30 June 2010
Joint Fire Support
Joint Publication 3-09
i
PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning,
coordinating, and executing joint fire support across the range of military operations.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the
Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for
interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It
provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and
other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations,
education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in
preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the
authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the
JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the
overall objective.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff,
commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces,
subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.
b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be
followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances
dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the
contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.
Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military
command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United
States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should
evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where
applicable and consistent with US laws, regulations, and doctrine.
For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
LLOYD J. AUSTIN III
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
Preface
ii JP 3-09
Intentionally Blank
iii
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-09, DATED 13 NOVEMBER 2006
AND SUPERSESSION OF J OINT PUBLICATION 3-09.1,
DATED 28 MAY 1999
Consolidates Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Laser Designation Operations, into JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support,
and cancels JP 3-09.1
Clarifies what constitutes nonlethal fires and their purpose
Expands the discussion of the joint fires element to explain the key functions
and tasks it generally performs
Updates the descriptions of the component fires command and control entities
provided by the Services; to include new descriptions: forward air controller
(air), tactical air controller (air), joint forward observer, joint tactical air
controller and joint air component coordination element
Adds paragraphs on the Advance Field Artillery Tactical Data System and
Theater Battle Management Core Systems
Eliminates detailed discussion on datums, coordinates systems, and area
reference systems and references JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to
Joint Operations, for the source of this information
Inserts new Joint Fire Support Assessment paragraph
Adds an Airspace Coordinating Area subparagraph under Airspace
Coordinating Measures paragraph in Appendix A
Incorporated the JP 3-09.1 material into new Appendix C
Modifies the definitions of counterfire, fires, schedule of fire, and supporting
fire
Creates new term and definition for concept of fires
Removes from JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, the terms and definitions for: at my command, backscatter,
call fire, call for fire, continuous illumination fire, direct support artillery,
enlisted terminal attack controller, fire, fire, barrage (specify), fire capabilities
chart, fire control, fire control radar, fire control system, fire coordination, fire
for effect, fire message, fire mission, fire plan, firepower, firing chart, laser,
laser footprint, laser linescan system, laser pulse duration, laser target
designating system, laser-target/gun-target angle, laser target marker, laser
Summary of Changes
iv JP 3-09
target making system, low angle, low angle fire, low angle loft bombing, offset
lasing, pulse code, pulse repetition frequency, rate of fire, special operations
terminal attack controler, spillover, and submunition
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ vii
CHAPTER I
JOINT FIRE SUPPORT OVERVIEW
Introduction ............................................................................................................... I-1
Concept of Fires ........................................................................................................ I-2
Employment Considerations ..................................................................................... I-3
Synchronization of Maneuver and Fires ................................................................... I-4
Synchronizing and/or Integrating Maneuver and Interdiction .................................. I-5
CHAPTER II
JOINT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL
Introduction .............................................................................................................. II-1
Joint Fire Support Command and Control ............................................................... II-1
CHAPTER III
JOINT FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND EXECUTION
Introduction ............................................................................................................ III-1
Joint Fire Support Planning ................................................................................... III-1
Other Planning Considerations .............................................................................. III-4
Joint Fire Support Planning Process ...................................................................... III-7
Joint Fire Support Coordination ........................................................................... III-12
Joint Fire Support Assessment .............................................................................. III-16
Joint Fire Support and Force Capabilities ............................................................ III-17
Joint Fire Support Coordination Measures and Reference Systems .................... III-20
Combat Identification .......................................................................................... III-20
Mitigation of Collateral Damage ......................................................................... III-21
APPENDIX
A Control and Coordination Measures ................................................................. A-1
B Joint Fire Support Operation Order Format ....................................................... B-1
C Laser-Guided Systems ........................................................................................ C-1
D References ......................................................................................................... D-1
E Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ E-1
Table of Contents
vi JP 3-09
GLOSSARY
Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-6
FIGURE
II-1 Typical Joint Fires Element ............................................................................. II-3
III-1 Joint Fire Support Planning Process ............................................................. III-8
A-1 Fire Support and Control Measures .............................................................. A-3
A-2 Fire Support Coordination Line .................................................................... A-4
A-3 Restrictive Fire Line, Fire Support Area, and Zone of Fire .......................... A-8
C-1 Airborne and Ground Designator Advantages and Disadvantages ..................C-6
C-2 Example of Safety Zone, Acquisition Area, and Optimal Attack Zone ...........C-8
C-3 Hellfire Designator Exclusion Zone .................................................................C-9
vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW
Describes the Joint Fire Support System
Discusses Joint Fire Support Command and Control
Delineates Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
Overview
Scope and Purpose
This publication provides fundamental principles
and guidance
for planning, coordinating, and
executing joint fire support across the range of
military operations. It sets forth joint doctrine to
govern the activities and performance of the Armed
Forces of the United States in joint operations and
provides the doctrinal basis for interagency
coordination and for US military involvement in
multinational operations.
Introduction
Command and Control
The foundations of joint fire support are based
on the elements of combat power, the principles
of joint operations, and joint functions. The
elements of combat power are combined to provide
the basis for the generation of overwhelming
firepower. The fire support system has its roots in
the firepower element of combat power.
Joint Fire Support
is Synchronized to Collectively
Ensure Effective Fires.
Synchronized joint fire support requires the
coordinated interaction of all of the elements of
the fire support system, thorough and continuous
planning,
aggressive coordination, and vigorous
execution.
The fire support system includes the
target acquisition, command and control (C2), and
attack/delivery systems
that must function
collectively to ensure effective fires are delivered
where and when the commander requires them.
Fires
Fires. Fires are defined as the use of weapon
systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect
on a target. All fires are normally synchronized and
integrated to achieve synergistic results. Fires can
Executive Summary
viii JP 3-09
be delivered by air, land, maritime, or special
operations forces (SOF).
Joint Fires
Joint Fires. Joint fires are defined as fires
delivered during the employment of forces from two
or more components in coordinated action to
produce desired effects in support of a common
objective.
Joint Fire Support
Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support is defined as
joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and SOF to
move, maneuver, and control territory, populations,
airspace, and key waters in support of the joint force
commander’s (JFC’s) scheme of maneuver.
All Fires Should Support Joint
Force Commander Objectives.
The concept of operations (CONOPS) describes
how actions of the joint force components and
supporting organizations will be integrated,
synchronized, and phased to accomplish the
mission, including potential branches and sequels.
All fires should support the JFC’s objectives. Some
fires will support maneuver forces, and other fires
are independent of maneuver and orient on creating
specific effects.
Supported Commanders
The land and maritime force commanders are
the supported commanders within the areas of
operations (AOs) designated by the JFC
. In
coordination with the land and/or maritime force
commander, those commanders designated by the
JFC to execute theater and/or joint operations area
(JOA)-wide functions have the latitude to plan and
execute these JFC prioritized operations within land
and maritime AOs. Any commander executing such
a mission within a land or maritime AO must
coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects
and fratricide. If those operations w
ould have
adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the
commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide
functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue
with the land or maritime component commander,
or consult with the JFC for resolution.
Preventive Measures for
Limiting Fratricide
Commanders must identify and assess situations
that increase the risk of fratricide. The primary
preventive measures for limiting fratricide are
Executive Summary
ix
comprehensive combat identification training,
command emphasis, disciplined op
erations, fire
support coordination measures, airspace
coordination measures, close coordination among
component commands, rehearsals, reliable and
interoperable, battle tracking, effective procedures,
and enhanced situational awareness.
Fundamental and Beneficial
Effects of Teamwork
Combining joint fire support and maneuver relies on
the fundamental and beneficial effects of teamwork,
unity of effort, and synchronization of capabilities
in time, space, and purpose. Maneuver and joint
fire support are c
omplementary functions that
are essential to achieving JFC objectives. Joint
fire support destroys, neutralizes, or suppresses
enemy forces and disrupts enemy maneuver, both
on the surface and in the air, which assists the
maneuver of friendly forces.
Joint Fire Support Effects
Typically, the execution of joint fire support has
an immediate or near term effect on the conduct
of friendly operations.
Complementary Operations
Synchronizing and/or integrating interdiction
and maneuver (air, land, and maritime) provides
one of the most dynamic concepts available to the
joint force. Interdiction and maneuver usually are
not considered separate operations against a
common enemy, but rather normally are considered
complementary operations designed to achieve the
military strategic and operational objectives.
Joint Fire Support Command and Control
Synchronization and
Integration
The JFC, using systems that allow rapid response to
changes as they occur, is responsible for ensuring
the synchronization and integration of joint fires.
The challenge for the JFC is to integrate and
synchronize the wide range of capabilities at his
disposal.
The Operations Directorate of
a Joint Staff
The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3)
serves as the JFC’s principal staff advisor for the
coordination, integration, and synchronization of
joint fire support with other major elements of
operations such as C2, intelligence, movement and
Executive Summary
x JP 3-09
maneuver, protection, and sustainment. The J-3
recommends, coordinates, reviews, designates, and
disseminates fire support coordination measures,
maneuver control measures, and airspace
coordinating measures as part of overall concept of
the operations for joint fires and joint fire support.
Joint Fires Element
The JFC may approve the formation of a joint
fires element (JFE) within the J-3. The JFE is an
optional staff element comprised of representatives
from the J-3, the components, and other elements of
the JFC’s staff, to include the intelligence
directorate of a joint staff targeting staff, logistics
directorate of a joint staff,
plans directorate of a
joint staff, and others as required. The JFE is an
integrating staff element that synchronizes and
coordinates fires planning and coordination on
behalf of the JFC and should be physically located
near the joint task force joint
operations center,
collocated with the information operations cell if
possible. The JFE assists the J-3 in accomplishing
responsibilities and tasks as a staff advisor to the
JFC.
Joint Targeting and
Coordination Boards
Typically JFCs organize joint targeting coordination
boards (JTCB). The JFC has the responsibility to
conduct planning, coordination, and deconfliction
associated with joint targeting. When a JTCB is not
established and the JFC decides not
to delegate
targeting oversight, the JFC may perform this task at
the joint force headquarters. Typically, however,
the JFC may establish
a JTCB and appoints the
deputy JFC or a component commander to chair it.
Unique Fire Support
Command and Control
Agencies
The land, air, maritime, and SOF components of a
joint force all have unique fire support command
and control agencies.
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
Integration in the Joint
Planning Process
The key to effective integration of joint fire
support is the thorough and continuous inclusion
of all component fire support elements in the
joint planning process, aggressive coordination
efforts, and a vigorous execution of the plan.
Executive Summary
xi
Joint Fire Support Planners
Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators
actively participate with other members of the staff
to develop estimates, give the commander
recommendations, develop the joint fire support
portion of the CONOPS, and supervise the
execution of the commander’s decision. The
effectiven
ess of their planning and coordination is
predicated on the commander providing clear and
precise guidance.
Purpose of Joint Fire Support
Planning
The purpose of joint fire support planning is to
optimize its
employment by integrating and
synchronizing
joint fire support with the
commander’s maneuver plan. During the planning
phase, commanders develop a CONOPS,
including the concept for fires. Commanders
determine how to shape the operational
environment with fires to assist maneuver and
how to use maneuver to exploit the use of joint
fire support.
Four Basic Fire Support Tasks
Effective joint fire support depends on planning for
the
successful performance of the following four
basic fire support tasks: support forces in contact;
support the CONOPS; s
ynchronize joint fire
support; and sustain joint fire support
operations.
Wartime Posture
When the instruments of national power
(diplomatic, information, military,
and economic)
are unable to achieve national strategic objectives or
protect national interests without force, the US
national leadership may decide to conduct a
major operation involving large-
scale combat,
placing the United States in a wartime posture.
In such cases, the goal is to prevail
against the
enemy as quickly as possible, conclu
de hostilities,
and establish conditions favorable to the United
States, the host nation, and its multinational
partners.
Crisis Response and
Contingency Operations
Joint fire support employed in support of crisis
response and contingency operations may
be the
same as those employed for major operations and
campaigns but are normally more restrictive in their
application.
Executive Summary
xii JP 3-09
Security Cooperation and
Deterrence Operations
Lethal joint fire support employed in support of
security cooperation and deterrence operations are
normally the most restrictive in their application and
may be limited to defensive fires only.
Multinational Operations
Fire support coordination in multinational
operations demands special arrangements with
multinational forces and local authorities. To
maximize the fires of the multinational force and to
minimize the possibility of fratricide, the
multinational force commander and staff must
become familiar with each nation’s capabilities and
limitations in munitions, digital capability, and
training, to ensure that they develop good fire
support coordination throughout the multinational
force.
Joint Fire Support Planning
Joint fire support planning is accomplished utilizing
both the targeting and joint fire support estimate
processes. It is a continual and cyclical process of
planning, synchronizing, and executing joint fires
involving tactical, operational, and strategic
considerations that also utilizes joint fire support
command, control, and communications systems
and architectures. Initiated during mission analysis
and continuing through post-execution assessment,
the joint fire support planning process includes the
following steps: end state and the commander’s
objectives; target development and prioritization;
capabilities analy
sis; commander’s decision and
force assignment; mission planning and force
execution; and assessment.
Agencies Involved in
Coordinating Joint Fire
Support
Agencies involved in coordinating joint fire support
employ several principles which are extensions of
the four basic fire support tasks.
Plan early and continuously.
Ensure continuous flow of targeting
information.
Consider the use of all lethal and/or
nonlethal attack means.
Executive Summary
xiii
Use the lowest echelon capable of
furnishing effective support.
Furnish the type of joint fire support
requested.
Use the most effective joint fire support
means.
Avoid unnecessary duplication.
Coordinate airspace.
Provide adequate support.
Provide for rapid coordination.
Protect the force.
Analyze effectiveness.
Provide for flexibility.
Joint Fire Support
Coordination
Joint fire support coordination includes all efforts to
deconflict attacks, avoid fratricide, reduce
duplication of effort, and assist in shaping the
operational environment. Coordination
procedures must be flexible and responsive to the
ever changing dynamics of warfighting.
Assessment
Assessment is a continuous process that measures
progress of the joint force toward mission
accomplishment.
The JFC and component
commanders assess the operational environment and
the progress of operations, and compare them to
their initial vision and intent.
Combat Identification
Combat identification is the process of attaining
an accurate characterization of detected objects
in the operational
environment sufficient to
support an engagement decision. Depending on
the situation and the operational decisions that
must be made, this characterization may be
limited to “friend,” “enemy,” “neutral,” or
“unknown.” In other
situations, other
characterizations may be required including,
Executive Summary
xiv JP 3-09
but not limited to, class, type, nationality, and
mission configuration.
Mensuration
Mensuration is the act of precisely measuring
something and is commonly used in t
argeting to
refer to the exact
measurement (location) of a
target’s geographical coordinates. Point
mensuration has always been an important part of
targeting, since the points measured represent the
desired points of impact for the munitions
employed. As the accuracy of weapons delivery has
improved, the importance of mensuration has grown
in proportion and is a vital part of targeting.
Principle of Proportionality
Under the law of armed conflict, the principle of
proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of
civilian life and damage to civilian property
incidental to att
acks must not be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage expected to be gained. Commanders
therefore have the responsibility to attempt to
minimize collateral damage to the greatest extent
practicable. Collateral damage estima
tion is an
important step in the target development process.
However, it should not preclude the inclusion of
valid military targets on a target list.
I-1
CHAPTER I
JOINT FIRE SUPPORT OVERVIEW
1. Introduction
a. The joint force commander (JFC) and component commanders, with the
assistance of their staffs, integrate and synchronize joint fire support in time, space, and
purpose to increase the effectiveness of the joint force. The JFC organizes forces to
accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations (CONOPS). The
organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet planned phases of contemplated
operations and any development that may require a change in plan. The JFC establishes
subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate
command and support relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the
component commanders. The JFC provides guidance to integrate components
capabilities and synchronize the execution of fires. Systems for delivering firepower may
be limited, and there are competing priorities for employing these assets. Therefore,
JFCs and their staffs carefully balance resources and requirements over the course of a
joint operation to ensure the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities required to
achieve the objective.
b. The foundations of joint fire support are based on the elements of combat power,
the principles of joint operations, and joint functions. The elements of combat power are
combined to provide the basis for the generation of overwhelming firepower. The fire
support system has its roots in the firepower element of combat power. The principles of
joint operations provide a set of time-tested guidelines for combining the elements of
combat power and employing fire support. Joint functions are related capabilities and
activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations
to include fires.
c. Synchronized joint fire support requires the coordinated interaction of all of the
elements of the fire support system, thorough and continuous planning, aggressive
coordination, and vigorous execution. The fire support system includes the target
acquisition (TA), command and control (C2), and attack/delivery systems that must
function collectively to ensure effective fires are delivered where and when the
commander requires them.
(1) Fires. Fires are defined as the use of weapon systems to create specific
lethal or nonlethal effects on a target. All fires are normally synchronized and
integrated to achieve synergistic results. Fires can be delivered by air, land, maritime, or
special operations forces (SOF).
“Joint fire support is defined as joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and
special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations,
airspace, and key waters.”
Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations
Chapter I
I-2 JP 3-09
(2) Joint Fires. Joint fires are defined as fires delivered during the
employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to
produce desired effects in support of a common objective. Joint fires are provided to
assist forces (air, land, maritime, or SOF) in conducting operations across the range of
military operations.
(3) Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support is defined as joint fires that assist air,
land, maritime, and SOF to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace,
and key waters in support of the JFCs scheme of maneuver. Integration and
synchronization of joint fire support with the movement and maneuver of the supported
force is essential. Prerequisites for effective joint fire support are interoperable systems,
broad understanding of the differing strengths and limitations of each Services
capabilities and how they are applied, and clear agreement about how those capabilities
will be integrated in any given operational setting.
2. Concept of Fires
The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint force components and
supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the
mission, including potential branches and sequels. The commander defines
responsibilities by providing guidance to the staff and subordinate commanders. Integral
to the CONOPS is the concept of fires. The concept of fires describes how lethal and
nonlethal joint fires will be synchronized and integrated to support the JFCs operational
objectives. The JFC determines the enemys center of gravity (COG), associated critical
factors, and decisive points and how the application of fires can assist in creating the
desired effects to attain the objective. The JFC can also highlight the anticipated critical
actions, times, and places that would serve as triggers for friendly action. The JFC
determines the sequencing of key events and emphasizes the desired end state. Some
fires will support maneuver forces and other fires are independent of maneuver and orient
on creating specific effects. All fires should support the JFCs objectives. The JFC
provides guidance on his objectives and desired effects and priorities and what
effects of fires should have on the enemy (e.g., deny, disrupt, delay, suppress,
neutralize, destroy, or influence). In addition, the JFC provides guidance on munitions
usage and restrictions. The JFC also provides guidance on restricted targets and a no-
strike list (NSL). Restricted targets are targets that have specific restrictions imposed
upon them. Actions that exceed specified restrictions are prohibited until coordinated
and approved by the establishing headquarters (HQ). This list also includes restricted
targets directed by higher authorities. Items on an NSL are those objects or entities
characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under the law of armed
conflict, international law and/or rules of engagement (ROE). Additional considerations
for an NSL could include conventions, or agreements, or damaging relations with the
indigenous population. The JFC may also make available specific assets for operational
area-wide employment, such as Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMSs), sensor-
fuzed weapons, or Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs), and nonlethal assets
designed to enable or disable materiel, personnel, and networks.
Joint Fire Support Overview
I-3
3. Employment Considerations
a. Complementary and Interdependent. The JFC integrates diverse fires assets
from air, land, maritime, SOF, and multinational forces. To maximize the effects of fires,
complementary and interdependent actions are required. These actions include planning,
target acquisition, execution, and assessment.
b. Command and Control in Operational Areas. The land and maritime force
commanders are the supported commanders within the areas of operations (AOs)
designated by the JFC. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime force
commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate
this integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate
target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs.
(1) Synchronization of efforts within land or maritime AOs with theater and/or
joint operations area (JOA)-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate
synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the
theater and/or JOA, including within the land and maritime force commanders AOs.
The joint force air component commander (JFACC) is normally the supported
commander for the JFCs overall air interdiction (AI) effort, while land and maritime
component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs.
(2) In coordination with the land and/or maritime force commander, those
commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater and/or JOA-wide functions have
the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations within land and maritime
AOs. Any commander executing such a mission within a land or maritime AO must
coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects and fratricide. If those operations would
have adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute
the JOA-wide functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the land or
maritime component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.
(3) A joint special operations area (JSOA) is a restricted area of land, sea, and
airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special
operations component or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) for the conduct of
special operations (SO) (e.g., a discrete direct action mission or longer term
unconventional warfare operations). JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate
simultaneous conventional and SO. Within the JSOA, the joint force special operations
component commander (JFSOCC) is the supported commander.
c. Unity of Effort. Component forces planning, execution, and TA capabilities
often overlap. Due to the diversity of systems capable of providing joint fire support, C2,
and TA, the JFC must ensure unity of effort throughout the joint force.
Chapter I
I-4 JP 3-09
4. Synchronization of Maneuver and Fires
a. Combining joint fire support and maneuver relies on the fundamental and
beneficial effects of teamwork, unity of effort, and synchronization of capabilities in
time, space, and purpose. As a principle of war, maneuver is the movement of forces in
relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver
or threaten delivery of the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force.
Maneuver positions forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock,
physical momentum, and massed effects. The focus of maneuver is to render opponents
incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to
fight as an effective, coordinated whole) rather than by destroying them physically
through attrition.
See Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, for a more detailed discussion on
maneuver.
b. Maneuver and joint fire support are complementary functions that are
essential to achieving JFC objectives. Maneuver is conducted to achieve positional
advantage in respect to the enemy action to accomplish the mission. The principal
purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to the enemy COG in order
to control or destroy associated critical capabilities (CCs). Maneuver of forces relative to
enemy CCs can be key to the JFCs operation. Through maneuver, the JFC concentrates
forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical
momentum. Chances of successful maneuver are improved with fire support and
movement. Joint fire support destroys, neutralizes, or suppresses enemy forces and
disrupts enemy maneuver, both on the surface and in the air, and influences populations
which assists the maneuver of friendly forces. Joint fire support may be used separately
from or in combination with maneuver to achieve strategic objectives or destroy,
neutralize, or suppress enemy ground, maritime, and air forces, and influence
populations. Through effective maneuver of friendly forces, the enemy can be placed
into a position of disadvantage. If the enemy remains in position, their forces may be
isolated and destroyed by fires delivered by land, air, maritime, and SOF. If the enemy
withdraws, attempts to establish new defensive positions, or maneuvers their forces for
counterattack, they may be exposed to unacceptable losses caused by the effective use of
joint fire support. When exploiting the effects of maneuver, commanders use joint fire
support to neutralize the enemys forces and destroy their will to fight. Maneuver and
firepower (joint fire support) are complementary dynamics of combat power. Although
one might dominate a phase of the battle, their synchronization is a characteristic of
successful military operations. The synchronization of fires and maneuver makes the
defeat of larger enemy forces feasible and enhances the protection of friendly forces.
“Battles are won by fire and by movement. The purpose of the movement is to
get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy. This is from
the rear or flank.”
George S. Patton Jr.
