Is Discretionary Fiscal Policy Effective? The Caribbean Experience - Paper presented at the Options for the Caribbean After the Global Financial Crisis Conference, Barbados, January 27

Is Discretionary Fiscal Policy Effective? The

Caribbean Experience

Prosper F. Bangwayo-Skeete

Paper presented at the Options for the Caribbean After the Global Financial Crisis Conference

Bridgetown, Barbados─January 27–28, 2011

Organized by the University of the West Indies, the Central Bank of Barbados, and the

International Monetary Fund

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) only, and the presence of them, or

of links to them, on the IMF website does not imply that the IMF, its Executive Board, or its

management endorses or shares the views expressed in the paper.

Conference on Economic Growth, Development and Macroeconomic Policy

–

Is discretionary fiscal policy effective? The Caribbean experience

Prosper F. Bangwayo-Skeete



Abstract

Governments’ recourse to fiscal policy to mitigate the effects of the recent global

economic crisis has renewed interest on the role of fiscal policy on influencing

economic activity. Understanding the effectiveness of fiscal policy to economic

activity aids policymakers spending decisions. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the

economic effects of discretionary fiscal policy (i.e. increases in government

expenditures and tax cuts) in the Caribbean – Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and

Tobago. Using structural vector autoregressive and structural vector error correction

models, the estimates show that government spending policies can stimulate the

economy of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago but not of Barbados. Discretionary tax

policies are found desirable in consolidating fiscal balances.

Keywords: fiscal shocks, Caribbean, structural vector autoregressive models;

structural vector error correction models



International College of the Cayman Islands, Cayman Islands

Email: prosper.bangwayo-skeete@myicci.com;

pfbangwayo@yahoo.com

Tel: 1(345) 517 2874

Address: P.O Box 530; KY1-1502; Grand Cayman; Cayman Islands

1. Introduction

The 2008-2009 global economic crisis wrecked havoc across the world including

the Caribbean. The IMF (2010) reported that real output in the Caribbean contracted

by 2.8 percent compared to 0.6 percent, the global average in 2009. Across the region,

however, there were diverse effects on output. Barbados’ output fell by 0.2% in 2008

and slumped by a further 4.4% in 2009. Jamaica recorded economic downturns of

0.9% and 2.7% in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Trinidad and Tobago’s economic

growth decelerated in 2008 and declined by 3.2% in 2009. Similar to OECD

countries, the Caribbean economies responded by injecting large discretionary fiscal

stimulus packages in 2009 to dampen recessionary pressures and stimulate their

economies. While Jamaica’s fiscal expansion focused on both expanding government

spending and tax cuts, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago responded through

increasing government expenditure.

Such recourse of governments to fiscal policy to mitigate the effects of the global

economic crisis renewed interest on the role of fiscal policy on influencing economic

activity. Economic theory, however, is not conclusive on whether discretionary fiscal

policy is effective. The classical models believe that the market system automatically

adjusts to booms and busts. Therefore, they presume no role for fiscal policy

indicating its ineffectiveness. However, both neoclassical and neo-Keynesian models

imply a positive effect of government spending on output; albeit different dynamics.

The neoclassical models typically predict a negative effect on private consumption

(see, e.g., Baxter and King (1993)), while neo-Keynesian models predict the opposite

sign.

Akin to theory, the empirical literature offers no consensus on the size or even the

sign of the effects of fiscal shocks on output. The evidence is largely based on two

approaches: the “dummy variable” approach and the “structural vector

autoregressive” (SVAR) models. Studies on the dummy variable approach typically

report negative private consumption and positive output response to government

spending; see for example Ramey and Shapiro (1998). The approach relies on the

narrative record and news about fiscal build-ups to identify shocks to government

spending. Although the approach identifies shocks postulated as truly exogenous to

the system, it is subject to the researcher’s ability to accurately identify the date such

exogenous shocks occurred. Thus, several studies use the SVAR approach pioneered

by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). It involves identifying fiscal policy “shocks” using

SVARs and simulating the dynamic impact of these shocks on GDP and other

variables of interest. The SVAR studies typically find a larger effect of government

spending on GDP and in some cases crowding-in of consumption (e.g. Blanchard and

Perotti, 2002, and Gali et al., 2007). Other SVAR studies find crowding-out of

consumption and a smaller but positive effect on GDP (see Perotti, 2009). Mountford

and Uhlig (2009) use less restrictive sign-restrictions to identify fiscal shocks and find

much smaller deficit-spending multipliers.

