires, and they are controlled during execution by the

JFHQ-C that supports the JFC.

See JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, for additional information about C2 of cyberspace

operations.

d. Joint Fire Support Digital C2 Systems

(1) The Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS)

is a software application that presents and manipulates command, control,

communications, computers, intelligence, information, and communications interfaces to

and from various systems to obtain, coordinate, and disseminate information. This digital

integration of US and allied fires provides a forum for nominating targets and coordinating

deliberate and dynamic targeting. The JADOCS application can reside on any commercial

off-the-shelf computer with a Microsoft Windows operating system and connected to the

appropriate theater networks.

(2) The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is a multi-

Service, integrated fire support system that processes fire missions, air support requests,

and other related information to coordinate and maximize the use of all fire support assets

(e.g., mortars, FA, attack helicopters, air support, naval gunfire, and offensive EW). It

meets the needs of the FA for planning the use of critical resources and for managing,

collecting, and passing vital fire support data throughout fire support channels. AFATDS

can create, store, and check FSCMs/ACMs for violations during fire mission processing.

AFATDS can send both preplanned and immediate air support requests through each

echelon of command to the supporting AOC. It is fielded from echelons above Army corps

or Marine expeditionary force to firing battery levels. With their AFATDS, the DASC is

able to link digitally into the artillery and TA channels to achieve a rapid counterfire

capability from either ground or air systems. AFATDS can communicate over a variety of

networks, including frequency modulation, high frequency, very high frequency, and

ultrahigh frequency.

(3) The theater battle management core system (TBMCS) is a force-level,

integrated air C2 system. TBMCS provides hardware, software, and communications

interfaces to support the preparation, modification, and dissemination of the force-level air

battle plan. TBMCS provides applications and communication interfaces that allow the

ground commander to nominate, track, and verify targets in the ATO and deconflict

airspace with the airspace control order (ACO).

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

II-23

(4) The forward observer system (FOS) is an automated fire support system

used by commanders, FSCs/FSCOORDs, fire support officers, Army fire support team

(FIST) chiefs, forward observers, and surveyors located at or employed remotely from the

fire support agencies at corps, division, regiment, brigade, squadron, battalion, company,

battery, troop, and platoon echelons. The FOS provides fires and effects integrators with

an automated decision-making, planning, and execution capability, which provides

seamless integration of synchronized and accurate fires into the maneuver commander’s

scheme of maneuver. The FOS performs automated fire mission, artillery target

intelligence, fire planning, clearance of fires, and survey and geometry processing

supporting the FA mission.

(5) The Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS) is a mobile airspace

management system that provides US Army commanders, airspace users, airspace

managers, and Army air traffic controllers a system for providing digitized, multi-echelon

planning and execution of airspace management and air traffic services. TAIS provides

the following capabilities:

(a) Airspace control planning and enhanced airspace control execution.

(b) Improved theater and intra- and inter-corps/division air traffic services

support.

(d) Direct links to the theater air-ground system through interfaces with the

automated airspace planning and communications systems of the airspace control

authority.

(6) The Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System provides the firing

platform the ability to conduct strike planning and coordination functions, conduct launch

operations, flex inflight TLAMs to alternate preplanned aim points, and receive inflight

health and status updates from the missile.

See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, for more

detailed information about airborne ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination

systems.

e. Digitally aided close air support (DACAS) systems involve digital systems in

aircraft and ground-based JTAC kits, which aid in the conduct of CAS planning and

execution for the purpose of attacking a surface target. DACAS consists of CAS that is

augmented by machine-to-machine exchange of SA and/or targeting messages that can

include CAS briefs; friendly, threat, and target locations; battle damage assessment (BDA);

clearance of fires; and C2. DACAS utilizes datalink to exchange both text and/or visual

cueing information to enhance SA of the battlefield, minimize transcription errors, and

decrease kill-chain timeline. The use of DACAS systems requires detailed network

planning and comprehensive mission planning to ensure digital connectivity and efficient

mission data flow between CAS participants. Additionally, C2 nodes at the operational

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and tactical level should be organized, manned, and equipped to support unique digital

exchange standards to ensure digital interoperability.

See JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, for more information on DACAS systems.

f. Additional Assets. Each Service operates additional assets capable of contributing

specific capabilities as needed. Examples of such assets or systems include the US Army’s

Airborne Reconnaissance Low-Enhanced; the US Navy’s EP-3s; or the US Air Force’s

RC-135s and U-2s that, if allocated or used in a joint reporting environment, can also

provide timely intelligence to joint fire support.

III-1

CHAPTER III

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

1. Introduction

a. The purpose of joint fire support planning is to optimize fires by integrating

and synchronizing joint fire support as part of the JFC’s OPLAN or OPORD.

Effective integration and synchronization of joint fire support requires the thorough and

continuous inclusion of all component fire support elements in the joint planning process,

aggressive coordination, and vigorous execution of the plan. The supported commander,

supporting commanders, joint fire support planners, and joint fires support agency planners

should maintain a continuous dialogue.

b. The effectiveness of fire support planning and coordination is predicated on

the JFC providing clear and precise guidance. Joint fire support planners and

coordinators actively participate with other members of the staff to develop estimates,

provide the commander with recommendations, develop the associated scheme of fires to

the CONOPS, develop the fire support appendix to the OPLAN/OPORD, and supervise

the execution of the commander’s decision throughout the joint targeting cycle.

c. All components plan for and coordinate joint fire support. Commander’s

CONOPS are integral to the scheme of fires. Just as the JFC’s intent and CONOPS should

take into account the integration and synchronization of tactical, operational, and strategic

operations, the CONOPS for component commanders should integrate and synchronize

joint fire support at the tactical, as well as the operational, level. Joint fire support planning

and coordination is continuous and its execution decentralized.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for a more detailed discussion of

planning and operational considerations.

2. Considerations

a. Scheme of Fires. During planning, commanders develop a CONOPS, which forms

the basis for the plan or OPORD. From this guidance, the commander and staff develop

the scheme of fires to support the scheme of maneuver. Commanders also determine how

to shape the operational environment, including the use of joint fires, to create conditions

to allow freedom of maneuver. Plans to achieve subordinate objectives should include the

effects desired from joint fire support. Joint fire support planners advise commanders on

the best use of available joint fires support capabilities, develop joint fire support plans,

prepare necessary orders for approval by appropriate commanders, and implement

approved joint fire support plans for the component or joint force. Joint fire support

requirements are considered throughout the JFC’s planning and decision-making processes

and during all phases of an operation.

b. Basic Joint Fire Support Functions. Joint fire support is assessed by evaluating

whether it creates desired effects on the enemy, helps create conditions for decisive

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operations, and supports joint force operations. Joint fire support is built on four basic

fire support functions:

(1) Support Forces in Contact. The commander provides joint fire support to

protect and enable freedom of maneuver to forces in contact.

(2) Support the CONOPS. The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what

the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The

scheme of fires describes how joint fires will be synchronized and integrated to support the

JFC’s objectives, as articulated in the CONOPS.

(3) Integrate and Synchronize Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support is

synchronized through fire support coordination, beginning with the commander’s estimate

and CONOPS. Joint fire support is planned continuously and concurrently with the

development of the scheme of maneuver. Furthermore, joint fire support must be

synchronized with other joint force activities (e.g., air operations, cyberspace operations,

ISR functions, special operations, personnel recovery, and information-related activities)

to optimize limited resources and avoid friendly fire incidents.

(4) Sustain Joint Fire Support Operations. Joint fire support planners will

mitigate logistics limitations and exploit logistics capabilities. Planning includes

consideration of multiple modes of transportation when preparing estimates to move units;

an effective practice includes preparation of a continuity book with time-phased force and

deployment data and estimated aircraft requirements by unit, typically requiring advance

coordination with designated movement and fires authorities and centers.

c. Joint Fire Support Coordination. The supported commander plans, integrates,

and synchronizes joint fire support across the joint functions, in coordination with

supporting commanders. When planning and execution are concurrent, the JFC’s J-3 staff

coordinates integration and synchronization of joint fire support. Coordination between

the supported and supporting commands makes joint fire support planning an iterative

process. Both supported and supporting commanders need flexibility to rapidly modify

existing plans to improve effectiveness and mitigate risks.

d. Legal Considerations. Legal advisors should actively participate in the entire joint

planning process. Legal advisors should assist decision makers at every echelon in

translating policy decisions into legally acceptable plans and orders that comply with the

law of war and support national security objectives across the range of military operations.

For more information on legal considerations, see JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military

Operations.

e. ROE and Authorities. The identification, understanding, and development of

authorities and ROE are critical for successful planning and execution of joint fire support.

The joint force staff judge advocate (SJA) has a pivotal role in assisting operational

planners to anticipate, understand, and pursue necessary authorities. The JFC proactively

determines the need and timing for additional authorities and/or supplemental ROE

measures to preclude lagging operational requirements.

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III-3

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more information on

authorities. See CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for

the Use of Force for US Forces, for more information on ROE. Also see JP 3-0, Joint

Operations, for information on ROE considerations across the range of military

operations.

f. Planning Considerations Across the Range of Military Operations. The range

of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and

operations in scope and purpose. The potential range of military activities and operations

extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in times of relative

peace up through large-scale combat operations. The range of military operations

encompasses three primary categories: military engagement, security cooperation, and

deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations; and large-scale combat

operations.

(1) Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

(a) Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities

encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power

supports other USG departments and agencies and cooperates with international

organizations, such as the United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict.

These operations usually combine activities of conventional forces and SOF, USG

departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs, in a complementary

fashion.

(b) Various joint operations, such as a show of force or enforcement of

sanctions, support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use

force when necessary. Others, such as humanitarian and civic assistance programs,

promote international stability through peaceful cooperation.

activities is normally restricted and may be limited to certain situations, such as where it

might be necessary to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to

DOD forces or other persons in the vicinity.

(2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

(a) Crisis response and limited contingency operations can be a single, small-

scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended

duration involving combat. The strategic and operational objectives are to protect US

interests, to include preventing surprise attacks or further conflict.

(b) Joint fires in support of crisis response and contingency operations may

be similar to those employed for large-scale combat operations but are normally more

restrictive in their application. Joint fire support planning for crisis response and

contingency operations can be constrained by time limitations and rapid execution

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III-4 JP 3-09

requirements. During crisis response, joint fire support planning expeditiously organizes

and prioritizes limited assets.

(3) Large-Scale Combat Operations

(a) To achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the

US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation involving large-scale

combat, placing the US in a wartime state. In such cases, the objective is to prevail against

the enemy as quickly as possible; conclude hostilities; and establish conditions favorable

to the US, the host nation, and multinational partners.

(b) Large-scale combat operations typically occur within the framework of a

major operation or campaign. Joint fires in support of large-scale operations may include,

but are not limited to, air support by manned and unmanned aircraft; NSFS; and artillery,

mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as effects from electronic attack (EA), cyberspace

attack, and other capabilities.

offensive, defensive, and stability activities throughout all phases of the operation.

Stability activities are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the

US in coordination with other instruments of national power that seek to maintain or

reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services,

emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. As the mission of

stabilization efforts is to restore vital national services, rather than destruction of enemy

forces, the ROE will normally limit lethal fires employed in support of these activities.

Planners should consider the impact of lethal and nonlethal fires conducted during the early

combat phases on later stabilization and reconstruction phases of the operation and should

endeavor to ensure US ROE are understood and appreciated by mission partners to help

build and sustain mutual trust and confidence.

See CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of

Force for US Forces, for more information on ROE.

g. Intelligence. The limited availability and high demand for ISR collection assets

make it imperative that fire support planners carefully consider their intelligence and

collection requirements, to include potential intelligence gain/loss considerations, and

closely coordinate with intelligence planners. Target and munition selection, mitigation of

collateral damage and effects, and assessment are enabled through intelligence support.

Fire support planners should also consider the intelligence analytical processes.

See CJCSI 3370.01, Target Development Standards, for additional intelligence

considerations.

h. Prevention of Friendly Fire Incidents. The destructive power and range of

modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern warfare,

increase the potential for friendly fire incidents. Risk management is fully integrated with

planning and executing operations. Commanders identify and assess situations that

increase the risk of friendly fire incidents. Commanders minimize and control risks by

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III-5

implementing preventive measures in all plans. The primary preventive measures to limit

friendly fire incidents are CID training, command emphasis, disciplined operations,

coordination measures, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals,

reliable and interoperable coordination systems, battle tracking, and enhanced SA.

Employment of FFT-capable systems and devices, and singular preventive measures

identified above, assist in preventing friendly fire incidents but are not intended to be used

as a sole means for clearance of fires. Vesting engagement decisions in well-trained and

qualified personnel greatly reduces the risk of friendly fire incidents. Commanders balance

the application of preventive measures to reduce friendly fire incidents with their impact

on the ability to engage enemy forces, since overly restrictive preventative measures risk

limiting the effectiveness of friendly operations and actions. SPINS may also specify

means to prevent friendly fire incidents in particular missions.

i. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). As part of joint fires planning, planners

must complete detailed collateral damage estimates. This is particularly important prior to

engaging enemy WMD storage sites, weapon systems, or production facilities that could

result in a release and dispersal of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)

material. This effort includes not only WMD sites but also all targets known or suspected

to contain toxic industrial materials (TIMs). For this reason, targets of this nature are

normally placed on the RTL; however, mission priorities to counter WMD and military

necessity may obligate JFCs to engage WMD targets with joint fires. Ground commanders

should be advised of the predicted hazard area and must be given enough time to take

appropriate force protection measures and be prepared to conduct CBRN response.

Collateral effects on the local civilians should also be anticipated and planned for as well.

JFCs should plan for follow-on operations to respond to and mitigate the effects of

collateral damage from the effects of WMD. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(DTRA) provides modeling and simulation tools available continuously through its

National Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Technical Reachback Enterprise to aid

in the planning of strikes on WMD targets by conducting in-depth/long-range and time-

sensitive plume hazard analyses. DTRA has the capability to model CBRN plume hazards

from deeply buried and hardened targets to further support the collateral damage estimation

(CDE) mission. These software tools can provide information to help minimize the release

or dispersal of CBRN material and forecast the effectiveness of conventional and agent

defeat weapons strikes on WMD targets and the resulting possible collateral effects.

For more information regarding CDE, see CJCSI 3122.06, (U) Sensitive Target Approval

and Review (STAR) Process, and CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage

Estimation Methodology.

For more information on WMD, see JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,

and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

j. Multinational Considerations

(1) Military operations are inherently joint and multinational. Joint fire support to

multinational operations may encounter delays until coordination with partner nations is

complete and agreements are ratified. Specifically, developing agreements on multinational

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ROE may require significant time to coordinate, since most nations require approval from

their highest levels of government for national ROE in multinational operations. Integration

of digital fire support systems also presents a challenge, as interoperability, approvals to

connect, multi-level security issues, and variance in equipment reliability and resiliency tend

to impede the rapid and complete formation of multinational information networks.

Developing national ROE for multinational operations, and preparing detailed technical

descriptions of fire support systems prior to the operation, can speed coordination,

agreement, and approval of multinational joint fire support operations.

(2) To maximize the effectiveness of multinational fire support and to minimize

the possibility of friendly fire incidents, the multinational force commander and staff

should become familiar with each nation’s capabilities and limitations in TA systems,

attack and delivery systems, fire support C2 systems, munitions, and training. Special

arrangements include implementation of communications and language standards,

exchange of liaison personnel, and adoption of interoperability procedures. Commanders

should establish a standard operating procedure (SOP) for fire support to implement special

arrangements and to communicate the process for the exchange of targeting information.

To synchronize forces and optimize mission partner capabilities, the multinational force

staff should:

(a) Identify and integrate joint and multinational fire support C2 systems and

procedures.

(b) Identify and codify attack and delivery system capabilities and

limitations.

positions, liaisons, and technical representatives).

(d) Plan, coordinate, and rehearse the use of coordination and control

measures.

(e) Develop and promulgate a methodology to assess multinational joint fire

support results.

(3) Examples of coordinated fire support arrangements:

(a) Use NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs). These provide

participants with common terminology and procedures. When operating with countries

not in NATO, similar SOP agreements should be made.

(b) Use SOF teams assigned to multinational units to provide the JFC with

an accurate evaluation of capabilities, location, and activities of multinational forces, thus

facilitating the JFC’s C2.

(d) Use a standard datum.

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(e) Establish common meteorological procedures and standards.

(f) Provide liaison officers as required.

(g) Establish/coordinate the multinational ROE before the commencement

of hostilities and continually refine them during operations.

(h) Establish the policy for indirect fire systems using non-precision

munitions within the ROE.

(i) Establish the policy for using obscurants, illumination, and cluster

munitions with inherent high dud potential within the ROE.

(j) Establish SOPs concerning the ways that digitally and non-digitally

equipped forces operate together. When automatic interfaces are unworkable, determine

liaison officer requirements.

(k) Establish a multinational target numbering system.

See JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for further information.