War As I Knew It
Joint Fire Support Overview
I-5
c. Prevention of Fratricide. The destructive power and range of modern weapons,
coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential
for fratricide. Risk management must become fully integrated while planning and
executing operations. Commanders must identify and assess situations that increase
the risk of fratricide. Commanders then incorporate guidance into all plans to minimize
and control risks by implementing preventive measures. The primary preventive
measures for limiting fratricide are comprehensive combat identification (CID) training,
command emphasis, disciplined operations, control measures, fire support coordination
measures (FSCMs), airspace coordinating measures (ACMs), close coordination among
component commands, rehearsals, reliable and interoperable coordination systems, battle
tracking, and enhanced situational awareness (SA). Recent developments in automation
and blue force tracking tools, as well as any singular preventative measures identified
above, assist in preventing fratricide, but must not be used as a sole means for clearance
of fires. The risk of fratricide is greatly reduced when engagement decisions are vested
with well-trained and qualified personnel. However, there is a trade-off between
reducing fratricide with restrictive rules and enduring higher friendly casualties by the
enemy. Therefore, fire support coordination and synchronization must be emphasized by
the JFC. Special instructions may also specify particular means to prevent fratricide in
specific missions.
d. Effects. Typically, the execution of joint fire support has an immediate or near
term effect on the conduct of friendly operations. Component commanders employ joint
fires to create the effects described in their CONOPS by synchronizing fires against the
enemy. Detailed integration and coordination with supported and supporting forces is
required. Planning allows detailed integration of joint fire support assets for anticipated
time-sensitive targets (TSTs) and other immediate targets.
e. Nonlethal Fires. Nonlethal fires are any fires that do not directly seek the
physical destruction of the intended target and are designed to impair, disrupt, or delay
the performance of enemy forces, functions, or facilities, or to alter the behavior of an
adversary. Nonlethal fires can be created using nonlethal or lethal weapons/capabilities.
Nonlethal fires are primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while
minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property
and the environment. Employment of nonlethal fires and other nonlethal capabilities
must be integrated into operations to produce synergistic results. Examples include
masking smoke, nighttime area illumination, area denial, and employment of some
information operations (IO) capabilities, such as electronic attack (EA) and computer
network attack (CNA), that deceive the enemy, disable the enemys C2 systems, and
disrupt operations. The employment of nonlethal fires is especially important when
restraint and limitations on the use of deadly force are directed.
5. Synchronizing and/or Integrating Maneuver and Interdiction
Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemys military
surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise
achieve objectives.
Chapter I
I-6 JP 3-09
a. Synchronizing and/or integrating interdiction and maneuver (air, land, and
maritime) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force.
Interdiction and maneuver usually are not considered separate operations against a
common enemy, but rather normally are considered complementary operations designed
to achieve the military strategic and operational objectives. Moreover, maneuver by air,
land, or maritime forces can be conducted to interdict enemy military potential. Potential
responses to integrated and synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create a dilemma
for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces may be
exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to
reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver.
The synergistic combined arms effect created by integrating and synchronizing
interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational
level.
b. The land or maritime commander should clearly articulate the vision of maneuver
operations to other commanders that may employ interdiction forces within the land or
maritime AO. The land or maritime commanders intent and CONOPS should clearly
state how interdiction will enable or enhance land or maritime force maneuver in the AO
and what is to be accomplished with interdiction (as well as those actions to be avoided,
such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a
specific area). Once this is understood, other interdiction-capable commanders normally
can plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with the land
or maritime commander. However, the land or maritime commander should provide
other interdiction-capable commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and
execution of interdiction operations within the AO.
c. JFCs must prioritize activities to support the maneuver and interdiction needs of
all forces and take action to mitigate any factor interfering with their effective
employment. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish
procedures through which land or maritime force commanders can specifically identify
those interdiction targets they are unable to engage with organic assets within their
operational areas that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be
identified individually or by category, specified geographically, or tied to a desired effect
or time period. Interdiction target priorities within the land or maritime AOs are
considered along with theater and/or JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and are
reflected in all the related resourcing decisions. The JFACC uses these priorities to plan,
coordinate, and execute the theater and/or JOA-wide AI effort. The purpose of these
procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets
directly affecting planned maneuver by air, land, or maritime forces.
See JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, for a more detailed discussion of interdiction.
II-1
CHAPTER II
JOINT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. Introduction
This chapter reviews the joint force command structure and the fire support functions
employed to control joint fires. It includes their roles, responsibilities, and some of the
targeting systems available to them. The successful application of joint fire support
depends on the close coordination of these functions. Joint fire support must function in
a coordinated and integrated manner to support the commander’s objectives.
2. Joint Fire Support Command and Control
a. Joint Force Commander and Staff
(1) Joint Force Commander. The JFC, using systems that allow rapid
response to changes as they occur, is responsible for ensuring the synchronization and
integration of joint fires. The challenge for the JFC is to integrate and synchronize the
wide range of capabilities at his disposal. The JFCs intent will normally be to bring
force against the opponents entire structure in a near simultaneous manner to overwhelm
and cripple the enemys capabilities and will to resist. In this effort, liaison elements play
a pivotal role in the coordination of joint fire support.
(2) Directorate of Operations
(a) The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) serves as the JFCs
principal staff advisor for the coordination, integration, and synchronization of joint fire
support with other major elements of operations such as C2, intelligence, movement and
maneuver, protection, and sustainment. These functions may include:
1.
Developing estimates of the situation and courses of action (COAs).
2.
Developing mission-type orders and guidance for JFC approval.
3.
Developing operation orders (OPORDs), and operation plans
(OPLANs).
4. Developing joint fire support targeting guidance, objectives, and
priorities for JFC approval.
A superiority of fire, and therefore a superiority in directing and delivering fire
and in making use of fire, will become the main factors upon which the
efficiency of a force will depend.
Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch
Precepts and Judgments, 1919
Chapter II
II-2 JP 3-09
5.
Coordinating and assessing joint operations.
6.
Coordinating ROE.
7.
Recommending, coordinating, reviewing, designating, and
disseminating FSCMs, maneuver control measures, ACMs as part of overall concept of
the operations for joint fires and joint fire support.
8.
Maintaining munitions supply status and logistic concerns affecting
joint force operations.
9.
Ensuring IO are fully integrated and synchronized with operations.
10.
Establishing a joint fires element (JFE).
11.
Organizing and serving as a member of a joint targeting
coordination board (JTCB), if established by the JFC.
(b) The JFC may approve the formation of a JFE within the J-3. The JFE is
an optional staff element comprised of representatives from the J-3, the components, and
other elements of the JFCs staff, to include the intelligence directorate of a joint staff
targeting staff, logistics directorate of a joint staff, plans directorate of a joint staff, and
others as required. (See Figure II-1.) The JFE is an integrating staff element that
synchronizes and coordinates fires planning and coordination on behalf of the JFC and
should be physically located near the joint task force (JTF) joint operations center,
collocated with the IO cell if possible. The JFE assists the J-3 in accomplishing
responsibilities and tasks as a staff advisor to the JFC. JFE key functions and tasks
generally include the following:
1.
Develops JOA-wide joint targeting guidance, objectives, and
priorities (normally accomplished in conjunction with component planners as part of the
joint planning group [JPG]).
2.
Coordinates, deconflicts, and validates target nominations at the
JFC level and higher.
3.
Coordinates component input to the joint integrated prioritized
target list (JIPTL). Prioritizes and forwards the JIPTL to the JTCB for review and
approval and then manages the approved JIPTL.
4.
Coordinates, maintains, and disseminates a complete list of
FSCMs within the JOA to avoid fratricide and deconflicts with other current or future
operations, to include managing the restricted target list (RTL) and NSL.
5. Develops the roles, functions, and agenda of the JTCB for JFC
approval.
Joint Fire Support Command and Control
II-3
6.
Organizes a strategy team to address intermediate targeting efforts
to bridge the gap between current and future operations.
TYPICAL JOINT FIRES ELEMENT
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-8 structure, resource, and assessment
directorate of a joint staff
LEGEND
provides input to
direct participation
standing
organization
group formed
as required
Commander,
Joint Task Force
JFE DIRECTOR
Targeting
Section
Operations
Section
Plans
Section
Component/
Service Liaisons -
Representatives
Headquarters Staff
Liaisons -
Representatives
JOINT FIRES ELEMENT (JFE)
Joint Force
Special Operations
Component Commander
Interagency
Partners
J-2
Joint Force
Air
Component Commander
National Intelligence
Community
J-3
J-5
Joint Force
Land
Component Commander
Multinational
Partners
J-4
J-8
Joint Force
Maritime
Component Commander
Joint Targeting
Coordination
Board
Figure II-1. Typical Joint Fires Element
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II-4 JP 3-09
7.
Reviews/recommends intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) collection requirements to include assisting the joint intelligence
support element in developing targets.
8.
Develops the joint fires estimate and COAs.
9.
Monitors TST and component-critical target operations for the J-3.
Recommends procedures for engaging TSTs and component-critical targets.
10.
Recommends JTF high-payoff targets (HPTs) to the JPG.
11.
Coordinates joint fires and targeting ROE issues.
12.
Develops collateral damage prevention procedures based on
commandersguidance and higher level directives.
13.
Conducts assessments of joint fires and targeting in coordination
with higher HQ and components.
(c) J-3 staffing may vary based on how the JFC forms the joint force HQ
and the component forces for the operation. The J-3’s augmentation requirements will
depend on a variety of factors, including the mission, expected complexity and duration
of the operation, peacetime staffing levels, expertise of the new operations staff, and the
joint force composition. Such augmentation should provide the capability to accomplish
fires planning and coordination functions relevant to the operation.
(d) Some joint force operations may require only limited augmentation. In
this case, the JFC might choose to absorb augmentees directly into existing joint force
staff sections and divisions. For example, the JFC may augment the joint operations
center with additional personnel from the combatant commands or Services to ensure
continuous operations capability.
(e) Information systems bring critical information together for collation,
collaboration, interpretation, and analysis to enable decisionmaking. Information
systems, personnel, equipment, and a variety of related procedures support the execution
of joint fire support missions. Unity of effort is key to the effective coordination of joint
fire support. Vertical and horizontal integration is also essential for effective joint fire
support. For this reason, Service and functional components provide a hierarchy of
coordinators, coordination agencies, and liaison officers that interface with commanders
at each level of execution. These coordinators have one goal in common — to effectively
direct the integration and employment of joint fire support to accomplish the mission.
(3) Joint Force Staff Functions. To effectively plan joint fire support,
planners must understand the objective, purpose of the operation, and the commanders
intent. Subordinate JFCs will translate the combatant commanders guidance and
strategy into clearly defined and attainable operational level objectives. They then write
Joint Fire Support Command and Control
II-5
supporting OPLANs and OPORDs to attain those objectives. These plans and orders will
contain a CONOPS that describes joint force employment. Joint fire support priorities
and goals are typically listed as part of the overall priorities and goals within the
CONOPS. The commanders estimate and the CONOPS assist in focusing the
employment of all assets, to include those providing joint fire support.
(a) Commander and Staff Estimates. Estimates help the commander
clearly understand the situation and select the best COA. The estimate results in an
accurate visualization of the current enemy and friendly situation, a visualization of the
goal or mission, and a clear expression of COAs. Consideration of how to employ fires
continues throughout the estimate process.
(b) Concept of Operations. The CONOPS is key in describing how the
commander anticipates the operation unfolding. The concept is based on the
commanders selected COA and describes where and how friendly forces engage the
enemy. In the CONOPS, the commander describes how the action of each of the
components or supporting commands fit together to accomplish the assigned mission.
The CONOPS discusses joint force maneuver and the application of joint fire support.
The joint fires discussion should reflect the JFCs concept for application of available
fires assets. Guidance for joint fire support should address the following:
1.
Joint force policies, procedures, and planning cycles.
2.
Joint fire support assets for planning purposes.
3.
Priorities for employing TA assets.
4.
Areas that require joint fire support to support operational
maneuver.
5.
TSTs.
6.
High-value targets (HVTs) and HPTs.
7.
Anticipated joint fire support requirements.
8.
FSCMs.
(4) Synchronizing Command and Control Assets. The JFC utilizes C2 to
synchronize efforts in a number of key areas, such as ISR. Appropriate joint, Service,
and national agencies engaged in ISR activities must support the efforts to integrate and
synchronize fires. To support the synchronization of fires, C2 must be responsive to the
user, and be capable of real-time information management and data processing.
See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.
Chapter II
II-6 JP 3-09
b. Joint Targeting Coordination Board. The JFC has the responsibility to conduct
planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with joint targeting. Typically, the
JFC establishes a JTCB and appoints the deputy JFC or a component commander to chair
it. When a JTCB is not established and the JFC decides not to delegate targeting
oversight, the JFC may perform this task at the joint force HQ. If the JFC so designates,
a JTCB may be either an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review
mechanism. In either case, it should be comprised of representatives from the staff, all
components and, if required, their subordinate units. The primary focus of the JTCB is to
ensure target priorities, guidance, and the associated effects are linked to the JFCs
objectives. Briefings conducted at the JTCB should focus on ensuring that targeting
efforts are coordinated and synchronized with intelligence and operations (by all
components and applicable staff elements). The JTCB must also maintain a current joint
target list, RTL, NSL, and current and planned FSCMs. (The JFC JFE will receive
component lists and FSCMs, then collate and disseminate current and planned target lists
and FSCMs.) The JTCB may assist the JFC in developing or revising the targeting
guidance and/or priorities. The JTCB maintains a macro-level view of the operational
area and ensures targeting nominations are consistent with the JFCs intent. In a
multinational environment, the JTCB may be subordinate to a multinational targeting
coordination board.
See JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
c. Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS)
(1) When conducting multinational operations, some contributing nations may
not have connectivity to the joint force information systems. This will require an
additional communications system to ensure that these forces and organizations have
interoperability to remain a viable contribution to the multinational effort.
(2) The JFC can facilitate information sharing by coordinating with the
supported commanders to establish a coalition local area network such as the
CENTRIXS. CENTRIXS provides one example of establishing and maintaining
multinational connectivity at the tactical and operational level, with reachback
capability to the strategic level.
d. Component Fires Command and Control
(1) Joint Force Land Component
(a) US Army Joint Fire Support Command and Control Agencies. Fire
support personnel are assigned at all levels from company to theater army (which may
also be the Army Service component commander or joint force land component
commander [JFLCC] HQ). A company fire support officer (FSO) leads the fire support
team (FIST). Battalion/squadron/brigade combat team FSOs lead the fires cell at their
respective HQ and are assisted by subordinate FSOs and fire support noncommissioned
officers (NCOs). The commander of the brigade combat teams fires battalion is
Joint Fire Support Command and Control
II-7
identified as the fire support coordinator and the commanders primary advisor on the
planning for and employment of field artillery (FA) and fire support and the integrations
of lethal and nonlethal fires. The chief of fires (COF) leads the fires cell found from
division to theater army level. He is assisted by cell FSOs and fire support NCOs. The
fires cell can send representatives (FSOs and/or fire support NCOs) fires elements to
other sections or cells within the HQ. These fire support personnel advise the
commander on fire support capabilities and joint fire support C2, effective use of fires
assets, and assist in the planning, coordination, and execution of fires.
1.
Chief of Fires (Army). The US Army COF is the senior FA officer
permanently assigned as the full-time fire support staff advisor to the commander and
staff at division and higher HQ. The COF performs all the staff functions associated with
fire support. Additionally, as fire support cell supervisor, the COF works with the
commander and his staff to integrate fire support and IO (core supporting and related
capabilities) with each other and into the unit’s concept of operation.
2.
Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD). The US Army
provides a BCD as the interface for selected operational environment functions between
the Army forces (ARFOR) and the air commander, or the US Air Force Service
component commander. A BCD is collocated with the joint air operations center
(JAOC), combined air operations center, or the Air Force air and space operations center
(AOC). The BCD interface includes exchanging current intelligence and operational
data, support requirements, coordinating the integration of ARFOR requirements for
ACMs, FSCMs, and theater airlift. A BCD can also be tasked to perform ARFOR
interface duties for subordinate US Army HQ. The BCD is not a fire support cell, but
acts as the ARFOR senior liaison element and also can perform many fires functions.
When a US Army HQ is the land commander, the BCD serves as the land commanders
liaison to the air component commander.
3.
Liaison. Although liaison elements from other Services are found
at supported Army units, various liaison elements such as Marine liaison, naval air
liaison, special operations liaison element (SOLE), and Navy surface operations liaison
elements usually link up with the BCD at the JAOC when appropriate. Typically, ground
liaison officers for fighter and airlift wings and other liaison officers may also be
provided.
4.
Fires Cell. The fires cell of the theater army operational command
post oversees the application of joint fire support, artillery, rockets, and offensive IO in
support of theater army operations. Responsibilities include:
a.
Coordinating and synchronizing all aspects of operational fires
with component commands, major subordinate commands, and multinational forces.
b.
Synchronizing fires with other governmental agencies.
Chapter II
II-8 JP 3-09
c.
Overseeing the development of the theater army operational
fires objectives, supporting target nominations, and attack guidance through the execution
of joint boards and cells.
d.
Participating as members of the joint and theater army target
coordination board, candidate target review boards, and other boards as required.
See Field Manual (FM) 3-09, Fire Support.
5.
US Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). The
AAMDC is the Armys operational lead for theater air and missile defense (TAMD) and
plans, coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes the operational elements of TAMD. The
AAMDC, normally collocated with the JAOC, operates in direct support (DS) of the area
air defense commander (AADC) and is fully integrated into the AADCs air defense C2
system. The AAMDC attack operations cell and intelligence section integrated within
the JAOC conduct analysis and targeting focused specifically against the theater missile
(TM) threat. Analysis includes such actions as developing TM information requirements,
building operational patterns and profiles, identifying trigger events, analyzing launch
events, conducting countermobility analysis, and identifying electronic warfare (EW)
vulnerabilities. TM targeting actions include nominating attack strategies and submitting
target nominations and mission requests directly to the JAOC. When appropriate, the
AAMDC commander or representative participates in the JTCB. Also, the AAMDC and
BCD will coordinate and synchronize their operations at the JAOC.
See FM 3-01.20/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I])
3-2.30, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for JAOC/AAMDC
Coordination.
(b) US Marine Corps Joint Fires Command and Control Agencies.
Depending upon the mission, the decision of the JFC, and their capabilities, US Marine
Corps (USMC) forces may be employed as the joint force land component, as part of the
joint force land component, as the joint force maritime component or as part of the joint
force maritime component, or as the joint force air component. Marine Corps forces will
operate as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) consisting of a command element, a
ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and a logistics
combat element. The MAGTF commander will retain operational control (OPCON) of
organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF ACE is the support of the
MAGTF GCE. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets normally will be in
support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to
the JFC, for tasking through the JFACC, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and
long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF DS requirements will be
provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for the support of other components
of the joint force or the joint force as a whole. Various agencies and elements exist
within the MAGTFs to assist commanders in the execution of their fires responsibilities.
These agencies may be used for either landing force (LF) or sustained land operations.
The Marine expeditionary force (MEF) command element organizes a force fires
Joint Fire Support Command and Control
II-9
coordination center (FFCC), which is responsible for overall fires coordination. At each
level below the MEF command element (division, regiment, and battalion), a fire support
coordination center (FSCC) is established as an advisory and coordination agency within
the GCE. The FFCC and each FSCC is staffed with representatives of the various Marine
Corps and Navy supporting arms whose roles differ at the various levels. For example,
during the initial phase of an amphibious operation, while control and coordination
responsibility of supporting arms is still afloat, the MAGTF typically provides the LF
representation in the Navy’s supporting arms coordination center (SACC).
See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for additional information.
1.
Commanders. In an amphibious operation, the commander,
amphibious task force (CATF), exercises the overall responsibility for coordination of
naval surface fire support (NSFS), air support, and LF artillery fire support. When the
commander, landing force (CLF), normally the MAGTF commander, is established
ashore, the CATF may pass this responsibility to the CLF. Once the passage of control
ashore is executed, the CLF will coordinate fires within the AO. When control is afloat,
the senior naval fire support coordination agency is the SACC.
See JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.
2.
Liaison. LF representatives coordinate requests of LF elements
ashore, monitor fire support activities, and plan additional requirements. This includes
continued liaison with the SACC and close coordination with the Marine air command
and control system (MACCS). LF representatives in the SACC make appropriate
recommendations regarding troop safety, type and means of delivery, and record all
target information for future reference ashore. Once control passes ashore, the MAGTF
commander executes responsibilities through the FFCC or FSCC ashore. This
responsibility includes continued liaison with the SACC along with close coordination
with the MACCS.
3.
Force Fires Coordination Center. The FFCC is the senior fire
support organization for the MAGTF. As such, it assists the MAGTF commander in the
planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of fires for a MAGTF. While the
FFCC assists the commander in fighting the single battle, its focus is on the deep fight.
The FFCC coordinates those matters that cannot be coordinated by the GCE (FSCC),
ACE Marine tactical air command center (TACC), or combat service support operations
center for integration of fire support plans. Additionally, it assists in providing fires in
support of close and rear fight. FFCC liaisons are sourced to provide close and
continuous coordination.
4. Fire Support Coordination Center. The FSCC is a single location
that centralizes communications facilities and personnel for the coordination of all forms
of fire support for the GCE. The USMC employs a designated ground combat officer as
a fire support coordinator (FSC), who acts as the direct representative of the CLF for the
planning and coordinating of all available fire support. The FSCC is organized and
Chapter II
II-10 JP 3-09
supervised by the FSC and is collocated with, and in support of, the operations officer. A
USMC FSCC normally includes an air section, naval gunfire liaison section, and artillery
section to plan and execute fires in support of the scheme of maneuver. Additionally, a
mortar section may be included in the FSCC for an infantry battalion, but will not be
found at any other level of C2 for fire support coordination.
5.
Tactical Air Command Center. The Marine TACC is the senior
agency of the MACCS. It provides the facilities for the commander of the ACE and the
battlestaff to command, supervise, and direct MAGTF air operations. The Marine TACC
is usually established ashore incrementally, beginning with a tactical air direction center
(TADC). When the commander of Marine Corps forces is also the JFACC, he will
augment the Marine Corps TACC with elements from other components to create a
JAOC.
6.
Direct Air Support Center (DASC). The DASC is an organization
within the MACCS and serves as the Marine Corps central coordination point for all
aircraft support to GCE-user agencies at all echelons. The DASC assigns direct air
support aircraft to terminal control agencies, provides aircraft ingress and egress route
instructions, and disseminates advisory information. When control is afloat, the Navy
tactical air control center (TACC) supervises the ashore DASCs operation. When
control is ashore, the Marine TADC or Marine TACC supervises the DASC’s operations.
The DASC is normally the first major air control agency to land in an amphibious
operation. The DASC becomes operational when control of the operation is passed
ashore and collocates (physically or electronically) with the senior FSCC.
7.
Marine Corps Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). The Marine
Corps TACP establishes and maintains facilities for liaison and communications between
supported units and appropriate control agencies. An air officer leads the TACP,
normally with three teams assigned per maneuver battalion. Their mission is to inform
and advise the supported ground unit commander on the employment of supporting
aircraft and to request and coordinate air support missions. In addition, the TACP
provides terminal attack control for close air support (CAS) missions.
8.
Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC). The Marine Corps
TAOC is subordinate to the Marine Corps TACC. Among its duties, the TAOC provides
safe passage, radar control, and surveillance for CAS aircraft en route to and from target
areas.
9.
Shore Fire Control Party (SFCP). The supporting Marine Corps
artillery battalions provide SFCPs to supported units. The SFCP consists of an NSFS
liaison team and an NSFS spotting team. The NSFS liaison team is specifically organized
to handle NSFS liaison matters for the supported commander, while the spotting team is
charged with requesting and adjusting fires of assigned DS ships and general support
(GS) ships.
Joint Fire Support Command and Control
II-11
(2) Joint Force Maritime Component/Commander Navy Forces
(a) Supporting Arms Coordination Center. The SACC is configured
with the communications facilities required to coordinate artillery, air, and naval surface
fires. Functioning as a fire support coordinating element for the maritime forces, the
SACC is supervised by the supporting arms coordinator. During amphibious operations,
the SACC is the primary agency that coordinates and controls all supporting fires for the
CATF to establish the LF ashore.
(b) Navy Tactical Air Control System. The Navy tactical air control
system is the principal air control system afloat. The senior Navy air control agency is
the Navy TACC. During amphibious operations, and before control is passed ashore,
Navy TACC controls all air operations within the amphibious objective area (AOA). The
Navy TACC is responsible for planning and conducting air operations, including CAS.
Typically, the Navy TACC is onboard the amphibious task force (ATF) flagship. If the
JFACCs command operations center is afloat, the Navy TACC may support operations
for the JAOC. The Navy TACC has two sections that control and integrate CAS:
1.
Air Traffic Control Section (ATCS). The ATCS provides initial
safe passage, radar control, and surveillance for CAS aircraft in the AOA. The ATCS
can also provide early detection, identification, and warning of enemy aircraft.
2.
Air Support Control Section. The air support control section
supports the Navy TACC by controlling, supporting, or transferring control to subsidiary
tactical air direction controllers afloat or ashore. The section is located in the SACC and
coordinates with the Navy TACC to assist in the deconfliction of air missions, routes, and
requests for fires.
(3) Joint Force Air Component Commander. JFCs normally will designate a
JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based
on the JFCs CONOPS. See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States, for additional guidance on the organization of joint forces.
Conversely, a transition from JFACC to JFC staff may also be directed when the JFC
determines that operational requirements warrant such a change. The Air Force, Navy, or
Marine Corps component commander may be designated as the JFACC. However, the
following discussion is based upon US Air Force fires C2 capabilities when the
commander Air Force forces is designated as the JFACC. The JFACC normally
exercises OPCON over US Air Force forces through the theater air ground system and
exercises tactical control or has a support relationship with other forces/capabilities made
available for tasking. The focal point for tasking and exercising control of these forces is
the JAOC. The JAOC performs the tasks of planning, coordinating, controlling,
reporting, and monitoring the execution of joint air operations.
(a) Joint Air Operations Center. The JAOC is structured to operate as a
fully integrated node and staffed by members of all participating components to fulfill the
air commanders responsibilities. The JAOC synchronizes air operations with joint force
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air, land, and sea operations through centralized planning, direction, and coordination of
air operations. The JAOC is the senior joint air power C2 element in the joint force and
is the JFACCs agent for providing centralized planning and decentralized execution of
joint air operations. The JAOC typically produces the joint air operations plan, air
tasking order (ATO), airspace control plan, and air defense plan.
See JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, for additional detailed
guidance on JAOC operations.
(b) Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). The ASOC is the principal
Air Force C2 node for integrating air power into Army land operations. As a direct
subordinate element of the JAOC, the ASOC is responsible for the direction and control
of air operations directly supporting the Army land operation. It processes and
coordinates air missions requiring integration with other supporting arms and ground
forces. The ASOC is usually collocated with the senior Army tactical echelon, and
coordinates operations with the permanently aligned TACP and the JAOC. The ASOC
has five primary functions. It manages CAS assets within the supported ground
commanders AO; processes CAS requests and controls the flow of CAS aircraft;
deconflicts airspace coordination measures and fire support coordinating measures with
aircraft; assigns and directs attack aircraft, when authorized, to the joint terminal attack
controllers (JTACs); and manages the Air Force air request net and its specific tactical air
direction net frequencies. Additionally, the ASOC may also coordinate in other mission
areas, to include AI, air defense, ISR, joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD),
and joint personnel recovery.
(c) Tactical Air Control Party. The TACP is the principal Air Force
liaison element collocated with Army maneuver units from battalion through corps. The
TACP has two primary missions: advise ground commanders on the capabilities and
limitations of air operations, and provide the primary terminal attack control of CAS.
TACPs coordinate ACMs and deconflict aircraft with Army fire support. TACPs are
organized into expeditionary air support operations groups or squadrons that are aligned
with their respective Army corps, division, or brigade HQ.
(d) Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]). The FAC(A) is a
specifically trained and qualified aviation officer who exercises control from the air of
aircraft engaged in CAS of ground troops. The FAC(A) is normally an airborne
extension of the TACP. The FAC(A) also provides coordination and terminal attack
control for CAS missions as well as locating, marking, and attacking ground targets using
other fire support assets.
(e) Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC[A]). The TAC(A) is an
officer who coordinates, from an aircraft, the actions of other aircraft engaged in air
support of ground or sea forces. The TAC(A) also expedites CAS aircraft-to-JTAC
handoff during “heavy traffic” CAS operations.
Joint Fire Support Command and Control
II-13
(f) Joint Fires Observer (JFO). A JFO is a trained and certified Service
member who can request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting
information in support of Type 2 and Type 3 CAS terminal attack control, and perform
autonomous terminal guidance operations (TGO). JFOs provide the capability to exploit
those opportunities that exist in the operational environment where a trained observer
could be used to efficiently support air delivered fires, surface-to-surface fires, and
facilitate targeting. JFOs cannot perform terminal attack control of CAS missions and do
not replace a trained and certified JTAC.
(g) Joint Terminal Attack Controller. A JTAC is a qualified (certified)
Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft
engaged in CAS and other offensive air operations. A qualified and current JTAC will be
recognized across the Department of Defense (DOD) as capable and authorized to
perform all types of terminal attack control.
See JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, for more detailed information about C2 of CAS
operations.
(h) The Control and Reporting Center (CRC). The CRC is a deployable
battle management platform employed at the tactical level to support joint air operations.
It is directly subordinate to the Air Force AOC and can operate independently or in
combination with other C2 elements. CRC operators are able to support all the same
mission areas as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) although limited by
line of sight communications and radar coverage. The JAOC assigns the CRC a
geographic area, within which it manages all air defense, offensive air and airspace
management activities. The CRC can disseminate air defense warnings and an air picture
to other C2 nodes through data links and its extensive communications capabilities.
(i) Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE). The JFACC
may establish one or more JACCEs with other commandersHQ to better integrate joint
air operations with their operations. When established, the JACCE is a component level
liaison that serves as the direct representative of the JFACC. A JACCE is normally made
up of the liaison element(s) of the Service designated to provide the JFACC. The JACCE
does not perform any C2 functions and the JACCE director does not have command
authority over any air forces. The JACCE facilitates the integration of joint air power by
exchanging current intelligence, operational data, support requirements, and by
coordinating the integration of JFACC requirements for ACMs, FSCMs, personnel
recovery, and CAS. JACCE expertise should include plans, operations, ISR, space,
airspace management, air mobility, and administrative and communications support.
(4) Special Operations Component
(a) The JFSOCC exercises overall responsibility for coordination of all fire
support in support of SO and, when tasked, fire support using SOF assets in support of
other elements of the joint force. SOF coordinate fire support through both external and
SOF channels. Within SOF channels, various elements are established to assist
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commanders in the execution of their fire support responsibilities. SOF elements that
provide C2 and/or liaison capabilities include:
1.
Joint Special Operations Task Force. The JSOTF is a JTF
composed of SO units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special
operation or prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The
JSOTF may have conventional units assigned or attached to support the conduct of
specific missions. The JSOTF staff coordinates joint fire support with other components
of the joint force and US Government agencies. As appropriate, the staff can form a JFE.
2.
Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander
(JSOACC). The JSOACC is the commander within a joint SO command responsible for
planning and executing joint SO air activities, and for ensuring effective coordination,
synchronization, and integration of such activities with conventional air operations. The
JSOACC will normally be the commander with the preponderance of aviation assets
and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support assigned
and attached SO aviation assets. When a joint special operations air component is
established as a functional component of a JSOTF, the commander, joint special
operations task force (CDRJSOTF) normally exercises OPCON of all assigned and
attached joint SO aviation assets through the JSOACC. However, there are also
circumstances where the CDRJSOTF may elect to place selected SO aviation assets
under separate control. A key responsibility of the JSOACC is to ensure close liaison is
accomplished with other SOF components and with the conventional air components of
other Service and/or functional component commands. The JSOACC ensures liaison
with the JFACC is accomplished through the SOLE in the JFACCs JAOC. Through the
SOLE, the JSOACC ensures SO aviation activities are closely coordinated, synchronized,
and integrated with the JFACCs operations to ensure airspace coordination, flight safety,
operations security, and unity of effort.
3.
Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) and Naval
Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU). Naval SOF assigned to the SO commander are
normally under the C2 of an NSWTG or NSWTU. The NSWTG is a naval special
warfare organization that plans, conducts, and supports SO in support of fleet
commanders and SO commanders. The NSWTU is a subordinate unit of an NSWTG.
4.
Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE).
The SOCCE is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities with land and
maritime operations. The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conduct operations
in conjunction with a conventional force. It collocates with the command element of the
supported commander and performs C2 or liaison functions directed by the SO
commander. The focus of the coordination is on the synchronization of firepower and
deconfliction of joint fires.
(b) Special Operations Fire Support Coordination. Liaison between
SOF and other elements of the joint force is critical to both effective support and the
prevention of fratricide. SOF liaison elements provide SOF expertise to coordinate,
Joint Fire Support Command and Control
II-15
synchronize, and deconflict SO both in support of conventional forces and when SO are
conducted unilaterally. SOF C2 organizations such as an NSWTG and/or NSWTU or
SOCCE may provide (or act as) liaison elements for coordination of fire support with
their respective Service components. Additionally, the following elements are capable of
providing fire support coordination for SOF:
1.
Special Operations Liaison Element. The SOLE is a team
provided by the SO commander to the JFACC (if designated) or appropriate Service
component air C2 organization to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SO air, surface,
and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. The SOLE director works
directly for the SO commander and is not in the SOF chain of command, thus command
authority for mission tasking, planning, and execution of SO remains with the SO
commander. The SOLE director places SOF ground, maritime, and air liaison personnel
in divisions of the JAOC to integrate with the SO staff. The SOLE coordinates
appropriate FSCMs to help avoid fratricide.
2.
Special Tactics Team (STT). STTs are a task-organized element
of US Air Force SOF that may include combat control, pararescue, and SO weather
personnel. Functions include austere airfield and assault zone reconnaissance,
surveillance, establishment, and terminal control; tactical weather observations and
forecasting; combat search and rescue; combat casualty care and evacuation staging; as
well as coordinating, planning, and conducting air and ground fire support and terminal
attack control. STTs are a part of the theater SOF and are normally under OPCON of the
SO commander. When supporting air operations, tactical control of these teams should
be assigned to the air commander through the AOC as an extension of the theater air
control system. However, because the STT can be employed by both SOF and theater air
structures, it is imperative that apportionment, allocation, command relationships, and
control authority be clearly stated and understood by SO and air commanders.
3.
Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD). The
SOCOORD serves as the primary advisor to a US Army corps or MEF commander with
regard to SOF integration, capabilities, and limitations. The SOCOORD is a functional
staff element of the corps (or MEF) operations officer and serves as the J-3 SOF advisor,
with augmentation, if the corps (or MEF) is established as a JTF.
4. Joint Air Component Coordination Element to the Special
Operations Task Force. The JFACC provides a JACCE to other commanders in the
JOA to assist in coordinating joint air operations. For SOF, the JACCE will typically be
located at the JSOTF and work with the JFE. The JACCE provides the JSOTF with air
power expertise for both SOF and conventional air force assets. The JACCE represents
the JFACC for joint air operations and the JSOACC commander at the JSOTF on issues
relating to SOF and conventional air force integration into the ground scheme of
maneuver. The JACCE is the focal point for all preplanned air requests (e.g., CAS,
airlift, ISR, EW), and is responsible for validating JTACs currency and qualifications
upon entry into theater and tracking JTACs for all SOF components. The JACCE will be
active in both future planning and current operations at the JSOTF, and will work closely
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II-16 JP 3-09
with the JFE to pass the most responsive assets to immediate engagements that may
require fire support.
5.
Joint Fires Element. The SOF JFE plans, coordinates,
synchronizes, and executes fire support to safeguard both friendly ground and air units
while expediting joint fires. Together with the JACCE, the JFE will monitor and rapidly
respond to SOF joint fires requests. The JFE/JACCE team can efficiently determine the
most responsive resource and delivery means to respond to immediate support requests.
The JFE consolidates FSCMs for the JSOTF, tracks team locations, and reports them to
the SOLE to aid the air-ground deconfliction process.
e. Joint Fire Support Coordination, Targeting, Surveillance, and Management
Systems
(1) Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS)
(a) JADOCS facilitates the integration of joint/coalition fires. Digital
integration of US and allied joint fires systems enables timely execution of TSTs, HPTs,
and HVTs. The enhanced JADOCS allows for improved internal and external
coordination/execution of immediate targets by providing a suite of tools and interfaces
for horizontal and vertical integration across functional areas. It is currently installed on
over 900 systems worldwide, is the baseline for the Naval Fires Control System, and is a
major segment of the intelligence application package for theater battle management core
system (TBMCS) functionality at wing and squadron levels. The automated four
dimensional deconfliction capability aids in the reduction of fratricide, thereby expediting
prosecution of targets.
(b) The joint management function provides the ability to rapidly change
and display operational graphics and FSCMs while conducting joint fire support. It uses
the JADOCS engagement zone manager (EZM) and the common geographic reference
system to portray operational and some tactical operational graphics and FSCMs for both
linear and nonlinear situations. The EZM enables operators to quickly create and change
FSCMs and coordinate them between components for rapid approval and display. When
used in conjunction with the control measures manager, which enables rapid change and
display of FSCMs, these tools enable the JFC and components to visualize friendly fires
in three dimensions over any area. Operational graphics can also be overlaid with
imagery and terrain data to improve SA and planning.
(c) The AI planning and execution function provides more effective
employment of AI assets through timely and improved information flow for the
identification, assignment, and nomination of AI targets. It enables the joint force
component commanders and staff to allocate air resources in a more efficient manner
through early assessment of potential and planned missions. AI provides the ability to
monitor ATO execution through all phases and provides immediate visibility into AI
nominations throughout the targeting process, including periodic updates to tune AI
missions and maximize joint fires.
Joint Fire Support Command and Control
II-17
(d) The counterfire-common operational picture (CF-COP) function
provides a near real-time picture of the artillery battle. It allocates cannon and rocket
resources for more efficient counterfire operations through digital integration at multi-
echelons; from joint/multinational level down to tactical firing units. CF-COP also
includes munitions allocation and status.
(e) The FSCMs analysis function provides a means for assessing changes
and movements of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) on current and planned
missions in the ATO. It provides immediate visibility of targets exposed or covered by
movements in the FSCL and offers the JFC and staff opportunities to assess the
consequences prior to movement.
(f) The multinational coordination and integration function facilitates the
integration of coalition artillery with respect to both the counterfire battle and other
surface fires missions.
(g) The operational area visualization function enables improved SA. It
uses tools that provide visualization of coordination measures, ingress and egress routes,
and air defense threats. It also enables the commander and staff to visualize friendly fires
in three dimensions over any area. Control and coordination measures also can be
overlaid with imagery and terrain data to improve SA and planning.
(2) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)
(a) AFATDS is a fully automated C2 and communications system that
prioritizes targets and pairs them with optimal fire support weapon systems. It gives
commanders timely, accurate, and coordinated fire support to prioritize and engage
targets. AFATDS can execute as a completely automated system, but allows for human
intervention whenever necessary or at optional points. Configurable commanders
guidance is factored into each mission. Tailorable options and rule sets are available for
target processing, weapon pairing, information distribution, and communications
redundancy. AFATDS supports planning, execution, movement control, artillery mission
support, FA fire direction operations, and target analysis and engagement.
(b) Unit relationships are user-configurable to adapt to changing needs and
force structure. The system provides agility, allowing for the establishment of the sensor-
to-shooter link while enforcing mission coordination requirements. AFATDS provides
critical SA. Both friendly and enemy unit graphics are displayed, along with target
information from multiple sources. Due to multilevel communications across the
network, unit status and weapon platforms are monitored and updated continually on the
map. Information may be directly accessed from the map symbols. Friendly and enemy
units, targets, and operational areas can all be seen. Each AFATDS workstation may
filter the information to be displayed, allowing the commander to monitor the dynamic
current situation, missions processing through the system, and target updates from a
unique perspective.
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II-18 JP 3-09
(c) AFATDS is not limited to FA communications, but can communicate
and exchange data with Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) systems. It is interoperable with all fires subsystems including
gun display unit, artillery fire control systems, Firefinder Radar, Airborne Target
Handover System, and forward observer (FO) system. It interoperates with the Army
Battle Command Systems suite. The system also interoperates with joint level automated
systems such as Tactical Airspace Integration System, TBMCS, Joint Surveillance and
Target Attack Radar System (Ground Control Station), and Global Command and
Control System, as well as with Allied FA C2 systems such as the United Kingdoms
Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System and the German ADLER. It operates
over wire, combat net radio, mobile subscriber equipment, and satellite and can
communicate over local area network for SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNET)/Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) and Enhanced
Position Location and Reporting System operations.
(d) The planning function within AFATDS allows for detailed planning
and COA analysis by projecting friendly and enemy positions, guidance specific to the
plan, and a task organization for the plan. In order to assist with the planning function, an
enemy template tool is provided. A system tool supports multiphase maneuver COAs
and can compare and recommend the best COA considering commanders priorities.
Plans can be easily disseminated. The planning activity does not affect the current
situation until the operator implements the plan. Plans are implemented into the current
situation by phase this immediately updates the unit task organization guidance,
geometry, and target database to reflect changes.
(e) Target analysis and engagement is a robust aspect of AFATDS. Target
list management functions allow for copy and merge, target duplication checks, sorting,
searching, and target data reception and transmission. Fire plans and schedules of fires
guidance can also be applied to target analysis (e.g., target selection standards, HPTs,
decay time, target prioritization). The fire support system task list alone can contain a
100-rule set of prioritized target to weapon system parings and a prioritized list of
commander’s preferences. Preplanned missions can be linked to sensor reports for
dynamic targeting. The system can deal with many weapons and pair those weapons to
targets, minimizing the sensor to shooter timeline. The system can filter sensor reports so
that every report does not have to be engaged, and the system also selects the best
weapon and munitions based on target parameters (e.g., environment, countermeasures,
target location error [TLE], age), the munitions required (e.g., effects capability, hazard
area), and weapon status (e.g., response time, current mission load, ammunition
inventory). AFATDS can determine quantities of munitions to achieve a desired target
damage effects. The system will filter targets and process missions based on a
configurable mission value and precedence. The system analyzes cannon, mortar, rocket,
ATACMS, fixed- and rotary-wing air, naval gun, standard missile, and Tomahawk as
possibilities for weapons. It deconflicts ground and airspace encroachments (spatial
coordination is four dimensional, including time analysis), is fully automatic, and keeps
interested nodes appraised of targeting information. The system considers commanders
guidance, latest unit status, mission history, and effects algorithms, which determine
Joint Fire Support Command and Control
II-19
munition quantity for both guided and unguided munitions. During mission processing,
the operator may view and tailor the system recommendation. The intervention display
shows all key data and analysis results.
(3) Theater Battle Management Core System
(a) The TBMCS is a force level integrated air C2 system. TBMCS
provides hardware, software, and communications interfaces to support the preparation,
modification, and dissemination of the force-level air battle plan (ABP). The ABP
includes the ATO and airspace control order (ACO). TBMCS unit-level operations and
intelligence applications provide Air Force wings the capability to receive the ABP, parse
it, and manage wing operations and intelligence to support execution of the ABP.
(b) TBMCS supports the development and sharing of a common relevant
operational picture of theater air and surface activity. Common TBMCS applications and
interfaces provide a network for joint force data sharing. The TBMCS intelligence and
targeting applications at the theater JFACC level, at the ASOC, and at the DASC support
the coordination of precision engagement fires, safe passage zones, and near real-time
warnings of impending air attack. The air and surface surveillance and weapons
coordination engagement options enable synchronized operations and employment of the
correct weapons for each target to generate the desired results. Engagement intentions
and results assessments are shared by all TBMCS network participants, contributing to
improved decisionmaking by commanders.
(c) TBMCS links tactical aviation and related units to the JFACC. When
properly employed, TBMCS is a tool enabling linkage from the operational objectives of
the commander, joint task force, through the JFACC, to the tactical activity of individual
units. It also facilitates air battle planning, intelligence, operations, and execution
functions for theater air operations; and enables coordination among higher, adjacent, and
subordinate units and across Service boundaries.
(d) TBMCS fielding includes every theater air component, all Navy aircraft
carriers and command ships, all Marine air wings, and all Air Force flying wings and
ASOC squadrons. Army BCDs also interface with TBMCS. TBMCS uses two primary
databases: the air operations database and the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB).
TBMCS contains a combination of processes and tools to support ATO production,
which is the primary product TBMCS.
(4) Airborne Warning and Control System. The AWACS provides radar
control and surveillance of air traffic. The AWACS’s range, flexibility, and C2 system
capabilities enable it to operate directly subordinate to the JAOC. It is able to provide
many of the capabilities of the CRC, depending upon mission configuration and the needs
of the theater. It can establish data links with other C2 nodes, such as the ASOC, and can
disseminate air defense warnings and an accurate air picture. AWACS can also provide
limited functions of the ASOC and TAC(A). AWACS cannot provide positive CID of
ground targets.
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(5) Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). JSTARS
performs theater-wide C2 and ISR support missions. JSTARS provides radar
surveillance and targeting information to component commanders to develop an
understanding of the enemy situation and to support operations. JSTARS mission
capabilities contribute to an understanding of the friendly and enemy situation and assist
ground, air, and naval commanders in delaying, disrupting, and destroying enemy forces
and C2 of friendly forces, in accordance with the JFCs overall objectives. JSTARS
supports these component operations by providing continuous wide area surveillance and
targeting support to commanders equipped with common ground station and Joint
Service Work Station. JSTARS can also support air operations to include AI, CAS,
offensive counterair, and nontraditional missions. JSTARS can also provide limited
functions of the ASOC and TAC(A). JSTARS cannot provide positive CID of ground
targets.
(6) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs). UASs offer the joint force
significant capabilities and are integrated into all levels by the Services. UASs can be
employed for higher risk and longer endurance missions with varying levels of autonomy
and survivability because they have no aircrew design limitations. As an ISR platform, a
UAS can provide timely ISR required for attacking and assessing targets (e.g., TSTs,
HPTs, and HVTs). They offer a broad range of collection capabilities, including
communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, electro-optical, infrared imagery,
and real-time imagery. In addition, a UAS can provide target marking, laser designation,
communications gateway extension (e.g., communications relay, network extension),
ordnance delivery, and weapons effects assessment in support of joint fire support (see
Chapter III, Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution, subparagraph 7a[3],
Unmanned Aircraft Systems). In all of these capacities, UAS provide the JFC with
options that have significant risk management advantages, such as persistence and
minimal risk to friendly personnel, over manned systems.