Ilzetzki et al. (2010) examine fiscal multipliers for 45 countries contrasting

advanced and developing countries using the structural VAR approach. They find that

output effect of an increase in government consumption tend to be larger in industrial

countries, in economies with predetermined exchange rates (but zero in flexible

exchange rate economies), in more closed economies, and in economies with lower

debt levels. This paper complements this study (and other fiscal policy effect studies)

by investigating the output effects of discretionary fiscal shocks – changes in

government spending and taxes – in the Caribbean to offer evidence of alternative

economic environments. The three largest Anglo-Caribbean countries by GDP size

are considered – Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Barbados and Trinidad

and Tobago are high income countries, while Jamaica is an upper middle income

country (World Bank, 2009). More so, Barbados operates a fixed exchange rate

system for over 30 years. Trinidad and Tobago has a crawling peg (quasi-fixed

exchange regime) while Jamaica operates a flexible exchange rate since 1991. All

three countries are open economies, though Jamaica and Barbados are more indebted

than Trinidad and Tobago.

Few studies have been done in the Caribbean. Guy and Maynard (2009) and

Bynoe and Maynard (2008) employ SVAR to address the effectiveness of fiscal

policy in Barbados. These studies, however, consider only one country which does

not necessarily provide guidance for analyzing the impact of fiscal shocks in the

Caribbean as a whole. Using the widely adopted SVAR approach over the period

1980-2009, our paper finds that expansionary government spending has a transitory

positive impact on GDP in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. In the case of Barbados

and in contrast to Bynoe and Maynard (2008), government spending is not effective in

jump-starting the economy. Interestingly, in all countries we find taxes to be effective

on fiscal consolidation but not stimulating the economy.

The next section proceeds to relate important features of fiscal policy in each

country. Section 3 discusses the econometric approach while section 4 presents the

data and the estimation results. Finally, section five concludes.

2. Background country experiences: contractions and fiscal policy

According to World Bank (2009), Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago are high

income nations with PPP real GDP per capita of US$21,600 and US$21,300

respectively while Jamaica is an upper-middle income country recording US$8,400

real GDP per capita in 2009. Each country, however, has had several periods of

growth and contractions since 1960. Barbados experienced 6 phases of output

contractions, Trinidad and Tobago had 3 phases and Jamaica underwent 4 periods of

contractions. Table 1 shows the specific years of economic downturns for each

country.

Table 1: Economic contractions since 1960

Barbados Trinidad & Tobago Jamaica

1963

1974 1973-1980

1981-1982 1983-1989 1984-1985

1990-1992 1992-1993

1996-1998

2001-2002

2008-2009 2009 2008-2009

Source : World Bank -World Development Indicators (2009)

The subsequent sub-sections discuss the economic developments of each country

with particular focus on contractions and associated fiscal policies. All three countries

moved away from relying on agriculture to a strong tourism base. In addition,

Barbados has a vibrant offshore financial services sector, Trinidad has strong

manufacturing sector and oil and gas production sectors and Jamaica has a large

mining sector led by bauxite and alumina.

2.1. Barbados

In 1963, three years before independence, Barbados experienced an economic

decline, which was engendered by the 1960-1961economic recession in the United

States. During that time the country was a low-income economy that was highly

dependent on agriculture, mainly sugar production. In 1974 another economic

contraction occurred due to the global oil crisis induced recession which heavily

impinged the tourism sector. The government responded in 1975 by increasing both

current and capital spending by 10 percent and 28 percent respectively.

The following 6 years averaged real GDP growth of 0.6%. In 1981 and 1982 real

GDP fell due to recessionary conditions in the US and Europe which led to a sharp

decline in tourist arrivals and weaker demand for domestic exports. Large government

outlays in 1981 were reflected in higher wages and in the expansions of government’s

extensive capital works programme, but slower revenue growth resulted in a

significant build-up of the fiscal deficit (Maynard, 2009). To boost the ailing

economy, the government obtained a Eurodollar loan while the central bank relied on

international credit lines mainly the IMF. The resultant reduced economic activity in

1981, lowered government revenue. Hence, government controlled current

expenditures in 1982 which halved budget deficit. However, difficulties in financing

the deficit still persisted.

The international economic conditions improved and so did the tourism sector.

