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RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS
Singapore | 20 September 2019
Indonesia’s Policing of Hoax News Increasingly Politicised
Ross Tapsell*
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• 2019 saw increasing arrests by police of citizens for spreading or distributing ‘hoax
news’.
• The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology is working closely with
the police on this matter.
• Most of the arrests were of citizens accused of creating or spreading hoax news that
discredited President Joko Widodo.
• The controversial Information and Electronic Transactions Act (UU ITE) is becoming
the country’s de facto ‘anti-fake news’ law.
* Ross Tapsell is Senior Lecturer and Researcher at the Australian National University’s
College of Asia and the Pacific. He is currently Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak
Institute.
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INTRODUCTION
‘Hoax news’ has become a buzzword in the Indonesian lexicon. For this article I define
‘hoax news’ as similar to the more globally recognized term ‘fake news’: material
deliberately fabricated and masqueraded as truth. Arrests for creating hoax news are
supported by many Indonesians because popular (and much scholarly) discourse generally
argues that the regulators cannot keep up with the hoax news creators.
1
This paper examines
recent Indonesian police arrests of Indonesian citizens for creating or spreading hoax news,
and the discussion revolves around issues of freedom of speech, proper process of police
action and consistency in implementing laws. It is argued that Indonesia’s controversial
Information and Electronic Transactions Act (UU ITE) is becoming the country’s de facto
‘anti-fake news’ law, similar to those proposed or in existence in other countries in the
region.
My research examines some recent arrests made during the Indonesian election (September
2018-April 2019) of citizens for creating and/or distributing hoax news material.
2
Prior to
the election period, between September 2018 and April 2019, SAFENET documented 22
cases of charges under UU ITE. There were also at least 19 arrests of people accused of
creating or distributing hoax news reported in the Indonesian media during this time, many
of which under UU ITE. Such arrests occurred all over the country, including Aceh,
Lombok, Riau, Sulawesi and Kalimantan, but the majority occurred in Java. The cases
discussed in this paper are largely ones covered by Indonesia’s online media; there may
indeed be many more not reported, especially in the ‘outer regions’ given Indonesia’s
notoriously Java-centric news coverage.
3
This research does not include the high profile
‘fake news factory’ Saracen, which spread hate speech against the president and other
political figures, because the arrests being studied were made prior to September 2018.
4
A
number of arrests made in May, in the aftermath of the election, are not included in this
report.
I argue that arrests for distributing hoax news remain problematic for legal reasons and for
political transparency, and require further investigation from scholars, non-government
organisations and legislative and legal bodies in Indonesia. Of course, Indonesian legal
cases are often inconsistent and can raise more questions than provide answers.
5
My
purpose is to provide a broader analysis of ‘hoax news’ arrests, which are something that is
new to Indonesia’s policing and legal landscape, and to problematize the modus operandi
throughout the 2019 election campaign, when arrests for this crime increased.
CREATION VERSUS DISTRIBUTION
A number of arrests were made in Indonesia during the election campaign concerning
content that was deemed to be of a non-political nature. They include cases involving the
spreading of material about earthquakes and child kidnappings, and health scares. Most of
these investigations remain open or have not yet gone to court. Notable cases include five
separate arrests in early October 2018, of citizens in Sulawesi Selatan, Riau, Batam,
Lombok and Surabaya who shared hoax material about an earthquake and/or tsunami
occurring in Indonesia
6
. In early November, police made 13 separate arrests of citizens in
Jakarta, East Java, West Java and South Sulawesi for sharing material about children being
kidnapped.
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The problem here is that arrests of citizens are made for distributing ‘hoax news’. Did these
citizens share information maliciously knowing it was fake, or were they duped by the
content and shared thinking it was real? In the case of child abduction videos in Jakarta,
those arrested included a security guard, an angkot driver and an unemployed woman. The
police admitted the suspects thought the content was real and were simply trying to raise
awareness.
7
In the case of earthquakes or tsunamis, for example, posts of disaster warnings
are regularly posted by citizens on their social media platforms. Are citizens expected to
only post warnings once the official bureau of meteorology had posted something? Given
how official systems have previously failed to warn citizens of impending disasters, such a
policy would be both unrealistic but also potentially unsafe.