3. Joint Fire Support and Force Capabilities

Fires planners must have a thorough knowledge of all available capabilities and their

ability to create lethal and/or nonlethal effects and be aware of capabilities that might be

used by other multinational partners (and USG departments and agencies). Only by

knowing what is available can the planners effectively develop COAs to employ fires for

presentation to, and approval by, the commander and subsequent development of a joint

fire support plan. Joint fire support capabilities may include, but are not limited to, air-to-

surface capabilities, surface-to-surface capabilities, cyberspace capabilities, offensive

space control, EA, information-related activities, and other capabilities that can create

nonlethal effects.

a. Air-to-Surface Capabilities

(1) Fixed-Wing Aircraft. Fixed-wing aircraft provide JFCs flexibility, range,

speed, lethality, precision, and the ability to mass fires at a desired time and place. Fixed-

wing aircraft support the joint fires tasks of strategic attack, countering air and missile

threats (including SEAD and offensive counterair), and interdiction. Fixed-wing aircraft

provide joint fire support with AI, CAS, airborne C2, ISR, strike coordination and

reconnaissance (SCAR), SEAD, and FAC(A). The capacity of aircraft to deliver precision-

guided munitions can enable JFCs to limit collateral damage, as well as strike otherwise-

inaccessible targets. Also, aircraft may provide real-time attack assessment. Additionally,

stealth technology allows for the delivery of weaponry with increased survivability.

(2) Rotary-Wing Aircraft. Rotary-wing aircraft can employ a variety of

weapons, including precision-guided weapons. They can also provide terminal guidance for

other weapon platforms, as well as operate during periods of limited visibility. The US Army

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III-8 JP 3-09

normally employs attack helicopters as maneuver units to conduct two basic types of attack

missions: attacks against enemy forces in close, friendly contact with other Army maneuver

forces and attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact with other Army forces. US

Army attack helicopters can also perform CAS in support of another component. The USMC

employs its attack rotary-wing aviation primarily as a CAS platform. The ACE deploys with

the MAGTF to execute CAS in support of the GCE ground maneuver elements.

(3) Unmanned Aircraft (UA). The long endurance of UA necessary to support

their ISR missions enables them to provide extended support to TST, HVT, and HPT

missions. UA can also support or conduct CAS, SCAR, AI, and other joint fires missions.

Specific tasks for the UA may include TA and marking, terminal guidance of ordnance,

providing precision coordinates for Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided munitions,

delivery of onboard precision-guided ordnance, BDA, signal intelligence,

communication/data relays, and retargeting (i.e., shoot-look-shoot). UA should be

requested, tasked, routed, controlled, and deconflicted in a manner similar to methods used

for fixed-winged and rotary-winged manned aircraft, with exceptions made for their

unmanned nature (e.g., inability to see and avoid other air traffic).

(4) Standoff Weapons. US forces employ a variety of air-to-surface standoff

weapons, with a number of armaments and capabilities. Standoff weapons provide the JFC

with an ability to engage targets at extended ranges while minimizing the risk to friendly

forces. Some examples of air-to-surface standoff capabilities include:

(a) The joint air-to-surface standoff missile (JASSM) and its extended-range

variant, which are air-launched, low-observable, subsonic cruise missiles specifically

designed to penetrate air defense systems. The missiles incorporate GPS-aided inertial

navigation system (INS) guidance with an infrared seeker in the terminal phase of flight.

Optimizing JASSM’s full-precision and low-observable capabilities requires prior

coordination with both strike units and target intelligence agencies.

(b) The small diameter bomb (SDB), which is an air-launched, precision-

guided, glide weapon. It provides strike aircraft with high-loadout, all-weather,

autonomous, standoff-attack capability outside of point defenses. SDB increment I

provides precision capability through a GPS-aided INS against fixed targets, while SDB

increment II incorporates a GPS-aided INS and additional tri-mode seeker, optimized for

engaging fixed, relocatable, moving targets, at any time of day and in adverse weather

conditions.

to-surface glide weapon employing a variety of munitions that can be employed against

land and sea targets. A joint standoff weapon is a launch-and-leave weapon that employs

a GPS-aided INS and is capable of day, night, and adverse weather operations.

(5) Precision-Guided Weapons. US forces employ precision-guided weapons

with specific armaments that support the military operations and give the JFC the ability

to engage a broad array of potential targets (e.g., equipment and personnel, hard and deeply

buried targets, tunnels and enclosed spaces) while minimizing collateral damage.

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III-9

b. Surface-to-Surface Capabilities

(1) Rockets. The multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) supplements cannon

artillery by delivering a large volume of fires in a very short period of time against HPTs.

MLRS is used for counterfire and deliberate attacks against enemy air defenses, light

materiel, and personnel targets. The all-weather MLRS fires free-flight and guided rockets

and missiles. Free-flight or guided rocket options include warheads with either unitary

high-explosive or dual-purpose improved conventional munitions. The basic free-flight

rocket munitions have a maximum range of 26 kilometers, while the extended-range rocket

may engage targets to about 45 kilometers. The Global Positioning System Multiple

Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) provides commanders with increased accuracy and

greater range (up to 70 kilometers), reducing the number of rockets required to create

desired effects on a target. The M270A1 MLRS can carry 12 rockets and the M142 High

Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) can carry 6 rockets. However, their

extremely high altitude of delivery (apex of missile trajectory, maximum ordinate) requires

close coordination with air planners and liaisons to ensure aircraft are not in the vicinity

during launches and descents.

(2) Missiles

(a) The ATACMS provides long-range, surface-to-surface fire support.

ATACMSs are fired from an MLRS (two missiles) or HIMARS platform (one missile) and

may consist of antipersonnel/antimaterial submunitions or a unitary high-explosive

warhead. The ATACMS retains the responsiveness of rockets, though it possesses a much

greater range (up to 300 kilometers). The ATACMS antipersonnel/antimaterial warhead

is designed to engage soft targets and the unitary high-explosive warhead is designed to

engage fixed infrastructure while minimizing collateral damage. The ATACMS’s

accuracy and all-weather capability, coupled with extended range and quick response time,

make it a formidable system against dynamic targets. Due to the range and altitude of the

ATACMS and GMLRS, target engagements require detailed airspace coordination and

integration.

(b) The US Navy U/RGM-109 Tomahawk is an all-weather, long-range,

subsonic cruise missile used for deep land attack warfare, launched from US Navy surface

ships and submarines. The U/RGM-109C [Tomahawk Block III Conventional] variant

contains a 1,000-pound class blast/fragmentary unitary warhead, while the submunition

variant [U/RGM-109D] includes a submunitions dispenser with combined effect bomblets.

The Tomahawk Block IV [U/RGM-109E or Tactical Tomahawk], conventional variant,

adds the capability to reprogram the missile while in-flight via two-way satellite

communications to strike any of 15 pre-programmed alternate targets or redirect the missile

to any GPS target coordinates. The Tomahawk Block IV missile can loiter over a target

area to respond to emerging targets or, with its on-board camera, provide battle damage

information. All Tomahawk variants can engage well-defended targets at long distances

and provide precision fires to the joint force. Employing the Tomahawk weapon system

requires coordination with the maritime component’s MOC, Tomahawk strike coordinator,

and strike and mission planning cells. Tomahawks require both mission planning to plan

the routes and strike planning to coordinate the execution. With proper coordination,

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Tomahawks can also support calls for fire from supported units (typically SOF or Marine).

With proper planning, all variants can be used on short notice, day or night, with few

weather restrictions. Tomahawk strikes may be conducted without air support and when

the risk of aircraft loss is high. Tomahawks are also capable of neutralizing enemy air

defenses to facilitate larger attacks by conventional air operations. In theater, associated

MOC Tomahawk strike mission planning cells provide the JFMCC additional capacity to

plan new missions or modify selected missions.

(3) Cannon Artillery and Mortars

(a) Cannon artillery is usually the most available fire support system within

the AO, capable of performing counterfire, interdiction, and SEAD. However, range

limitations (maximum range less than 40 kilometers) often prevent these systems from

striking operationally or strategically relevant targets. Cannon artillery provides near-

immediate response times, 24-hour availability, and 360-degree coverage. Cannon

artillery offers area and precision fires, such as the Excalibur and precision guidance kit.

The Excalibur is a precision-guided, extended-range, 155-millimeter high-explosive

cannon artillery projectile with an integrated GPS INS guidance and unitary warhead. It

provides artillery capabilities in urban areas and restrictive terrain, while minimizing

collateral damage. The Excalibur is currently compatible with the M109A6 Paladin; self-

propelled Howitzer; and the M777A2, lightweight (155 millimeter), towed Howitzer. The

precision guidance kit is a trajectory-correcting fuse kit compatible with standard 155-

millimeter munitions. It has the following advantages:

1. Operates in all weather conditions.

2. Engages targets with increased accuracy (less than 10 meters circular

error probable at all ranges).

3. Has a near-vertical terminal trajectory.

(b) Organic mortars are organized as platoons in maneuver and Ranger

battalions and as sections in Stryker brigade combat team and infantry brigade combat team

rifle companies. Mortars are high-angle, relatively short-range, high rate-of-fire, area fire

weapons. Their mobility makes them well suited for close support of maneuver. Mortars

can also be used for final protective fire, obscuration, and illumination. US mortar

munitions include a 120-millimeter precision munition; some multinational mortar units

also have precision-guided munitions of different calibers. The maneuver commander

decides how and when mortars, as a key fire support asset, will be integrated into the

CONOPS.

(4) NSFS

(a) NSFS provides fire support by naval surface gun, missile, and EW

systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives.

Naval assets can provide support in a unique manner and should be considered as one

source of fire support along with other components and weapon systems.

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III-11

(b) When supporting an amphibious assault, the commander, amphibious

task force (CATF), prepares the overall NSFS plan. In general, the mission of NSFS units

in an amphibious assault is to support the assault by destroying or neutralizing shore

installations that oppose the approach of ships and aircraft and to deliver fires against

enemy forces that may oppose the LF, including its post-landing advance.

1. When the number of ships permits, individual ships will be assigned

as DS to assault battalions. The DS mission establishes the priority in which the ship will

process calls for supporting fire and the anticipated zone of fire (ZF). The ship delivers

fires on planned targets and targets of opportunity in the ZF, which normally corresponds

to the zone of action of the supported unit. When possible, ships capable of performing

simultaneous missions will be given a DS mission, to allow for maximum fire support to

the forward units of the LF.

2. The GS mission requires an NSFS ship to support the force as a

whole, or that portion of the force assigned to the ship, by attacking targets in the ZF.

Prearranged fires are delivered in accordance with a schedule of fires published in the ATF

OPORD and the NSFS plan in the LF OPORD. Fires may also be allocated to a subordinate

unit for a specific mission(s). Upon completion of the mission(s), the ship reverts to GS.

Ships in GS support regimental-sized units or larger.

For further details and information on joint fires assets, see ATP 3-09.32/Marine Corps

Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-31.6/NTTP 3-09.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.6, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the

Joint Application of Firepower. For more information on TLAMs, see NTTP 3-03.1,

Volume I, Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TLAM-C/D/E) Employment Manual. For

more information on NSFS, see JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations; NTTP 3-02.2M,

Supporting Arms Coordination in Amphibious Operations; and Navy Warfare Publication

3-09, Navy Fire Support.

c. Cyberspace Operations. Cyberspace operations are the employment of

cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through

cyberspace. Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) and defensive cyberspace operations-

response actions (DCO-RA) missions may rise to the level of use of force, where physical

damage or destruction of enemy systems require use of fires in cyberspace. OCO are

intended to project power in and through cyberspace, and DCO-RA use defensive

measures, including fires, outside the defended network to protect it. Cyberspace attack

actions are a form of fires, taken as part of an OCO or DCO-RA mission, coordinated with

other USG departments and agencies, and carefully synchronized with planned fires in the

physical domains.

For additional guidance on cyberspace attack and integration with other fires, refer to JP

3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

d. Offensive Space Control. Offensive space control consists of operations

conducted for space negation, where negation involves measures to deceive, disrupt,

degrade, deny, or destroy space systems or services. Adversaries, both state and non-state

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III-12 JP 3-09

actors, will exploit the availability of space-based capabilities to support their operations.

In keeping with the principles of joint operations, this makes it incumbent on the US to

deny adversaries the ability to utilize space capabilities and services. Offensive space

control actions targeting an enemy’s space-related capabilities and forces could employ

reversible and/or nonreversible means and are considered a form of fires.

For additional guidance on offensive space control, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations.

e. EA. EA involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or

antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment to degrade, neutralize,

or destroy enemy combat capability. EA is considered a form of fires. EA includes active

EA, in which EA systems or weapons radiate in the EMS. The effects of EA can be lethal

or nonlethal. Integrating and synchronizing EA with maneuver, C2, and other joint fires is

essential. Deconflicting EA and cyberspace operations is critical since uncoordinated EA

may significantly impact cyberspace attack utilizing the EMS.

For additional guidance on EA, refer to JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

f. Capabilities that can create nonlethal effects can be used to support achievement of

JFC objectives. Their use can also limit collateral damage, can reduce risk to civilians, and

may reduce opportunities for enemy exploitation of friendly force actions. They may also

reduce the number of casualties associated with the use of force, reduce unnecessary

impedance of friendly force maneuver, aid restoration of local commerce, limit

reconstruction costs, and maintain positive relations with the local populace.

(1) Information-Related Activities. The integration and synchronization of

fires with information-related activities through the targeting process is fundamental to

creating the necessary synergy between information-related activities and more traditional

maneuver and strike operations. Some information-related activities supporting joint fires

include:

(a) Military deception (MILDEC), which consists of actions taken to

deliberately mislead enemy or potential enemy decision makers as to friendly military

capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing them to take specific actions (or

inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. MILDEC is

part of the C2 function. Physical attack/destruction can support MILDEC by shaping an

enemy’s intelligence collection capability through destroying or nullifying selected ISR

capabilities or sites. Attacks can mask the main effort from the enemy.

For additional guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

(b) Military information support operations (MISO), which are planned

operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence

their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign

governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the

originator’s objectives. Selected audiences may include enemies, adversaries, friends, and

neutral groups or populations. Psychological operations support forces devise actions and

craft messages using visual, audio, and audiovisual formats, which can then be delivered

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III-13

by air, land, and maritime means, and through cyberspace, to selected individuals and

groups. Military information support personnel follow a deliberate process that aligns

commander’s objectives with an analysis of the operational environment. Many actions of

the joint force, such as strikes, have psychological impact, but they are not MISO unless

their primary purpose is to influence the attitudes, rules, norms, beliefs, and subsequent

behavior of a target audience. However, the psychological impact of such events can

significantly enhance or undermine MISO effectiveness and should be considered as part

of the planning, execution, and assessment of MISO. Regardless of the circumstances, all

MISO are conducted within carefully reviewed and approved programs and under mission-

tailored product approval guidelines that flow from national-level authorities.

Psychological operations officers advise the commander and operations officer on the

possible psychological impacts of all actions and impacts to ongoing operations.

For additional guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support

Operations. MISO support to non-US military is outlined in Department of Defense

Instruction (DODI) O-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

controls critical information and indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military

operations and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting

vulnerabilities. OPSEC identifies critical information and actions attendant to friendly

military operations to deny observables to the threat intelligence systems. For example,

OPSEC can protect the location of friendly fires capabilities.

For additional information on OPSEC, see JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(d) Special technical operations (STO). Fire support requirements should

be deconflicted and synchronized with STO. Detailed information related to STO and their

contribution to fire support can be obtained from the STO planners at combatant command

or Service component HQs.

(2) Nonlethal weapons (NLWs) are weapons, devices, and munitions that are

explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel

immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired

damage to property in the target area or environment. NLWs are intended to have

reversible effects on personnel and materiel. Planners should consider using NLWs to

minimize loss of life and damage to property that could negatively influence public

perception.

For more information on NLWs, see Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.03E,

DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy, and ATP 3-

22.40 (FM 3-22.40)/MCTP 10-10A (MCWP 3-15.8)/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/Coast

Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (CGTTP) 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.

(3) Additional Capabilities Supporting Joint Fires

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(a) Civil affairs (CA) introduce civil considerations, analysis, and

evaluation into the JTCB and targeting process. CA planners provide targeting options to

support the commander’s end state, support targeting with analysis and evaluation of

second- and third-order effects, recommend measures of performance (MOPs) and

measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to the JFC, and help mitigate effects on the local

population. CA analysis and evaluation of civil considerations supports target

development by participating in target system analysis, target folder, and target list

development processes, which is the responsibility of joint fires. Targeting can include

technologies designed to separate civilians from combatants, as well as those intended to

influence the attitudes of the population as a whole.

For additional guidance on CA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

(b) Electronic warfare support (ES) refers to the division of EW involving

actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for,

intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated

electromagnetic energy, for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting,

planning, and conduct of future operations. ES prepares the electromagnetic environment

for the commander to perform operational missions. ES synchronizes and integrates the

planning and operational use of sensors, assets, and processes within a specific battle space

to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, time, and terrain. ES data can

be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or physical attack,

and produce measurement and signature intelligence.

For additional guidance on ES, refer to JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

and disinformation.

For additional guidance on public affairs, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

(d) Other fires supporting military operations may include obscurant fires to

mask friendly positions and illumination fires, when required for night operations.