(7) Service Assets. Each Service operates additional assets such as the US
Armys Airborne Reconnaissance Low-Multifunction, the US Navys EP-3s, or the US
Air Forces RC-135s and U-2s that, if allocated or used in a net-centric reporting
environment, can also provide timely intelligence support to joint fire support.
III-1
CHAPTER III
JOINT FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND EXECUTION
1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on the planning and coordination of joint fire support. Joint fire
support planning and coordination ensures that all available joint fire support is
synchronized in accordance with the JFCs plan. The key to effective integration of
joint fire support is the thorough and continuous inclusion of all component fire
support elements in the joint planning process, aggressive coordination efforts, and
a vigorous execution of the plan. Commanders should not rely solely on their joint fire
support agencies to plan and coordinate joint fire support. A continuous dialogue
between the commander, subordinate commanders, and joint fire support planners must
occur.
a. Joint fire support planning is an integral part of the overall planning process.
Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators actively participate with other members of
the staff to develop estimates, give the commander recommendations, develop the joint
fire support portion of the CONOPS, and supervise the execution of the commanders
decision. The effectiveness of their planning and coordination is predicated on the
commander providing clear and precise guidance.
b. All components can plan for and coordinate joint fire support. Integral to the
commanders CONOPS is the concept of fires. Just as the JFCs intent and CONOPS
should take into account the integration and synchronization of tactical, operational, and
strategic operations, the CONOPS for component commanders should integrate and
synchronize joint fire support at the tactical as well as the operational level. Joint fire
support planning and coordination must be continuous and its execution decentralized.
See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for a more detailed
discussion of planning and operational considerations.
2. Joint Fire Support Planning
The purpose of joint fire support planning is to optimize its employment by
integrating and synchronizing joint fire support with the commanders maneuver plan.
During the planning phase, commanders develop a CONOPS, including the concept
for fires. Commanders determine how to shape the operational environment with
fires to assist maneuver and how to use maneuver to exploit the use of joint fire
support. Objectives are restated in terms of what effects are required from joint fire
Commanders and leaders must remain flexible and therefore, must keep plans
simple. Be nimble of mind.
General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (1993-1997), quoted at Ft. Polk
Chapter III
III-2 JP 3-09
support. Decisive operations, freedom of action, massing the effects of firepower, and
depth and simultaneity are typical considerations. Joint fire support planners are
responsible for advising commanders on the best use of available joint fires support,
developing joint fire support plans, issuing necessary orders in the name of appropriate
commanders, and implementing approved joint fire support plans for the component or
joint force. Joint fire support requirements are considered throughout the JFCs planning
and decision-making processes and during all phases of an operation.
a. Planning. Contingency planning of joint fire support is a complex task. Joint fire
support planning becomes even more complex during crisis action planning due to the
limited time to plan and coordinate operations that may require rapid execution. During
crisis situations, joint fire support planning must expeditiously organize and prioritize
limited assets to synchronize fires.
b. Basic Joint Fire Support Tasks. Effectiveness of the joint fire support effort is
measured by creating desired effects on the enemy, setting conditions for decisive
operations, and supporting joint force operations. Effective joint fire support depends
on planning for the successful performance of the following four basic fire support
tasks:
(1) Support Forces in Contact. The commander must provide responsive joint
fire support that protects and ensures freedom of maneuver to forces in contact with the
enemy throughout the operational area.
(2) Support the Concept of Operation. The CONOPS clearly and concisely
expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available
resources. The concept of fires must describe how joint fires will be synchronized and
integrated to support the JFC’s objectives as articulated in the CONOPS.
(3) Synchronize Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support is synchronized
through fire support coordination, beginning with the commanders estimate and
CONOPS. Joint fire support must be planned both continuously and concurrently with
the development of the scheme of maneuver. Further, operations providing joint fire
support must be synchronized with other joint force operations (e.g., air operations,
cyberspace operations, ISR functions, SO, and IO) in order to optimize the application of
limited resources, achieve synergy, and avoid fratricide.
(4) Sustain Joint Fire Support Operations. Joint fire support planners must
formulate joint fire support plans to reflect logistic limitations and to exploit logistic
capabilities. Ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical
support are all critical to sustaining joint fire support operations.
c. Planning Considerations Across the Range of Military Operations
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
III-3
(1) Major Operations and Campaigns
(a) To achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the
US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation involving large-scale
combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to prevail
against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions
favorable to the United States, the host nation, and its multinational partners.
(b) Major operations and campaigns are complex and require detailed
planning. Joint fire support for major operations may include, but is not limited to, the
lethal effects of air support by manned and unmanned aircraft, NSFS, artillery, mortars,
rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects from EA, CNA, and other nonlethal
capabilities.
(c) Major operations and campaigns involve an ever-changing balance of
offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout all phases of the operation.
Stability operations are missions, tasks, and activities that seek to maintain or reestablish
a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency
infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. As the mission in stability
operations is to restore vital national services, rather than destruction of an enemy force,
the ROE will normally limit the level of lethal fires employed in support of these
activities. Additionally, planners must consider the impact of joint fires on stability
efforts throughout the operation; this includes the impacts of fires conducted during the
early combat phases on later stabilization and reconstruction phases of the operation.
(2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations
(a) Crisis response and contingency operations can be a single small-scale,
limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration
involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to
protect US interests and/or prevent surprise attack or further conflict.
(b) Joint fire support employed in support of crisis response and
contingency operations may be the same as those employed for major operations and
campaigns but are normally more restrictive in their application.
(3) Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence
(a) Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations
encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is
tasked to support other government agencies (OGAs) and cooperate with
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the United Nations or NATO, and other
countries to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict. These
operations usually involve a combination of conventional and unconventional forces and
capabilities as well as the efforts of OGAs, IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in a complementary fashion.
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III-4 JP 3-09
(b) Various joint operations, such as a show of force or enforcement of
sanctions, support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use
force when necessary. Others, such as humanitarian and civic assistance programs,
promote international stability by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation.
(c) Lethal joint fire support employed in support of security cooperation
and deterrence operations are normally the most restrictive in their application and may
be limited to defensive fires only.
3. Other Planning Considerations
a. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Limited ISR assets that will be
in high demand by numerous entities, make it imperative that fire support planners
carefully consider their ISR requirements and closely coordinate with ISR planners.
Target and munition selection, mitigation of collateral damage, and assessment cannot be
accomplished without accurate and timely ISR support.
b. Terminal Guidance Operations
(1) TGO are those actions that provide electronic, mechanical, voice, or visual
communications that provide approaching aircraft and/or weapons additional information
regarding a specific target location. Various ground elements or aircrews conducting a
wide variety of missions can search for, identify, and provide the location of targets using
systems like Global Positioning System (GPS), laser designators/range finders, aircraft
targeting pods, etc. Unless qualified as a JTAC or FAC(A), personnel conducting TGO
do not have the authority to grant weapons release to attacking aircraft. These functions
must be done by appropriate C2 authorities or a JTAC/FAC(A).
Note. Terminal guidance is guidance applied to a weapon between midcourse guidance
and arrival in the vicinity of the target and may be a function of TGO, CAS, interdiction,
or other missions.
(a) TGO can be used to facilitate attacks on targets in locations where the
supported commander determines that the distance from friendly forces to the target is
adequate to preclude the need for a JTAC or FAC(A) to perform detailed integration of
each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces.
(b) TGO independent of CAS (not in close proximity to friendly forces)
requires personnel conducting TGO to have direct or indirect communications with the
individual operating/commanding the delivery system, plus connectivity with TGO
weapons release authority.
(2) For TGO to be successful, C2 is essential; ACMs and radio procedures need
to be established and understood by all participating units and aircrew. TGO may
leverage CAS, TST, or other tactics, techniques, and procedures to aid in execution (such
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
III-5
as the CAS nine-line briefing format), but TGO should not be confused with CAS
operations requiring detailed integration performed by a qualified JTAC or
FAC(A) in close proximity to friendly forces.
c. Acquisition of Targets
(1) Laser designator and coordinate seeking weapons (CSW) acquisition
devices can enhance current capabilities of artillery, NSFS, and aircraft in the delivery of
munitions. Both aircraft (manned and unmanned) platforms and ground based observers
can laser-designate targets for laser-guided weapons and provide precision coordinates
for CSW. Employment of lasers can provide fire support personnel with precise target
marking, enhanced visual TA, and surprise. It can also reduce the weapon and/or sortie
attack requirements. However, several factors environment, laser system inherent
limits, target types, and laser code management affect laser employment. Joint fire
support planners and fire support coordinators must understand advantages and
limitations when employing lasers. Additional guidance can be found in Appendix C,
Laser-Guided Systems,” and JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support).
(2) Planning for using CSW assets in major combat operations carries
significant implications for intelligence resources. Given the high volume of targets in
the early days of an operation, advance preparation of targeting solutions will be essential
for meeting commanders guidance for target effects and ROE for collateral damage
minimization. Just as target systems analysis is crucial to identify vulnerabilities for
attack, the concept of aimpoint development must be applied to optimize and
coordinate the precise effects achievable with CSW employment.
(3) Aimpoint development involves interactive application of point
mensuration, weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation (CDE). This, in turn,
requires suitably skilled target analysts using integrated toolsets to reduce human
pointing and transcribing errors. Saving mensurated points into the MIDB requires
individual operator certification as prescribed in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction (CJCSI) 3505.01A, Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification and
Program Accreditation. In addition, significant workload is involved in deriving
mensurated coordinates, weaponeering, and performing CDE for each joint desired point
of impact data set as defined in Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction 3000.002,
US/Allied Target Analysis Program.
d. Nuclear Fires Planning. Joint nuclear fires are collaboratively planned by US
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in support of the JFCs efforts in accordance with
guidance supplied in overarching policies such as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSCP) and JSCP-Nuclear. Planning efforts are differentiated as either strategic planning
or theater planning. Only the President of the United States may authorize the
employment of nuclear weapons through the Commander, USSTRATCOM. Specific
execution details and operational procedures can be found in USSTRATCOMs Global
Strike Plan and Emergency Action Procedures.
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III-6 JP 3-09
e. Consequence of Execution Planning. When targeting enemy weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) storage sites, weapon systems, or production facilities, the fires cell
must complete detailed consequence of execution planning to determine the potential
release hazards due to the strike. Ground commanders in the target area must be advised
of the predicted hazard area and must be given enough time to take appropriate force
protection measures. Effects on the local civilians must be anticipated and planned for as
well. This planning must be done not only for WMD sites, but also for targets known or
suspected to contain toxic industrial chemicals or materials.
f. Multinational Considerations
(1) Military operations will normally be joint and often multinational. Fire
support coordination in multinational operations demands special arrangements with
multinational forces and local authorities. To maximize the fires of the multinational
force and to minimize the possibility of fratricide, the multinational force commander and
staff become familiar with each nations capabilities and limitations in munitions, digital
capability, and training. This also enhances the capability to conduct fire support
coordination throughout the multinational force. These special arrangements include
communications and language requirements, liaison personnel, and interoperability
procedures. A standard operating procedure (SOP) should be established for fire support
to achieve the most effective results for its use by the multinational force. To maximize
the effectiveness of fire support, the multinational force staff performs the following:
(a) Integrate joint and multinational systems and procedures to determine
priorities, and identify and track targets.
(b) Identify delivery systems.
(c) Assess post-attack results.
(d) Clear fires.
(e) Plan and coordinate the use of FSCMs.
(2) Examples of coordinated fire support arrangements:
(a) Establish NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs). These
provide participants with common terminology and procedures. When operating with
countries not in NATO, similar SOP agreements must be made.
(b) Use SOF teams assigned to multinational units to provide the JFC an
accurate evaluation of capabilities, location, and activities of multinational forces, thus
facilitating the JFCs C2.
(c) Establish guidelines for clearance of indirect fires in the ROE. See JP
3-16, Multinational Operations, for further information.
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
III-7
(d) Use a standard datum.
(e) Establish common meteorological procedures and standards.
(f) Provide liaison officers as required.
(g) Establish/coordinate the multinational ROE before beginning hostilities,
and continually refine them during operations.
(h) Establish the policy for indirect fire systems using non-precision
munitions within the ROE.
(i) Establish the policy for using smoke, illumination, and cluster munitions
with inherent high dud potential within the ROE.
(j) Establish SOPs for how digitally and non-digitally equipped forces
operate together. When automatic interfaces are unworkable, determine liaison officer
requirements.
(k) Establish a multinational target numbering system.
4. Joint Fire Support Planning Process
a. Introduction. Joint fire support planning is accomplished utilizing both the
targeting and joint fire support estimate processes. It is a continual and cyclical process
of planning, synchronizing, executing, and assessing joint fires involving tactical,
operational, and strategic considerations that also utilizes joint fire support
communications systems and architectures. Initiated during mission analysis and
continuing through post-execution assessment, the joint fire support planning process
includes the following steps: end state and the commanders objectives; target
development and prioritization; capabilities analysis; commanders decision and force
assignment; mission planning and force execution; and assessment (see Figure III-1).
More detailed information on this and related processes can be found in JP 3-60, Joint
Targeting, and the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Fires and
Targeting Handbook.
(1) The JFC and component commander staffs synchronize joint fire support
operations to optimize effects in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative
combat power at a decisive place and time. To facilitate synchronization efforts,
commanders and staffs must have a thorough knowledge of joint and Service doctrine,
major system capabilities, and procedures.
(2) Joint fires and fire support are coordinated and synchronized through the
joint targeting cycle. The purpose of targeting is to integrate and synchronize fires into
joint operations. Targeting also supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires
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III-8 JP 3-09
to actions and tasks at the joint force component level. The joint targeting process allows
the component commanders to independently plan, coordinate, and utilize organic fires
and fire support in their AOs to support the JTF CONOPS, while synchronizing joint
fires across the JOA. The JTCB, in particular, requires each of the components to brief
JOINT FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING PROCESS
BDA battle damage assessment
CONOPS concept of operations
JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list
LEGEND
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
CONOPS
Development
Target Product
Development
Weaponeering
Consolidate Target
Development, BDA, and
Capability Analysis
Assign Forces to
Targets/Missions
Collateral Damage
Estimation
Issue/Revise
Plans and Orders
Mission Analysis
Plan and Update
Effects
Targeting Guidance
Confirm and
Reattack
Approved JIPTL
End State and Commander's Objective
Mission Planning and Force Execution
Assessment
Target Development and Prioritization
Capabilities Analysis
Commander's Decision and Force Assignment
Planning Guidance
Engagement
Options
Combat
Assessment
Reattack
Recommendations
BDA
Post-Operation
Activities
Measure
MOP/MOE
Munitions
Effectiveness
Assessment
Target System
Analysis
Apportionment
Dynamic
Targeting
Issue OrdersExecute
Target Identification
and Nomination
Figure III-1. Joint Fire Support Planning Process
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
III-9
their scheme of maneuver and show how it supports the JTF CONOPS and works within
targeting guidance, prior to the JIPTL review. This effort allows both component and
joint fires to be deconflicted, coordinated, and synchronized.
b. Targeting
(1) Most JFC and component requirements for joint fire support are planned
and executed using the joint targeting process. The purpose of targeting is to integrate
and synchronize fires into joint operations. Targeting is the process of selecting and
prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering
operational requirements and capabilities. The targeting cycle is a rational and iterative
process that methodically analyzes, prioritizes, and assigns assets against targets
systematically to create those effects that will contribute to the achievement of the JFCs
objectives. It also supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires to actions
and tasks at the joint force component level.
(2) Within military operations, targeting must be focused on creating specific
effects to achieve the JFCs objectives or the subordinate component commanders
supporting objectives. Targeting proceeds from the definition of the problem to an
assessment of the results achieved by the executed COAs. The process allows for the
testing of multiple solution paths, a thorough understanding of the problem, and the
refinement of proposed solutions. The joint targeting process is flexible and adaptable to
a wide range of circumstances.
Detailed information on targeting can be found in JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
c. Component Planning Steps. This process consists of a series of interrelated
steps, requiring joint force staff and component cross coordination throughout.
(1) Receipt of Mission. Upon receipt of a mission, joint fire support personnel
assist the commander in mission analysis. Joint fire support personnel must understand
the commander’s guidance on the following:
(a) Specific COAs.
(b) Objectives and end state.
(c) ISR.
(d) TSTs, HVTs, and HPTs.
(e) Use of weapons effects and special munitions such as blast,
fragmentation, cluster, nuclear, mines, and lasers.
(f) Acceptable risks.
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III-10 JP 3-09
(g) C2.
(h) Commitment of the reserve force.
(i) Critical events to be considered.
(j) Commander’s assumptions.
(k) ROE.
(l) Assessment.
(m) Host nation concerns.
(2) Target Analysis. The commander establishes targeting guidance that must
be incorporated into the joint fire support planning process. The commander establishes
the priorities and describes the importance of a target set and/or category in relation to a
given situation or phase of operation. During an air assault operation, for example,
attacking known enemy air defense systems may be more important than attacking enemy
artillery sites. Targeting tactics, techniques, and procedures are discussed in JP 3-60,
Joint Targeting. The overall effectiveness and efficiency of the joint fire support
planning process increases as leaders consider the following:
(a) The type and amount of delivery assets and munitions available.
(b) The effectiveness of weapon system and/or munitions.
(c) The size, type, ability to detect, and posture of the target.
(d) Joint fire support asset characteristics (range, accuracy, rate of fire, and
response time).
(e) Civilians and damage to civilian objects.
(f) Target selection standards and decision criteria for target reattack.
(g) Damage criteria.
(3) Preparing the Joint Fire Support Estimate. Typically component staffs
employ the use of a joint fire support estimate. This estimate influences how available
joint fire support resources are employed to support the possible COAs and helps joint
fire support planners and/or coordinators integrate and synchronize the employment of
joint fire support resources. The estimate is a realistic appraisal of the effort required
to support the operation. It serves as a basis for identifying joint fire support priority
requirements that support the commanders intent. Factors that could affect the mission
and may be considered in the joint fire support estimate include the following:
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
III-11
(a) The task organization of subordinate forces and their missions.
(b) The availability of joint fire support resources, including FA, CAS (by
both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft), NSFS, SOF, EW, and ISR assets.
(c) The probable enemy fires plan.
(d) Enemy fires capability.
(e) The identification of TSTs, HVTs, and HPTs.
(f) Consumption factors (type and quantity), positioning requirements, and
priority of logistic support.
(g) Joint fires-related decision points.
(4) Issuing the Commanders Estimate. Based on information provided in
the staff estimates, the commander issues an estimate. It should provide joint fire support
planners and/or coordinators with guidance regarding prioritization of targets, desired
effects, and reattack.
(5) Course of Action Analysis. COA analysis is a systematic review process
performed by a commander and staff to determine the best COA for a given operation.
Each COA must be analyzed to consider the implications of both friendly and enemy
options during an operation. Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators are key
players in this analysis process. They advise the commanders on the joint fire support
assets available and recommend the most effective use of these assets. As the analysis
progresses, joint fire support planners and/or coordinators continuously evaluate the
integration of joint fire support into the commanders emerging concept of operation, to
include branches and sequels. As a result of this interaction, the commanders options
are influenced by the availability and allocation of joint fire support assets. The finished
product of this analysis is a COA that integrates joint fire support with maneuver and
synchronizes operations. Joint fire support planners use the results of COA development
in the targeting process.
(6) Initiating Planning Actions. Once the commander decides on a COA,
joint staff and fire support planners:
(a) Refine named areas of interest, decision points, and HVTs/HPTs.
(b) Integrate and refine the collection, TA, and assessment plan. All
collection assets are tasked and integrated to ensure there are no gaps in the coverage of
the AO.
(c) Develop joint fire support tasks, responsibilities, and requirements.
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III-12 JP 3-09
(d) Develop the joint fires employment concept and joint fire support plan.
d. The Joint Fire Support Plan. See Appendix B, Joint Fire Support Operation
Order Format,for an example format.
5. Joint Fire Support Coordination
a. Joint fire support coordination includes all efforts to deconflict attacks, avoid
fratricide, reduce duplication of effort, and assist in shaping the operational environment.
Coordination procedures must be flexible and responsive to the ever-changing
dynamics of warfighting. Simplified arrangements for approval or concurrence should
be established. Coordination is reflected in the CONOPS and in the sequencing and
timing of actions to achieve objectives. Coordination is enhanced when joint fire support
personnel clearly understand the commanders intent. A very important part of the
coordination process is the identification of potential fratricide situations and the
necessary coordination measures to positively manage and control the attack of targets.
(1) Synchronization. Joint fire support coordination is a flexible process that
must be kept as simple as possible to produce the desired results. The JFC and
component commanders synchronize joint fire support operations to place the right
attack means on the correct target at the precise time. To achieve synchronization,
commanders and staffs must have a thorough knowledge of each Services doctrine,
major systems, significant capabilities and limitations, and often their tactics, techniques,
and procedures.
(2) Principles. Agencies involved in coordinating joint fire support employ
several principles. These principles are extensions of the four basic fire support tasks
discussed earlier in this chapter.
(a) Plan Early and Continuously. To effectively integrate joint fire
support with the scheme of maneuver, planning must begin when the commander states
the mission and provides the command guidance. Whenever commanders guidance is
needed during planning, joint fire support planners and/or coordinators should solicit that
guidance from the commander. Planning is continuous and keeps pace with the dynamics
of the battle. Whenever possible, direct coordination can increase the probability for
success. The tactical unit providing the support should contact the unit being supported
to conduct detailed tactical planning. This is especially important, and often the hardest
to execute, when the support is being provided across component boundaries such as
during CAS.
(b) Ensure Continuous Flow of Targeting Information. Joint fire
support planners and/or coordinators should ensure that TA requirements for joint fire
support are identified and focused on detecting priority targets. Staffs ensure that target
information from all sources is evaluated and routed to the appropriate attack means.
This includes information from all echelons and from adjacent and supporting elements.
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
III-13
(c) Consider the Use of all Lethal and/or Nonlethal Attack Means.
Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators consider all attack means available at their
level and higher levels. They also consider the command guidance for the use of these
attack means in the present battle and in future battles.
(d) Use the Lowest Echelon Capable of Furnishing Effective Support.
In order to keep joint fire support responsive, the lowest level having effective means
available should deliver it. Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators must
determine what is needed. If assets are inadequate, they must request additional joint fire
support from the appropriate echelon or component. Coordination among Service and
functional components should occur at the lowest possible echelon. When coordination
cannot be accomplished or additional guidance is required, the next higher echelon
should be consulted.
(e) Furnish the Type of Joint Fire Support Requested. The requester is
usually in the best position to determine joint fire support requirements. However, joint
fire support planners and/or coordinators are in a position to weigh the request against the
commanders guidance on priority targets and the current and future needs for joint fire
support. The component, unit, or organization providing the fire support is normally best
able to provide the detailed targeting planning for optimum results.