8
This distinction between
creating and distributing is also important when it comes to political hoax cases. How do
the police decide whether the case is a crime or whether it is a non-chargeable error of
judgement?
The larger issue evident in these cases is how the police connect actors from all around the
country in order to identify the network of perpetrators. Are they alleged to have conspired
together to spread the offending material or to have shared the same material? Does it
matter? For example, in the case of the child abduction videos, police claim arrests were
made of the first people to upload the videos to their Facebook account.
9
If this was all
coordinated through a professional syndicate then that makes sense, but if these citizens
simply happened to be first to share the material on Facebook (after receiving it from
personal sources on WhatsApp, for example) then there is no larger conspiracy.
The answers to these questions lie in the coordination between the Ministry of
Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo) and the National Police’s criminal
investigation division (Bareskrim). Information-collection and sharing between the
Ministry of Communications and the Police is seen as a positive development by the
government, which wants to curtail the growing problem of hoax news. But questions
remain about whether a government body (Kominfo) should be working so closely with an
institution that should be separated from government direction (police). As one Indonesian
expert stated, the blurring of these two institutions means “we don’t know whether to report
an attack to the police’s cybercrime unit or to the ministry of communications and
information.”
10
The further concern is that these institutions become beholden to the sole
task of defending the sitting government. In January 2018, Indonesia launched the National
Cyber and Encryption Agency (BSSN), tasked to help stop the spread of hoaxes. It reports
directly to the president.
11
As we shall see below through analysis of political cases
throughout the 2019 election, government bodies and the police predominantly cracked
down on hoax material that was almost exclusively against the sitting government and
incumbent president.
ARRESTS FOR POLITICAL HOAX NEWS
As the election campaign neared, efforts to stop the creation and spread of hoaxes with
political content increased. The mainstream media largely focused on the danger of hoax
news undermining Indonesia’s democracy. One Diplomat article headline even asked ‘Will
‘Fake News’ Determine Indonesia’s Next President?’
12
Sensing this battle, Indonesia’s
security forces increased their capacity to combat disinformation. Kominfo had a ‘war
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room’ on 24-hour shift worked using Artificial Intelligence to combat hoax material.
13
Reports to the police can also be made by individual citizens, political and volunteer groups,
and NGOs. In 2017, the national police claimed to have received 4,000 reports of hoax
material.
14
In September 2018, five people in Sidoarjo, East Java, were arrested for sharing fake news
about a student protest at the Constitution Court in Jakarta.
15
In November, police arrested
an Acehnese man as alleged administrator of the Instagram account ‘Suara Rakyat’ that was
accused of spreading material stating that Jokowi was a communist.
16
That same month,
BSSN arrested a citizen in Bandung for uploading a hoax video that said the TNI arrested
Chinese citizens who made 110 million e-KTP’s in order to secure a Jokowi victory. On
December 26, an arrest was made in Aceh of the editor of a video which had Jokowi’s
running mate, Ma’ruf Amin, dressed as Santa Claus. He was later sentenced to a seven-
month imprisonment.
17
In early January, five Indonesians were arrested for involvement in
spreading the fake news that seven containers of already punched ballot papers voting for
Jokowi had arrived in Jakarta’s port of Tanjung Priok.
18
That same month, another arrest
for fake news slandering President Joko Widodo included a case in Bekasi of someone who
shared material stating that Jokowi had a fake degree from UGM.
19
In February, three
women in Karawang, West Java, were arrested and subsequently jailed for six months for
creating the hoax news that if Jokowi were to be elected, there would be no more azan (call
to prayer). The interesting aspect of this case was that the women were arrested for
essentially conducting a door-to-door campaign – they were all members of the PEPES
(Partai Emak-Emak Pendukung Prabowo-Sandi), although their case went ‘viral’ due to
video footage of them distributing this material. In March, there were two arrests in Medan
of people accused of creating a hoax that voting ballots had already been punched to favour
Jokowi prior to the election.