4. Joint Fire Support Planning

a. Joint fire support planning is a continual and cyclical process that synchronizes,

executes, and assesses joint fires at tactical, operational, and strategic levels with joint fire

support communications systems and architectures. Prior to execution, fires planning is

performed as part of the joint planning process. After OPLAN approval and during

execution, fire support is planned as part of the joint targeting process using the joint

targeting cycle.

b. Joint Fire Support Planning During the Joint Planning Process. The joint

planning process is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps used by the joint force to

develop, analyze, compare, and select a COA from which to produce a plan of action. Fires

planners have specific responsibilities during each step in the joint planning process.

Joint Fire Support Planning

III-15

(1) Mission analysis helps the JFC and staff understand the problem and purpose

of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process.

As part of joint fires and the joint fires support planning process, fires planners participate

in mission analysis to ensure a clear understanding of commander’s objectives and assist

in developing objectives that are achievable. Outputs from mission analysis include the

approved mission statement, commander’s intent, and planning guidance for COA

development.

(a) After approving the mission statement and issuing intent, the commander

provides the staff (and subordinates in a collaborative planning environment) with enough

additional guidance (including preliminary decisions) to focus the staff and subordinate

planning activities during COA development. This guidance may include:

1. Specific COAs.

2. Objectives and end state.

3. ISR.

4. TSTs, HVTs, and HPTs.

5. NSL, RTLs, and no-fire areas (NFAs).

6. Use of weapons effects and special munitions such as blast,

fragmentation, cluster, nuclear, mines, and lasers.

7. Acceptable risks.

8. C2.

9. Commitment of the reserve force.

10. Critical events to be considered.

11. Commander’s assumptions.

12. ROE.

13. Assessment.

14. Host-nation concerns.

(b) Targeting Guidance. The commander, in coordination with

components and other agencies, develops and issues targeting guidance, including

targeting priorities, TST criteria and procedures, component-critical targets, TA and

identification criteria, and authorized actions against targets. Targeting, joint fires, and fire

support planners use the JFC’s targeting guidance to aid in COA development.

See JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information.

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III-16 JP 3-09

(2) COA Development. COA development is a systematic process performed

by a commander and staff to develop the best COA for a given operation. Each COA is

analyzed to consider the implications of both friendly and enemy options during an

operation. Joint fires planners are well versed in weapon systems employment and

understand how best to synchronize the use of weapon systems and other actions to create

desired effects. As such, their role in this step of the joint planning process is critical.

Early in COA development (or possibly mission analysis), fires planners will assist the

operational planning team in determining what effects/conditions must be created to

achieve the commander’s objectives. Following this, the fires planners will develop an

initial scheme of fires to create those effects. The scheme of maneuver and scheme of fires

are interrelated and must be mutually supportive to be effective. Joint fires planners and

operational planning team members work together in developing the COAs to ensure they

remain distinguishable, suitable, feasible, acceptable, and complete. At the completion of

the COA development phase, joint fires planners have developed an initial scheme of fires

for each of the COAs being developed.

(3) COA Analysis and Wargaming. Participation of joint fires planners in COA

analysis and wargaming helps to understand strengths and weaknesses of each COA and

associated scheme of fires. Fires planners’ expertise is also critical to effectively adjudicate

friendly and enemy actions that may be taken during this step.

(4) COA Comparison. During this step, fires planners will articulate the scheme

of fires that is most supportable from an ability to execute perspective, as well as which

one is most likely to create the desired effects. This may be done in the form of a fires staff

estimate.

(5) COA Approval. During COA approval, the fires planners will submit the

refined scheme of fires that supports the COA recommended for approval. The output

from this step is an approved COA and approved scheme of fires for input to the plan or

order development step.

For a detailed description of the joint planning process, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(6) Plan or Order Development. Once the commander selects a COA, joint

staff and fires planners:

(a) Refine named areas of interest, decision points, and HVTs/HPTs.

(b) Integrate and refine the collection, TA, and assessment plan. Collection

assets are tasked and integrated to mitigate gaps in the coverage of the operational area.

(d) Develop the operational fires portion of the CONOPS. Through the

CONOPS, the JFC provides fires and targeting guidance, objectives, desired effects, tasks,

and targeting/fires priorities. The CONOPS provides further refined guidance on what and

where effects are desired by phase (e.g., deny, disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, destroy,

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III-17

corrupt, usurp, or influence). In addition, the JFC provides guidance on munitions usage

and restrictions, restricted targets, and an NSL.

(e) Develop the joint fire support plan. The commander’s joint fire support

plan is the product of joint and component fire support planning. The joint fire support

plan is attached as appendix 6 (Joint Fire Support) to annex C (Operations) to the OPORD

or OPLAN. In it, the JFC provides guidance to supporting commanders regarding the

current or expected enemy, friendly, and environmental situation; the joint fire support

mission, describing how to employ fires to support the CONOPS; the joint fire support

priorities; and the objectives for using space, air, land, maritime, and cyberspace operations

and special operations forces in a joint fire support role. Tabs to the appendix outline

specific tasks and guidance for organizing and operating a JFE, coordinating fire support,

deconflicting fires, integrating fire support C2 systems (e.g., AFATDS, JADOCS),

conducting dynamic targeting, integrating multinational fires, and incorporating fire

support liaisons.

For additional information on the contents and structure of the OPLAN or OPORD format,

including content on operational fires, targeting, and the joint fire support appendix, see

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and

Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.

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IV-1

CHAPTER IV

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION

1. Introduction

Joint fire support execution begins when the supported commander issues an execute

order for an operation to commence and continues until the operation is terminated or the

mission is accomplished. Commanders and their staffs simultaneously execute the

supported commander’s plan while continuing the planning process for subsequent

operations.

2. Considerations

a. Anticipate the Dynamics of Combat Operations. Force execution occurs when

targets are engaged (or otherwise affected) and effects are created. During force execution,

the operational environment changes as the enemy responds and deviates from friendly

force assumptions. As individual joint fire support activities are executed, synchronization

of tactical activities can become overwhelming for an operational staff. Fast-paced and

geographically dispersed operations are best executed through mission command, the

conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type

orders. Thorough understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of command is

essential to mission command.

For additional information on joint fire support execution, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air

Support, and ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-31.6/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP 3-2.6, Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower. See JP 1,

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for additional information on mission

command.

b. Maintain SA of the Operational Environment. To coordinate and synchronize

tactical units throughout the operational environment, the JFC and staff require a high level

of SA. SA enables supported and supporting commanders to share a common

understanding of the operational environment and allows dynamic targeting of targets of

opportunity. Dynamic targeting can provide a responsive use of on-call or re-tasked

missions to exploit enemy vulnerabilities that may be of limited duration.

See JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for information on dynamic targeting.

c. Leverage Interoperable Fire Support and C2 Systems. Digital fire support and

C2 systems that are interoperable with all forces, when available, help maintain

information flow between the supported and supporting commanders and their staffs.

Digitally aided fire support enables machine-to-machine exchange of required fire

“No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with

the main hostile force.”

Field Marshall Helmut Carl Bernard Graf von Moltke the Elder, Chief of Staff of

Prussian General Staff 1857-1871 and Great General Staff from 1871-1888

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IV-2 JP 3-09

support and targeting information for efficient and effective target prosecution by

joint and multinational forces. C2 and fire support systems also allow staffs to review

priority of fires through battle tracking, position reports, and execution checklists.

d. Use the Lowest Echelon Capable of Furnishing Effective Support. To keep

joint fire support responsive, the lowest level capable should deliver it. If fire support

assets are inadequate, joint fire support planners and coordinators should request additional

joint fire support from the appropriate echelon or component. Fire support coordination

between Service and functional components should occur at the lowest possible level.

When coordination cannot be accomplished at the lower levels or additional guidance is

required, the next higher echelon should be consulted.

e. Furnish the Type of Joint Fire Support Requested. The supported commander

best determines joint fire support requirements. However, the component, unit, or

organization providing the joint fire support has the most expertise and is best able to

determine and recommend the type and quantity of fire support to meet the supported

commander’s requirement.

f. Use the Most Effective Joint Fire Support Means. Requests for joint fire support

are tasked to the force capable of delivering the most effective joint fires within the required

time. When developing a recommendation for a weapon system, the joint fire support

planners and coordinators should consider the nature and importance of the target, the

engagement time window, the availability of attack assets, and the desired effects on the

target. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to sequence the attack by fixing the

enemy with immediately available joint fire support assets, while coordinating a

subsequent, more detailed attack by more effective assets. It may be necessary (and

advantageous) to employ fires from more than one source to create the desired effects on a

target.

g. Plan During Execution. Planning continues during execution, with an initial

emphasis on refining the existing plan and anticipating joint fire support requirements for

follow-on actions, to include branches and sequels. As the operation progresses, joint

planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping time frames: future plans, future

operations, and current operations. Future plans and future operations primarily

concentrate on subsequent operations or branches to current operations. This planning is

performed using the joint targeting cycle. Assessment of current operations feeds these

two planning efforts. Current operations addresses the immediate or very-near-term issues

associated with ongoing operations, focused on execution of the operation. This normally

occurs in the JOC or J-3. The nature and time frame associated with current operations

planning (usually the current 24-hour period) typically require the immediate

responsiveness of dynamic targeting.

h. Synchronize Battle Rhythms. The commander’s decision cycle, encapsulated in

the battle rhythm, regulates the sequencing of events during execution. The commander’s

battle rhythm enables the synchronization of current and future operations. Subordinate

and supporting commanders synchronize their own battle rhythms with the JFC. Some of

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IV-3

the joint fire support activities that influence, and are influenced by, the JFC’s battle rhythm

include the joint targeting cycle and the joint air tasking cycle.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on planning during execution; JP 3-

60, Joint Targeting, for a detailed discussion on dynamic targeting; and JP 3-0, Joint

Operations, for more information on battle rhythms.

i. Determine Joint Fire Support Requirements. As part of the joint targeting cycle,

the supported commander identifies and validates the joint fire support requirements. The

supported commander also determines the desired effects, along with time constraints,

collateral damage and collateral effects restrictions, and acceptable levels of risk to forces.

In many cases, fire support requirements may require a combination of lethal and nonlethal

effects from various capabilities to create the commander’s desired effects (including

second- and third-order effects).

(1) Once joint fire support requirements are identified, validated, and approved,

the supported commander transmits those requirements to the supporting commanders.

Greater detail can shorten coordination time, but the supported commander should allow

the supporting commanders latitude when deciding how to meet the requirement.

(2) The supported and supporting commanders ensure joint fire support complies

with the law of war principles of military necessity, humanity, distinction, proportionality,

and honor.

(3) Supporting commanders must understand all joint fire support requirements

and request clarification on any ambiguities. The supporting commanders will help the

supported commander comply with all law of war requirements and awareness of any

contradictory or more limiting application of the law of war by other multinational forces.

j. Allocate Joint Fire Support Resources. The supporting commanders select and

control fires that provide joint fire support based on the supported commander’s

requirements. The selected capability should meet time, collateral damage, and risk

criteria.

(1) Supporting commanders identify any augmentation the selected capability

will require to accomplish the joint fire support mission. Augmentation may include

assistance to find, fix, track, or target the supported commander’s requirements.

Supporting commanders should also provide collateral damage/effects and risk estimates

for the allocated joint fire support capability to the supported commander.

(2) The supporting commander needs reliable and redundant communications

systems to receive engagement authorization from the supported commander.

3. The Joint Targeting Cycle

a. The JFC’s joint fire support requirements are identified, planned, and executed as

part of the joint targeting process. Joint fire support planning is a critical part of the overall

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joint targeting process. Understanding the JFC’s guidance, CONOPS, and intent is the

most important and first activity of joint targeting because they document the objectives

relevant to the present situation and set the course for all that follows. Objectives are the

basis for developing the desired effects and scope of target development and are

coordinated among strategists, planners, and intelligence analysts for approval by the

commander.

b. The joint targeting cycle is a six-phase, iterative process that methodically analyzes,

prioritizes, and assigns assets against targets to create effects that will contribute to the

achievement of the JFC’s objectives (see Figure IV-1). It integrates and synchronizes fires

into joint operations by utilizing available capabilities, considering operational

requirements and capabilities, to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on targets. It

also helps link the effects of fires to actions and tasks at the joint force component level.

c. Targeting provides the process to prioritize targets, determine the appropriate fires

and which components will mission-plan and synchronize the execution of those fires, and

determine whether the resulting effects are sufficient to support the JFC’s objectives.

Understanding the objectives, intentions, capabilities, and limitations of all actors within

the operational environment enables the coordinated use of joint, interagency, and

multinational means to accomplish tasks, create effects, and achieve objectives. Target

development and selection are based on the JFC’s objectives and the available ways and

means to achieve them. In other words, the focus of targeting should be on executing those

required tasks and activities to create the necessary effects on targets in support of the

Figure IV-1. Joint Targeting Cycle

Joint Targeting Cycle

Phase 1.

Commander’s

Objectives, Targeting

Guidance, and

Intent

Phase 2.

Target Development

and Prioritization

Phase 6.

Combat Assessment

Phase 5.

Mission Planning

and Force

Execution

Phase 3.

Capabilities Analysis

Phase 4.

Commander’s

Decision and Force

Assignment

Joint Fire Support Execution

IV-5

JFC’s objectives rather than simply servicing a list of targets or basing targeting decisions

on the availability of particular weapons, platforms, or systems. Commanders and their

staffs integrate capabilities that can create lethal and nonlethal effects and

synchronize the execution of appropriate fires and activities through the joint

targeting cycle.

d. The JFC’s OPLAN or OPORD provides broad guidelines for prioritizing targets,

making clear which sets or systems are most important to the operation. The JFC’s

OPLAN or OPORD should also provide guidance on the sequencing of targeting actions

or effects, which is not the same thing as priority. Although creating parallel effects is

generally best, some targets are attacked sequentially to enable effects against other targets.

e. Targeting begins during pre-hostilities planning and continues throughout

execution. The joint force battle rhythm and the JFC’s decision cycle are two factors that

affect planning in the future plans, future operations, and current operations time frames

with the greatest potential impact on current operations planning. The joint targeting cycle

and supporting component processes (i.e., the six-stage air tasking cycle) adapt to the joint

force battle rhythm and decision cycle.

Detailed information on the joint targeting cycle can be found in JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

f. Targeting Considerations

(1) CDE. Collateral damage is the unintentional or incidental injury or damage

to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling

at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall

military advantage anticipated from the attack. However, even though such fires may be

lawful, commanders should ensure fires do not negatively impact operational or strategic

objectives. For example, in conducting counterinsurgency operations, a commander may

place additional constraints on fires, beyond what might be legally required, or employ

NLWs to avoid collateral damage that might bolster the local population’s support for the

enemy, decrease its support of US involvement, or degrade the US population’s support

for the operation. CDE should not be confused with risk estimate distances, which are

tools used by ground commanders to make risk decisions regarding the employment of

CAS or other fires near friendly forces.

(a) Under the law of war, the principle of proportionality requires that the

anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property incidental to attacks not be

excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.

Commanders, therefore, are required to take feasible precautions to minimize

incidental death and injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects in the conduct

of military operations, taking into account military and humanitarian considerations.

CDE is an important step in the target development process; however, it should not

necessarily preclude the inclusion of valid military targets on a target list.

See CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology, and Office

of the General Counsel, Department of Defense Law of War Manual, for more information.

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(b) Beyond the fundamentals of ensuring PID of the target and deriving and

using properly mensurated target coordinates, collateral damage may be minimized

through various methods. Optimizing selection of delivery system, time of delivery,

munition type, warhead, warhead fuzing, delivery heading, weapon flight path to the target,

weapon impact angle, impact velocity, shielding, and use of aimpoint offsets may also help

reduce unintended second- and third-order effects and consequences of fires. When

targeting sites containing WMD or TIMs, among other things, planners will consider the

potential release and dispersal hazards.

the discriminate application of fires with minimal collateral damage. Joint standards

and methods for estimating collateral damage potential provide mitigation techniques and

assist commanders with weighing collateral risk against military necessity and assessing

proportionality within the framework of the military decision-making process.

(2) Target coordinate mensuration is the measurement of a feature or location

on the Earth to determine precise latitude, longitude, and elevation relative to a commonly

accepted datum. Point mensuration is an important part of targeting, since the mensurated

points represent the desired points of impact for coordinate-seeking munitions or desired

mean points of impact for multiple non-coordinate-seeking weapons. Precise point

mensuration, combined with coordinate-seeking weapons, can help minimize collateral

damage caused by inaccurate weapons. When accomplished before ATO execution, point

mensuration permits employment of an entire class of GPS-aided weapons, consistent with

ROE and CDE guidance, and may allow JAOC personnel to significantly shorten the

targeting process.

See CJCSI 3370.01, Target Development Standards, and CJCSI 3505.01, Target

Coordinate Mensuration Certification and Program Accreditation, for more information.