(f) Use the Most Effective Joint Fire Support Means. Requests for joint
fire support are transmitted to the force capable of delivering the most effective joint fires
within the required time. When developing a recommendation for the appropriate
weapon system, the joint fire support planners and/or coordinators should consider
the nature and importance of the target, the engagement time window, the
availability of attack assets, and the results desired. In some circumstances, it may be
necessary to sequence the attack by fixing the enemy with immediately available joint
fire support assets, while coordinating a subsequent more detailed attack by more
effective assets. It may be necessary to use multiple assets to create the desired effects on
a target.
(g) Avoid Unnecessary Duplication. A key task for joint fire support
planners and/or coordinators is to ensure that duplications of joint fire support are
resolved.
(h) Coordinate Airspace
1. All component commanders must have the freedom to use airspace
to achieve the JFCs objectives and must have maximum flexibility to use assets (organic
and joint) within that airspace. Effective airspace management requires a responsive
airspace control system, standardization, minimal restrictions, and continuous
coordination among all airspace users. Joint planning and coordination are necessary
to minimize mutual interference while deploying and employing air defense and fire
support assets.
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III-14 JP 3-09
See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, and JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air
Operations, for additional information.
2. Commanders, assisted by joint fire support planners and/or
coordinators, must ensure that conflicts between surface-based indirect fire and air
operations are minimized. For example, an uncoordinated attack deep into the surface
AO by the joint force land component could result in an unexpected repositioning of
enemy air defense just prior to a planned air strike. Similarly, an uncoordinated air
mission beyond the FSCL could influence the wrong enemy force and interfere with the
ground scheme of maneuver.
3. All Services operate systems for airspace control. When similar
Service systems are linked with the airspace control authority by communications,
standardized procedures, and liaison, they become part of the integrated airspace control
system. The highest probability of interference between aircraft and surface-to-surface
weapons occurs at relatively low altitudes in the immediate vicinity of firing locations
and target impact areas. FSCMs and ACMs exist within a network of component joint
FISTs, liaison parties, and fire coordination elements. Using FSCMs and ACMs
correctly can prevent fratricide and duplication of effort while increasing the
effectiveness of air-to-ground and ground-to-ground ordnance.
JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, contains a detailed discussion on airspace control.
(i) Provide Adequate Support. The mission and commanders guidance
determine the amount and type of joint fire support needed for success. Joint fire
support planners and/or coordinators must inform the maneuver commander when
joint fire support requirements exceed capabilities.
(j) Provide for Rapid Coordination. Commanders must establish
procedures and responsibilities for the rapid coordination of joint fire support. In
some circumstances, coordination of joint fire support will be detailed and done in
advance. In other instances, due to operational circumstances, coordination will be rapid
and less detailed. Poor communication and collaboration procedures or inadequate
FSCMs may delay the delivery of joint fires, or the clearance of those fires, and
jeopardize the force. Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators must know the
availability of assets, the CONOPS, the commanders intent, FSCMs in effect, ROE,
clearance of joint fires procedures, and any other restrictions.
(k) Protect the Force. Given the complexity inherent in joint fire support,
prevention of fratricide must always be a high priority. Commanders at all levels
must consciously and deliberately reduce the potential for fratricide.
1. In the execution of joint fire support, joint forces must implement
measures to reduce the risk of fratricide to include disciplined execution of OPORDs, the
ACO, depth, vertical and horizontal coordination among forces, CID procedures, and
detailed situation awareness.
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
III-15
2. The change of established FSCMs and/or ACMs must be
coordinated as far in advance as possible. All joint force coordinating agencies must
inform their forces of the effective times and locations of new FSCMs and/or ACMs.
Following direction to execute the change, the component operations cells should
confirm the changes to ensure that affected forces are aware of new FSCM and/or ACM
locations and that associated positive control measures are being followed.
3. Additional measures that may be considered to protect the force
include:
a. Guidance and restrictions governing the authority, use,
reporting, marking, and clearing of mines and munitions with high sub-munitions dud
rates.
b. Restrictions on the use of incendiary munitions where resulting
fires might endanger maneuvering forces.
c. Guidance regarding cessation of NSFS to ensure safety of
amphibious shipping and joint forces operating in the AOA.
d. Policy on use of selected munitions and fuzes (e.g., variable
time fuze) in the JOA and/or AO.
e. Development and disciplined use of common operational
graphics and associated maneuver and ACMs and FSCMs throughout the joint force.
f. Special safety precautions to be observed during ship-to-shore
movement and with operations involving helicopterborne assaults.
g. Weapons employment restrictions.
h. Target identification and engagement criteria.
i. Prohibited targets.
(l) Analyze Effectiveness. During an operation, the effectiveness of joint
fire support is continuously evaluated to ensure that it is achieving the commanders
intent.
(m) Provide for Flexibility. Joint fire support planners and/or
coordinators must anticipate and provide for future contingencies. On-order missions and
the careful positioning of assets give the commander the flexibility to respond to
changing battlefield conditions.
b. Control and Coordination Measures. Within their operational areas, land and
maritime commanders employ permissive and restrictive FSCMs to expedite attack of
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III-16 JP 3-09
targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural
significance; clear joint fires; deconflict joint fire support operations; and establish
conditions for future operations. Along with other control measures, FSCMs and their
associated procedures help ensure that joint fire support does not jeopardize troop safety,
interfere with other attack means, or disrupt operations of adjacent subordinate units.
Maneuver commanders position and adjust control measures consistent with the location
of friendly forces, the concept of the operation, anticipated enemy actions, and in
consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The
primary purpose of permissive measures is to facilitate the attack of targets. Permissive
measures facilitate reducing or eliminating coordination requirements for the engagement
of targets with conventional means. Restrictive measures impose requirements for
specific coordination before engagement of targets. Control and coordination measures
are discussed in detail in Appendix A, “Control and Coordination Measures.”
6. Joint Fire Support Assessment
Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of
employing joint force capabilities during military operations. The JFC and component
commanders assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and
compare them to their initial vision and intent.
a. The assessment process begins during mission analysis, when the commander and
staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward
accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective, and continues
throughout execution. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust
operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels,
and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned
with the mission and end state.
b. Assessment is conducted at all levels of war. At the operational and strategic
levels it is typically more wide-ranging than at the tactical level and uses measures of
effectiveness that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic-
and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives,
and progress toward the end state. Tactical-level assessment typically uses measures of
performance to evaluate task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often
physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems.
Assessment of results at the tactical level helps commanders determine operational and
strategic progress, so JFCs must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that
links assessment activities and measures at all levels.
c. At the tactical level, combat assessment (CA) encompasses many tactical-level
assessment actions and has implications at the operational level as well. CA typically
focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and
nonlethal capabilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires, joint fire
support, and the joint targeting process. To conduct CA, it is important to fully
understand the linkages between the targets and the JFCs objectives, targeting guidance,
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
III-17
and desired effects. CA is composed of three related elements: battle damage
assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendations or future
targeting.
For more on assessment, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, and
the USJFCOM Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook.
7. Joint Fire Support and Force Capabilities
a. Lethal. Following is a general discussion of lethal capabilities available to the
JFC for joint fire support planning.
(1) Fixed-Wing Aircraft. The flexibility, range, speed, lethality, precision, and
ability to mass at a desired time and place contributes significantly to the overall joint fire
support available to a JFC. Fixed-wing aircraft offer the versatility and capability to
deliver combat power against the enemy when and where needed to attain objectives
across the range of military operations. The ability of aircraft to employ precision-guided
munitions offers a distinct advantage over other weapon systems in many cases. Guided
weapons can correct for ballistic, release, and targeting errors in flight. Manned aircraft
can offer the advantage of providing immediate attack assessment. Also, stealth
technology and the ability to employ air launched conventional standoff weaponry offer
unique advantages and, in effect, may achieve their own local air superiority due to their
reduced detectability.
(2) Attack Helicopters. The US Army normally employs attack helicopters as
maneuver units capable of conducting two basic types of attack missions, close combat
attack and interdiction attack. US Army attack helicopters can also perform CAS
functions when operating in support of another component. The USMC employs its
attack rotary-wing aviation primarily as a CAS platform. As an integral part of the
MAGTF, the ACE deploys as a supporting element to the GCE to execute CAS missions
in support of ground maneuver elements. Attack helicopters are capable of employing
precision guided weapons and providing terminal guidance for other weapon platforms.
They are also capable of operating during periods of limited visibility.
(3) Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The long endurance capability of UASs has
demonstrated that UASs can be critical to the support of TST, HVT, and HPT missions.
Situations may require UASs to support CAS, strike coordination and reconnaissance, AI,
and other joint fires missions. Specific tasks for the UASs may include: target
acquisition/marking, terminal guidance of ordnance, providing precision coordinates for
GPS-aided munitions, delivery of onboard precision-guided ordnance, battle damage
assessment, and retargeting (i.e., shoot-look-shoot). In the TST role, UASs are routed,
controlled, and deconflicted in the same manner as fixed- and rotary-winged manned
aircraft, as outlined in joint doctrine. Current weapons employed by unmanned aircraft
are in the 500-pound class or less and are usually GPS- or laser-guided.
Chapter III
III-18 JP 3-09
(4) Missiles
(a) ATACMS provides long-range, surface-to-surface fires against high
value, well-defended targets, day or night, and in near-all weather conditions. The
ATACMS missiles fired from the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers deliver warheads that include
antipersonnel/antimateriel bomblets, unitary high-explosive charges, or guided
submunitions. ATACMS can support a full range of operations including TSTs, J-
SEAD, counterfires, and in strikes requiring high levels of accuracy. Their inherent low
risk, accuracy, and range make these missiles a very viable option against stationary, non-
hardened targets.
(b) US Navy TLAMs can be effective in engaging well-defended targets at
long distances and provide a potent precision employment option to the joint force. Their
inherent low risk, accuracy, and range make these missiles a very viable option against
stationary, non-hardened targets. The TLAM weapon system may require coordination
with the strike and mission planners in theater at the maritime component commander’s
HQ. Planning is an ongoing process, independent of the decision to use the weapon and
can run in parallel to the decision process. With proper planning, TLAMs are capable of
conducting short-notice employment, day or night, with few weather restrictions. TLAM
strikes may be conducted without air support and/or when manned aircraft loss is
considered to be likely. TLAMs are also capable of neutralizing enemy air defenses to
facilitate a much larger attack by land- and maritime-based airpower. In theater, the
associated afloat planning systems suites provide the joint force maritime component
commander with the capability to plan new missions or modify selected missions in the
operational area.
(c) The US Air Force conventional air-launched cruise missile (CALCM) is
a near-precision, GPS-aided standoff weapon launched from a B-52. Mission planning
for the CALCM is accomplished by reachback, and close coordination is required
between missile planners, B-52 aircraft planners, and AOC planning staffs.
(d) The joint air-to-surface standoff missile (JASSM) is a US Air Force air
launched, low observable (LO), subsonic cruise missile specifically designed to penetrate
air defense systems. The missile incorporates GPS guidance with an infrared seeker in
the terminal phase of flight. Optimizing JASSMs full precision and LO capabilities
requires prior coordination with both strike units and target intelligence agencies.
(5) Rockets. The MLRS and the HIMARS launchers provide the joint force
with effective counterfire and attack of enemy defenses, light materiel, and personnel
targets. These weapon systems supplement cannon artillery fires by delivering large
volumes of firepower against selected targets. The MLRS and HIMARS typically fire
free-flight rockets against area targets and guided munitions against point targets. The
guided MLRS rocket provides another precision attack capability to support maneuver
forces and provide interdiction of HPTs and HVTs.
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
III-19
(6) Cannon Artillery and Mortars. Although cannon artillery and mortars
primarily provide close supporting fires to maneuver forces, they can also perform other
roles such as interdiction to support maneuver, or J-SEAD to facilitate air operations.
New precision artillery rounds, such as the Excalibur, provide all weather precision strike
capability for point targets in close proximity to friendly forces.
(7) Naval Surface Fire Support
(a) The general mission of NSFS ship units in an amphibious operation is
to support the assault by destroying or neutralizing shore installations that oppose the
approach of ships and aircraft, defenses that may oppose the LF, and defenses that may
oppose the post-landing advance of the LF.
(b) When the number of ships permits, each assault battalion will be
assigned a ship in DS. The DS mission establishes a one-to-one relationship between an
NSFS ship and the supported unit. The ship delivers fires on planned targets and targets
of opportunity in her zone of fire (ZF), which normally corresponds to the zone of action
of the supported unit. When possible, ships capable of performing simultaneous missions
will be given a DS mission to allow for maximum firepower to the forward units of the
LF.
(c) The GS mission requires an NSFS ship to support the force as a whole
or that portion of the force to which the ship is assigned. A ship in GS attacks targets in
the ZF which corresponds to the zone of action of the supported unit. Prearranged fires
are delivered in accordance with a schedule of fires published in the ATF OPORD and
the NSFS plan in the LF OPORD. Fires may also be allocated to a subordinate unit for a
specific mission(s). Upon completion of the mission(s), the ship reverts to GS. Ships in
GS support regimental-sized units or larger.
For further details and information on lethal joint fires assets, see FM 3-09.32, Marine
Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-16.6B, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures (NTTP) 3-09.2, AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, J-FIRE, Multi-Service Procedures for the
Joint Application of Firepower.
b. Nonlethal. Following is a general description of nonlethal capabilities available
to the JFC that facilitate joint fire planning and support. It is important to note that
nonlethal weapons are not without risk; but they are weapons explicitly designed and
primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel while minimizing
fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the
environment.
(1) Information Operations. The integration and synchronization of fires with
IO through the targeting process is fundamental to creating the necessary synergy
between IO and more traditional maneuver and strike operations. While all IO
capabilities can be used in joint fire support, EA and CNA are discussed below.
Chapter III
III-20 JP 3-09
(a) Electronic Attack. EA is the division of EW involving the use of
electromagnetic (EM) energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack
personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or
destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. EA includes:
actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemys effective use of the EM spectrum, such as
jamming and EM deception, and employment of weapons that use either EM or directed
energy as their primary destructive mechanism (e.g., lasers, radio frequency weapons,
particle beams).
(b) Computer Network Attack. CNA is the division of computer network
operations that uses computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks
themselves.
(2) Other. Other nonlethal joint fire support includes obscurant fires to mask
friendly positions and illumination fires when required for night operations.
8. Joint Fire Support Coordination Measures and Reference Systems
a. Fire Support Coordination Measures. See Appendix A, Control and
Coordination Measures,” for a detailed discussion of FSCMs.
b. Global Area Reference System (GARS). GARS provides commanders a
worldwide common frame of reference for joint force SA to facilitate coordination,
deconfliction, integration, and synchronization. For further guidance refer to JP 2-03,
Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
9. Combat Identification
CID is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the
operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. Depending on the
situation and the operational decisions that must be made, this characterization may be
limited to friend, enemy, neutral,” or unknown.” In other situations, other
characterizations may be required including, but not limited to, class, type, nationality,
and mission configuration. CID characterizations, when applied with combatant
commander ROE, enable engagement decisions and the subsequent use, or prohibition of
use, of lethal and nonlethal weaponry to accomplish military objectives. CID is used for
force posturing, C2, SA, and strike/no-strike employment decisions. Comprehensive CID
training, in conjunction with effective CID procedures and available technology, can
greatly reduce the risk of fratricide. Effective CID not only reduces the likelihood of
fratricide, but also enhances joint fire support by instilling confidence that a designated
target is, in fact, as described.
a. The JFCs CID procedures should be developed early during planning and ROE
development. When developing the JFCs CID procedures, important considerations
include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants including
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution
III-21
multinational forces, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. There are many different CID procedures
and systems currently in use by US and multinational forces. Experience has proven that
early identification of common CID procedures significantly increases CID effectiveness.
b. CID-related information exchange orients on SA for friendly and neutral forces,
restricted sites and structures, and identification of threat objects. During mission
execution CID information requires constant coordination and should be conveyed to
decisionmakers in an understandable manner.
10. Mitigation of Collateral Damage
a. Collateral damage is defined as, The unintentional or incidental injury or damage
to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling
at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the
overall military advantage anticipated from the attack. However, even though such fires
may be lawful, commanders should ensure fires do not negatively impact operational or
strategic objectives.
b. Under the law of armed conflict, the principle of proportionality requires that the
anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property incidental to attacks must
not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be
gained. Commanders therefore have the responsibility to attempt to minimize
collateral damage to the greatest extent practicable. CDE is an important step in the
target development process. However, it should not preclude the inclusion of valid
military targets on a target list.
c. Target coordinate mensuration is a process for measurement of a feature or
location on the earth to determine an absolute latitude, longitude, and height, and it is
used in targeting to refer to the exact location of a target. Point mensuration has always
been an important part of targeting, since the mensurated points represent the desired
points of impact for the munitions employed. As the accuracy of weapons delivery has
improved, the importance of mensuration has grown in proportion. When accomplished
before ATO execution, it permits employment of an entire class of weapons (those, like
GPS-aided and cruise missiles that guide to pre-set coordinates). This allows JAOC
personnel to significantly shorten the dynamic targeting portion of the targeting process.
Guided munitions guide to the mensurated point they are programmed to attack, so
accurate mensuration is vital to their employment. However, mensuration is not required
for accurate employment of all weapons.
d. WMD targets are a particular problem. Although the initial impact of a
conventional munition on a WMD target may cause little collateral damage, secondary
effects could include a release/dispersal of chemical, biological, or radiological material
or even an imperfect detonation of a nuclear device. For this reason, WMD targets are
usually placed on an RTL; however, mission priorities to combat WMD and/or military
necessity may require JFCs to engage joint fires on WMD targets. JFCs should plan for
Chapter III
III-22 JP 3-09
follow-on operations to manage the consequences and mitigate the effects of collateral
damage from WMD.
For more information on WMD, see JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of
Mass Destruction, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-
Yield Explosives Consequence Management.
e. In most operations, political or legal constraints require the creation of an NSL.
These are locations with legally protected status, or that are placed off-limits to attack for
important policy reasons.
f. Collateral damage may be minimized through many different methods.
Choosing an appropriate weapons system, munition warhead, warhead fuzing, and final
attack axis are all methods used to mitigate collateral damage.
g. As discussed earlier, nonlethal fires can be used to confuse, damage, deceive,
delay, deny, disorganize, disrupt, influence, or locate the enemy. The development of
nonlethal weapons has recently drawn greater interest due to the restraints imposed on
using lethal fires and greater public sensitivity to military and civilian casualties.
Accordingly, JFCs and planners should seek joint fire support options that mitigate
collateral damage and minimize noncombatant and/or civilian casualties,
particularly in heavily populated areas. The employment of nonlethal fires in
supporting these operations will also be governed by their political impact.
For further information on mitigating collateral damage, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting;
the methodology contained within CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage
Estimation Methodology; and CJCSI 3122.06C, Sensitive Target Approval and Review
(STAR) Process.
A-1
APPENDIX A
CONTROL AND COORDINATION MEASURES
1. Fire Support Coordination Measures
Locations and implementing instructions for FSCMs are disseminated electronically
by message, database update, and/or overlay through both command and joint fire
support channels to higher, lower, and adjacent maneuver and supporting units.
Typically they are further disseminated to each level of command, to include the
establishing command and all concerned joint fire support agencies. Not all measures
may apply to a joint operation. However, knowledge of the various FSCMs used by each
component is necessary for the effective use of joint fire support.
a. Planning and Coordination Considerations. The establishment or change of an
FSCM established by the JFLCC is typically initiated through the J-3 operations cell and
ultimately approved by the JFC. FSCMs enhance the expeditious engagement of targets,
protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural
significance, and set the stage for future operations. Commanders position and adjust
FSCMs consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior,
subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The operations cell informs
coordination elements of the change and effective time. Conditions which dictate the
change of FSCMs are also coordinated with the other agencies and components as
appropriate. As conditions are met, the new FSCM effective time can be projected and
announced. Following direction to execute the change, the operations cell should
confirm with all liaison elements that the FSCM changes have been disseminated. This
ensures that affected units are aware of new FSCM locations and associated positive
control measures are being followed, thus reducing the risk of fratricide.
b. STANAG 2245, Field Artillery and Fire Support Data Interoperability, and
STANAG 5620, Standards for the Interoperability of Fire Support Automated Data
Processing Systems, are examples of international joint fire support agreements. Before
commencing operations both joint force and component staff members must verify the
status of FSCMs in a multinational operation.
c. Before discussing coordinating measures, a brief background on operational
environment geometry will provide a better understanding for the application of the
different types of FSCMs.
(1) Operational areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous. When they are
contiguous, a boundary separates them and when noncontiguous, they do not share a
boundary; the CONOPS links the elements of the force. Noncontiguous operational areas
normally are characterized by a 360-degree boundary with the higher HQ responsible for
the area between noncontiguous operational areas. Within both contiguous and
noncontiguous areas, operations may be linear or nonlinear in nature.
Appendix A
A-2 JP 3-09
(2) In linear operations, commanders direct and sustain combat power toward
enemy forces in concert with adjacent units usually along lines of operations with
identified forward lines of own troops (FLOTs). Emphasis is placed on maintaining the
position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces usually resulting in
contiguous operations where surface forces share boundaries. Linear operations are
normally conducted against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat
to lines of communication (LOCs) requires control of the terrain around those LOCs. In
these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and integrate
combat power more easily.
(3) In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic
reference to adjacent forces and are usually characterized by more operations in
noncontiguous areas. Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous operations along
multiple lines of operation from selected bases. Nonlinear operations place a premium on
intelligence, mobility, and sustainment.
See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more on linear and nonlinear operations and
contiguous and noncontiguous operational areas.
2. Permissive Measures
a. Coordinated Fire Line
(1) Purpose. The coordinated fire line (CFL) is a line beyond which
conventional indirect surface joint fire support means may fire at any time within the
boundaries of the establishing HQ without additional coordination. The purpose of the
CFL is to expedite the surface-to-surface engagement of targets beyond the CFL without
coordination with the land commander in whose AO the targets are located.
(2) Establishment. The CFL is usually established by a brigade or division
commander equivalent, but it can also be established, especially in amphibious
operations, by a maneuver battalion. It is located as close to the establishing unit as
possible without interfering with the maneuver forces. There is no requirement for the
CFL to be placed on identifiable terrain. However, additional considerations include the
limits of ground observation, the location of the initial objectives in the offense, and the
requirement for maximum flexibility in both maneuver and the delivery of supporting
fires. Subordinate CFLs may be consolidated by higher HQ.
(3) Graphic Portrayal. The CFL is graphically portrayed by a dashed black
line, with CFLfollowed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective date-
time group (DTG) below the line (see Figure A-1).
b. Fire Support Coordination Line
(1) Purpose. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious engagement of targets of
opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does not divide an AO. The
Control and Coordination Measures
A-3
FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of
munition against surface targets (see Figure A-2).
(2) Establishment. An FSCL is established and adjusted by the appropriate
land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with
superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The FSCL is a term
oriented to air-land operations and is normally located only on land; however, in certain
situations, such as littoral areas, the FSCL may affect both land and sea areas. If
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE
LEGEND
XX
XX
XX
Forward Boundary
Objective
Not A
Boundary
PERMISSIVE
Fire Support
Coordination
Measure
F
S
CL
X
CO
RP
S
F
SC
L
XC
O
R
P
S
O/O
l
l
l
Enhances the expeditious attack of targets and sets the stage for future
operations.