20
In early April, there were arrests in East Jakarta and in
Lampung for alleged creators of a hoax that the KPU server was set to automatically
determine that Jokowi would win.
21
The pattern here is clear. The arrests were all for creating or distributing hoax material which
discredited or slandered the president, Jokowi. Indeed, some citizens arrested were even
identified as Prabowo supporters. This is not to say that the above arrests were illegitimate.
Rather, it is to highlight the type of arrests that gets prioritized, and to point out that there is
seemingly no evidence of any police arrests of citizens who shared fake news about
Prabowo Subianto or Sandiaga Uno, nor of citizens who were creating hoax material to help
Jokowi win the election.
It was likely that there would be more cases of hoax news against the president than against
any other political figure. For example, Mafindo, a Jakarta-based organization set up to
counter hoax news, reported in 2018 that 28.98% of hoax material was directed against
President Jokowi, and 20.85% against Prabowo.
22
But there is clear indication that there
was hoax news created by both supporters throughout the election campaign.
23
For example,
a well-known case of slander during the election campaign was ‘Sandi-leaks’ material
depicting Sandiaga as a philanderer.
24
The government took down the scandalous site, but
despite it being reported to the police
25
, as far as we know, no one has been arrested in
relation to this case. In late January, Prabowo’s team reported the tabloid Indonesia Barokah
to police for spreading hoax material. They claimed to have already reported 20 cases of
defamation and hoax material created to undermine their campaign, including reporting to
the police. They said at the time some reports had been there for three to six months and no
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arrests had been made.
26
One arrest was made of a man who was making financial gain
through a fake news syndicate. This included material slandering Prabowo but many other
political figures like Jokowi and Megawati Sukarnoputri.
27
The most publicised case of hoax news throughout this election was that concerning Ratna
Sarumpaet, a former campaign team member of losing pair Prabowo-Sandiaga’s team who
claimed to have been assaulted by a group of men for her involvement in the opposition
campaign. Photos of her swollen face were distributed widely on the internet and on
WhatsApp groups. She later confessed that the swelling was the result of cosmetic surgery.
The case transcended media platforms, and Ratna was the subject of all sorts of jokes,
memes and social media commentary. She was eventually sentenced to two years’ jail for
spreading misinformation and causing public disorder under Article 14 (1) of the Criminal
Code, as well as hate speech under Article 45A (2) of the UU ITE.
The case of Ratna Saruampeut deserves further scrutiny, yet her conviction was rarely
criticised by NGOs, Human Rights activists or Indonesian media commentators. Her case
was seemingly ‘watertight’ because she admitted guilt publicly, and furthermore, as a public
figure she knew the consequences of her accusation would lead to a media circus, which
she seemingly deliberately instigated. But Ratna was sacked from the campaign team and
was sensationally ridiculed online and found to be lying. Was not her sacking and internet
shaming enough punishment? Why did the prosecution ask for the maximum sentence – six
years imprisonment – which is more than for some corruption cases? Ratna’s eventual two-
year sentence was the same length as that of a group named Saracen, convinced of creating
a ‘fake news factory’. Were these two cases similar and their equal length of sentence fair?
Finally, there were other politicians who repeated Ratna’s claims about her having been
assaulted.
28
Should they have been charged for distributing fake news, given how others
had been charged for this in the cases outlined above? None of these questions have easy
answers, but they do point to the way in which these cases of ‘hoax news’ are currently
being investigated in the country.
UU ITE AS INDONESIA’S ANTI-FAKE NEWS LAW?
When neighboring Malaysia introduced its controversial anti-fake news law in the lead-up
to its general election in 2018, there was swift international condemnation. One person was
arrested under this law
29
: a Danish national descent who criticized the police and who
pleaded guilty without a lawyer, before being deported.
30
The law was eventually
overturned by the new government. New Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad would later
point out: “When you have a law to prevent people from airing views, then we are afraid
that the government itself may abuse it, as has happened in the past. We do not want any
government, whether this or the next one, to abuse such a law”.
31
Politicians in government
in Indonesia are not making similar statements.