4. Employment of Joint Fires

During execution, control of joint fire support forces is normally exercised through the

J-3. The J-3 integrates and synchronizes fires with other major elements of the operation

such as maneuver, information-related activities, special operations, and logistics. The JFE

manages the daily joint fire support coordination responsibilities. Since the JFE is

composed of representatives from operations, plans, targeting, intelligence, and each

subordinate and supporting command, it can be a powerful coordination and

synchronization tool for the J-3. The JFE performs the tasks outlined by the J-3. The JFE

may assess joint fires and joint fire support operations, providing rapid feedback to the JFC

for decision making. Joint fire support execution requires operational battle tracking of

friendly forces and equipment, targets, and threats to friendly forces. This is especially

important as joint fires are coordinated across components (Service or functional) and

between or within operational areas. Joint fires require planning, coordination, and

synchronization to maximize effectiveness and minimize risks to friendly forces. The JFE

can assist the J-3 with implementing measures to reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents,

to include disciplined execution of OPORDs, ACOs, ATOs, SPINS, targeting guidance,

Joint Fire Support Execution

IV-7

deconfliction, ROE, CID, and PID procedures and maintain the detailed SA necessary to

synchronize the joint fire support system.

a. Battle Tracking. Battle tracking builds and maintains a picture of the operational

environment that is accurate, timely, and relevant. Battle tracking increases the probability

that joint fires will be applied at the proper time and place. At the operational level, battle

tracking takes advantage of digital information systems, using multiple sources to generate

a coherent picture of the operational environment. Battle tracking helps maintain SA of

friendly and enemy progress, reduce redundant targeting, and reduce the possibility of

friendly fire incidents. The components will normally share their part of the COP with

other joint forces via the GCCS [Global Command and Control System], if available, to

meet the JFC’s reporting criteria. This provides rapid information exchange to facilitate a

shared understanding of the COP. The COP is normally generated with interfaced systems

information applications used by the joint force. It is incumbent on operators to realize the

accuracy, capabilities, limitations, and potential latency issues associated with the joint C2

systems architecture. Battle tracking is critical for disseminating the location of friendly

forces, targets, and threats to friendly forces.

(1) Provide FFT. Tracking friendly forces and equipment will aid in the

synchronization of maneuver and fires and in reducing the possibility of friendly fire

incidents. Given the complexity inherent in joint fire support, prevention of friendly fire

incidents is always a high priority. Commanders at all levels take continuous measures to

reduce the potential for friendly fire incidents. Components, agencies, and multinational

partners provide FFT position location information on all friendly forces (whether on land,

at sea, in space, or in the air) to combatant commanders to enable the dissemination and

display of accurate, timely, and actionable FFT data, including integration into the COP.

(2) Provide Target Lists. Targets for joint fire support can be identified and

nominated in the targeting cell of the operational HQ or identified, nominated, vetted,

validated, and prioritized at the point of engagement with the enemy. The COP should

display targets on the JTL, as well as the RTL and NSL.

(3) Identify and Track Threats to Friendly Forces. Threats to friendly forces

are located, tracked, and communicated to joint fire support forces. Threats to supporting

forces may require synchronized operations to suppress or destroy the threats prior to joint

fire support forces primary mission.

b. Coordinating Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support coordination during

execution includes all efforts to integrate and synchronize attacks, avoid friendly fire

incidents, reduce duplication of effort, and shape the operational environment. This

requires that coordination procedures be flexible and responsive to the ever-changing

dynamics of warfighting. Streamlined arrangements for approval or concurrence to joint

fires should be established. CAS is perhaps the most mature example of joint fires, and it

has taken many years to develop and refine the coordination procedures that enable the

successful execution of a single CAS event. The planning, coordination, and

synchronization of Service, functional, interagency, international, and multinational

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IV-8 JP 3-09

capabilities adds a complexity beyond CAS, requiring a deep analysis of the process

required to accomplish joint fires as more participants and capabilities are added.

(1) Provide for Rapid Coordination. Commanders establish procedures and

responsibilities to rapidly coordinate joint fire support. Coordination of joint fire support

should be detailed and done in advance, but in some instances, due to operational

circumstances, coordination will be rapid and less detailed. Poor communication and

collaboration procedures or inadequate FSCMs may delay the delivery or clearance of joint

fires from Service, functional, interagency, international, and multinational capabilities and

jeopardize the force. Joint fire support planners and coordinators should know the

availability of assets, the CONOPS, the commander’s intent, FSCMs and ACMs in effect,

ROE, clearance of joint fires procedures, and any other operational limitations. The

deconfliction processes and procedures established by the JFC take place as far forward in

the JOA as possible to ensure the timely delivery of joint fires.

(2) Employ Coordination and Control Measures. Commanders employ

permissive and restrictive coordination measures to facilitate planning and efficient

execution of maneuver, air operations, and fires while simultaneously providing safeguards

for friendly forces.

(a) FSCMs and MCMs are employed to expedite attack of targets; protect

forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance;

clear joint fires; integrate and synchronize joint fire support operations; and establish

conditions for future operations. Along with other control measures, FSCMs, MCMs, and

their associated usages and procedures help ensure joint fire support does not jeopardize

troop safety, interfere with other attack means, or disrupt operations of adjacent or

subordinate units. The JFE builds restrictions annotated in the RTL and NSL into FSCMs

to support the fire plan. Maneuver commanders position and adjust coordination and

control measures consistent with the commander’s objectives, location of friendly forces,

CONOPS, and anticipated enemy actions and in consultation with superior, subordinate,

supporting, and affected commanders. The primary purpose of permissive measures is to

facilitate the attack of targets. The primary purpose of restrictive measures is to safeguard

forces. See Appendix A, “Coordination and Control Measures,” for more information on

FSCMs and MCMs.

(b) ACMs facilitate efficient use of airspace to accomplish air operations

and fires and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Commanders ensure

ACM nominations support, and do not conflict with, joint operations prior to forwarding

to the JAOC. Aircraft (manned and unmanned) and fires may transit through an ACM

when coordinated with the responsible airspace control element. See Appendix A,

“Coordination and Control Measures,” for more information on ACMs.

waterspace for antisubmarine warfare weapons control to permit the rapid and effective

engagement of enemy submarines while preventing inadvertent attacks on friendly

submarines.

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IV-9

For more information on waterspace management, see NTTP 3-21.2, Coordinated

Submarine Operations.

(3) Coordinate Airspace

(a) Component commanders require freedom to use airspace to achieve the

JFC’s objectives and maximum flexibility to use assets (organic and joint) within that

airspace. Joint doctrine recognizes the need for each Service and functional component to

use the airspace with maximum availability, consistent with the JFC’s acceptable level of

risk. The JFC’s acceptable level of risk for all airspace users (including fires) should be

clearly delineated in the airspace control plan. Airspace control is enabled by responsive

airspace control systems, standardization of airspace practices, minimal restrictions, and

continuous integration and coordination among all airspace users. Joint planning and

coordination minimize mutual interference while deploying and employing air defense and

fire support assets. Many FSCMs and MCMs have a vertical component that requires

consideration and coordination when traversing or firing ordnance.

See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, and JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations, for additional

information.

(b) Commanders, assisted by joint fire support planners and coordinators,

ensure conflicts between surface-based indirect fire and air operations are minimized. For

example, joint force land component attacks deep into the surface AO are cross-checked

to minimize the risk that enemy air defenses are repositioned just prior to a planned air

strike. Similarly, an uncoordinated air mission beyond the FSCL could influence the

enemy forces to interfere with the ground scheme of maneuver.

systems are linked with the airspace control authority by communications, standardized

procedures, and liaison, they form an integrated airspace control system. The highest

probability of interference between aircraft and surface-to-surface weapons occurs at

relatively low altitudes in the immediate vicinity of firing locations and target impact areas.

FSCMs, ACMs, and other coordination measures exist within a network of component

joint FISTs, liaison parties, and fire coordination elements and are shared, understood, and

managed across the entire joint force to be effective. Using coordination measures

correctly can prevent friendly fire incidents and duplication of effort while increasing the

effectiveness of air-to-ground and ground-to-ground ordnance.

(d) The change of established coordination measures is coordinated as far in

advance as possible. All joint force coordinating agencies must inform their forces of the

effective times and locations of new coordination measures. Following direction to execute

the change, the component operations cells should confirm the changes to ensure affected

forces are aware of new coordination measures locations and that associated positive and

procedural control measures are being followed.

JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, contains a detailed discussion on airspace control.

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(4) Use the Common Global Area Reference System (GARS). GARS

provides commanders with a worldwide frame of reference to help coordinate, deconflict,

integrate, and synchronize joint fires.

For more detailed information on GARS, see JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint

Operations.

c. Synchronizing Joint Fire Support. Synchronization is the arrangement of

military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power

at a decisive place and time. To synchronize joint fires, commanders and staffs require a

thorough knowledge of each Service’s doctrine; major systems; capabilities; limitations;

and often their tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(1) Commanders and their planners should identify desired lethal and nonlethal

effects early in the targeting and planning processes. A clear understanding of the problem,

planning guidance, commander’s intent, and the operational framework provide the

necessary direction for the coherent integration of joint fire support capabilities at the

operational level, while appropriately leaving synchronization of detailed execution to

subordinate tactical units.

(2) Establishing fire support requirements and synchronizing fire support actions

are cross-functional efforts, requiring close coordination and information sharing across all

staff directorates and components. This cross-functional collaboration is best

accomplished through appropriate organizational processes that are broken down into

elements, functional boards, and planning teams composed of representatives from

appropriate directorates and components. For example, a JFE is a subordinate component

of the J-3, specifically formed to integrate and synchronize joint fires planning for the JFC.

Functional boards synchronize particular functions (e.g., information activities, targeting,

collection, and distribution) across multiple planning initiatives, allocate resources

between ongoing and future operations, and maintain continuity across ongoing operations,

in accordance with the commander’s guidance and decisions. Planning teams solve

problems related to specific tasks or requirements. Pre-execution, most joint fire support

planning is accomplished by the future plans and future operations planning teams. Upon

execution, the current operations team joins the joint fire support planning effort.

See JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more

information on JTF cross-functional staff organizations and operational activities.

(3) Some degree of synchronization is necessary at the operational level to align

actions and desired effects. However, operational-level HQs cannot synchronize every

action. Such detailed synchronization is contrary to the reasoning behind mission

command and mission-type orders, and it is impossible to keep up with the totality of

actions occurring in the operational area. Most of the responsibility for synchronizing joint

fire support actions falls to the components. For this reason, a clear understanding of the

commander’s intent and the overall scheme of fires is essential at all levels of the force.

Joint Fire Support Execution

IV-11

d. TA and Identification. Joint fire support planners and coordinators should

identify TA requirements for joint fire support and focus on detecting priority targets.

Staffs evaluate target information from all sources and route it to the appropriate supporting

commands. This includes information from all echelons and from adjacent and supporting

elements.

(1) TA

(a) TA is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient

detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. TA is one component of the joint

fire support system (the other components being C2 and the attack and delivery systems).

TA can occur at numerous points along the execution timeline and at all levels of command,

including the attack and delivery system performing the final attack. The JFC will issue

SPINS to provide guidance to the force on specific TA requirements prior to target

engagement. TA normally includes CID, PID, and target validation components.

(b) TA Methods. Detecting, identifying, and locating a target can be

accomplished by a wide range of capabilities, from the simple visual identification to

sophisticated electronic means. Once a target is detected, identified, and located, the target

information is communicated to the attack and delivery system assigned to engage the

target.

1. One method to communicate the location of intended targets is

through laser designators and coordinate seeking weapons (CSW). Laser designator and

CSW acquisition devices can enhance current capabilities of artillery, NSFS, and aircraft

in the delivery of munitions. Both aircraft (manned and unmanned) platforms and ground-

based observers can laser-designate targets for laser-guided weapons (LGWs) and provide

precision coordinates for CSW. Lasers can provide fire support personnel precise target

marking, enhanced visual TA, and surprise. Lasers can also reduce the weapon or sortie

attack requirements. Joint fire support planners and FSCs should understand the

advantages and limitations of employing lasers. Airspace control element personnel,

terminal attack controllers, and fires observers consider and account for the challenges

created by the unpredictable trajectories of CSW and LGWs. Additional guidance can be

found in Appendix B, “Lasers and Laser-Guided Systems,” and JP 3-09.3, Close Air

Support.

2. Another method to communicate the potential location of intended

targets is through thermal imagers. Thermal imagers range from mounted systems on

aviation assets and vehicles to small, hand-held, or helmet-mounted devices used by the

individual Service member. Thermal imaging provides a significant advantage to US

troops in the field. There are, however, limitations with thermal imagers that can affect

their range and/or the image produced, such as the effect of the size and power of the device

on the image produced, thermal crossover (i.e., the natural phenomenon that normally

occurs twice daily, usually at dusk and dawn, when temperature conditions are such that

there is a loss of contrast between two adjacent objects), and battlefield obscurants.

Weather can have both a positive and negative effect on thermal imagers; most thermal

imaging devices can look through weather conditions during day and night. Due to

Chapter IV

IV-12 JP 3-09

limitations, caution should be exercised when using thermal imaging as an uncorroborated

method of CID.

(2) CID. CID is characterizing detected objects in the operational environment

to support engagement decisions. The CID process complements the identification process

to support application of weapons, resources, or other military options. The objective of

CID is to obtain the highest confidence identification possible. This characterization may

be limited to “friend,” “enemy,” “neutral,” or “unknown.” Other characterizations may be

required, including, but not limited to, class, type, nationality, and mission configuration.

CID characterizations, when applied with combatant commander ROE, enable engagement

decisions and the subsequent use or prohibition of fires. CID is used for force posturing,

C2, SA, and strike/no-strike employment decisions. Effective CID not only reduces the

likelihood of friendly fire incidents but also enhances joint fire support by instilling

confidence that a designated target is, in fact, as described. CID-related information

exchange orients on SA for friendly and neutral forces, restricted sites and structures, and

identification of threat objects. CID is acquired prior to engagement.

For detailed information regarding CID during counterair activity, see JP 3-01,

Countering Air and Missile Threats, and ATP 3-01.15(FM 3-01.15)/MCTP 10-10B/NTTP

3-01.8/AFTTP 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated

Air Defense System.

(3) PID. PID is an identification derived from observation and analysis of target

characteristics, including visual recognition; ES systems; non-cooperative target

recognition techniques; identification, friend or foe systems; other physics-based

identification techniques; or human identity-based biometric data collection devices. The

JFC will issue SPINS for PID requirements for attack and delivery platforms by asset and

mission type. CID and FFT processes, such as those methods noted above, should inform

PID decisions. The degree of accuracy of a PID method is specific to that method and

should remain a constant, whereas CID criteria can be changed by the JFC or decentralized

decision maker based on ROE. Comprehensive PID training, in conjunction with effective

PID procedures and available technology, can greatly reduce the risk of friendly fire

incidents. The JFC’s PID procedures should be developed early during planning and ROE

development. When developing the JFC’s PID procedures, important considerations

include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants, including

multinational forces, other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and

NGOs. US and multinational forces use many different CID and FFT processes and

systems. Early identification of common PID procedures significantly increases PID

effectiveness.

(4) FFT. FFT is the process of fixing, observing, and reporting the location and

movement of friendly forces. Inextricably linked, the composite employment of CID and

FFT is requisite to effective target engagement with minimal risk of friendly fire incidents.

Whereas CID emphasizes characterization of all detected objects in the target area, the FFT

component seeks to positively discern and report relevant friendly force position location

information to decision makers throughout the target engagement sequence. During

Joint Fire Support Execution

IV-13

mission execution, CID and FFT information should be constantly coordinated and

conveyed to PID decision makers in clear and concise language.

(5) Target Validation. Target validation ensures targets meet the objectives and

criteria outlined by the commander’s guidance and ensures compliance with the law of war

and ROE. Target validation during dynamic targeting includes analysis of the situation to

determine whether planned targets still contribute to objectives, whether targets are

accurately located, and how planned actions will impact other friendly operations. Target

revalidation ensures the target remains relevant to the current situation and is part of target

identification. The PID decision is crucial to having a valid target.

e. Target Engagement Authority. The authority and responsibility to engage targets

rests with the JFC responsible for the operational area. The JFC communicates

engagement criteria to the force through ROE and SPINS specific to each operational area.

The JFC may delegate target engagement authority to subordinate commanders.

f. TGO are those actions that provide electronic, mechanical, voice, or visual

communications that provide approaching aircraft and/or weapons additional information

regarding a specific target location. Various ground elements or aircrews conducting a

wide variety of missions can search for, identify, and provide the location of targets using

systems like GPS, laser designators/range finders, and aircraft targeting pods. Unless

qualified as a JTAC or FAC(A), personnel conducting TGO do not have the authority to

grant weapons release to attacking aircraft. These functions are done by appropriate C2

authorities or a JTAC/FAC(A). Terminal guidance is guidance applied to a weapon

between midcourse guidance and arrival in the vicinity of the target and may be a function

of TGO, CAS, interdiction, or other missions.

(1) TGO can be used to facilitate attacks on targets in locations where the

supported commander determines that the distance from friendly forces to the target is

adequate to preclude the need for a JTAC or FAC(A) to perform detailed integration of

each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces.

(2) TGO independent of CAS (not in close proximity to friendly forces) requires

personnel conducting TGO to have direct or indirect communications with the individual

operating/commanding the delivery system, plus connectivity with TGO weapons release

authority.

(3) For TGO to be successful, C2 is essential; ACMs and radio procedures need

to be established and understood by all participating units and aircrew. TGO may leverage

CAS; TST; or other tactics, techniques, and procedures to aid in execution (such as the

CAS 9-line briefing format), but TGO should not be confused with CAS requiring

detailed integration performed by a qualified JTAC or FAC(A) in close proximity to

friendly forces.