Established by appropriate level commander in consultation with superior,
subordinate, and supporting commanders.
Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders.
FSCL fire support coordination line O/O on order
Figure A-2. Fire Support Coordination Line
FIRE SUPPORT AND CONTROL MEASURES
LEGEND
airspace coordination area
altitude
coordinated fire line
division
effective
free-fire area
fire support coordination line
maximum
mechanized
minimum
no-fire area
phase line
restrictive fire area
ACA
ALT
CFL
DIV
EFF
FFA
FSCL
MAX
MECH
MIN
NFA
PL
RFA
RFA
3D Mech Div
080800ZAUG
To
100800ZAUG
MAX ALT
MIN ALT
F
S
C
L
X
C
O
R
P
S
0
5
1
2
3
0
Z
A
P
R
CF
L
2
5
D
IV
0
8
080
0ZA
PR
P
L
D
E
LT
A
P
L
D
E
L
TA
ACA
XCorps
MIN ALT 300FT
MAX ALT 4000
MA00000000 to MA00000000
MA00000000 to MA00000000
EFF 091200ZAUG
NFA
3D Mech Div
EFF-080800ZAUG
FFA
XCorps
080800-081600ZAUG
Or
EFF-080800ZAUG
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
B
OUND
AR
Y
Figure A-1. Fire Support and Control Measures
Appendix A
A-4 JP 3-09
possible, the FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features to assist identification
from the air. In amphibious operations, the FSCL is normally established by the CLF
after coordination with the CATF. Changes to the FSCL require notification of all
affected forces within the AO and must allow sufficient time for these forces and/or
components to incorporate the FSCL change. Current technology and collaboration tools
between the elements of the joint force determine the times required for changing the
FSCL. The JFC should establish a time standard in his guidance for shifting FSCLs.
Whenever possible, restrictive measures are employed by commanders to enhance the
protection of friendly forces operating beyond the FSCL measures such as restrictive
fire areas (RFAs) and no-fire areas (NFAs).
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE
LEGEND
XX
XX
XX
Forward Boundary
Objective
Not A
Boundary
PERMISSIVE
Fire Support
Coordination
Measure
F
S
CL
X
CO
RP
S
F
SC
L
XC
O
R
PS
O/O
l
l
l
Enhances the expeditious attack of targets and sets the stage for future
operations.
Established by appropriate level commander in consultation with superior,
subordinate, and supporting commanders.
Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders.
FSCL fire support coordination line O/O on order
Figure A-2. Fire Support Coordination Line
Control and Coordination Measures
A-5
(3) Graphic Portrayal. The FSCL is graphically portrayed by a solid black
line extending across the assigned areas of the establishing HQ. The letters FSCLare
followed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective DTG below the line.
FSCLs do not have to follow traditionalstraight-line paths. Positioning the FSCL on
terrain identifiable from the air is a technique that may further assist in fratricide
prevention. Curved and/or enclosed FSCLs have applications in nonlinear joint
operations (see Figure A-2).
(4) Employment. Use of an FSCL is not mandatory. Forces engaging targets
beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow
necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the land. In exceptional
circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the engagement
of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide
and waste resources. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface
engagement operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force
commander. This control is exercised through the operations staff or with predesignated
procedures. The FSCL is not a boundary the synchronization of operations on either
side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of
the land or amphibious force boundary. The establishment of an FSCL does not create a
free-fire area (FFA) beyond the FSCL. When targets are engaged beyond an FSCL,
supporting elements engagements must not produce adverse effects on or to the rear of
the line. Engagements beyond the FSCL must be consistent with the establishing
commanders priorities, timing, and desired effects and deconflicted whenever possible
with the supported HQ.
(5) Considerations. The decision on where to place or even whether to use an
FSCL requires careful consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates of the
situation and CONOPS. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of movement,
concept and tempo of the operation, organic weapon capabilities, and other factors are all
considered by the commander. The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the FLOT in
the defense than in the offense; however, the exact positioning depends on the situation.
Placing the FSCL at greater depths will typically require support from higher organic HQ
and other supporting commanders. Also, when the FSCL is positioned at greater depth,
there is greater requirement for detailed coordination with the establishing commander.
(a) Air strikes short of the FSCL (both CAS and AI) must be under positive
or procedural control to ensure proper clearance of joint fires (e.g., JTACs or FAC[A]s).
Land commanders must consider the need for extra control measures.
(b) By establishing an FSCL close-in, yet at sufficient depth so as to not
limit high-tempo maneuver, land and amphibious force commanders ease the
coordination requirements for engagement operations within their AOs by forces not
under their control such as NSFS or AI.
(c) Coordination of engagements beyond the FSCL is especially critical to
commanders of air, land, and SOF units operating beyond the FSCL. Such coordination
Appendix A
A-6 JP 3-09
is also important when engaging forces are employing wide-area munitions or those with
delayed effects. Finally, this coordination assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant
engagement operations.
(d) The establishing commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as
required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL
may change frequently. A series of predisseminated “on-order” FSCLs will help
accelerate the coordination required. The establishing commander quickly transmits the
change to higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting HQ to ensure engagement operations
are appropriately coordinated by controlling agencies. Anticipated adjustments to the
location of the FSCL are normally transmitted to other elements of the joint force
sufficiently early to reduce potential disruptions in their current and near-term operations.
Careful planning and coordination is essential for changes to the FSCL. This planning is
necessary to minimize the risk of fratricide and avoid disrupting operations.
(e) Varying capabilities for acquisition and engagement may exist among
adjacent commanders in a multinational operation. Normally, corps level commanders
may establish an FSCL to support their operations. Layered FSCLs and multiple,
separate, noncontiguous corps and/or MEF FSCLs positioned at varying depths create a
coordination and execution challenge for supporting commanders (e.g., tracking effective
times, lateral boundaries, and multiple command guidance). In cases such as these when
the components share a mutual boundary, the JFC or JFLCC may consolidate the
operational requirements of subordinates to establish a single FSCL. This FSCL may be
noncontiguous, to reflect the varying capabilities of subordinate commands. A single
FSCL facilitates air support, accommodates subordinate deep operations requirements,
and eases coordination of FSCL changes.
c. Free-Fire Area
(1) Purpose. An FFA is a specific designated area into which any weapon
system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing HQ. It is used to
expedite joint fires and to facilitate jettison of aircraft munitions.
(2) Establishment. An FFA may be established only by the military
commander with jurisdiction over the area (usually, a division or higher commander).
Preferably, the FFA should be located on identifiable terrain; however, it may be
designated by grid coordinates or GARS.
(3) Graphic Portrayal. The FFA is graphically portrayed by a solid black line
defining the area and the letters FFAwithin, followed by the establishing HQ and the
effective DTG (see Figure A-1).
d. Kill Boxes
(1) Definition. A kill box is a three-dimensional area used to facilitate the
integration of joint fires.
Control and Coordination Measures
A-7
(2) Purpose. When established, the primary purpose of a kill box is to allow
lethal attack against surface targets without further coordination with the establishing
commander and without terminal attack control. When used to integrate air-to-surface
and surface-to-surface indirect fires, the kill box will have appropriate restrictions. The
goal is to reduce the coordination required to fulfill support requirements with maximum
flexibility, while preventing fratricide. A kill box will not be established specifically for
CAS missions.
(3) Establishment. A kill box is established and adjusted by supported
component commanders in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and
affected commanders, and is an extension of an existing support relationship established
by the JFC.
See FM 3-09.34/MCRP 3-25H/NTTP 3-09.2.1/AFTTP(I) 3-2.59, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment, for further information.
3. Restrictive Measures
a. Restrictive Fire Line
(1) Purpose. The restrictive fire line (RFL) is a line established between
converging friendly forces one or both may be moving that prohibits joint fires or
the effects of joint fires across the line without coordination with the affected force. The
purpose of the line is to prevent fratricide and duplication of engagements by converging
friendly forces.
(2) Establishment. The commander common to the converging forces
establishes the RFL. It is located on identifiable terrain when possible. In linkup
operations, it is usually closer to the stationary force to allow maximum freedom of
action for the maneuver and joint fire support of the linkup force.
(3) Graphic Portrayal. The RFL is graphically portrayed by a solid black line,
with RFLfollowed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective DTG below
the line (see Figure A-3).
b. No-Fire Area
(1) Purpose. The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit joint fires or their effects
into an area. There are two exceptions:
(a) When the establishing HQ approves joint fires within the NFA on a
mission-by-mission basis.
(b) When an enemy force within the NFA engages a friendly force and the
engaged commander determines there is a requirement for immediate protection and
responds with the minimal force needed to defend the force.
Appendix A
A-8 JP 3-09
(2) Establishment. Any size unit may establish NFAs. If possible, the NFA is
established on identifiable terrain. It may also be located by a series of grids or by a
radius from a center point.
(3) Graphic Portrayal. The NFA is graphically portrayed as an area outlined
with a solid black line with black diagonal lines inside. The letters NFAare within,
followed by the establishing HQ and the effective DTG (see Figure A-1).
RESTRICTIVE FIRE LINE, FIRE SUPPORT AREA,
AND ZONE OF FIRE
DIV division
DS direct support
FSA fire support area
FSS fire support station
LEGEND
GS general support
LOD line of departure
RFL restrictive fire line
ZF zone of fire
DS
GS
015 TRUE
015 TRUE
DS
FSA II
RED 1 BLUE 2
XX
FSA I
015 TRUE
ZF6
ZF4
ZF3
XX
X
FSS I
LODLOD
R
F
L
1
s
t
D
I
V
1
2
1
2
00
Z
A
U
G
Figure A-3. Restrictive Fire Line, Fire Support Area, and Zone of Fire
Control and Coordination Measures
A-9
c. Restrictive Fire Area
(1) Purpose. An RFA is an area where specific restrictions are imposed and in
which joint fires, or the effects of joint fires, that exceed those restrictions will not be
delivered without coordination with the establishing HQ. The purpose of the RFA is to
regulate joint fires into an area according to the stated restrictions.
(2) Establishment. A maneuver battalion or higher echelon normally
establishes an RFA. Usually, the RFA is located on identifiable terrain, by grid, or by a
radius from a center point. To facilitate rapidly changing operations, on-call RFAs may
be used. The dimensions, locations, and restrictions of the on-call RFA are prearranged.
(3) Graphic Portrayal. The RFA is graphically portrayed by a solid black line
defining the area and the letters RFAwithin, followed by the establishing HQ and the
effective DTG. The restrictions may be included within the graphic if space allows, or
reference may be made to a specific OPORD or OPLAN (see Figure A-1).
d. Zone of Fire
(1) Purpose. A ZF is an FSCM that includes the area within which a
designated ground unit or fire support ship delivers, or is prepared to deliver, joint fire
support. Joint fires may or may not be observed. Land is divided into ZFs which are
assigned to gunfire support ships and units as a means to coordinate their efforts with
each other and with the scheme of maneuver of the supported ground unit. Units and
ships assigned ZFs are responsible for engaging known targets and targets of opportunity
according to their mission and the guidance of the supported commander.
(2) Establishment. The commander of the maritime force providing NSFS
establishes and assigns ZFs for the forces. The ZF for an artillery battalion or a ship
assigned the mission of DS normally corresponds to the AO of the supported unit. The
ZF for an artillery battalion or a ship assigned the mission of GS should be within the
boundaries of the supported unit. When used in conjunction with naval gunfire, the size
and shape of a ZF will depend on the following:
(a) Boundaries of Zone of Fire. In order to permit ready identification by
the spotter and the individual fire support ship, the boundaries of the ZFs should be
recognizable both on the terrain and on a map. It may be necessary to divide a large ZFs
into two or more smaller zones due to considerations discussed below. The boundaries of
ZFs of DS ships should correspond to the zones of action of the LF units supported.
(b) Size. The size of each ZF should be such that the fire support ships, or
ships assigned to observe and/or destroy targets, will be able to accomplish the mission in
the time allocated. When ZFs are delineated, known or suspected targets scheduled for
destruction in each zone are plotted, and then the number and type of targets are
compared to the capability of the ship.
Appendix A
A-10 JP 3-09
(c) Visibility. Observation from seaward is a desirable feature for ZFs,
since it permits a ship to deliver more accurate and rapid fire.
(d) Accessibility to Fire. The ZFs must be accessible to the trajectory of
the fire support ship(s) assigned to the zone.
(3) ZFs are also assigned to FA units by their higher HQ. The ZF for FA units
assigned to a maneuver unit or assigned the mission of DS corresponds to the AO of the
parent or supported maneuver unit. The ZF for an artillery unit assigned the mission of
reinforcing corresponds to the ZF of the reinforced artillery unit. The ZF for an artillery
unit assigned the mission of GS-reinforcing corresponds to the ZF of the reinforced
artillery unit and is within the AO of the supported maneuver unit. The ZF for an
artillery unit assigned the mission of GS corresponds to the AO of the supported
maneuver unit.
(4) Graphic Portrayal. ZFs are delineated by the use of broken lines (solid
lines if unit boundaries are used) and are designated by Arabic numerals, e.g., ZF3(see
Figure A-3).
4. Maneuver Control Measures
a. Boundaries
(1) Purpose. A boundary is a maneuver control measure. In land warfare, it is
a line by which surface AOs between adjacent units and/or formations are defined.
Boundaries designate the geographical limits of the AO of a unit. Within their own
boundaries, units may execute joint fires and maneuver without close coordination with
neighboring units unless otherwise restricted. Normally, units do not fire across
boundaries unless the fires are coordinated with the adjacent unit or the fires are beyond
an FSCM, such as a CFL. These restrictions apply to conventional and special munitions
and their effects. When fires such as smoke and illumination affect an adjacent unit,
coordination with that unit is normally required. A commander can, in certain situations,
decide to fire across boundaries at positively identified enemy elements without
coordination. However, direct and observed joint fires should be used when firing across
boundaries at positively identified enemy forces when there is no time to coordinate with
adjacent friendly units.
(2) Establishment and/or Portrayal. Any commander given an AO can
establish boundaries for subordinate units. These boundaries will be respected by all
Service and functional components. Boundaries are depicted as solid black lines with a
symbol placed on the boundary to show the size and designation of the highest echelons
that have the boundary in common. If the units are of unequal size, the symbol of the
higher unit is shown and the designation of the lower unit is given completely (see Figure
A-1).
Control and Coordination Measures
A-11
b. Phase Lines
(1) Purpose. A phase line (PL) is a maneuver control measure used by land
forces for control and coordination of military operations. It is usually a recognizable
terrain feature extending across the zone of action. Units normally report crossing PLs,
but do not halt unless specifically directed. PLs can be used to identify limits of advance,
monitor rates of movement, control joint fires (when dual designated as an FSCM), or
define an AO. The purpose of each PL and any actions required by forces affected by the
PL will be specified on the OPORD of the establishing HQ.
(2) Establishment and/or Portrayal. Any commander given an AO can
establish PLs. A PL is depicted as a solid black line labeled PLand assigned letters,
numbers, or code name designations (see Figure A-1).
c. Fire Support Area and/or Fire Support Station
(1) Purpose. A fire support area (FSA) is an appropriate maneuver area
assigned to fire support ships by the maritime commander from which they deliver
surface joint fire support to an operation ashore. An FSA is normally associated with
amphibious operations but can be used whenever it is desirable to have a fire support ship
occupy a certain geographic position. A fire support station (FSS) is an exact location at
sea from which a fire support ship delivers fires. This designation is used to station ships
in order to be able to reach certain targets. For example, a ship in an FSA may not be
able to reach a certain target except when it is stationed at the FSS.
(2) Establishment. The officer in tactical command, typically the CATF,
establishes FSAs and FSSs. In amphibious operations when engagement groups are
formed and separate landing areas are designated, the CATF may assign each
engagement group commander the responsibility for control of naval gunfire support
within the area.
(3) Graphic Portrayal. FSAs are designed with Roman numerals (FSA I, II,
III) and are shown on the NSFS operations overlay. FSSs are designated by numbers
(FSS 1, 2, 3) and are shown on the NSFS operations overlay as an X indicating the exact
position of the ship (see Figure A-3).
5. Airspace Coordinating Measures
a. Airspace Coordinating Measures. ACMs are critical to the successful
employment of joint fires. A key to effectively coordinating joint fires is to constantly
view the operational environment as a three dimensional area. ACMs are nominated
from subordinate HQ through component command HQ, and forwarded to the airspace
control authority in accordance with the air control plan. Most ACMs impact on direct
and indirect joint fires trajectories and UASs because of their airspace use. Some ACMs
may be established to permit surface joint fires or UAS operations. The component
commanders ensure that ACM nominations support and do not conflict with joint
Appendix A
A-12 JP 3-09
operations prior to forwarding to the JAOC. The airspace control authority approves
formal ACM nominations and includes them in the ACO. The airspace control authority
consolidates, coordinates, and deconflicts the airspace requirements of the components
and publishes the ACMs in the ACO. The ACO is normally published at least daily and
is often distributed both separately and as a section of the ATO.
See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, and JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air
Operations, for further information on C2 of air operations.
b. Normally, ACMs such as minimum risk routes will terminate in the vicinity of the
FSCL. However, the situation may require establishing active and planned ACMs
beyond the FSCL to facilitate rapid change of both the FSCL and ACM. ACMs may be
established to facilitate operations between the FSCL and the land force commanders
forward boundary. Ground infiltration and aerial insertion and/or extraction of SOF or
long-range surveillance teams as well as attack helicopter maneuver are operational
examples.
c. Changes to ACMs within a land force AO are initiated by the components air
control element with airspace control authority approval. One common procedural ACM
that impacts on the delivery of aerial fire support is a coordinating altitude. A
coordinating altitude separates fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The JFC approves the
coordinating altitude, which is normally specified in the air control plan. The airspace
control authority is the final approving authority for changes, which are requested
through airspace coordination channels. Fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft planning extended
operations penetrating this altitude should, whenever possible, notify the appropriate
airspace control facility.
d. Airspace Coordination Area (ACA). The ACA is the primary ACM which
reflects the coordination of airspace for use by air support and indirect joint fires.
(1) Purpose. ACAs are used to ensure aircrew safety and the effective use of
indirect supporting surface joint fires by deconfliction through time and space. The ACA
is a block or corridor of airspace in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from
friendly surface fires. A formal ACA (a three dimensional box of airspace) requires
detailed planning. More often an informal ACA is established using time, lateral
separation, or altitude to provide separation between surface-to-surface and air-delivered
weapon effects.
For additional information on the ACA, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, and JP 3-52,
Joint Airspace Control.
(2) Establishment. The airspace control authority establishes formal ACAs at
the request of the appropriate component commander. ACAs require detailed planning.
Though not always necessary, formal ACAs should be considered. Vital information
defining the formal ACA includes minimum and maximum altitudes, a baseline
designated by grid coordinates at each end, the width (on either side of the baseline), and
Control and Coordination Measures
A-13
the effective times. When time for coordination is limited, an informal ACA is used. In
an informal ACA, aircraft and surface joint fires may be separated by time or distance
(lateral, altitude, or a combination of the two). The informal ACA can be requested by
the maneuver commander requesting CAS or employing helicopters, and is approved at
battalion or higher level. Both types of ACAs are constructed with the assistance of the
air liaison officer to ensure they meet the technical requirements of the aircraft and
weapon systems.
(3) Graphic Portrayal. A formal ACA is shown as an area enclosed by a solid
black line. Depicted inside the enclosed area are ACA,the establishing HQ, the
minimum and maximum altitudes, the grid coordinates for each end of the baseline, and
the effective DTG or the words on order. Informal ACAs are not normally displayed
on maps, charts, or overlays (see Figure A-1).
Appendix A
A-14 JP 3-09
Intentionally Blank
B-1
APPENDIX B
JOINT FIRE SUPPORT OPERATION ORDER FORMAT
ANNEX XX (JOINT FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code
name] [issuing HQ]
(Include heading if annex distributed separately from OPLAN/OPORD.)
1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces
(1) Include a detailed description of enemy fire support and air defense assets.
(2) List enemy rocket, cannon, missile, and air force units. Include those
organic to maneuver units. List all fire support units that can be identified as being
committed or reinforcing. Consider all identified fire support units within supporting
range as being in support of the committed force. Include the number of possible enemy
air sorties by day, if known. Estimate the number, type, yield, and delivery means of
enemy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons available to the
committed force.
b. Friendly Forces
(1) State the concept of fires.
(2) Provide adjacent units’ concept of fires, if applicable.
(3) Include supporting air, land, and maritime forces.
c. Environment
(1) Terrain. List terrain aspects that would impact operations.
(2) Weather. List weather aspects that would impact operations.
(3) Civil considerations. List civil considerations that would impact
operations. Refer to civil-military operations annex as required.
2. MISSION. State the joint fire support mission for the operation.
3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Joint Fires. Describe how joint fires will be used to support the
CONOPS. State the priority of joint fire support. This must be consistent with what is in
Appendix B
B-2 JP 3-09
the concept of fires in the OPORD/OPLAN. Address the objectives for using air, land,
and maritime fires.
b. Air Component
(1) General. Briefly describe the air commanders concept for the use of air
power.
(2) Air interdiction.
(3) Close air support.
(4) Electronic attack. Refer to IO annex as required.
(5) Intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance operations. Refer to ISR
annex as required.
(6) Miscellaneous. State the following:
(a) The ATOs effective time period.
(b) Deadlines for submission of AI, CAS, search and rescue, and EW
requests.
(c) The mission request numbering system based on the target numbering
system.
(d) Joint suppression of enemy air defense taskings from the land
component commander.
(e) Essential ACA measures such as coordinating altitude, target areas,
minimum risk route requirements — identified in the ACA annex.
c. Land Component
(1) General. Include the concept for use of cannon, mortar, rocket, and missile
fires in support of shaping operations.
(2) Organization for combat.
(3) Allocation of ammunition.
(4) Miscellaneous. Include the following:
(a) Changes to the targeting numbering system.
Joint Fire Support Operation Order Format
B-3
(b) The use of pulse repetition frequency (PRF) codes.
(c) Positioning restrictions.
d. Maritime Component
(1) General. Include the concept for use of NSFS and TLAMs.
(2) NSFS Organization.
(3) Miscellaneous.
(a) Trajectory limitations or minimum safe distances.
(b) Frequency allocations.
(c) Reference to an NSFS annex.
e. Nuclear Operations
f. Smoke Operations
g. Target Acquisition. Include information pertaining to the employment and
allocation of TA systems and EW assets.
h. Coordinating Instructions
(1) List the targeting products (target selection standards matrix, HPT list, and
attack guidance matrix).
(2) List FSCMs.
(3) Refer to time of execution of program of fires.
(4) Include ROE.
(5) List fire support rehearsal times and requirements.
(6) List target allocations.