The highly controversial UU ITE was created in 2008 to address commentary online. It
includes a defamation clause similar to the one in the existing Penal Code, but specifically
for online communications. There was immediate backlash and reviews at the
Constitutional Courts, which ultimately failed to have the law revoked. Prosecutions under
this law grew from there. SAFENET documented only one case of UU ITE in 2010, but 20
in 2013, to 41 cases in 2014.
32
In the Freedom House 2016 ‘Freedom of the Net’ Report, it
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was argued that UU ITE “continues to represent a serious threat to internet freedom. Often
resulting in pre-trial detention, charges facilitate retaliation for online expression, even in
cases that never make it to court”.
33
Some politicians in Prabowo’s coalition have spoken out against the harsh use of UU ITE
34
,
in particular recently after opposition politician Ahmad Dhani was sentenced to 1.5 years in
jail for a series of political crude tweets. Another example is that of opposition vice-
presidential candidate Sandiaga Uno who said that if he were elected he would revise the
law, because “I want to protect us from ourselves. I don’t want us to be using those laws to
hit our opponents”.
35
In the aftermath of the election, the Indonesian government also made
statements about revising the UU ITE, but for different reasons. In August, Minister of Law
and Human Rights Yasonna H Laoly confirmed that the administration was planning to
submit a content revision to UU ITE, in light of the case of Baiq Nuril, a female teacher
who was sentenced to six months in prison for recording her principal sexually harassing
her. Nuril was pardoned by President Joko Widodo in July 2019.
36
Overall, there has been
little reflective commentary from government officials about whether UU ITE is basically
being used as an equivalent of an ‘anti-fake news law’.
Police also charged citizens under Article 14 Paragraph 2 of Law No. 1/1946 on the
Criminal Code – usually referred to in the mainstream media as a law against ‘treason’ or
‘subversion’ – which carries a maximum sentence of three years behind bars. But as critics
of this law have argued, the Criminal Code Law stipulates a high measure of ‘chaos’, and
was written in 1946 – a time of heightened political tension around the formation of the new
nation, and certainly long before the internet was invented. As Institute Criminal Justice
Reform executive director Anggara argues, “commotion among netizens isn’t enough to
trigger the ‘chaos’ article of the law and use it as a basis for suspect naming”.
37
In May
2019, police arrested the campaign spokesman for Prabowo and Sandiaga, Lieus
Sungkharisma, as well as opposition PAN politician Eggi Sudjana
38
‘on suspicion of
subversion and spreading hoaxes’.
39
Of course, it is quite reasonable to believe that if someone deliberately creates hoax news
material for the purpose of slander or for vilifying ethnic or religious groups, they deserve
to be investigated, and if found guilty, sentenced accordingly. Thus, the question we should
be asking is whether the current modus operandi of Indonesian police arrests for spreading
hoax news is satisfactory and fair, and what alternatives might be considered.
CONCLUSION
Almost everyone agrees that Indonesia (as everywhere in the world) has an increasing
problem of hoax news material being spread widely on the internet and social media
platforms. The motivations for individuals who create hoax news are twofold. First, some
people are motivated by money. The clicks they receive on their website or social media
page can lead to significant funds. Second, in the political arena, people create and distribute
hoax news because they can in that way gain a political advantage for their chosen
candidate. The hoax is usually a slandering of a rival candidate. More responsibility needs
to go to the platforms themselves. Google, Youtube and Facebook need to make sure ‘fake
news’ is not a viable business model. Political ‘black campaigning’ is harder to manage, but
‘takedowns’ of social media disinformation producers does seem to help discourage these
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types of actors.
40
In the absence of them doing so, the Indonesian government is stepping in
by making arrests and criminalizing citizens for spreading hoaxes.
This article has outlined the existing problems with this approach. A key finding is that
arrests are seemingly haphazard, or politicized. Arrests for distributing (as opposed to
creating) hoax news is problematic, and police investigations should centre around
observing and arresting ‘syndicates’ who spread fake or hoax news with the purpose of
making money, or who are paid significant funds by political actors. Arresting individual
citizens via a network of collaboration between a government institution and police units
has the potential to create distrust of authorities within Indonesia’s generally open and
vibrant public sphere. Civil defamation laws, rather than criminal ones, could be a useful
alternative in many of these political cases.