5. Dynamic Targeting—Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess

Targets identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in targeting,

are prosecuted using dynamic targeting procedures, often referred to as find, fix, track,

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IV-14 JP 3-09

target, engage, and assess (or the “kill chain”) by air and maritime component forces and

the decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology by land component forces. Dynamic

targeting produces targets of opportunity that include unplanned targets and unanticipated

targets and those targets that meet the criteria to achieve objectives but were not selected

for action during the current joint targeting cycle. The JFC will issue SPINS for dynamic

targeting, which should include minimum required criteria prior to target engagement. The

timeline for engaging targets using dynamic targeting procedures could be minutes, versus

hours, days, or longer, but the previously discussed procedures for TA and identification,

including specific CID, FFT, PID, and target validation criteria, is still required. In some

instances, a single aircrew could perform every step in the “kill chain,” including being

designated as the target engagement authority. Missions flown to specifically detect,

locate, identify, and engage targets of opportunity include:

a. SCAR. Missions flown in a specific geographic area and elements of C2 used to

match weapons effects with targets per the supported commander’s prioritized target list

through proper real-time allocation of interdiction assets. A SCAR mission is designed to

effectively and efficiently destroy targets and conduct associated BDAs. SCAR

interdiction assets include fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and surface-to-surface fires.

For additional information regarding SCAR, see ATP 3-60.2/MCRP 3-20D.1 (MCRP 3-

23C)/NTTP 3-03.4.3/AFTTP 3-2.72, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance.

b. Airborne alert AI. An on-call air mission that pursues unplanned or unanticipated

targets of opportunity in designated areas versus planned targets tasked on an ATO.

Airborne alert AI is also used against planned targets that are detected during execution by

the supported commander. Airborne alert AI is referred to as armed reconnaissance in the

Marine Corps.

See JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, for more information.

c. CAS. Air action by aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to

friendly forces and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and

movement of those forces.

See JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, for more information.

d. SEAD. An activity to neutralize or temporarily degrade enemy air defenses by

destructive or disruptive means. Destructive SEAD is the activity to do the same but with

destructive means. Joint SEAD is a broad term that encompasses all SEAD activities

provided by components of a joint force. Opportune suppression is unplanned against

surface air defense targets of opportunity and are governed by ROE (in the case of aircrew

self-defense) or by procedures established by the supported commander (for missions

actively seeking out previously unlocated threats). Using event-based triggers allows for

greater flexibility for the fire support element and firing unit in terms of planning and

SEAD.

Joint Fire Support Execution

IV-15

For additional information regarding SEAD, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile

Threats, and ATP 3-01.4/MCRP 3-22.2A/NTTP 3-01.42/AFTTP 3-2.28, Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses.

For more detailed information regarding dynamic targeting, see ATP 3-60.1/MCRP 3-

31.5/NTTP 3-60.1/AFTTP 3-2.3, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Dynamic Targeting.

6. Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare

a. War-at-sea strike is the execution of deliberate, offensive attacks against enemy

surface combatants and materiel. War-at-sea strikes can be executed against maritime

dynamic targets by air, surface, or subsurface assets.

b. Counter-fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft is conducted in direct defense of

maritime assets and requires increased integration between air- and surface-delivered fires

and the movement of maritime forces. While counter-fast attack craft/fast inshore attack

craft requires a level of integration higher than that of armed reconnaissance, counter-fast

attack craft/fast inshore attack craft should not be interpreted as CAS in the maritime

environment.

For more detailed information, refer to ATP 3-04.18/MCRP 3-25J/NTTP 3-20.8/AFTTP

3-2.74, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime

Surface Warfare.

Chapter IV

IV-16 JP 3-09

Intentionally Blank

V-1

CHAPTER V

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT ASSESSMENT

1. Introduction

Assessment is a continual process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing

joint force capabilities during military operations. It involves monitoring and evaluating

the current situation and progress toward mission completion. Operation assessment refers

specifically to the process the JFC and staff use during planning and execution to measure

progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions or effects, and achieving

objectives. Commanders continuously observe the operational environment and the

progress of operations; compare the results to their initial visualization, understanding, and

intent; and adjust planning and operations based on this analysis. Staffs monitor key factors

that can influence operations and provide the commander information needed for decisions.

2. Considerations

a. Operation assessment is commander-centric. Commanders maintain a personal

sense of the progress of the operation or campaign, shaped by conversations with senior

and subordinate commanders, key leader engagements, and battlefield circulation.

Operation assessment complements the commander’s awareness by methodically

identifying changes in the operational environment, identifying and analyzing risks and

opportunities, and formally providing recommendations to improve progress toward

mission accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the organization’s

planning (beginning in the plan initiation step) and operations battle rhythm to best support

the commander’s decision cycle.

b. As an essential part of the overall operation assessment, the JFC-level and

component-level staff will assess joint fire support. The staffs should assess how

effectively the joint fire support system supports forces in contact, supports the CONOPS

and associated fire support plan, synchronizes joint fire support, and sustains joint fire

support operations. Positive indicators include a continuous flow of targeting information

up and down the chain of command; availability of capabilities that can create both lethal

and nonlethal effects; access to the requested type of joint fire support; consistent use of

the most effective joint fire support; patterns of avoiding unnecessary duplication; civilian

casualties and collateral damage; efficient use of airspace; prompt joint fire support for

troops in contact, along with rapid coordination methods; protecting the force; and flexible

supported and supporting staffs. Negative indicators include insufficient creation of effects

or achievement of objectives, patterns of friendly fire incidents, or unanticipated or

unacceptable amounts of civilian casualties or collateral damage.

“Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of

employing joint force capabilities during military operations.”

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

Chapter V

V-2 JP 3-09

c. Assessment Indicators. As the staff develops the desired effects, objectives, and

end states during planning, they should concurrently identify the specific pieces of

information needed to infer changes in the operational environment supporting them.

These pieces of information are commonly referred to as indicators. Indicators are

relevant, observable or collectible, responsive, and resourced. For joint fire support,

assessment indicators should provide data to indicate the effectiveness of joint fire support

and progress toward or away from objectives; for these reasons, it is essential that baseline

data be collected for later comparison as close to the outset of operations as possible.

Assessment plans should include both quantitative and qualitative indicators. An example

of a joint fire support assessment indicator could be the speed with which important

information is communicated to, and acknowledged by, components of the joint fire

support system.

d. Combat Assessment. Combat assessment is phase 6 of the joint targeting cycle

and is conducted at all levels of warfare. Combat assessment evaluates the results of

weapons and target engagement and thus provides data for joint fires and the joint targeting

processes at all levels. Combat assessment is composed of three related elements: BDA,

munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), and reattack recommendation.

(1) BDA is an element of combat assessment and is the estimate of target damage

or effect, which is based on physical damage assessment, change assessment, and

functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from target

engagement.

(2) MEA is conducted concurrently and interactively with BDA and is the

assessment of the military force applied in terms of the weapon system and munitions

effectiveness to determine and recommend any required changes to the methodology,

tactics, weapon system, munitions, fuzing, and/or weapon delivery parameters to increase

force effectiveness. MEA is primarily an operations responsibility, with support from

intelligence as documented in the MEA CONOPS.

(3) Reattack recommendation is an assessment derived from the results of BDA

and MEA that provides the commander systematic advice on reattack of targets and further

target selection to achieve objectives. The reattack recommendation is a combined

operations and intelligence function.

Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, and CJCSM 3162.01, Joint Methodology for Battle

Damage Assessment, for further information on combat assessment.

3. Process

Ultimately, operation assessment is a process that measures progress toward mission

accomplishment. The JFC may direct the formation of a cell, whose primary function is to

develop and execute the assessment plan and to conduct assessments. The assessment cell

is a cross-functional organization with representatives from applicable J-code directorates,

the SJA, components, and multinational and interagency partners. The assessment cell

Joint Fire Support Assessment

V-3

operates during both planning and execution phases of an operation. Joint fire support may

have a subordinate assessment team or working group that feeds the assessment cell.

a. Develop the Joint Fire Support Assessment Plan. Joint fire support assessment

is a continuous process that is refined throughout planning and execution. The building of

an effective joint fire support assessment plan, including the development of collection

requirements, normally begins during mission analysis after identification of the initial

desired and undesired effects. Use the joint fire support planning process, planning steps,

basic joint fire support tasks, and joint fire support coordination principles in the planning

and execution chapters of this publication as a starting point to identify relevant,

quantifiable MOEs, MOPs, and other indicators of successful joint fire support.

(1) Develop Joint Fire Support MOEs and Indicators. As operational-level

effects are seldom created or observed instantaneously, joint fire support-related MOEs

provide a framework to conduct trend analysis of joint fires effects over time, both positive

and negative. The development of joint fire support MOEs and indicators can commence

immediately after the identification of desired and undesired effects. MOEs help to answer

questions such as: “Are we doing the right things?” “Are our actions producing the desired

effects?” “Are alternative actions required?”

(2) Develop Joint Fire Support Indicator Threshold Criteria. Criterion

development during planning establishes a consistent baseline to assess trend analysis and

reduce subjectivity of reporting agencies.

(3) Develop Joint Fire Support MOPs. MOPs are criteria to assess friendly

actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs and task-metric development are

normally conducted concurrently with, or shortly following, COA development. MOPs

are developed and tracked by the current operations integration cell and in individual staff

sections’ running estimates but are not normally part of the formal assessment plan. MOPs

help to answer the following questions: “Are we doing things right?” “Was the action

taken?” “Were the tasks completed to standard?” “How much effort was involved?”

(4) Develop the Collection Plan. Each joint fire support indicator should be

matched with its source(s) in subordinate units responsible for reporting them, as well as

the staff member responsible for collecting that information. They should ensure the

reporting requirements for subordinate units are sustainable and they leverage other

reporting requirements to minimize separate, redundant assessment reporting requirements

on subordinate units and staffs. The plan should be periodically reviewed and updated.

(5) Assign Responsibilities for Conducting Analysis and Generating

Recommendations. In addition to collection, members of the staff analyze assessment

data and develop recommendations.

(6) Identify Feedback Mechanisms. In units with an assessment cell, both the

assessment cell and the staff principal present their findings to the commander at a tempo

determined by the commander’s decision cycle and formalized in the commander’s battle

rhythm. The assessment cell presents the assessment framework with current values and

Chapter V

V-4 JP 3-09

discusses key trends. Insights from the statistical analysis of the information are presented.

After the assessment cell presents its framework, staff principals can agree or disagree with

the values provided and present insights and factors not considered or not explicit in the

formal model. The staff principal then provides actionable recommendations based on the

assessment.

(7) Write the Joint Fire Support Assessment Plan. Incorporate joint fires into

plans and orders, providing guidance and direction to subordinate organizations. The joint

fire support assessment plan may be included as an appendix to the operations annex or,

alternatively, in the reports annex. It should provide a detailed matrix of the MOEs

associated with the desired effects, as well as subordinate indicators. The joint fire support

assessment plan should identify collection means and reporting responsibilities for specific

MOEs, MOPs, MOE indicators, methods to analyze and evaluate data, venues where the

staff and commander can interface, and actions for improvement (see Figure V-1).

Notional Assessment Plan Development Matrix

Assessment

Aspects

Task Assessment Operational

Environment

Assessment

Campaign

Assessment

Source (basis) for

criteria

Directed tasks in

operation order.

Desired conditions

(operational environment)

in operation order.

End state objectives

(success criteria).

Criteria Primarily measure of

performance.

Primarily measure of

effectiveness.

Measure of

effectiveness.

Indicators Largely quantitative

(e.g., is task

accomplished to

standard?). May have

commander qualitative

input.

Balance of quantitative

and qualitative input.

Balance of quantitative

and qualitative input.

Collection means Reports, significant

actions, subordinate

commanders,

circulation.

Reports, polls,

subordinate commanders,

stakeholders, circulation.

Reports, polls,

subordinate

commanders,

stakeholders, circulation.

Analysis and

evaluation

Current operations-

centric, hot wash, and

commander qualitative.

Staff analysis and

evaluation through staff-

wide efforts, with focused

assessment cell and

working group.

Commander parallel

evaluation based on

qualitative (opinion-

based) indicators through

commander crosstalk and

circulation. Informed by

staff efforts.

Combination of the

quantitative staff efforts

and commander

qualitative analysis and

evaluation. Trend

analysis.

Commander-staff

interface venues

Daily updates, hot

washes.

Periodic operational

environment staff

assessment updates,

commander post-

circulation reports.

Formal assessment

briefings and

conferences.

Actions for

improvement

Staff and subordinate

commanders provide

recommendations.

Commander decisions.

Staff and subordinate

commanders provide

recommendation.

Commander decisions.

Staffs and subordinate

commanders provide

recommendations.

Commander decisions.

Figure V-1. Notional Assessment Plan Development Matrix

Joint Fire Support Assessment

V-5

b. Execute the Joint Fire Support Assessment Plan. As part of the overall

assessment, the staff’s assessment measures the progress toward, or regression from, the

achievement of objectives. It should begin as soon as information concerning MOPs,

MOEs, and associated indicators are received. Assessment steps are:

(1) Monitor. Monitoring is the continuous observation of conditions relevant to

the current operation. Monitoring within the joint fire support assessment process allows

staffs to collect relevant information, specifically information about the current situation

that can be compared with the forecasted situation described in the commander’s intent and

CONOPS.

(2) Evaluate. The staff analyzes joint fire support information, collected through

monitoring, to evaluate its impact on the operation’s progress. Evaluation examines

criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and to analyze the rate of progress.

Evaluation helps commanders identify what works and what does not work and gain insight

to better accomplish the mission. Well-devised measures can help the commanders and

staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects. Joint

fire support-related MOEs and MOPs help identify progress toward completing tasks,

achieving objectives, and attaining end state conditions. The frequency of staff

assessments should be determined by the commander’s decision cycle. Normally, formal

staff assessments may be conducted once or twice monthly. During high-tempo operations,

staff assessments may be required more frequently—weekly or even daily. Staff

assessments include assessment of actions taken to create effects (MOEs), task assessment

(MOPs), and, if needed, deficiency analysis.

(3) Recommend or Direct Action. Monitoring and evaluating are critical

activities; however, joint fire support assessment is incomplete without feedback and

recommendations to direct action. Assessment may diagnose problems, but unless the

diagnosis recommends adjustments to joint fire support activities, its use to the commander

is limited. Based on the evaluation of progress, the staff brainstorms recommendations to

the joint fire support plan and makes preliminary judgments about the relative merit of

those changes. Making adjustments includes assigning new tasks to subordinates,

reprioritizing joint fire support, and modifying the COA. Assessment occurs during all

military operations. Assessment diagnoses threats, suggests improvements to the joint fire

support plan, reveals opportunities, and considers partner-nation fire support systems.

Assessment also considers transition from conflict to post-conflict and actions that could

impair access to joint or partner-nation fire support capabilities during the conflict phases.

The staff presents the results and conclusions of its assessments and recommendations to

the commander as an operation develops.

c. Assess the Plan. The staff should continuously evaluate the assessment plan to

add missing information and eliminate duplication and unnecessary reporting. The staff

should make recommendations for changes and improvement and update the plan, as

required, to provide the best information possible to the commander.

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V-6 JP 3-09

4. Results and Products

a. Results. Assessment of the joint fire support system provides various benefits to

the joint force. In addition to measuring results and progress, assessment is used to improve

planning, support decision making, manage, and improve staff SA of the composition and

capabilities of forces available.

(1) Measure Results. MOEs help evaluate the progress of operations (“Are we

on track to achieve the objective?”).

(2) Measure Progress. MOPs evaluate task execution, asking whether actions

are performed as planned.

(3) Improved Planning. Determining how to measure the effectiveness of

actions taken to create effects, or the progress toward achieving an objective, enhances

conceptual understanding and leads to better-designed plans and more insightful

objectives.

(4) Support Decision Making. Assessment conclusions and recommendations

feed adjustments into the plan and give evidence to support commanders’ decisions.

(5) Support Management of Resources. Assessment results and recommendations

allow commanders to efficiently allocate resources and funds.

(6) Increase Knowledge. Assessment produces significant material for the

identification of best practices and for the historical study of operations contributing to the

development of lessons learned. (See CJCSI 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned Program, and

the Joint Lessons Learned Information System at https://www.jllis.mil/apps/index.cfm.)

(7) A Means to Motivate. Assessment helps commanders set objectives and

provide specific and measurable targets to direct their staffs and forces. Assessment can

confirm success or highlight failures.

b. Products. Assessment reports may be formal or informal. Commanders provide

planning guidance on the level of detail for upcoming operations. In protracted

stabilization efforts, commanders may require formal assessment plans, assessment

working groups, and standard reports. In fast-paced offensive or defensive operations, or

in an austere theater of operations, a formal assessment may be impractical. To assess

progress in those cases, commanders rely more on reports and assessments from

subordinate commanders, the COP, operation updates, assessment briefings from the staff,

and their personal observations. The joint fire support assessment results will probably be

combined with the assessment results from other mission areas to form a comprehensive

operations and intelligence assessment report. Collection managers must be trained to

provide information collection support to targeting. Priority intelligence requirements

must link to commander’s decision points and synchronize collection efforts in time and

space to answer priority intelligence requirements. Examples of assessment report tools

include:

Joint Fire Support Assessment

V-7

(1) Effects-to-Task Summary. Desired effects may not be created after all

supporting tasks are completed. In these cases, a task-to-effect analysis should be

performed to determine whether the discrepancy is due to a time lag between tasks or

actions completion and anticipated results or whether the tasks or actions cannot achieve

the intended results. Mismatches should be investigated, and remedies should be

developed and communicated.