(7) Specify the datum or coordinate system to be used.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Identify the location of munition transfer points and
ammunition supply points, or refer to the logistics annex. List the controlled supply rate.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Appendix B
B-4 JP 3-09
APPENDIXES:
1. Air Component Support
2. Land Component Support
3. Maritime Component Support
4. SO Component
DISTRIBUTION: (If distributed separately from OPLAN/OPORD)
C-1
APPENDIX C
LASER-GUIDED SYSTEMS
1. General
a. Laser-guided systems provide the joint force with the ability to locate and engage
targets with an increased first-round hit probability. Laser-guided systems can effectively
engage a wide range of targets, including moving targets. Laser-guided weapons
(LGWs) can reduce the number of weapons and/or weapon systems required to create an
effect or achieve an objective, because of increased accuracy. Based on the threat level
and environment, laser-guided systems provide additional capabilities, but also have
distinct limitations. In any laser designating situation, strive for simplicity and use all
available resources to help ensure first-pass success.
b. Laser Capabilities. Laser designators radiate a narrow beam of pulsed energy.
Current tactical lasers operate in the near infrared wavelength spectrum, which is not
visible to the human eye. When within range, the laser designator can be aimed so the
energy precisely designates a chosen spot on the target. Laser target designators (LTDs)
mark targets for laser spot trackers (LSTs) and LGWs. Some laser systems can
accurately determine target range and location. When coupled with horizontal and
vertical scales, they can measure target azimuth and elevation.
c. Laser Target Ranging and Designation Systems. Laser target ranging and
designation systems can provide accurate range, azimuth, and elevation information to
locate enemy targets. These systems may vary from handheld to aircraft-mounted
devices and perform similar functions with varying degrees of accuracy. In combination
with GPS, lasers can provide accurate enemy target locations. In addition, lasers in
combination with GPS can provide for target area analysis. This analysis can be used to
fire weapons accurately at the enemy, to accurately locate future friendly observer
locations, and to enable friendly forces to effectively conduct maneuver operations as
well as command and control their forces by accurate identification of terrain reference
points.
d. Laser Acquisition Devices. Of the two types of laser acquisition devices, the
first, the LST, is used to aid visual acquisition of the target to be attacked by another
weapon. This type of laser acquisition device is normally mounted on fixed-wing aircraft
or helicopters. The second type of acquisition device is a seeker and guidance kit
mounted on LGWs which guide on coded laser energy.
e. Basic Considerations. There are five basic considerations for using LSTs or
LGWs:
(1) Line of sight (LOS) must exist between the designator and the target and
between the target and the LST/LGW.
(2) PRF codes of the laser designator and the LST/LGW must be compatible.
Appendix C
C-2 JP 3-09
(3) The direction of attack must allow the LST/LGW to sense enough
reflected laser energy from the target for the seeker to acquire and lock on the target.
(4) The LTD must designate the target at the correct time, and for the correct
length of time. If the length of time is insufficient, the seeker head could break lock and
the flight pattern of the LGW becomes unpredictable.
(5) The delivery system (air or ground) must deliver the LGW within the
specific LGW envelope to ensure the weapon can physically reach the target. There is an
increased hazard to friendly forces when aircrews release weapons behind friendly
lines.
f. Environmental factors can affect laser designators and seeker head
performance. Tactics and techniques must consider low clouds and fog, smoke, haze,
snow and rain, solar saturation, and other visually limiting phenomena.
g. Beam divergence and target size. Laser spot size is a function of beam
divergence and the distance from the laser designator to the target. If an LTD has a beam
spread or divergence of 1 milliradian, its spot would have a diameter of approximately
one meter at a distance of 1,000 meters in front of the designator. If this spot were aimed
at a 3-meter by 3-meter box 3,000 meters away the laser spot would be as wide and tall as
the box.
h. Target Reflection. Most surfaces have a mixture of mirror-like and scattered
reflections. Laser energy reflects in an arc, but is strongest at the angle where it would
reflect if the surface were a mirror. If the LTD is perpendicular to a surface the reflection
can be seen from all angles on the designated side, but can be detected best near the laser
to target line (LTL), which is a line from the LTD to the target usually expressed in
degrees magnetic. When the surface is at an angle to the laser designator, the angle of
strongest reflection is also predictable. Glass, water, and highly polished surfaces are
poor surfaces to designate because they reflect laser energy in only one direction. This
requires the seeker to be in this small region and looking toward the reflected energy to
achieve TA. Battlefield dynamics will rarely provide the opportunity to perfectly align
laser designation/reflectivity in the direction of approaching aircraft or munitions. Strict
adherence to laser cones or baskets and center mass target designation will best ensure
success.
i. Opponent Use of Laser Countermeasures. US opponents realize the
importance of laser countermeasures in a conflict with the United States or its
multinational partners. Many of the techniques for countering laser energy and sensitive
electro-optical equipment are common knowledge throughout much of the world. US
opponents are well-equipped to detect and counter the sophisticated laser designator and
guidance systems used by the armed forces of Western nations.
j. Legal Uses of Lasers on the Battlefield. Protocol IV to the Certain Conventional
Weapons Convention (Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons) prohibits the use of lasers
Laser-Guided Systems
C-3
specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision. For all other
types of lasers, such as those used for detection, targeting, range-finding,
communications, and target destruction, parties to the Protocol have an obligation to
take all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to
unenhanced vision. The DOD Policy on Blinding Lasers recognizes that accidental or
incidental eye injuries may occur on the battlefield through the use of lasers for detection,
targeting, range-finding, communications, and target destruction; however, it is DOD
policy to strive, through training and doctrine, to minimize these injuries.
For a discussion of laser-guided considerations for CAS, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air
Support.
For additional information on laser operations, see FM 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-
09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, JFIRE, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the
Joint Application of Firepower.
2. Laser Hardware
a. Laser-Guided Weapons. All LGWs home on PRF-coded reflected laser energy.
Some LGWs require target lock-on before launch (LOBL) and during the entire time of
flight. Other LGWs allow target lock-on after launch (LOAL) and require illumination
only during the terminal portion of flight. All LGWs require illumination until weapon
impact. Typical laser-guided weapons include:
(1) Laser-guided bombs (LGBs). Paveway II, III, and enhanced Paveway III
(GPS aided).
(2) Laser-guided missiles (LGMs). AGM-65E Laser Maverick and AGM-114
HELLFIRE. LGMs generally provide greater standoff launch ranges than LGBs.
Greater range provides increased survivability for aircrews operating in a high threat
environment. Aircrews and JTACs must exercise caution when launching LGMs from
behind friendly troops.
(a) Laser Maverick employment considerations include:
1.
In the event the laser signal is lost, the weapon will safe itself and
overfly the target. The Maverick system allows aircrew to engage targets designated by
either air or ground sources with inflight selectable PRF codes.
2.
Delivery aircraft must have unobstructed LOS to the target to
achieve Maverick lock-on.
3.
The missile requires LOBL.
4. The Maverick and the laser designator must be set to the same PRF
code prior to launch.
Appendix C
C-4 JP 3-09
5.
For other than self-designation, the attack heading must be adjusted
to optimize the reflected laser energy.
(b) Hellfire employment considerations include:
1.
In the event the laser signal is lost after lock-on, the missile seeker is
programmed to begin searching for properly coded laser energy. The Hellfire system
allows aircrews to engage targets designated by either air (buddy or autonomous, fixed
wing or rotary wing) or ground forces with inflight selectable PRF codes.
2.
The Hellfire can be employed in a LOBL or LOAL mode. In
LOBL, the missile must acquire the laser energy prior to launch. In LOAL, the missile
can be fired from defilade or behind a mask and climbs on a preprogrammed profile,
searching for properly coded laser energy as it executes its fly-out. The trajectory of the
missile can be altered by delaying laser designation.
3.
The Hellfire missile uses last pulse logic in case of under spill and to
protect the designator. The missile will hit the most distant laser spot within the seeker
field of view.
4.
The Hellfire is unimpeded by ceilings of 2,000 feet (ft) above
ground level (AGL) and above. For employment under ceilings below 2,000 ft the
aircrew will vary the missile mode, designator delay, and employment range to shape the
trajectory. The rule of thumb minimum ceiling for Hellfire employment is 500 ft AGL.
(3) Cannon Launched Guided Projectile - Copperhead
(a) Copperhead is a 155-millimeter, cannon-launched, guided projectile
with a shaped-charge warhead and a laser seeker. When fired at a moving or stationary
hard point target, Copperhead homes in on laser energy reflected from the target during
the final part of its trajectory. A remote laser designator provides laser energy.
Copperhead is best used against multiple targets in large target arrays outside the range of
maneuver direct fire weapon systems (approximately 3,000 meters). Copperhead may
engage a single target or very few widely separated targets if they are HPTs; for example,
an enemy commanders vehicle. Targets appearing within the range of maneuver direct
fire weapon systems should be engaged by Copperhead only when the maneuver
commander directs or when the direct fire systems are unable to engage the targets.
(b) Copperhead targets can be engaged as either planned targets or targets
of opportunity. Planned targets are preferred because the firing battery requires less
reaction time. Most often, the target-of-opportunity technique is used only during
offensive operations.
For more information on Copperhead employment, see FM 3-09.42, Fire Support for the
Brigade Combat Team.
Laser-Guided Systems
C-5
(4) Laser-Equipped UASs
(a) General Procedures
1.
Employment. Laser-equipped UASs utilize the same procedures
and communications as an airborne laser designator operator (LDO). In some cases, the
UAS may also act as a strike aircraft, using the same procedures as other strike aircraft.
2.
Target Acquisition Considerations. If a laser-equipped UAS is
being utilized by the LDO, coordination between the UAS flight crew and the attack
aircrew is critical for both safety and laser geometry. LST-equipped strike aircraft should
notify the LDO that they are LST capable upon arriving on-station. The LDO, through
standard communication, will then direct the UAS mark onto the target. The LDO may
pass the UAS laser PRF code to the attack aircraft, or the attack aircraft may pass its
weapons code to the LDO.
3.
Deconfliction of Airspace. Standard procedures used by LDOs to
deconflict fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft apply to laser-equipped UASs employed
on laser designation operations. Proper laser geometry and 2,000-ft altitude blocks for
the UAS stationing orbit are recommended when using a UAS to mark for strike aircraft.
b. Laser Target Designators. Ground laser target designators (GLTDs) are
employed by ground forces to illuminate targets with laser energy. LGWs use this
energy to guide to the target. LSTs use the reflected laser energy as a reference point for
lock-on and tracking. The laser energy PRF is adjustable and must match the PRF setting
on the weapon or tracker. GLTD ranges vary from 10 meters to 5 kilometers. Airborne
laser target designators (ALTDs) are carried on aircraft and provide the same function as
the GLTD. ALTDs are capable of very long range lasing and are normally employed
below 30,000 ft AGL. See Figure C-1 for advantages and disadvantages of airborne and
ground designators.
Note: The PRF of LGBs is normally only adjustable prior to flight and cannot be
changed once airborne. Most missiles such as Maverick and Hellfire can be adjusted in-
flight. JTACs and aircrews must ensure the laser designator PRF matches the code
programmed into the weapon or the weapon will not guide.
c. Laser Rangefinders/Target Locating Devices. Laser rangefinders (LRFs) use
low power laser pulses to measure range to an object. Digital magnetic compass
systems will not provide the accuracy needed for a single inertially-aided munition
weapon to hit a point target. Target locating devices are devices that incorporate an
LRF, magnetic or gyroscopic compass, tilt measurement devices, and GPS. These
systems measure the range and angles from its position provided by the GPS to
mathematically derive a target location. If used correctly the quality of the target location
is generally much better than that of a hand-derived coordinate. The accuracy of the
coordinate is dependent on many variables. Errors are induced by inaccurate GPS
data, poor azimuth, range and elevation data, system calibration, and user skill.
Appendix C
C-6 JP 3-09
These errors are magnified with range and can result in significant TLEs. Due to
the variables listed previously, TLEs may vary from 10 meters at 1 kilometer to
more than 300 meters at maximum ranges.
d. Laser Spot Trackers. LSTs are systems that allow acquisition of a coded laser
designated target. LSTs are laser sensors that provide heads up display cueing for
aircraft equipped with these systems. While scanning for laser energy, these systems
have a limited field of view that depends on range and switch settings. In general, the
chances of acquisition are improved when cueing aids such as target marks, landmarks,
and inertial navigation system/GPS coordinates help the pilot point the aircraft in the
direction of the target.
3. Laser Designation Operations
a. Laser designation operations are divided into three primary categories: laser
target ranging, TA, and weapons guidance.
(1) Target Ranging. Target ranging systems can provide accurate range,
azimuth, and elevation information to identified targets.
AIRBORNE AND GROUND DESIGNATOR
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
TYPE DESIGNATORS
AIRBORNE
2. Overhead Wheel
Position
1. Trail Position
3. Offset or Opposing
Wheel Position
GROUND
Increased standoff
Larger target area footprint
Larger laser spot size
Increased susceptibility to
podium effect
Increased probability of
success (spot detection)
Increased standoff
Axis restrictive
Increased platform
predictability
Decreased platform
predictability
Good standoff
Decreased effectiveness in
target areas with varying
vertical developments
(podium effect)
Axis restrictive
Increased susceptibility to
podium effect
Coordination intensive
Axis restrictive
Increased designator
exposure
Coordination intensive
Decreased platform
predictability
Excellent standoff
Smaller laser spot size
Decreased targeting
ambiguity
Rapid battle damage
assessment
ADVANTAGES
DISADVANTAGES
Figure C-1. Airborne and Ground Designator Advantages and Disadvantages
Laser-Guided Systems
C-7
(2) Target Acquisition. TA involves the use of an LST carried by the aircraft
and an LTD aimed by a ground team or in some cases from the same or another aircraft.
(3) Weapons Guidance. Weapons guidance allows an LGW to home in on
reflected laser energy placed on a target by an LTD. This allows precision delivery of
weapons, some at standoff distances.
b. Laser Designation Position. In selecting a laser designation position, the LDO
must consider LOS, expected munitions trajectory, tactical situation, cover and
concealment, weather, and communications requirements. The LDO should select
positions that are near expected locations of high priority targets while minimizing
risks to friendly forces. If redundant LTDs are going to be employed, mutual support
and coordination with maneuver elements should be addressed. The observer or
controller team should determine its position as accurately as possible.
c. Employment. When employing LSTs, GLTDs, and LGWs, the following
procedures will be used.
(1) Attack headings and LTLs, sometimes called designator target lines or
pointer target lines, are normally pre-coordinated between the LDO and LGW-employing
aircrew. The LTL is normally expressed in degrees magnetic unless otherwise requested.
(2) Safety Zone. Due to the possibility of false target indications from
atmospheric scatter of the laser beam close to the laser exit port, attack headings should
avoid the safety zone unless the tactical situation safely dictates otherwise. The safety
zone is defined as a volume of airspace in the shape of a cone (generally 20 degrees)
whose apex is at the target and extends equidistant either side of the target-to-laser
designator line (see Figure C-2). This cone has a limit of plus or minus 10 degrees in the
horizontal plane and a vertical limit of 20 degrees. Aircraft may engage targets from
above the cone, as long as they remain above the 20 degrees. This safety zone will
primarily affect low altitude delivery aircraft passing close to the LDO location. The
minimum safe altitude for aircraft will vary with the aircrafts distance from the target.
Aircrews may have difficulty determining how high they need to fly to remain above the
20-degree cone. Due to the possibility of false target indications, final attack headings
must avoid the 20-degree safety exclusion zone, unless the tactical situation dictates
otherwise.
(3) Fratricide. Designator profiles behind the launch platform are
inherently the safest and will minimize the possibility of fratricide. The possibility
of fratricide still exists while operating anywhere within the optimal attack zone. It
is highest in the designated safety zone or when a false lock-on is achieved. Attack
headings should be planned with consideration for friendly forces and noncombatant
civilian locations. Ultimately the primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are
command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component
commands, rehearsals, and enhanced SA.
Appendix C
C-8 JP 3-09
(4) The attack zone is inside a 120-degree cone whose apex is at the target and
extends to 60 degrees on either side of the target-to-laser designator line and is outside
the 20-degree safety zone. To give the laser trackers/weapons a better chance of
acquiring the reflected laser spot, a smaller, 90-degree, cone (+/45 degrees) is preferred,
and the optimum attack axis is normally from 10 to 45 degrees on either side of the
target-to-laser designator line.
(5) Aircrews should verify that they are attacking the correct target through
additional means (such as visual description, terrain features, and non-laser target marks).
(6) Hellfire Designator Exclusion Zone. The LTL must be given to the
aircrew in degrees magnetic. The aircrew needs this information to align the helicopter,
ensuring positive seeker lock-on of the LGM for LOBL delivery or positive in-flight
Acquisition
area
Acquisition
area
Laser seeker/
weapon platform
prohibited
Laser seeker/
weapon platform
prohibited
EXAMPLE OF SAFETY ZONE, ACQUISITION AREA,
AND OPTIMAL ATTACK ZONE
TARGET
FOV
NOTE: Seeker field of view (FOV) must not encompass area of laser designator.
Laser seeker/
weapon platform
= Low risk
= Moderate risk
= High risk
L
L
L
M
M
M
o
o
60
45
H
H
H
Laser target designator
o
20 Safety zone (+/- 10
degrees of centerline)
Avoid weapon release unless
the situation necessitates
Figure C-2. Example of Safety Zone, Acquisition Area, and Optimal Attack Zone
Laser-Guided Systems
C-9
seeker lock-on of the LGM for LOAL. The LTL will also allow the aircrew to prevent
inadvertently engaging the LTD. The LDO must be outside a 30-degree by 40-degree
zone from the aircraft, but within a 120-degree cone from the target (see Figure C-3).
d. Terrain and Target Concealment
(1) If the LDO suspects that the target may be partially masked from the view
of the incoming laser weapon, the LDO should aim the laser at a point on the target
believed to be within LOS of the seeker. If the target is well concealed, the laser spot
may be aimed at some overhead or nearby object. However, this method is not preferred
and should be used only when the situation demands an immediate attack on the target.
HELLFIRE DESIGNATOR EXCLUSION ZONE
22K ft altitude
At 8 km downrange
Designator
exclusion zone
Not to scale
Airborne and ground designators
must be 120-degree cone
area.
within
Airborne and ground designators
must be 30- by 40-degree
no-fly zone.
outside
1
5
K
ft
c
r
o
s
s
r
a
n
g
e
A
t
8
k
m
d
o
w
n
r
a
n
g
e
Shooter
Target
30
o
o
o
o
o
30
60
60
30
4
0
o
LEGEND
ft kmfeet kilometersK thousand
Figure C-3. Hellfire Designator Exclusion Zone
Appendix C
C-10 JP 3-09
(2) If a designated mobile target moves out of the view of the LDO, it may
still be possible to salvage the attack. A point near the target may be designated until the
target again comes into view or until designation responsibility can be passed to another
operator who has the target in sight. It is also possible to move the laser spot to another
target in the immediate vicinity. If the LST or LGW has already locked on, the laser spot
should be moved slowly and without interrupting laser output to the new target location.
e. LDO Survivability. To enhance survivability, the LDO should keep designation
time to the minimum necessary for the weapon or seeker being used. This reduces the
time available for the enemy to detect, locate, and act to suppress the LTD and/or LDO.
f. Laser Designation Timing. Successful use of LGWs or LSTs depends on the
ability of the LDO to designate the target at the proper time. Laser designation must be
closely coordinated with the delivery of an LGW. Timing requirements should take into
account the following:
(1) Weapons requiring LOBL.
(2) Weapons allowing LOAL.
(3) Remaining LTD battery life (if applicable).
(4) Laser radiation time constraints due to overheating.
(5) Susceptibility to laser countermeasures.
g. Joint Interoperability. Laser designation operations and weapons delivery units
must have compatible and secure communications equipment and common secure codes
or the authentication codes necessary for joint communications on non-secure nets.
4. Execution Considerations
a. Target Acquisition Considerations
(1) Using LTDs can provide a fast and accurate means of marking targets for
both LGWs and LST-equipped aircraft. Using target coordinates, smoke, and
illuminating flares complements LTD target-marking and improves the chances for
successful first pass TA. Without cueing, aircraft may be pointed too far away from the
target to acquire the laser spot. Therefore, when the tactical situation allows,
supplemental marking is recommended to avoid losing sorties or having to re-attack.
Care should be taken to avoid obscuring the target with the visual mark.
(2) Attack Angles. Aircrews release or launch LGWs so the reflected laser
energy will be within the seeker field of view at the appropriate time. The maximum
allowable attack angle (laser-to-target/seeker-to-target) depends upon the characteristics
Laser-Guided Systems
C-11
of the weapon system employed. If the angle is too large, the seeker will not receive
enough reflected energy to sense the laser spot.
(3) Coordination with JTAC. If the attack aircraft has an LST, the JTAC can
designate the target for aircrew identification. The aircrew can use the LST to visually
locate the target. Once the aircrew locates the target, it can conduct an attack using
unguided ordnance.
(4) Employment of LGBs in conjunction with coded LTDs is either
autonomous or assisted. Autonomous LGB employment uses the CAS aircrafts
onboard LTD for terminal weapons guidance. Most aircraft capable of delivering LGBs
can provide on-board autonomous self-designation. Assisted LGB employment uses an
off-board LTD for terminal weapons guidance. This is typically accomplished by a
ground team operating a GLTD (such as a ground/vehicle laser locator designator) or by
another aircraft (known as buddy lasing). Aircraft without on-board ALTDs that can
carry and deliver LGBs but have no on-board terminal weapons guidance capability
require assisted LGB employment. Coded LTDs are ground and airborne systems
that have two specific purposes. First, they provide terminal weapons guidance for
LGWs. Second, they designate targets for coded LSTs. Coded LTDs emit laser energy
with a PRF and require input of specific laser codes for operation. Codes are assigned to
LGWs and directly relate to the PRF that harmonizes the designator and seeker interface.
Coded LTDs used for terminal weapons guidance must be set to the same code as
the LGW. Certain LGWs, such as LGBs, are coded prior to takeoff and cannot be
changed once the aircraft is airborne. However, all coded LTDs, with the exception of
the AC-130H, can change codes while airborne. (Note: The AC-130H’s LTD is
permanently preset with only one code [1688] and cannot be changed.) The JTAC will
have to coordinate efforts to ensure both the aircraft and designator are on the same code.
Coordination for the LTD to match the LGW code is conducted through the ATO,
DASC/ASOC, or JTAC nine-line briefing. Sometimes, an LTD will serve the dual
purpose of target designation for a coded laser acquisition/spot tracker and terminal
weapons guidance for LGWs. In these cases, the LTD, LST, and LGW must have the
same code. Laser codes are always passed as four digits to avoid confusion. When
briefing LST-equipped aircraft, include the four-digit laser code and LTL in accordance
with the CAS briefing format. If aircraft check in with a different code, then it is the
JTACs responsibility to make appropriate corrections. Even if the aircraft is capable of
self-designation, the JTAC should have a backup GLTD ready if it is available.
(5) Laser Designation Time. The aircrew may request a longer laser-on time
based on munitions characteristics. If communications are unreliable, the JTAC should
begin designating 20 seconds before time on target or with 20 seconds remaining on time
to target (unless the aircrew is using loft delivery). Laser designation time with LGBs
delivered from a loft profile will vary depending on the weapon being delivered. Refer to
appropriate tactics manuals for loft laser designation time rules of thumb. While
reducing laser operating time is important in a laser countermeasure environment or when
using battery-operated designators, designation time must be long enough to guarantee
mission success.