Thus, economic growth expanded for almost a decade. In 1991 and 1992 Barbados

experienced a deep recession. The recession was largely attributable to a fall in sugar

exports and the Gulf war which adversely affected the tourism sector. In order to

restore the economy, the government borrowed funds from the IMF which also paved

way for the adoption of IMF structural adjustment beginning in 1993. The adjustment

program included restrictions on fiscal spending such that by the end on 1993 fiscal

deficit decreased to 0.5% due to stronger revenue growth. Consequently, growth rates

have averaged between 3%-5% from 1993-2000.

A combination of economic liberalization (through deregulation of the banking

sector), negative spillover effects of a depressed world economy and the September

11, 2001 terrorism attacks in U.S, caused a domestic banking liquidity crisis; which

resulted in economic contractions in 2001 and 2002. To help better manage the

challenges posed by this deteriorating economic climate, government issued a US$

150 million international bond in the last quarter of 2001. In order to stimulate

economic activity, the government adopted expansionary policies by increasing both

current and capital outlays, which resulted in an increase in the fiscal deficit.

As the recent global recession hit, Barbados suffered negative growth in both

2008 and 2009. In response the government injected a fiscal stimulus package in

2009.

2.2. Jamaica

Jamaica experienced a deep economic recession from 1973-1980. The recession

was largely due to the international oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80; which

resulted in declines in the sale of bauxite and alumina products due to increase costs

of processing transport.

After a period of steady growth from 1986 to 1995, real GDP decline by 0.1%,

1.1% and 2.3% in 1996, 1997 and 1998 respectively. The decline in GDP in 1996 and

1997 was largely due to a banking crisis triggered by the financial liberalization

initiated since 1991 (Kirkpatrick, 2002). In 1997, a severe island-wide drought (the

worst in 70 years) that drastically reduced agricultural production was primarily

responsible for dwindling output the following year. At first, government provided

liquidity support through the central bank. That is, government intervened in the

distressed institutions mostly through capital injections, in exchange for equity, board

seats and assets. Nonetheless, in some instances other institutions were closed

exacerbating the economic decline.

The global economic crisis also hit Jamaica in 2008-2009. In 2009, Jamaica

implemented a stimulus package which included tax cuts, duty exemptions and loans

to help the economy's most vulnerable sectors.

2.3. Trinidad and Tobago

For a while Trinidad and Tobago – a petroleum based economy – was sparred

from the upsurge of oil crisis in 1970s and 1980s which caused significant strain in

Barbados, Jamaica and Guyana. With the drastic reduction in oil prices in the mid and

later half of 1980s fortunes were reversed. The country underwent a prolonged period

of economic decline from 1983 to 1989. Real GDP slumped each year recording an

average contraction of 9% per year. Consequently, the fiscal position deteriorated.

The economy recovered in 1990 and 1991. However, the economic policy reforms

enacted in 1991 aggravated by the global economic recession caused a contraction in

output in 1992 and 1993 where GDP decline averaged 4.5%.

Over the next 15 years, the country boomed anchored by petroleum production.

Nonetheless, the recent global turmoil dampened global demand in both energy and

non-energy sectors. Consequently, in 2009 the government recorded its first deficits

in seven years amounting to 5.3% of GDP from a surplus of 7.8% in 2008. At the end

of March 2010, central government debt amounted to US$28,832.4 million, an

increase of US$3,688.2 million above the end of 2009. Most of this increase was due

to a private placement amounting to $3.1 billion which caused the central government

domestic debt stock to rise to US$20,120.6 million in 2009.

3. Econometric Framework

This section discusses two econometric strategies used to estimate the effects of

fiscal policy on economic activity in the Caribbean.

3.1 Structural vector autoregressive (SVAR)

First, we adopt structural VAR proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and

Perotti (2004) to identifying fiscal shocks. These are identified through exploiting

decision lags in policymaking as well as utilizing economic theory. The reduced form

VAR is represented as follows:

ttt

UXLAX 

1

)(

(1)

where ),,(

, ttttt

ydtgX  is the vector of endogenous variables containing

government spending, tax revenue, debt to GDP ratio and real GDP respectively. A(L)

is an autoregressive lag polynomial. The vector

),,,(

uuuuU 

contains the

reduced-form residuals, which in general will present non-zero cross-correlations.

Identification strategy

The reduced-form residuals of

g and

t equations,

and

, can be thought of

as linear combinations of three types of shocks: (a) the automatic response of

spending and net taxes to GDP and debt innovations; (b) systematic discretionary

response of fiscal policy to the macro variables in the system (for instance, reductions

in tax rates that some countries could implement systematically in response to

recessions); and (c) random discretionary fiscal policy shocks, considered the truly

uncorrelated structural fiscal policy shocks. Thus, the reduced-form residuals in the

first two equations of (1) can be expressed as

ttg

tdg

tyg

uuu





,,,

(2a)

tgt

tdt

tyt

uuu





,,,

(2b)

where



and



are the ‘structural’ discretionary fiscal shocks. Given our interest

is to analyse the effects of



and



on the rest of the variables, estimation of all

ji,



and

ji,



’s is required. Some restrictions on

ji,



are spelt out later which are

necessary to identify the structural shocks and coefficients. Therefore, the reduced

form innovations,

is a linear combination of the structural shocks,

; which can

be written as:

BVU

1

 , where ),,,(



 (3)

The structural shocks are assumed to be independently and identically distributed

with covariance matrix equal to the identity. The SVAR can be obtained by

substituting equation (3) into (1) and rearranging:

ttt

BVXLAX 

1

)(

(4)

3.2. Structural vector error correction (SVEC)

The second econometric procedure applied is a SVEC following Johansen and

Juselius (1990), King et al. (1991), Jacobson et al. (1997), and Breitung et al. (2004).

At first, tests for unit roots and cointegration à la Johansen are carried out. In the case

where the data is nonstationary and cointegration exists, a SVEC procedure is used

instead of the structural VAR. Cointegration relationship signals existence of a long-

run stable relation among the variables in the system. In that case SVAR would not be

the correct specification because an error correction term would be missing from the

estimated reduced-form VAR. For that reason, the model should take into account that

the variables are cointegrated and include the previous period deviation from

equilibrium,

1



, in order to correctly identify the dynamics of the system after any

shock.

The reduced-form of a first–order VEC can be written as:

tttt

XLAXX





 11

)(

where the forecast errors are:

1





. In this case,

the SVEC would be:

tttt

BVXLAXX 

 11

)( . Similar to the structural

VAR procedure, several restrictions should be imposed to the



matrix in order to

identify the structural shocks and coefficients.

4. Empirical Analysis: Data, Results and Discussion

4.1 Data

Following Beetsma et al. (2008) and Bénétrix and Lane (2009, 2010), but in

contrast to some related literature, we use annual data instead of quarterly data to

study the impact of fiscal shocks on the real output of Barbados, Jamaica and

Trinidad. Bénétrix and Lane (2009) show that the Perotti (2005) group of countries

provide very similar results whether quarterly or annual data are employed. Hence,

the choice of quarterly versus annual data makes little difference. The use of annual

data also provides conceptual advantages over quarterly data. For instance, Beetsma

et al. (2008) argue that fiscal shocks uncovered with annual data are closer to the

actual shocks since fiscal policy is not substantially revised within a year. Moreover,

the use of annual data eliminates concerns about seasonal patterns in fiscal

expenditures.

The annual data utilized include total debt to GDP ratio )(

d , public expenditure

)(

, tax revenue

)(

and GDP

)(

. The GDP deflator was used to deflate the later

three variables. Similar to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Burriel et al. (2010) the

definition of central government spending is the sum of government consumption and

investment, while tax revenue is defined as the government receipts less grants and

capital revenue. Variables of interest are expressed all as logs of their real value

except total debt ratio which is in logs. We use annual data covering the period 1980-

2009. The data was obtained from the Central Bank of Barbados, Central Bank of

Jamaica, Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, Wold Bank (2009) World

Development Indicators and The IMF’s (2009) International Financial Statistics.

4.2 Results and Discussion

The starting point is to determine the number of VAR lags for each country’s

system using the lag selection criteria methods. The VAR for Barbados, Jamaica,

Trinidad and Tobago includes one, four and two lags respectively of each endogenous

variable. This is according to the results provided by the likelihood ratio (LR) test, the

Akaike, Schwatz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria and the final prediction

error; see table A1. The next step is to perform unit root tests on all variables in the

system. Using Augmented Dickey Fuller and Philips-Perron tests, table A2 report

presence of unit roots on all variables though their first differences are stationary. The

level-variables are cointegrated hence the structural VEC model is used to identify the

structural shocks.

The system is ordered such that fiscal policy variables are first (i.e. public

expenditure )(

g and tax revenue )(

t ) since they are exogenous to the economy (see

Burriel et al., 2010 and Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). Similar to Burriel et al. (2010),

we assume that expenditure decisions are prior to tax ones, which implies a zero value

for

tg,



. This allows us to retrieve

directly from (2a) and to use it in (2b) in order

to estimate

gt,



by ordinary least squares (OLS). Given our objective is to study the

effects of fiscal policy shocks, the ordering of the remaining variables total debt to

GDP ratio )(

d and GDP )(

y is immaterial to the results.

Further assumptions are adopted. Similar to Blachard and Perotti (2002), we rule

out any discretionary response of government spending to unexpected

contemporaneous movement in economic activity i.e.





. Because taxes and

government spending are policy variables, there is no contemporaneous effect

between them i.e. 0



tggt



. Combining these assumptions and using the optimal

lags on differenced variables, the system is identified and the resulting impulse

responses for each country are as shown in Figure A1, A2 and A3. The impulse

response function graphs show the response of GDP and debt ratio to government and

tax shocks. Due to lack of consistent debt data on Trinidad, a three variable system

was estimated such that the impulse response functions reflect the effect of

government spending and tax shocks on GDP only

. The results convey important

information.

For Barbados, a 1% increase in real government spending has a small negative

impact on real GDP growth of 0.02% after a year which gradually dissipates. This

implies that injections of government funds are not effective at stimulating economic

activity. This result was also found by Ilzetzki et al. (2010) for developing countries.

However, it contradicts the findings of Bynoe and Maynard (2008) who found a

positive effect; possibly due to their use of Choleski decomposition for restrictions.

The Choleski decomposition is not based on economic theory; hence is likely to

provide biased results (Enders, 2004). Our estimates also indicate that a 1% positive

government spending shock increases the debt ratio by 0.08% a year later. In addition,

increased government spending does not significantly affect tax revenues.

A 1% positive tax shock has no immediate effect on real GDP growth. After a

year, real GDP growth increases by 0.2% and quickly vanishes. The same tax shock

decreases the debt ratio by 0.3% in the following year and gradually declines

overtime. This could indicate that the government of Barbados largely increase taxes

for fiscal consolidation purposes (e.g. to reduce government debt and fiscal deficits)

in order to move the economy from an unsustainable to a sustainable path. Such a tax

policy would boosts consumer confidence who respond by increasing real private

consumption thereby increasing real GDP growth. In line with this finding, Romer

and Romer (2007) also noted that the effect of a U.S. tax shock on output depends on

whether it is motivated by the government’s desire to stabilize the debt, or unrelated

to the stance of fiscal policy. Our results also indicate that positive tax expenditure

shocks encourage government spending, which peaks at 0.17% in the second year and

quickly dissipates.

In the case of Jamaica, a 1% government spending shock takes 4 years to

influence GDP growth by 0.07%. Thereafter the impact quickly disappears and later

causes a 0.6% decline in GDP growth. The same shock has no statistically significant

effect on tax revenue and debt ratio. A 1% tax shock has no immediate effect on GDP,

however, after 4 years it increases GDP growth by 0.14%, rapidly dies down and after

8 years reduces GDP by 0.1%. Additionally, the tax shock has a positive effect of

0.06% on the debt ratio after 4 years and quickly vanishes. The same shock reveals

The absence of debt ratio on Trinidad and Tobago is not expected to affect our results significantly

since Trinidad has low debt levels historically.

that increased revenues promote short-lived government spending of 0.3% four years

later.

As for Trinidad and Tobago, a 1% shock in government spending increase GDP

growth by 0.07% in the second year and with time the effect diminishes in an

oscillatory non-negative manner. Further, the spending shock boost tax revenues of

0.34% two years later which slowly vanishes in cyclical way overtime. The effect of

tax shocks on GDP exhibit a similar pattern to the effects of government spending

shocks. Akin to Barbados and Jamaica (though different lags), positive tax shocks

indicate that higher revenues encourage government spending which responds at a

maximum of 0.32% in year 2; thereafter it slowly vanishes in an oscillatory manner.

5. Conclusion

This paper builds on previous literature analysing the effects of fiscal policy for

economic activity. Using structural vector autoregressive and structural vector error

correction models, the study assesses the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity

in the Caribbean from 1980-2009. Results indicate that injection of government funds

is ineffective in triggering economic activity in the case of Barbados. In both Jamaica

and Trinidad and Tobago, government spending has transitory effects on economic

activity with a delay of four and two years respectively. Hence, when faced with

economic recessions, the neo-Keynesian prescription is more appropriate for Trinidad

and Jamaica but is generally a failure for Barbados. However, the slow impact raises

questions as to the usefulness of discretionary fiscal policy for short-run stabilization

purposes.