(2) MOE Indicator Analysis Matrix. When there is a mismatch between tasks

or action completion and the creation of the anticipated effect, a review of the associated

MOE indicator data is the first step in deficiency analysis. The deficiency analysts should

ensure the reported data is timely and of sufficient fidelity to support a high level of

confidence in the assessment of the effectiveness of the action taken to create the desired

effect.

(3) Task Analysis Matrix. After the effects status is verified, the status of the

tasks and underlying actions should be verified. If tasks and actions are verified as

completed, the analysis team determines whether sufficient time has elapsed for changes

to be reflected in the indicators. If so, the team should inform the JPG, who will determine

whether the OPLAN or OPORD should continue unchanged or whether additional or

alternative tasks or actions are warranted.

(4) Civilian Casualties Assessment Tracker. All allegations of civilian

casualties will be tracked and assessed for validity. Those allegations that meet a

credibility assessment threshold will be tasked to the striking component for further refined

assessment up to a command-directed legal investigation. Data collected will be

maintained by a designated staff agency such as a civilian casualty monitoring team.

(5) Assessment Summary. Following the formal assessment team meeting,

assessment personnel finalize the assessment summary for review by the formal assessment

board (if established) and the commander. While the specific format for the assessment

summary varies, at a minimum, the effects summary display should include the effect title,

current assessment status, previous assessment status, and confidence level.

Chapter V

V-8 JP 3-09

Intentionally Blank

A-1

APPENDIX A

COORDINATION AND CONTROL MEASURES

1. Introduction

The purpose of this appendix is to familiarize commanders and staff with coordination

and control measures necessary to C2 operations as part of a joint force. Commanders and

staff establish various FSCMs, MCMs, and ACMs to facilitate effective joint military

operations. Commanders use these measures consistent with the location of friendly

forces, the CONOPS, and anticipated enemy actions and in consultation with superior,

subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Coordination and control measures are

directives to subordinate commanders to assign responsibilities, coordinate actions, and

control operations. Commanders tailor their use of control measures to conform to the

higher commander’s intent, their mission, and the amount of authority delegated to

subordinates.

2. Fire Support Coordination Measures

a. Locations and implementing instructions for FSCMs are disseminated

electronically by message, database update, and/or overlay through both command and

joint fire support channels to higher, lower, and adjacent maneuver and supporting units.

Typically, they are further disseminated to each level of command, to include the

establishing command and all concerned joint fire support agencies. Not all measures may

apply to a joint operation; however, knowledge of the various FSCMs used by each

component is necessary for the effective use of joint fire support.

(1) Planning and Coordination Considerations. Commanders position and

adjust FSCMs consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior,

subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The operations cell informs

coordination elements of the change and effective time. Conditions that dictate the change

of FSCMs are also coordinated with the other agencies and components as appropriate. As

conditions are met, the new FSCM effective time can be projected and announced.

Following direction to execute the change, the operations cell should confirm with all

liaison elements that the FSCM changes have been disseminated. This ensures affected

units are aware of new FSCM locations and associated positive control measures are being

followed, thus reducing the risk of friendly fire incidents. During target development, the

J-2 may collaborate with the intelligence community to confirm the functional

characterization of a target. When this vetting process leads to placing restrictions on a

target, the target is placed on the RTL rather than the JTL. Entities confirmed as no-strike

elements cannot become targets unless they lose their protected status through operational

imperatives and established ROE, which may provide the requisite authority to engage

such targets under the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. The J-2 places entities

confirmed as no-strike elements on the NSL. It is imperative that the JFE establish

processes and procedures to review the RTL and NSL and build appropriate FSCMs for all

fire plans. Failure to develop FSCMs based on the RTL and NSL may result in incidental

death or injury to civilians and/or damage to civilian objects or friendly equities in the

vicinity of the target.

Appendix A

A-2 JP 3-09

(2) Multinational Considerations. Before commencing multinational operations,

joint force and component staff members verify the status of any international agreements

concerning FSCMs. STANAG 2245, Field Artillery and Fire Support Data Interoperability,

is an example of an international joint fire support agreement.

(3) Before discussing specific FSCMs, a brief background on operational

environment geometry will provide a better understanding for the application of the

different types of FSCMs.

(a) Operational areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous. When they are

contiguous, a boundary separates them, and when noncontiguous, they do not share a

boundary; the CONOPS links the elements of the force. Noncontiguous operational areas

are normally characterized by a 360-degree boundary with the higher HQ responsible for

the area between noncontiguous operational areas. Within both contiguous and

noncontiguous areas, operations may be linear or nonlinear in nature.

1. In linear operations, commanders direct and sustain combat power

toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units, usually along lines of operations with

identified forward lines of own troops. Emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of

the land force in relation to other friendly forces, usually resulting in contiguous operations

where surface forces share boundaries. Linear operations are normally conducted against

a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat to lines of communications

requires control of the terrain around those lines of communications. In these

circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and integrate combat

power more easily.

2. In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without

geographic reference to adjacent forces and are usually characterized by more operations

in noncontiguous areas. Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous operations along

multiple lines of operation from selected bases and place a premium on intelligence,

mobility, and sustainment.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more information on linear and nonlinear operations and

contiguous and noncontiguous operational areas.

(b) Within their AOs, land and maritime force commanders employ

permissive and restrictive FSCMs to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and

simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces.

1. Permissive FSCMs facilitate attacks and include coordinated fire

lines (CFLs), battlefield coordination lines (BCLs), FSCLs, free-fire areas (FFAs), and kill

boxes.

2. Restrictive measures safeguard friendly forces and include

airspace coordination areas (ACAs), restrictive fire lines (RFLs), NFAs, restrictive fire

areas (RFAs), and ZFs.

b. Permissive FSCMs

Coordination and Control Measures

A-3

(1) CFL

(a) Purpose. The CFL is a line beyond which conventional surface-to-

surface direct fire and indirect fire support means may fire at any time within the

boundaries of the establishing HQ without additional coordination but does not eliminate

the requirement/responsibility to coordinate the airspace required to conduct the

mission. The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the surface-to-surface engagement of

targets beyond the CFL by not requiring coordination with the AO-owning commander to

approve creating effects on identified targets. Such fires still comply with ROE and law-

of-war targeting constraints; designation of a CFL is not authorization to fire

indiscriminately into the area.

(b) Establishment. The CFL is usually established by a brigade or division

commander equivalent, but it can also be established, especially in amphibious operations,

by a maneuver battalion. It is located as close to the establishing unit as possible without

interfering with the maneuver forces. There is no requirement for the CFL to be placed on

identifiable terrain. However, additional considerations include the limits of ground

observation, the location of the initial objectives in the offense, and the requirement for

maximum flexibility in both maneuver and the delivery of supporting fires. Subordinate

CFLs may be consolidated by higher HQs.

line with “CFL,” followed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective date-

time group (DTG) below the line (see Figure A-1).

(2) BCL

(a) Purpose. A BCL is a Marine Corps-specific FSCM that facilitates the

expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity between the measure (the BCL) and the

FSCL. When established, the primary purpose is to allow MAGTF aviation to attack

surface targets without approval of a GCE commander, in whose area the targets may be

located. To facilitate air-delivered fires and deconflict air and surface fires, appropriate

coordination measures, such as ACAs and kill boxes, may typically be established in the

area between the BCL and the FSCL. Ground commanders may strike any targets beyond

the BCL, and short of the FSCL, with artillery and/or rockets, without coordination, as long

as those fires deconflict with the established ACA overhead. This includes targets in an

adjacent ground commander’s zone that falls within the BCL-FSCL area. Such fires must

still comply with ROE and law-of-war targeting constraints; designation of a BCL is not

authorization to fire indiscriminately into the area.

(b) Establishment. The MAGTF commander establishes the BCL. The

BCL should follow well-defined terrain features that are easily identifiable from the air.

The positioning of the BCL considers the tactical situation. This should include the scheme

of maneuver or plan of defense, weather, terrain, type and source of aircraft, and overall

flexibility of maneuver and fire support. The BCL is disseminated by the establishing

MAGTF commander to the FSCCs of subordinate, adjacent, and higher HQs, as required.

It is further disseminated at each level of command, including the establishing command,

Appendix A

A-4 JP 3-09

to all concerned fire support agencies, such as the DASC, Marine TACC, fire direction

center, SACC, and NSFS ships. Since the BCL typically includes airspace parameters for

the safe employment of aviation assets, it has been likened to a purple kill box.

support maps, charts, and overlays by a solid black line with the letters “BCL,” followed

by the establishing HQ in parentheses above the line and effective DTG below the line.

(d) Considerations. Normally, Marine units prefer placing the FSCL close

to the forward edge of the battle area so organic indirect fires can range most targets short

of the FSCL and organic air assets have maximum freedom to engage targets beyond the

FSCL. However, since, in many operations, the FSCL is controlled by the JFC, the FSCL

may be placed at a significantly greater distance than the maximum range of Marine Corps

indirect fire assets. This gives the enemy a sanctuary between the maximum range of

Figure A-1. Fire Support Coordination and Maneuver Control Measures

Fire Support Coordination and Maneuver Control Measures

Legend

ACA airspace coordination area

CFL coordinated fire line

FFA free-fire area

NFA no-fire area

PL phase line

RFA restrictive fire area

Maximum Altitude

Minimum

Altitude

RFA

3D Mechanized Division

080800ZAUG

100800ZAUG

NFA

3D Mechanized Division

Effective 080800ZAUG

FFA

XCorps

080800-081600ZAUG or

Effective 080800ZAUG

ACA

XCorps

Minimum Altitude 300 Feet

Maximum Altitude 4000 Feet

MA00000000 to MA00000000

Effective 091200ZAUG

Coordination and Control Measures

A-5

indirect fire supporting arms and the FSCL, in which aviation assets cannot freely engage

without coordination and that GCE assets are unable to influence. The BCL was thus

developed as a supplemental measure that may or may not be used. A key factor is the

range and positioning of GCE organic weapon systems and the positioning of the FSCL.

If the FSCL is placed in such a way that a sanctuary exists between the range of Marine

artillery and the FSCL, the MAGTF commander can use this internal coordinating measure

to facilitate the attack of targets within this area. The BCL allows MAGTF fire support

assets to attack surface targets without further coordination with the GCE commander, in

whose area the targets may be located. Marine aviation may strike any target beyond the

BCL and short of the FSCL without further coordination, including targets in an adjacent

Marine commander’s zone between the BCL and FSCL. Before firing, the ground

commander should coordinate with the ACE (DASC) if surface-delivered fires will violate

ACAs associated with the BCL.

(3) FSCL

(a) Purpose. The FSCL delineates coordination requirements for the joint

attack of surface targets. It requires the coordination of joint fires in support of common

objectives beyond the measure with affected force HQ. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious

engagement of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. The FSCL applies

to all fires of air-, land-, and maritime-based weapon systems using any type of munition

against surface targets. The FSCL is a permissive FSCM, with the permissive area being

beyond the coordination measure. The air component, while recognizing this aspect of the

FSCL, also views the FSCL as a restrictive FSCM when regarding the area short of the

coordination measure. The JFLCC and JFMCC cannot employ fires long of the FSCL

without coordination with affected commanders, and the JFACC cannot employ fires short

of the FSCL without coordination with the JFLCC or JFMCC. The FSCL is a significant

consideration during interdiction operations. The FSCL is primarily used to establish C2

procedures for planning and execution purposes—it does not define mission types.

Interdiction can occur both short of, and beyond, the FSCL. Attacks on surface targets

short of the FSCL, during the conduct of joint interdiction operations, are controlled by,

and/or coordinated with, the appropriate land or amphibious force commander.

(b) Establishment. An FSCL is established and adjusted by the appropriate

land or amphibious force commander within their boundaries, in consultation with

superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. If possible, the FSCL should

follow well-defined terrain features to assist identification from the air. The FSCL is

oriented to air-land operations and is normally located only on land; however, in certain

situations, such as littoral areas, the FSCL may affect both land and maritime areas. In

amphibious operations, the FSCL is normally established by the commander, LF, after

coordination with the CATF. Changes to the FSCL require notification of all affected

forces within the AO in sufficient time to allow for these forces and/or components to

incorporate the FSCL change. Current technology and collaboration tools between the

elements of the joint force determine the times required for changing the FSCL. The JFC

should establish guidance for shifting FSCLs. The decision of where to place (or whether

even to use) an FSCL requires careful consideration. Placement of the FSCL should strike

a balance, so as not to unduly inhibit operational tempo, while maximizing the

Appendix A

A-6 JP 3-09

effectiveness of organic and joint force interdiction assets. The optimum placement of the

FSCL varies with specific AO circumstances, but considerations include the ground force

positions and anticipated scheme of maneuver during the effective time period of the FSCL

and their indirect fire support systems’ range limits, where typically the preponderance of

lethal effects on the AO shifts from the ground component to the air component. In this

way, the FSCL placement maximizes the overall effectiveness of the joint force, and each

component will suffer only a small reduction in efficiency. The proper location for the

FSCL may also shift from one phase of the operation (or campaign) to the next, depending

on the scale and scope of each component’s contribution during that phase. The FSCL is

not a boundary—the synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the

responsibility of the establishing commander, out to the limits of the land or amphibious

force boundary. The establishment of an FSCL does not create an FFA beyond the

FSCL. When targets are engaged beyond the FSCL, supporting elements’ engagements

should not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Engagements beyond the

FSCL are consistent with the establishing commander’s priorities, timing, and desired

effects and deconflicted, whenever possible, with the supported HQ.

line extending across the assigned areas of the establishing HQ. The letters “FSCL” are

followed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective DTG below the line.

FSCLs do not have to follow traditional straight-line paths. Positioning the FSCL on

terrain identifiable from the air is a technique that may further assist in friendly fire incident

prevention. Curved and/or enclosed FSCLs have applications in nonlinear joint operations

(see Figure A-2).

(d) Considerations. The commander’s decision on FSCL location is based

on estimates of the situation, CONOPS, the location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of

movement, concept and tempo of the operation, organic weapon capabilities, and other

factors. The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the forward line of own troops in the

defense rather than in the offense; however, the exact positioning depends on the situation.

Placing the FSCL at greater depths will typically require support from higher HQs and

other supporting commanders. Also, when the FSCL is positioned at a greater depth, there

is increased responsibility for detailed coordination placed upon the establishing

commander.

1. By establishing the FSCL close in, yet at sufficient depth to avoid

limiting high-tempo maneuver, land and amphibious force commanders ease the

coordination requirements for target engagement within their AOs by, and with, forces not

under their control, such as NSFS or AI. Unless a permissive control measure such as a

kill box is established, air strikes short of the FSCL (both CAS and AI) are approved by

the establishing commander in near real time, thus approving/revalidating both preplanned

and dynamic missions before they engage targets. CAS missions will be conducted in

accordance with terminal attack control procedures found in JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

2. Within these AOs, land and maritime commanders are designated the

supported commander for the integration and synchronization of maneuver, fires, and

interdiction. Accordingly, land and maritime commanders designate the target priority,

Coordination and Control Measures

A-7

effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. Further, in coordination

with the land or maritime commander, a component commander designated as the

supported commander for theater/JOA-wide interdiction has the latitude to plan and

execute JFC-prioritized missions within a land or maritime AO. Commanders executing

such a mission within a land or maritime AO coordinate the operation to avoid adverse

effects and friendly fire incidents. If those operations would have adverse impact within a

land or maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions readjusts

the plan, resolves the issue with the land or maritime component commander, or consults

with the JFC for resolution. FSCL placement is determined by the land or maritime

component commander, based on mission and objectives. For targets engaged by the air

component beyond the FSCL, the land or maritime commander will relay, through their

BCD or naval and amphibious liaison element, their plan for priority, effects, and timing

(via the joint targeting cycle’s component target nomination list). Any changes to those

priorities, effects, and timing desired by the land or maritime commanders will also be

Figure A-2. Fire Support Coordination Line

Fire Support Coordination Line

Objective



Enhances the expeditious attack of targets and sets the stage for future operations.

Established by appropriate level commander in consultation with superior, subordinate,

and supporting commanders.

Forces attacking targets beyond a fire support coordination line must inform all affected

commanders.

Appendix A

A-8 JP 3-09

relayed through their BCD or naval and amphibious liaison element to effect changes

beyond the FSCL.

3. Coordination of engagements beyond the FSCL is especially critical

to commanders of all types of forces (air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and special

operations) operating beyond the FSCL. Such coordination is also important when

engaging forces are employing wide-area munitions or those with delayed effects. Finally,

this coordination assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant engagements.