Appendix C
C-12 JP 3-09
b. LGW Delivery
(1) TA is usually followed by the delivery of LGWs. Some LGWs, such as
laser Maverick, and low-level LGB and/or Paveway III, can be released at ranges that
may reduce the delivery aircrafts exposure to enemy air defense systems and increase
aircraft survivability.
(2) Once released, the weapon homes in on reflected laser energy.
(3) Like any air delivered weapon system, the maneuver commander must fully
understand and accept the consequences of a possible failure of the weapon to properly
guide to the target. The final decision to release LGWs from behind friendly lines in
a laser designation operations environment rests with the maneuver commander.
c. Concept of Employment
(1) Tactical Air Control Party. The TACP is the Marine Corps or Air Force
tactical air control agency located with the supported ground unit. Its functions are
providing air liaison, advising on the use of air assets, and coordinating and controlling
laser designation operations missions to support the ground commanders scheme of
maneuver. The TACP provides the terminal attack control of laser designation
operations in support of ground forces.
(2) Fire Support Team, Combat Observation and Lasing Team (COLT),
and FO Procedures for LDO. When possible, the LDO should be located with the
FIST/COLT, and the FIST/COLT should place a radio close to the LDO (USMC LDOs
may or may not be collocated with their FOs). Placing a radio close to the LDO will
minimize the need to relay laser calls between the pilot and the FIST/COLT. At times,
the LDO will not be with the FIST/COLT and may not be able to see the target. The
LDO will coordinate laser designation with the FIST/COLT. When the LDO and
FIST/COLT are not together, aircrews may make laser calls directly to the FIST/COLT
on a frequency assigned by the LDO in the remarks section of the LDO briefing. In
situations where the USMC LDO is not in an optimum position to designate the target,
the LDO may control the aircraft with the FO actually designating the target. The USMC
LDO and FO can communicate and coordinate using the TACP local net; however, prior
coordination is required.
d. Rotary Wing Procedures
(1) General. Using rotary-wing aircraft to deliver LGWs allows the ground
commander to destroy high-threat-point targets. Rotary-wing aircraft may be equipped
with any combination of ALTDs, LSTs, and LGWs. All LTDs can assist laser-system-
equipped rotary-wing aircraft in TA and provide terminal weapons guidance. Rotary-
wing aircraft are employed by the Army as maneuver elements under direct control of the
ground commander or aviation unit commander. One of the functions of Marine attack
helicopters is to provide laser designation operations in support of the MAGTF. Precise
Laser-Guided Systems
C-13
engagements will be aided by the use of LGWs. Army SO attack helicopter crews are
also trained to perform laser designation operations with LGWs.
(2) Laser Designation for Rotary-Wing Aircraft
(a) Employment. Laser designation for TA provides fast and accurate
target hand-off. Certain rotary-wing aircraft are equipped with LSTs and aid the pilots
visual TA by providing cockpit indications on the location of the laser spot. TA can be
followed with the delivery of either LGWs or nonguided weapons. The aircraft can
designate either for their own weapons or for other rotary-wing or fixed-wing aircraft.
(b) Communications between the LDO and the aircrew is essential for
positive target hand-off to LST-equipped rotary-wing aircraft. Positive target hand-off
requires prior coordination. The LDO must provide the appropriate laser code, LTL in
degrees magnetic, and laser spot offset (if applicable).
(3) Laser Designation for Rotary-Wing Aircraft with HELLFIRE LGMs.
The lock-on and launch ranges of LGMs can be several miles. LGMs provide extended
standoff for high-threat targets. The pilot has several options for firing mode, firing
method, and missile seeker lock-on.
(a) Firing Modes
1.
Single Fire or Manual Mode. In the single-fire mode, one missile
is launched. This mode can be used with autonomous direct, remote direct, and remote
indirect fire methods, as discussed below.
2.
Rapid Fire. Rapid fire is a technique of launching two or more
missiles on the same code. Multiple targets can be engaged by launching missiles at least
8 seconds or more apart, as specified by the LDO. Once the first missile hits the first
target, the LDO must smoothly move the laser spot to the next target.
3.
Ripple Fire. In the ripple fire mode, missiles are fired one after the
other on different codes. For best effect, multiple LTDs should be used to achieve ripple
fire. Each LTD operates on a different laser code, and the weapons seekers are coded to
match each designator.
4.
Rapid or Ripple Fire. Using multiple codes and LTDs, the
combination of rapid or ripple fire can be achieved.
(b) Firing Methods
1. Direct Fire Method. Direct fire is achieved using either
autonomous or remote LTDs. When using remote designators, the rotary-wing aircraft is
free to resume terrain masking or engage other targets after each LGM launch. This
capability is called fire and forgetand increases aircraft survivability and flexibility.
Appendix C
C-14 JP 3-09
2.
Indirect Fire Method. Indirect fire is achieved by using remote
LTDs. Vulnerability of rotary-wing aircraft to enemy direct-fire weapons and radar
detection is minimized by employing LGMs in the indirect-fire method. The LGM is
launched while the aircraft is positioned behind masking terrain features, like trees and
hills. The pilot selects a trajectory for the LGM (either high or low) over the masking
terrain feature. The seeker will then locate and lock on to the remote laser-designated
target.
(c) HELLFIRE Missile Seeker Lock-on Options
1.
Lock-on After Launch. The LOAL option can be used in the
direct-fire mode and is always used for the indirect-fire method. The LGM is launched
on a trajectory toward the target with seeker lock-on occurring in flight. This option
allows missile launching toward the target area during adverse weather, hazy days, long
ranges, or temporary target obscuration. Lock-on will occur when the obstruction to the
seekers view dissipates or is bypassed during the approach to the target area.
2.
Lock-on Before Launch. The LOBL option requires direct LOS to
the target and requires the seeker to be locked on to the target before launch.
(d) Fratricide. To keep the Hellfire missile from locking onto the
designator instead of the target, Angle-T between the designator-target line and the
missile target line should be less than 1,065 mils (60 degrees). The LDO must ensure the
launch platform operator knows the location of the observer so that the launch platform
can be repositioned if necessary for safety.
For additional information on the Army FA laser operations, see FM 6-30, TTP for
Observed Fire.
See FM 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, JFIRE, Multi-Service
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower, for
additional information on laser operations.
See JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, for expanded discussion of laser-guided considerations
for CAS.
D-1
APPENDIX D
REFERENCES
The development of JP 3-09 is based upon the following primary references:
1. DOD Publications
a. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of
Force for US Forces.
b. CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology.
c. CJCSI 3505.01, Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification and Program
Accreditation.
d. CJCSI 3900.01 Series, Position Reference Procedures.
e. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
f. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.
g. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
h. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
i. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
j. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.
k. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.
l. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.
m. JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations.
n. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.
o. JP 3-13, Information Operations.
p. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.
q. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.
r. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.
s. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
Appendix D
D-2 JP 3-09
t. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.
u. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
v. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.
2. Multi-Ser vice Publications
a. FM 3-01.20/AFTTP(I) 3-2.30, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for JAOC/AAMDC Coordination.
b. FM 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6B/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, JFIRE, Multi-Service
Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower.
c. FM 3-09.34/MCRP 3-25H/NTTP 3-09.2.1/AFTTP(I) 3-2.59, KILL BOX, Multi-
Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment.
3. Ser vice Publication
FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire.
4. Combatant Command Publications
a. USJFCOM Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook.
b. USSTRATCOM Global Strike Plan and Emergency Action Procedures.
E-1
APPENDIX E
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:
CDR, USJFCOM, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine and Education Group, 116
Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content
(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorship
The lead agent for this publication is USJFCOM. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor
for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).
3. Supersession
This publication supersedes JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 13 November 2006.
JP 3-09.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Laser Designation Operations,
dated 28 May 1999, is cancelled.
4. Change Recommendations
a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:
TO: CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//
Routine changes should be submitted electronically to CDR, Joint Warfighting Center,
Doctrine and Education Group and info Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force
Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services
and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7, when changes to source
documents reflected in this publication are initiated.
c. Record of Changes:
CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED
NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Appendix E
E-2 JP 3-09
5. Distribution of Publications
Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is
unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must
be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.
6. Distribution of Electronic Publications
a. The Joint Staff will not print copies of electronic JPs for distribution. Electronic
versions are available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and
https://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine
(NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant
commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments
or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché
Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Bolling AFB,
Washington, DC 20340-5100.
c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the
Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs.
GL-1 JP 3-09
GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AADC area air defense commander
AAMDC US Army Air and Missile Defense Command
ABP air battle plan
ACA airspace coordination area
ACE aviation combat element (MAGTF)
ACM airspace coordinating measure
ACO airspace control order
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction)
AGL above ground level
AI air interdiction
ALTD airborne laser target designator
AO area of operations
AOA amphibious objective area
AOC air and space operations center (USAF)
ARFOR Army forces
ASOC air support operations center
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATCS air traffic control section
ATF amphibious task force
ATO air tasking order
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
BCD battlefield coordination detachment
C2 command and control
CA combat assessment
CALCM conventional air-launched cruise missile
CAS close air support
CATF commander, amphibious task force
CC critical capability
CDE collateral damage estimation
CDRJSOTF commander, joint special operations task force
CENTRIXS Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
CF-COP counterfire common operational picture
CFL coordinated fire line
CID combat identification
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CLF commander, landing force
CNA computer network attack
COA course of action
COF chief of fires
COG center of gravity
COLT combat observation and lasing team
Glossary
GL-2 JP 3-09
CONOPS concept of operations
CRC control and reporting center
CSW coordinate seeking weapons
DASC direct air support center
DOD Department of Defense
DS direct support
DTG date-time group
EA electronic attack
EM electromagnetic
EW electronic warfare
EZM engagement zone manager
FA field artillery
FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne)
FFA free-fire area
FFCC force fires coordination center
FIST fire support team
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual (Army)
FO forward observer
FSA fire support area
FSC fire support coordinator (USMC)
FSCC fire support coordination center
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support coordination measure
FSO fire support officer
FSS fire support station
ft feet
GARS Global Area Reference System
GCE ground combat element (MAGTF)
GLTD ground laser target designator
GPS Global Positioning System
GS general support
HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
HPT high-payoff target
HQ headquarters
HVT high-value target
Glossary
GL-3
IGO intergovernmental organization
IO information operations
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
JACCE joint air component coordination element
JADOCS Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
JAOC joint air operations center
JASSM joint air-to-surface standoff missile
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFE joint fires element
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFO joint fires observer
JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander
JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list
JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JPG joint planning group
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
J-SEAD joint suppression of enemy air defenses
JSOA joint special operations area
JSOACC joint special operations air component commander
JSOTF joint special operations task force
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTAC joint terminal attack controller
JTCB joint targeting coordination board
JTF joint task force
LDO laser designator operator
LF landing force
LGB laser-guided bomb
LGM laser-guided missile
LGW laser-guided weapon
LO low observable
LOAL lock-on after launch
LOBL lock-on before launch
LOC line of communications
LOS line of sight
LRF laser rangefinder
LST laser spot tracker
LTD laser target designator
LTL laser-to-target line
MACCS Marine air command and control system
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
Glossary
GL-4 JP 3-09
MEF Marine expeditionary force
MIDB modernized integrated database
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO noncommissioned officer
NFA no-fire area
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIPRNET Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
NSFS naval surface fire support
NSL no-strike list
NSWTG naval special warfare task group
NSWTU naval special warfare task unit
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OGA other government agency
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
PL phase line
PRF pulse repetition frequency
RFA restrictive fire area
RFL restrictive fire line
ROE rules of engagement
RTL restricted target list
SA situational awareness
SACC supporting arms coordination center
SFCP shore fire control party
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SO special operations
SOCCE special operations command and control element
SOCOORD special operations coordination element
SOF special operations forces
SOLE special operations liaison element
SOP standard operating procedure
STANAG standardization agreement (NATO)
STT special tactics team
TA target acquisition
TAC(A) tactical air coordinator (airborne)
TACC tactical air command center (USMC);
tactical air control center (USN)
TACP tactical air control party
TADC tactical air direction center
Glossary
GL-5
TAMD theater air and missile defense
TAOC tactical air operations center (USMC)
TBMCS theater battle management core system
TGO terminal guidance operations
TLAM Tomahawk land attack missile
TLE target location error
TM theater missile
TST time-sensitive target
UAS unmanned aircraft system
USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command
USMC United States Marine Corps
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
WMD weapons of mass destruction
ZF zone of fire
GL-6 JP 3-09
PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions
found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for
these terms and definitions.
air interdiction. Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the
enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against
friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at
such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with
the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)
airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility
for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also
called ACA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52)
airspace coordinating measures. Measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of
airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly
forces. Also called ACMs. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52)
airspace coordination area. A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area,
established by the appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are
reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace coordination area may be
formal or informal. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09.3)
air tasking order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate
units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces
to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include
call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also
called ATO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-30)
area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land
and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire
operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for
component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also
called AO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)
at my command. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
backscatter. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating
coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or
areas. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)
Glossary
GL-7
call fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
call for fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength,
freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)
close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets
that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of
each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP
1-02. SOURCE: 3-0)
collateral damage. Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects
that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time.
Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall
military advantage anticipated from the attack. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)
combat identification. The process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected
objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision.
Also called CID. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
computer network operations. Comprised of computer network attack, computer
network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations.
Also called CNO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 3-13)
concept of fires. A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses how
lethal and nonlethal fires will be synchronized and integrated to support the
commander’s operational objectives. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, that clearly and concisely
expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be
done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of
the operation. Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS. (JP 1-02.
SOURCE: JP 5-0)
continuous illumination fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
coordinated fire line. A line beyond which conventional and indirect surface fire
support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing
headquarters without additional coordination. The purpose of the coordinated fire
line is to expedite the surface-to-surface attack of targets beyond the coordinated fire
line without coordination with the ground commander in whose area the targets are
located. Also called CFL. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
counterfire. Fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons. Includes
counterbattery and countermortar fire. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
Glossary
GL-8 JP 3-09
defilade. 1. Protection from hostile observation and fire provided by an obstacle such as
a hill, ridge, or bank. 2. A vertical distance by which a position is concealed from
enemy observation. 3. To shield from enemy fire or observation by using natural or
artificial obstacles. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the
source JP.)
directed energy. An umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the production of
a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles.
Also called DE. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source
JP.)
direct support artillery. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
electronic attack. Division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic
energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or
equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat
capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called EA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP
3-13.1)
electronic warfare. Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed
energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic
warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and
electronic warfare support. Also called EW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.1)
enlisted terminal attack controller. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
field artillery. Equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of
cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers. Field artillery cannons are
classified according to caliber as follows:
Light — 120mm and less.
Medium — 121-160mm.
Heavy — 161-210mm.
Very heavy — greater than 210mm.
Also called FA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source
JP.)
fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
fire barrage (specify). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
fire capabilities chart. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
fire control. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
fire control radar. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
Glossary
GL-9
fire control system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
fire coordination. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
fire for effect. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
fire message. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
fire mission. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
fire plan. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
firepower. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
fires. The use of weapon systems to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
fire support. Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special
operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in
pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
fire support area. An appropriate maneuver area assigned to fire support ships by the
naval force commander from which they can deliver gunfire support to an
amphibious operation. Also called FSA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
fire support coordination. The planning and executing of fire so that targets are
adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 3-09)
fire support coordination center. A single location in which are centralized
communications facilities and personnel incident to the coordination of all forms of
fire support. Also called FSCC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP
3-09 as the source JP.)
fire support coordination line. A fire support coordination measure that is established
and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their
boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected
commanders. Fire support coordination lines facilitate the expeditious attack of
surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. A fire support
coordination line does not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary
between close and deep operations or a zone for close air support. The fire support
coordination line applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using
any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond a fire support coordination
line must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary
reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the fire
Glossary
GL-10 JP 3-09
support coordination line must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects
on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of a fire support coordination line, all air-to-
ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate
land or amphibious force commander. The fire support coordination line should
follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the fire support
coordination line is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special
operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this
coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the fire support
coordination line. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and
could waste limited resources. Also called FSCL. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
fire support coordination measure. A measure employed by land or amphibious
commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide
safeguards for friendly forces. Also called FSCM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)
fire support element. That portion of the force tactical operations center at every
echelon above company or troop (to corps) that is responsible for targeting
coordination and for integrating fires delivered on surface targets by fire-support
means under the control, or in support, of the force. Also called FSE. (JP 1-02.
SOURCE: JP 3-09)
fire support officer. Senior field artillery officer assigned to Army maneuver battalions
and brigades. Advises commander on fire-support matters. Also called FSO.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.)
fire support station. An exact location at sea within a fire support area from which a
fire support ship delivers fire. Also called FSS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02)
firing chart. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
forward observer. An observer operating with front line troops and trained to adjust
ground or naval gunfire and pass back battlefield information. In the absence of a
forward air controller, the observer may control close air support strikes. Also called
FO. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.)
free-fire area. A specific area into which any weapon system may fire without
additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. Also called FFA. (JP
1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
grid coordinates. Coordinates of a grid coordinate system to which numbers and letters
are assigned for use in designating a point on a gridded map, photograph, or chart.
(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
high-payoff target. A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the
success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value
Glossary
GL-11
targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly
commander’s mission. Also called HPT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)
high-value target. A target the enemy commander requires for the successful
completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to
seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s
area of interest. Also called HVT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)
inertial navigation system. A self-contained navigation system using inertial detectors,
which automatically provides vehicle position, heading, and velocity. Also called
INS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
interdiction. 1. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military
surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to
otherwise achieve objectives. 2. In support of law enforcement, activities conducted
to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, vessels,
vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-03)
joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more
components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common
objective. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)
joint fires element. An optional staff element that provides recommendations to the
operations directorate to accomplish fires planning and synchronization. Also called
JFE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)
joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces
to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. (JP
1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)
joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned,
attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air
operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The
joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish
missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC.
(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)
joint targeting coordination board. A group formed by the joint force commander to
accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited
to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities,
and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board is normally
comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if
required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP
3-60)
Glossary
GL-12 JP 3-09
kill box. A three-dimensional area used to facilitate the integration of joint fires. (JP
1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
laser. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
laser footprint. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
laser guided weapon. A weapon which uses a seeker to detect laser energy reflected
from a laser marked/designated target and through signal processing provides
guidance commands to a control system which guides the weapon to the point from
which the laser energy is being reflected. Also called LGW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 3-09)
laser linescan system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
laser pulse duration. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
laser rangefinder. A device which uses laser energy for determining the distance from
the device to a place or object. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
laser seeker. A device based on a direction sensitive receiver which detects the energy
reflected from a laser designated target and defines the direction of the target relative
to the receiver. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
laser spot. The area on a surface illuminated by a laser. (Approved for incorporation
into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.)
laser spot tracker. A device that locks on to the reflected energy from a laser-marked or
designated target and defines the direction of the target relative to itself. Also called
LST. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.)
laser target designating system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
laser target designator. A device that emits a beam of laser energy which is used to
mark a specific place or object. Also called LTD. (Approved for incorporation into
JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.)
laser-target/gun-target angle. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
laser target marker. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
laser target marking system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
low angle. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
low angle fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
Glossary
GL-13
low angle loft bombing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
mensuration. The process of measurement of a feature or location on the earth to
determine an absolute latitude, longitude, and elevation. For targeting applications,
the errors inherent in both the source for measurement as well as the measurement
processes must be understood and reported. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)
no-fire area. An area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or their
effects are prohibited. Also called NFA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09.3)
nonlethal weapon. A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to
incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to
personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Also called
NLW. (1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28)
no-strike list. A list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of
military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement. Attacking
these may violate the law of armed conflict or interfere with friendly relations with
indigenous personnel or governments. Also called NSL. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP
3-60)
offset lasing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
phase line. A line utilized for control and coordination of military operations, usually an
easily identified feature in the operational area. Also called PL. (1-02. SOURCE:
JP 3-09)
positive control. A method of airspace control that relies on positive identification,
tracking, and direction of aircraft within an airspace, conducted with electronic
means by an agency having the authority and responsibility therein. (JP 1-02.
SOURCE: 3-52)
prearranged fire. Fire that is formally planned and executed against targets or target
areas of known location. Such fire is usually planned well in advance and is
executed at a predetermined time or during a predetermined period of time. (JP
1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
procedural control. A method of airspace control which relies on a combination of
previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP
3-52)
pulse code. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
pulse repetition frequency. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
rate of fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
Glossary
GL-14 JP 3-09
restrictive fire area. An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which
fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with
the establishing headquarters. Also called RFA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
restrictive fire line. A line established between converging friendly surface forces that
prohibits fires or their effects across that line. Also called RFL. (JP 1-02.
SOURCE: JP 3-09)
rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate
the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called
ROE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1-04)
schedule of fire. Groups of fires or series of fires fired in a definite sequence according
to a definite program. The time of starting the schedule may be on call. For
identification purposes, schedules may be referred to by a code name or other
designation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
special operations terminal attack controller. None. (Approved for removal from JP
1-02.)
spillover. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
submunition. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
supporting fire. Fire delivered by supporting units to assist or protect a unit in combat.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.)
targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate
response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 1-02.
SOURCE: JP 3-0)
target of opportunity. 1. A target identified too late, or not selected for action in time,
to be included in deliberate targeting that, when detected or located, meets criteria
specific to achieving objectives and is processed using dynamic targeting. There are
two types of targets of opportunity: unplanned and unanticipated. 2. A target visible
to a surface or air sensor or observer, which is within range of available weapons and
against which fire has not been scheduled or requested. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP
3-60)
terminal guidance operations. Those actions that provide electronic, mechanical, voice
or visual communications that provide approaching aircraft and/or weapons
additional information regarding a specific target location. Also called TGO. (JP
1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
Glossary
GL-15
time-sensitive target. A joint force commander designated target requiring immediate
response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or
will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces. Also called TST. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 3-60)
zone of action. A tactical subdivision of a larger area, the responsibility for which is
assigned to a tactical unit; generally applied to offensive action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 3-09.)
zone of fire. An area into which a designated ground unit or fire support ship delivers, or
is prepared to deliver, fire support. Fire may or may not be observed. Also called
ZF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)
Glossary
GL-16 JP 3-09
Intentionally Blank
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1-0
JP 2-0 JP 3-0
PERSONNEL
JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0
LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
COMMUNICATION
SYSTEMS
PLANS
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE
Maintenance
Approval Development
Initiation
JOINT
DOCTRINE
PUBLICATION
ENHANCED
JOINT
WARFIGHTING
CAPABILITY
STEP #4 - Maintenance
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JP published and continuously
assessed by users
Formal assessment begins 24-
27 months following
publication
Revision begins 3.5 years after
publication
Each JP revision is completed
no later than 5 years after
signature
STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development
STEP #1 - Initiation
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JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
JSDS prepares JS staffing package
JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature
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LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the
first draft (FD)
PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC
FD comment matrix adjudication
JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing
Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC
comment matrix
FC Joint working group
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Joint Doctrine Development
Community (JDDC) submission to
fill extant operational void
US Joint Forces Command
(USJFCOM) conducts front-end
analysis
Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
validation
Program Directive (PD) development
and staffing/joint working group
PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship
Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and
releases PD to lead agent (LA)
(Service, combatant command, JS
directorate)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.
is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of
the development process:
Joint Publication
(JP) 3-09 Operations