A second key finding is that the current system favours arrests of those who attack the sitting
president. While the president is no doubt a major subject of political hoaxes, the structure
within the police to report directly to the president, and its close relationship with a
government ministry (Kominfo) seemingly leads to a more partisan operation. This system
creates the potential for arrests that are politically motivated and based largely around
whether the content is anti-government, leading to a perception that the government does
not tolerate criticism and is using the security forces as an instrument of political repression.
By reflecting on the approaches taken throughout the 2019 elections, Indonesian
government and security forces might look to more reasoned and accountable police process
in the immediate future. There is a warning for other countries in the region too, as reflected
in the comments made by Mahathir and Sandiaga Uno, that once an ‘anti-fake news law’ is
created, police arrests for hoax material have a tendency to focus on hoax content which is
critical of government and security forces. Police and government institutions must
remember that the laws they create, and when and how they are used, is done for the benefit
of all citizens, rather than for serving those currently in power.
1
Kwok, Y 2018, ‘Indonesia’, in M Kajimoto & S Stanley (eds), Overview of misinformation
ecosystem in India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan,
University of Hongkong, pp. 9-15.
2019, ‘Hoaks jelang pilpres meningkat, penebarnya ‘kebanyakan kaum ibu’’, BBC Indonesia, 2
April 2019. Accessible via https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-47769556
Septiasputri, MD 2019, ‘Jelang Pemilu 2019, Kominfo-Kemenko Polhukam Cegah Penyebaran
Hoaks’, rri.co.id, 11 January 2019. Accessible via
http://rri.co.id/post/berita/622078/nasional/jelang_pemilu_2019_kominfokemenko_polhukam_ceg
ah_penyebaran_hoaks.html
https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/8898/ramai-ramai-melawan-hoax/0/sorotan_media
https://tirto.id/kominfo-rancang-permen-untuk-denda-medsos-yang-ikut-biarkan-hoaks-daiH
https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/24-jam-polisi-memantau-berita-hoax-di-media-sosial
https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/19/01/12/pl7esa335-pemerintah-semakin-giat-
tangkal-hoaks
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2
Sources used for these cases are media reports in the Indonesian online media, as well as
SAFENET-documented cases available at http://id.safenetvoice.org/daftarkasus/. I would like to
thank Levriana Yulistari for her contributions and thoughts in conceiving this piece.
3
Ross Tapsell, Media Power in Indonesia: Oligarchs, Citizens and the Digital Revolution,
Rowman and Littlefield, 2017.
4
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-police-uncover-fake-news-factory
5
Crouch, M 2013, Law and Religion in Indonesia: Conflict and the Courts in West Java,
Routledge, London and New York.
6
https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/10/09/20063531/polisi-tangkap-anak-penyebar-kabar-
hoaks-tsunami-di-bulukumba
https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/10/06/12025091/diduga-sebar-hoaks-bencana-di-medsos-
warga-surabaya-ditangkap-polisi
https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/10/04/20302141/seorang-wanita-ditangkap-diduga-sebar-
hoaks-gempa-dan-tsunami-di-sumbawa
https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/10/03/18585481/sebar-hoaks-bencana-di-palu-dan-
donggala-warga-batam-ditangkap
https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/10/04/15063911/polda-riau-tangkap-perempuan-penyebar-
hoaks-gempa-di-jakarta-dan-jawa
https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/10/03/18004001/sebar-hoaks-gempa-ibu-rumah-tangga-di-
sidoarjo-ditangkap-polisi
7
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/11/03/police-arrest-four-in-connection-to-fake-child-
abduction-video.html
8
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/24/asia/indonesia-tsunami-disaster-year-intl/index.html
9
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/11/03/police-arrest-four-in-connection-to-fake-child-