4. The establishing commander adjusts the location of the FSCL, as

required, to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL may

change frequently. A series of predisseminated “on-order” FSCLs will help accelerate the

coordination required. The establishing commander quickly transmits the change to

higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting HQs to ensure engagements are appropriately

coordinated by controlling agencies. Anticipated adjustments to the location of the FSCL

are normally transmitted to other elements of the joint force sufficiently early to reduce

potential disruptions of their current operations. Careful planning and coordination is

essential for changes to the FSCL. This planning is necessary to minimize the risk of

friendly fire incidents and to avoid disrupting operations.

5. Varying capabilities for acquisition and engagement may exist among

adjacent commanders in a multinational operation. Normally, commanders at senior

tactical echelons establish an FSCL to support their operations. Layered FSCLs and

multiple, separate, noncontiguous corps and/or MAGTF FSCLs positioned at varying

depths create a coordination and execution challenge for supporting commanders (e.g.,

tracking effective times, lateral boundaries, and multiple command guidance). In cases

such as these, when the components share a mutual boundary, the JFC or a designated

component commander may consolidate the operational requirements of subordinates to

establish a single FSCL. This FSCL may be noncontiguous to reflect the varying

capabilities of subordinate commands. A single FSCL facilitates air support,

accommodates subordinate deep operations requirements, and eases coordination of FSCL

changes.

6. The maritime AO may be contiguous or noncontiguous and normally

does not employ an FSCL. However, targets may be in close proximity to friendly forces,

requiring detailed integration to maximize joint fires and minimize friendly fire incidents.

Depending on the phase of the operation, maritime targets may be designated as TSTs,

while war-at-sea targets should be planned targets that may include other functional

components.

(4) FFA

(a) Purpose. An FFA is a specific designated area into which any weapon

system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing HQ. It is used to

expedite joint fires and to facilitate jettison of aircraft munitions. Such fires still comply

with ROE and law-of-war targeting constraints; designation of an FFA is not

authorization to fire indiscriminately into the area.

Coordination and Control Measures

A-9

(b) Establishment. An FFA may be established only by the military

commander with authority over the area (usually, a division or higher commander).

Preferably, the FFA should be located on identifiable terrain; however, it may be

designated by grid coordinates or GARS.

line defining the area and the letters “FFA” within, followed by the establishing HQ and

the effective DTG (see Figure A-1).

(5) Kill Box

(a) Purpose. A kill box is a three-dimensional FSCM, normally built

through the combined use of an FSCM (for the ground) and an ACM (for the air), used to

facilitate the integration of fires. A kill box is a measure, not a mission. Kill boxes are

established to support interdiction efforts as part of the JFC’s joint targeting process. Kill

boxes allow lethal attack against surface targets without further coordination with the

establishing commander and without the requirement for terminal attack control. When

used to integrate air-to-surface and subsurface/surface-to-surface indirect fires, the kill box

will have appropriate restrictions. These restrictions provide a three-dimensional block of

airspace in which participating aircraft are deconflicted from friendly surface fires. The

restrictive measures also prevent non-participating aircraft and maneuver forces from

entering the kill box. The objective is to reduce the coordination required to fulfill support

requirements with maximum flexibility (permissive attributes), while preventing friendly

fire incidents (restrictive attributes). Fires executed in a kill box should comply with ROE

and law-of-war targeting constraints; designation of a kill box is not authorization to

fire indiscriminately into the area.

(b) Establishment. Supported component commanders establish a kill box

in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.

Requirements for kill boxes and other control measures are determined using normal

component targeting and planning processes and are established and approved by

commanders or their designated staff. Information about the type, effective time, duration,

and other attributes will be published and disseminated using existing voice and digital C2

systems. Component commanders, acting on JFC authority, establish and adjust kill boxes

within their AO/JOA in consultation with higher, subordinate, supporting, and affected

commanders.

See FM 3-09, Field Artillery and Fire Support, and ATP 3- 09.34/MCRP 3-31.4 (MCRP 3-

25H)/NTTP 3-09.2.1/AFTTP 3-2.59, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for Kill Box Planning and Employment, for further information.

c. Restrictive FSCMs

(1) ACA. The ACA is the primary FSCM that reflects the coordination of

airspace for use by air support and indirect joint fires.

(a) Purpose. ACAs are used to ensure aircrew safety and the effective use

of indirect supporting surface joint fires by deconfliction through time and space. The

Appendix A

A-10 JP 3-09

ACA is a block or corridor of airspace in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from

friendly surface fires. A formal ACA (a three-dimensional box of airspace) requires

detailed planning. More often, an informal ACA is established using time, lateral

separation, or altitude to provide separation between surface-to-surface and air-delivered

weapon effects.

For additional information on ACAs, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, and JP 3-52, Joint

Airspace Control.

(b) Establishment. The airspace control authority establishes formal ACAs

at the request of the appropriate commander. Though not always necessary, formal ACAs

should be considered. Vital information defining the formal ACA includes minimum and

maximum altitudes, a baseline designated by grid coordinates at each end, the width (on

either side of the baseline), and the effective times. When time for coordination is limited,

an informal ACA is used. The informal ACA can be requested by the maneuver

commander requesting CAS or employing helicopters and is approved at the battalion or

higher level. Both types of ACAs are constructed with the assistance of the air liaison

officer to ensure they meet the technical requirements of the aircraft and weapon systems.

solid black line. Depicted inside the enclosed area are “ACA,” the establishing HQ, the

minimum and maximum altitudes, the grid coordinates for each end of the baseline, and

the effective DTG or the words “on order.” Informal ACAs are not normally displayed on

maps, charts, or overlays (see Figure A-1).

(2) RFL

(a) Purpose. The RFL is a line established between converging friendly

forces—one or both may be moving—that prohibits joint fires or the effects of joint fires

across the line without coordination with the affected force. The purpose of the line is to

prevent friendly fire incidents and duplication of engagements by converging friendly

forces.

(b) Establishment. The commander common to the converging forces

establishes the RFL, which is located on identifiable terrain when possible. In linkup

operations, it is usually closer to the stationary force, to allow maximum freedom of action

for the maneuver and joint fire support of the linkup force.

line, with “RFL,” followed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective DTG

below the line.

(3) NFA

(a) Purpose. The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit joint fires or their effects

into an area. There are two exceptions:

Coordination and Control Measures

A-11

1. When the establishing HQ approves joint fires within the NFA on a

mission-by-mission basis.

2. When an enemy force within the NFA engages a friendly force and

the engaged commander determines there is a requirement for immediate protection and

responds with the minimal force needed to defend the force.

(b) Establishment. Any size unit may establish NFAs. If possible, the NFA

is established on identifiable terrain. It may also be located by a series of grids or by a

radius from a center point.

outlined with a solid black line with black diagonal lines inside. The letters “NFA” are

within, followed by the establishing HQ and the effective DTG (see Figure A-1).

(4) RFA

(a) Purpose. An RFA is an area where specific restrictions are imposed and

in which joint fires, or the effects of joint fires, that exceed those restrictions will not be

delivered without coordination with the establishing HQ. The purpose of the RFA is to

regulate joint fires into an area according to the stated restrictions.

(b) Establishment. A maneuver battalion or higher echelon normally

establishes an RFA. Usually, the RFA is located on identifiable terrain, by grid, or by a

radius from a center point. To facilitate rapidly changing operations, on-call RFAs may be

used. The dimensions, locations, and restrictions of the on-call RFA are prearranged.

line defining the area and the letters “RFA” within, followed by the establishing HQ and

the effective DTG. The restrictions may be included within the graphic if space allows or

reference may be made to a specific OPORD or OPLAN (see Figure A-1).

(5) ZF

(a) Purpose. A ZF is an FSCM that includes the area within which a

designated ground unit or fire support ship delivers, or is prepared to deliver, joint fire

support. Joint fires may or may not be observed. Land is divided into ZFs, which are

assigned to gunfire support ships and units as a means to coordinate their efforts with each

other and with the scheme of maneuver of the supported ground unit. Units and ships

assigned ZFs are responsible for engaging known targets and targets of opportunity

according to their mission and the guidance of the supported commander.

(b) Establishment. The commander of the maritime force providing NSFS

establishes and assigns ZFs for the forces. The ZF for an artillery battalion or a ship

assigned the mission of DS normally corresponds to the AO of the supported unit. The ZF

for an artillery battalion or a ship assigned the mission of GS should be within the

boundaries of the supported unit. When used in conjunction with naval gunfire, the size

and shape of a ZF will depend on the following:

Appendix A

A-12 JP 3-09

1. Boundaries of ZF. To permit ready identification by the spotter and

the individual fire support ship, the boundaries of the ZFs should be recognizable both on

the terrain and on a map and should correspond to the zones of action of the LF units

supported. It may be necessary to divide a large ZF into two or more smaller zones due to

considerations that follow.

2. Size. The size of each ZF should be such that the fire support ships,

or ships assigned to observe and/or destroy targets, will be able to accomplish the mission

in the time allocated. When ZFs are delineated, known or suspected targets, scheduled for

destruction in each zone, are plotted, after which the number and type of targets are

compared to the capability of the ship.

3. Visibility. Observation from seaward is a desirable feature for ZFs,

since it permits a ship to deliver more accurate and rapid fire.

4. Accessibility to Fire. The ZFs must be accessible to the trajectory of

the fire support ship(s) assigned to the zone.

units assigned to a maneuver unit, or assigned the mission of DS, corresponds to the AO

of the parent or supported maneuver unit. The ZF for an artillery unit assigned the mission

of reinforcing corresponds to the ZF of the reinforced artillery unit. The ZF for an artillery

unit assigned the mission of GS-reinforcing corresponds to the ZF of the reinforced artillery

unit and is within the AO of the supported maneuver unit. The ZF for an artillery unit

assigned the mission of GS corresponds to the AO of the supported maneuver unit.

(d) Graphic Portrayal. ZFs are delineated by the use of broken lines (solid

lines if unit boundaries are used) and are designated by Arabic numerals (e.g., “ZF3”).

For more information on ZF, see FM 3-09, Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support.

3. Maneuver Control Measures

Land, maritime, and amphibious commanders use MCMs to define lines of

responsibility in support of movement and maneuver of friendly forces.

a. Boundaries

(1) Purpose. A boundary is an MCM. In land warfare, it is a line by which

surface AOs between adjacent units and/or formations are defined. Boundaries designate

the geographical limits of the AO of a unit. Within their own boundaries, units may execute

joint fires and maneuver without close coordination with neighboring units, unless

otherwise restricted. Normally, units do not fire across boundaries unless the fires are

coordinated with the adjacent unit or the fires are beyond an FSCM, such as a CFL. These

restrictions apply to conventional and special munitions and their effects. When fires such

as obscurants and illumination affect an adjacent unit, coordination with that unit is

normally required. A commander can, in certain situations, decide to fire across boundaries

at positively identified enemy elements, without coordination. However, direct and

Coordination and Control Measures

A-13

observed joint fires should be used when firing across boundaries at positively identified

enemy forces when there is no time to coordinate with adjacent friendly units.

(2) Establishment and/or Portrayal. Any commander given an AO can

establish boundaries for subordinate units. These boundaries will be respected by all

Service and functional components. Boundaries are depicted as solid black lines with a

symbol placed on the boundary to show the size and designation of the highest echelons

that have the boundary in common. If the units are of unequal size, the symbol of the

higher unit is shown and the designation of the lower unit is given completely (see Figure

A-1).

b. Phase Lines (PLs)

(1) Purpose. A PL is an MCM used by land forces for control and coordination

of military operations. It is usually a recognizable terrain feature extending across the zone

of action. Units normally report crossing PLs but do not halt unless specifically directed.

PLs can be used to identify limits of advance, monitor rates of movement, control joint

fires (when dually designated as an FSCM), or define an AO. The purpose of each PL, and

any actions required by forces affected by the PL, will be specified on the OPORD of the

establishing HQ.

(2) Establishment and/or Portrayal. Any commander given an AO can

establish PLs. A PL is depicted as a solid black line labeled “PL” and assigned letters,

numbers, or code-name designations (see Figure A-1).

c. Fire Support Area (FSA) and/or Fire Support Station (FSS)

(1) Purpose. An FSA is an appropriate maneuver area assigned by the maritime

commander to fire support ships, from which they deliver surface joint fire support to an

operation ashore. An FSA is normally associated with amphibious operations but can be

used whenever it is desirable to have a fire support ship occupy a certain geographic

position. An FSS is an exact location at sea from which a fire support ship delivers fires.

This designation is used to station ships to be able to reach certain targets. For example, a

ship in an FSA may not be able to reach a certain target except when it is stationed at the

FSS.

(2) Establishment. The officer in tactical command, typically the CATF,

establishes FSAs and FSSs. In amphibious operations when attack groups are formed and

separate landing areas are designated, the CATF may assign each attack group commander

the responsibility for control of naval gunfire support within the area.

(3) Graphic Portrayal. FSAs are designated by Roman numerals (e.g., FSA I,

II, III) and are shown on the NSFS operations overlay. FSSs are designated by numbers

(e.g., FSS 1, 2, 3) and are shown on the NSFS operations overlay as an X, indicating the

exact position of the ship.

Appendix A

A-14 JP 3-09

4. Airspace Coordinating Measures

ACMs. ACMs are employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish

missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Effectively and

efficiently integrating and coordinating joint fires depends on the understanding and

realization that the operational environment is a three-dimensional area, or volume of

space, through which air assets operate and through which fires are employed. ACMs are

nominated from subordinate HQs through component command HQs and forwarded to the

airspace control authority in accordance with the airspace control plan. Additionally, some

ACMs may be established to permit surface joint fires or UA operations. The component

commanders ensure ACM nominations support, and do not conflict with, joint operations

prior to forwarding to the airspace control authority. The airspace control authority

consolidates, coordinates, and deconflicts the airspace requirements of the components and

publishes the ACMs in the ACO. Simply stated, ACMs are approved by the airspace

control authority and promulgated via the ACO. The ACO is published to meet the

operations tempo and should be promulgated to meet the pace of the ACM request process.

Expect the ACO to be distributed both separately and as a section of the ATO. ACMs also

have specific usages that further help to define use and purpose to assist with effective

planning, integration, and execution. ACMs that have joint fire support applicability are

listed below.

a. An air corridor (AIRCOR) is a restricted air route of travel specified for use by

friendly aircraft established for the purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired

upon by friendly forces. AIRCOR procedures are used to route aircraft between such areas

as forward arming and refueling points, holding areas, and battle positions. AIRCOR

usages include minimum-risk routing, transit corridors and routes, and low-level transit

routes. Altitudes of an AIRCOR do not exceed the coordinating altitude, if established.

b. A restricted operations zone is airspace reserved for specific activities in which

the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. Restricted operations zones may

support air-to-air refueling, CAS, personnel recovery, ATACMS, and combat air patrol.

Prior to entry into an established restricted operations zone, both manned and unmanned

aircraft must coordinate with the owning organization to receive authorization.

c. The coordinating altitude is an ACM that uses altitude to separate users and as the

transition between different airspace control elements. Airspace users (e.g., manned and

unmanned aircraft, direct and indirect fires) transiting the coordinating altitude must

coordinate with the affected airspace control elements.

d. A no-fly area is airspace of specific dimensions set aside for a specific purpose in

which no aircraft operations are permitted, except as authorized by the appropriate

commander and controlling agency. No-fly area procedures can be used to enforce a

diplomatically designated no-fly zone, which can stipulate which flights are authorized and

which are prohibited. Since no-fly areas negatively impact air operations, their use is

balanced against the needs of affected commanders.

Coordination and Control Measures

A-15

e. A high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) is airspace in which there is a

concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons and airspace users. A HIDACZ

has defined dimensions, which usually coincide with geographical features or navigational

aids. Access to a HIDACZ is normally controlled by the maneuver commander, who can

also direct a more restrictive weapons status within the HIDACZ. A HIDACZ allows

ground/MAGTF commanders to restrict a volume of airspace from users not involved with

ongoing operations. The restriction is necessary because of the large volume and density of

fires supporting ground operations within the described geographic area.

f. A coordination level is a procedural method to separate fixed-wing and rotary-

wing aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft normally will not

fly.

See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for further information.

Appendix A

A-16 JP 3-09

Intentionally Blank

B-1

APPENDIX B

LASERS AND LASER-GUIDED SYSTEMS

1. General

a. Laser-guided systems provide the joint force with the ability to locate and engage

targets with an increased first-round hit probability. Laser-guided systems can effectively

engage a wide range of targets, including moving targets. LGWs can reduce the number

of weapons and/or weapon systems required to create an effect to achieve an objective

because of increased accuracy. Based on the threat level and environment, laser-guided

systems provide additional capabilities but also have distinct limitations. Those

performing laser-designation tasks should strive for simplicity and use all available

resources to help ensure first-pass success.

b. Laser Capabilities. Laser designators radiate a narrow beam of pulsed energy.