Tax shocks are positively related to GDP suggesting that an attempt to stimulate

the Caribbean economies with tax cuts may not yield desirable results. However, the

results have important implications for the design of fiscal consolidation plans. In

particular, our finding suggest that tax reform aimed at curtailing the growth of debt

or fiscal deficits may yield desirable results while improving GDP growth in all

countries. These findings are very informative to policymakers for containing

recessionary effects, stimulating the economy or consolidating the fiscal stance.

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Table A1: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria

Lag Log Likelihood LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC

Barbados 0 159.509 2.80E-11 -12.959 -12.907* -12.7627*

1 177.698 36.378 2.4e-11* -13.1415* -12.881 -12.1598

2 185.036 14.676 5.50E-11 -12.4197 -11.9508 -10.6526

3 191.907 13.742 1.70E-10 -11.6589 -10.9817 -9.10645

4 205.601 27.389* 5.00E-10 -11.4668 -10.5813 -8.12897

Jamaica 0 87.9605 7.30E-11 -11.9944 -12.0113 -11.8118

1 103.297 30.672 9.10E-11 -11.8995 -11.984 -10.9866

2 135.018 63.442 2.20E-11 -14.1454 -14.2975 -12.5021

3 952.957 1635.9 4.7e-59* -128.708 -128.928 -126.334

4 1960.07 2014.2* . -272.01* -272.246* -269.454*

Trinidad & Tobago 0 50.9907 2.10E-07 -6.85582 -6.86849 -6.71888*

1 54.7399 7.4983 4.70E-07 -6.1057 -6.1564 -5.55793

2 66.1945 22.909* 4.20E-07 -6.45635* -6.54509* -5.49777

3 71.6562 10.923 1.60E-06 -5.95088 -6.07764 -4.58147

4 . . -7.6e-41* . . .

Notes:

For Barbados and Jamaica, ∆g, ∆t, ∆d, ∆y are the endogenous variables while the constant is exogenous

g represents government spending; t is tax revenue; d denotes debt ratio and y is GDP

FPE: Final prediction error

AIC: Akaike information criterion

HQIC: Hannan-Quinn information criterion

SBIC: Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion

* indicates lag order selected by the criterion

LR: sequential modified LR test statistic

∆d is excluded from Trinidad and Tobago's endgenous variables.

∆ denotes the first-difference operator.

Table A2: Unit Root Tests

Variable

Levels First-difference Levels First-difference

Barbados g -0.463 -5.656*** -0.433 -5.741***

t -1.406 -5.377*** -1.45 -5.386***

d -1.168 -4.07*** -1.173 -4.053***

y -0.761 -3.702*** -0.873 -3.748***

Jamaica g -0.725 -3.761*** -0.682 -3.745***

t -1.684 -4.254*** -1.668 -4.293***

d -1.183 -2.128* -1.588 -2.072*

y -2.247 -2.764* -2.14 -2.74*

Trinidad & Tobago g -0.719 -7.729*** 0.06 -3.854***

t -0.135 -3.391** -0.813 -7.729***

y -1.616 -3.759* 0.379 -3.769*

Notes:

Augmented Dickey Fuller Philips Perron

*, **,*** are the MacKinnon critical values for the rejection of the null hypothesis

of a unit root at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.

g represents government spending; t is tax revenue; d denotes debt ratio and y is GDP

Figure A1: Barbados’ impulse response functions

-1

-.5

-1

-.5

-1

-.5

-1

-.5

0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8

debt ratio

government spending

tax revenue

GDP

debt ratio

government spending

tax revenue

GDP

95% CI impulse response function

year

Response to 1% government spending shock Response to 1% tax shock

Figure A2: Jamaica’s impulse response functions

-1

-.5

-1

-.5

-1

-.5

-1

-.5

0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8

debt ratio

government spending

tax revenue

GDP

debt ratio

governemnt spending

tax revenue

GDP

95% CI impulse response function

year

Response to 1% government spending shock

Response to 1% tax shock

Figure A3: Trinidad and Tobago’s impulse response functions

-.5

0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8

government spending

tax revenue

GDP

government spending

tax revenue

GDP

95% CI impulse response function

year

Response to 1% government spending shock Response to 1% tax shock