abduction-video.html
10
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2132683/can-indonesias-new-cybercrime-
unit-win-its-war-fake-news
11
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2132683/can-indonesias-new-cybercrime-
unit-win-its-war-fake-news
12
https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/will-fake-news-determine-indonesias-next-president/
13
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesia-election-fake-news-war-room-fighting-
political-hoaxes-11439398
14
https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-
43333434?fbclid=IwAR3gDk04EyuFDtZLcveEbHhVI8d06lTvFLJqcUpLo12AOjlSoglagTkL0w
U
15
Puspita, S 2018, ‘Penyebar hoaks kerusuhan MK ingin ajak turunkan Jokowi’, Kompas.com, 17
September 2018. Accessible via:
https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2018/09/17/11081691/penyebar-hoaks-kerusuhan-mk-ingin-
ajak-mahasiswa-demo-turunkan-jokowi
16
https://www.msn.com/id-id/berita/nasional/polisi-tangkap-admin-ig-suara-rakyat-23-pernah-
posting-jokowi-pki/ar-BBQ0yjj
17
https://regional.kompas.com/read/2019/05/21/23212701/pengedit-video-hoaks-maruf-amin-
berkostum-sinterklas-divonis-7-bulan-penjara
18
https://tirto.id/polisi-tangkap-penyebar-hoaks-surat-suara-tercoblos-di-bekasi-ddMH
19
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/01/21/14035591/polri-tak-tahan-penyebar-hoaks-ijazah-
jokowi
20
https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4475148/penyebar-hoax-surat-suara-sudah-dicoblos-01-di-
sumut-diciduk-polisi
21
https://www.liputan6.com/pilpres/read/3935027/rapat-singgung-server-kpu-diatur-untuk-01-
berlangsung-satu-
jam?related=dable&utm_expid=.9Z4i5ypGQeGiS7w9arwTvQ.1&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2
F
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22
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/20/fake-news-spikes-in-indonesia-ahead-of-
elections
23
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-election-fakenews-insight/fact-checkers-vs-hoax-
peddlers-a-fake-news-battle-ahead-of-indonesias-election-idUSKCN1RM2ZE
24
https://coconuts.co/jakarta/news/govt-orders-block-sandiaga-scandal-website-vp-candidate-
categorically-denies-salacious-rumors/
25
https://www.google.com/amp/s/nasional.tempo.co/amp/1134193/relawan-prabowo-laporkan-6-
akun-diduga-penyebar-skandal-sandiaga
26
https://www.inews.id/news/nasional/dugaan-hoaks-indonesia-barokah-kasus-ke-20-yang-
dilaporkan-bpn-
prabowo?fbclid=IwAR3JYKxqh_leQOq6jrLwbnG4dwy1XsTjuKZ3Twf89rEKes3gvJwUoWJs45
o
27
https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-
43333434?fbclid=IwAR3gDk04EyuFDtZLcveEbHhVI8d06lTvFLJqcUpLo12AOjlSoglagTkL0w
U
28
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/10/03/jokowis-campaign-team-calls-on-ratna-to-
report-assault-to-police.html
29
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-palestinian-fakenews/danish-national-first-to-be-
convicted-under-malaysias-fake-news-law-idUSKBN1I10I9
30
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/30/first-person-convicted-under-malaysias-fake-
news-law
31
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/04/09/dr-m-malaysia-stands-firm-over-repeal-of-
anti-fake-news-act#dVJ4Js4wW01QWRjy.99
32
Usman Hamid, ‘Laws, crackdowns and control mechanisms: digital platforms and the state’ in
Jurriens and Tapsell (eds) Digital Indonesia: Connectivity and Divergence, ISEAS Publishing,
2017.
33
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2016/indonesia
34
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36
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38
https://tirto.id/lieus-sungkharisma-eggi-sudjana-sampaikan-keluhan-ke-fadli-zon-d9h4
39
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/05/21/prabowo-campaign-spokesman-arrested-on-
subversioncharges.html
40
https://theconversation.com/melawan-persebaran-disinformasi-di-indonesia-119285
https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20170131142258-185-190284/kiat-menkominfo-
tangkal-penyebaran-berita-hoax
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10
ISSUE: 2019
No. 75
ISSN 2335-6677
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!
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