Current tactical lasers operate in the near infrared wavelength spectrum, which is not

visible to the human eye. When within range, the laser designator can be aimed so the

energy precisely designates a chosen spot on the target. Laser target designators mark

targets for laser spot trackers (LSTs) and LGWs. Some laser systems can accurately

determine target range and location. When coupled with horizontal and vertical scales,

they can measure target azimuth and elevation.

c. Laser Target Ranging and Designation Systems. Laser target ranging and

designation systems can provide accurate range, azimuth, and elevation information to

locate enemy targets. These systems may vary from handheld to aircraft-mounted devices

and perform similar functions with varying degrees of accuracy. In combination with GPS,

lasers can provide accurate enemy target locations. In addition, lasers in combination with

GPS can provide for target area analysis. This analysis can be used to fire weapons

accurately at the enemy, to accurately locate future friendly observer locations, and to

enable friendly forces to effectively conduct maneuver operations, as well as C2 their

forces by accurate identification of terrain reference points.

d. Laser Acquisition Devices. Of the two types of laser acquisition devices, the

first, the LST, is used to aid visual and sensor acquisition of the target to be attacked

by another weapon. This type of laser acquisition device is mounted on most fixed-wing

aircraft and some helicopters. The second type of acquisition device is a seeker and

guidance kit mounted on LGWs, which guide on coded laser energy.

2. Enemy Use of Laser Countermeasures

US enemies realize the importance of laser countermeasures in a conflict with the

US or its multinational partners. Many of the techniques for countering laser energy and

sensitive electro-optical equipment are common knowledge throughout much of the world.

US enemies are well-equipped to detect and counter the sophisticated laser designator and

guidance systems used by the armed forces of Western nations.

Appendix B

B-2 JP 3-09

3. Legal Uses of Lasers on the Battlefield

Protocol IV to the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (Protocol on Blinding

Laser Weapons) prohibits the use of lasers specifically designed to cause permanent

blindness to unenhanced vision. For all other types of lasers, such as those used for

detection, targeting, range-finding, communications, and target destruction, parties to the

Protocol have an obligation to “take all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of

permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.” It is DOD policy on blinding lasers that

recognizes that accidental or incidental eye injuries may occur on the battlefield through

the use of lasers for detection, targeting, range-finding, communications, and target

destruction; however, it is DOD policy “to strive, through training and doctrine, to

minimize these injuries.”

For a discussion of laser-guided considerations for CAS, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

For additional information on laser operations, see ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-31.6 (MCRP 3-

16.6A)/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP 3-2.6, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

the Joint Application of Firepower.

4. Laser-Equipped Unmanned Aircraft General Procedures

a. Employment. Laser-equipped UA utilize the same procedures and communications

as an airborne laser designator operator (LDO). In some cases, the UA may also act as a

strike aircraft, using the same procedures as other strike aircraft.

b. TA Considerations. If a laser-equipped UA is being utilized by the LDO,

coordination between the UA flight crew and the attack aircrew is critical for both safety

and laser geometry. LST-equipped strike aircraft should notify the LDO that they are LST-

capable upon arriving on-station. The LDO, through standard communication, will then

direct the UA mark onto the target. The LDO may pass the UA laser pulse repetition

frequency code to the attack aircraft or the attack aircraft may pass its weapons code to the

LDO.

c. Deconfliction of Airspace. Standard procedures used by LDOs to deconflict fixed-

wing and rotary-wing aircraft apply to laser-equipped UA employed on laser designation

operations. Proper laser geometry and 2,000-foot altitude blocks for the UA stationing

orbit are recommended when using a UA to mark for strike aircraft.

See JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, for an expanded discussion of laser-guided

considerations for CAS and TGO.

C-1

APPENDIX C

POINTS OF CONTACT

Joint Staff J-7/Joint Doctrine Division

Website: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/

E-mail Support: [email protected]il

Phone Number: 703-692-7273 (DSN 222)

Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/Lead Agent/Joint Staff J-6

Deputy Director for Cyber and Command, Control, Communications and

Computer Integration, Joint Fires Division, Joint Fire Support and Joint Close

Air Support Branch

Phone Number: 757-836-0344 (DSN 836)

Appendix C

C-2 JP 3-09

Intentionally Blank

D-1

APPENDIX D

REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-09 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Department of Defense Publications

a. DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program.

b. DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) and NLW

Policy.

c. DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense.

d. DODI O-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

e. DOD Policy on Blinding Lasers (17 January 1997).

f. Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense Law of War Manual.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of

Force for US Forces.

b. CJCSI 3122.06E, (U) Sensitive Target Approval and Review (STAR) Process.

c. CJCSI 3150.25G, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

d. CJCSI 3160.01C, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology.

e. CJCSI 3270.01B, Personnel Recovery.

f. CJCSI 3370.01B, Target Development Standards.

g. CJCSI 3505.01C, Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification and Program

Accreditation.

h. CJCSI 3900.01D, Requirements for Geospatial Information and Services.

i. CJCSM 3162.01A, Joint Methodology for Battle Damage Assessment.

j. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

k. JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

l. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

m. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

Appendix D

D-2 JP 3-09

n. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

o. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations.

p. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

q. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

r. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

s. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

t. JP 3-05, Special Operations.

u. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

v. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

w. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

x. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

y. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

z. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

aa. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

bb. JP 3-14, Space Operations.

cc. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

dd. JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations.

ee. JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations.

ff. JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations.

gg. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

hh. JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

ii. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

jj. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

kk. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

ll. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

References

D-3

mm. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

nn. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

oo. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

3. Multi-Service Publications

a. ATP 3-06.1/MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP 3-01.04/AFTTP 3-2.29, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations.

b. ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-31.6 (MCRP 3-16.6A)/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP 3-2.6, Multi-

Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower.

c. ATP 3-09.34/MCRP 3-31.4/NTTP 3-09.2.1/AFTTP 3-2.59, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Planning and Employment.

d. ATP 3-22.40 [FM 3-22.40]/MCTP 10-10A/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/CGTTP

3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of

Nonlethal Weapons.

e. ATP 3-91.1/AFTTP 3-2.86, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center.

4. Service Publications

a. ADRP 3-09, Fires.

b. FM 3-09, Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support.

c. ATP 3-07.6, Protection of Civilians.

d. ATP 3-09.30, Observed Fires.

e. NTTP 3-21.2, Coordinated Submarine Operations.

f. NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center.

5. Multinational Publication

STANAG 2245, Field Artillery and Fire Support Data Interoperability.

Appendix D

D-4 JP 3-09

Intentionally Blank

E-1

APPENDIX E

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the

Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf

and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.[email protected]l. These comments should address

content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is Joint Staff

J-6, Deputy Director for Cyber and Command, Control, Communications, and Computer

Integration, ATTN: Joint Fires Division.

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,

made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Lou

Durkac, Joint Staff J-6; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr. Danny Allen, Joint Staff J-6;

LCDR Jason Berwanger, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division; and LCDR

Adam Yates, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 12 December 2014.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,

please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-

support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other

organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents

reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force

readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint

Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons

learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative

resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness

of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine

Appendix E

E-2 JP 3-09

development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,

events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become

institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are

routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the

development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil

(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be

IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,

Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD

Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are

available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp

(NIPRNET) and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/generic.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at

http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and

Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-

Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member,

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-

ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally

reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support

agencies.

GL-1

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

AADC area air defense commander

AAMDC Army air and missile defense command

ACA airspace coordination area

ACE aviation combat element (USMC)

ACM airspace coordinating measure

ACO airspace control order

ADRP Army doctrine reference publication

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures

AI air interdiction

AIRCOR air corridor

AMD air and missile defense

ANGLICO air-naval gunfire liaison company

AO area of operations

AOA amphibious objective area

AOC air operations center

ASOC air support operations center

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATCS air traffic control section

ATF amphibious task force

ATO air tasking order

ATP Army techniques publication

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BCD battlefield coordination detachment (USA)

BCL battlefield coordination line

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs

CAS close air support

CATF commander, amphibious task force

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CDE collateral damage estimation

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command

CFL coordinated fire line

CGTTP Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures

CID combat identification

CIE collaborative information environment

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

COA course of action

COC combat operations center

Glossary

GL-2 JP 3-09

CONOPS concept of operations

COP common operational picture

CRC control and reporting center

CSW coordinate seeking weapons

DACAS digitally aided close air support

DASC direct air support center

DCO-RA defensive cyberspace operations-response actions

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

DODI Department of Defense instruction

DS direct support

DTG date-time group

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EA electronic attack

EMS electromagnetic spectrum

ES electronic warfare support

EW electronic warfare

FA field artillery

FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne)

FE fires element

FECC fires and effects coordination center (USMC)

FFA free-fire area

FFT friendly force tracking

FIST fire support team (USA)

FM field manual (USA)

FOS forward observer system

FSA fire support area

FSC fire support coordinator (USMC)

FSCC fire support coordination center (USMC)

FSCL fire support coordination line

FSCM fire support coordination measure

FSCOORD fire support coordinator (USA)

FSS fire support station

GARS Global Area Reference System

GCE ground combat element (USMC)

GMLRS Global Positioning System Multiple Launch Rocket

System

GPS Global Positioning System

GS general support

HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone

HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

Glossary

GL-3

HPT high-payoff target

HQ headquarters

HVT high-value target

INS inertial navigation system

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

JACCE joint air component coordination element

JACE joint air coordination element

JADOCS Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

JAGIC joint air-ground integration center

JAOC joint air operations center

JASSM joint air-to-surface standoff missile

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JFE joint fires element

JFHQ-C joint force headquarters-cyberspace

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander

JFO joint fires observer

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list

JOA joint operations area

JOC joint operations center

JP joint publication

JPG joint planning group

JSOA joint special operations area

JSOAC joint special operations air component

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTAC joint terminal attack controller

JTCB joint targeting coordination board

JTF joint task force

JTL joint target list

JTWG joint targeting working group

LCE logistics combat element (USMC)

LDO laser designator operator

LF landing force

LGW laser-guided weapon

LST laser spot tracker

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

Marine TACC Marine tactical air command center

Glossary

GL-4 JP 3-09

MARLE Marine liaison element

MCM maneuver control measure

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication

MCTP Marine Corps tactical publication

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEA munitions effectiveness assessment

MILDEC military deception

MISO military information support operations

MLRS multiple launch rocket system

MOC maritime operations center

MOE measure of effectiveness

MOP measure of performance

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Navy TACC Navy tactical air control center

NFA no-fire area

NGO nongovernmental organization

NLW nonlethal weapon

NSFS naval surface fire support

NSL no-strike list

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

OCO offensive cyberspace operations

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

OPSEC operations security

PID positive identification

PL phase line

RFA restrictive fire area

RFL restrictive fire line

ROE rules of engagement

RTL restricted target list

SA situational awareness

SACC supporting arms coordination center (USMC)

SCAR strike coordination and reconnaissance

SDB small diameter bomb

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

SFCP shore fire control party

SJA staff judge advocate

SJOA space joint operating area

SOCCE special operations command and control element

SOF special operations forces

SOJTF special operations joint task force

Glossary

GL-5

SOLE special operations liaison element

SOP standard operating procedure

SOTF special operations task force

SPINS special instructions

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO)

STO special technical operations

STT special tactics team

TA target acquisition

TAC(A) tactical air coordinator (airborne)

TACP tactical air control party

TACS theater air control system

TAIS Tactical Airspace Integration System

TAOC tactical air operations center (USMC)

TBMCS theater battle management core system

TGO terminal guidance operations

TIM toxic industrial material

TLAM Tomahawk land-attack missile

TST time-sensitive target

UA unmanned aircraft

USG United States Government

USMC United States Marine Corps

WMD weapons of mass destruction

ZF zone of fire

GL-6 JP 3-09

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

chief of fires. The senior organic fires Army staff officer at division and higher

headquarters level who advises the commander on the best use of available fire support

resources, provides input to necessary orders, and develops and implements the fire

support plan. Also called COF. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

combat identification. The process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected

objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision.

Also called CID. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

coordinated fire line. A line beyond which conventional surface-to-surface direct fire and

indirect fire support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the

establishing headquarters without additional coordination but does not eliminate the

responsibility to coordinate the airspace required to conduct the mission. Also called

CFL. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

counterfire. Fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons. (DOD Dictionary.

Source: JP 3-09)

defilade. 1. Protection from hostile observation and fire provided by an obstacle such as a

hill, ridge, or bank. 2. A vertical distance by which a position is concealed from enemy

observation. 3. To shield from enemy fire or observation by using natural or artificial

obstacles. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

field artillery. Equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of

cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers. Also called FA. (DOD

Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

fires. The use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal

effects on a target. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

fire support. Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, space, cyberspace,

and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and

facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. (Approved for incorporation

into the DOD Dictionary.)

fire support area. An appropriate maneuver area assigned to fire support ships by the

naval force commander from which they can deliver gunfire support to an amphibious

operation. Also called FSA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

fire support coordination. The planning and executing of fire so targets are adequately

covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (Approved for incorporation into

the DOD Dictionary.)

fire support coordination center. A single site in which centralized communications

facilities and personnel incident to the coordination of all forms of fire support for

Glossary

GL-7

Marine forces are located. Also called FSCC. (Approved for incorporation into the

DOD Dictionary.)

fire support coordination line. A fire support coordination measure established by the

land or amphibious force commander to support common objectives within an area of

operation, beyond which all fires must be coordinated with affected commanders prior

to engagement and, short of the line, all fires must be coordinated with the establishing

commander prior to engagement. Also called FSCL. (Approved for incorporation

into the DOD Dictionary.)

fire support coordinator. 1. The officer in charge of the fire support coordination center.

Also called FSC. 2. The brigade combat team’s organic fires battalion commander.

Also called FSCOORD. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

fire support element. That section of the tactical operations center at every echelon above

company responsible for targeting coordination and for integrating fires under the

control or in support of the force. Also called FSE. (Approved for incorporation into

the DOD Dictionary.)

fire support officer. The field artillery officer, from the operational to tactical level,

responsible for advising the supported commander or assisting the senior fires officer

of the organization on fires functions and fire support. Also called FSO. (Approved

for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

forward observer. An individual operating with front line troops trained to adjust ground

or naval gunfire and pass back battlefield information. Also called FO. (Approved

for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

free-fire area. A specific region into which any weapon system may fire without

additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. Also called FFA.

(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

friendly force tracking. The process of fixing, observing, and reporting the location and

movement of friendly forces. Also called FFT. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

grid coordinates. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

inertial navigation system. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

kill box. A three-dimensional permissive fire support coordination measure with an

associated airspace coordinating measure used to facilitate the integration of fires.

(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

laser-guided weapon. A weapon that uses a seeker to detect laser energy reflected from

a laser-marked/designated target and provides guidance commands to a control system

that guides the weapon to the target. Also called LGW. (Approved for incorporation

into the DOD Dictionary.)

Glossary

GL-8 JP 3-09

laser rangefinder. A device that uses laser energy for determining the distance from the

device to a place or object. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

laser spot. The area on a surface illuminated by a laser. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

laser spot tracker. A device that locks on to the reflected energy from a laser-marked or

designated target and defines the direction of the target relative to itself. Also called

LST. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

laser target designator. A device that emits a beam of laser energy that is used to mark a

specific place or object. Also called LTD. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD

Dictionary.)

naval gunfire support. Fire provided by Navy surface gun systems in support of a unit or

units tasked with achieving the commander's objectives. Also called NGFS. (DOD

Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

nonlethal weapon. A weapon, device, or munition that is explicitly designed and

primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or materiel immediately, while

minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to

property in the target area or environment. Also called NLW. (Approved for

incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

phase line. An easily identified feature in the operational area utilized for control and

coordination of military operations. Also called PL. (Approved for incorporation into

the DOD Dictionary.)

restrictive fire area. A location in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which

fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the

establishing headquarters. Also called RFA. (Approved for incorporation into the

DOD Dictionary.)

restrictive fire line. A specific boundary established between converging, friendly surface

forces that prohibits fires or their effects from crossing. Also called RFL. (Approved

for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

schedule of fire. Groups or series of fires that are fired in a definite sequence according

to a definite program. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

scheme of fires. The detailed, logical sequence of targets and fire support events to find

and engage targets to support the commander’s objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source:

JP 3-09)

shore fire control party. A specially trained unit that controls naval gunfire in support of

troops ashore. Also called SFCP. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD

Dictionary.)

Glossary

GL-9

spotter. A trained individual positioned to observe and report results of naval gunfire to

the firing agency and who may also designate targets. (Approved for incorporation

into the DOD Dictionary.)

supporting fire. Fire delivered by supporting units to assist or protect a unit in combat.

(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

terminal guidance operations. Actions using electronic, mechanical, voice, or visual

communications that provide approaching aircraft and/or weapons additional

information regarding a specific target location. Also called TGO. (DOD Dictionary.

Source: JP 3-09)

time of flight. In artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support, the time in seconds from the

instant a weapon is fired, launched, or released from the delivery vehicle or weapons

system to the instant it strikes or detonates. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD

Dictionary.)

zone of action. A tactical subdivision of a larger area. (Approved for incorporation into

the DOD Dictionary.)

zone of fire. An area into which a designated ground unit or fire support ship delivers, or is

prepared to deliver, fire support. Also called ZF. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

Glossary

GL-10 JP 3-09

Intentionally Blank

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment

matrix

LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first

draft (FD)

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

FC joint working group

STEP #4 - Maintenance

Revision begins 3.5 years

after publication

Formal assessment begins

24-27 months following

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

JP published and continuously

assessed by users

STEP #1 - Initiation

Joint doctrine development

community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-

end analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant

command, JS directorate)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM

PLANSPERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

JP 3-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint

Publication (JP) 3-09 Operationsis in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below

illustrates an overview of the development process: