The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

The nexus of conﬂict and

illicit drug traﬃcking

Syria and

the wider

region

Syria and

the wider

region

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

A N E T W O R K T O C O U N T E R N E T W O R K S

The nexus of conict and illicit drug

tracking

Syria and the wider region

November 2016

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmied in any form or by any means without permission in

writing from the Global Initiative. Please direct inquiries to:

The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime

WMO Building, 2nd Floor

7bis, Avenue de la Paix

CH-1211 Geneva 1

Switzerland

www.globalinitiative.net

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI) is grateful to the national and international in-

stitutions which shared their knowledge and data with the report team, including though not limited to, Europol,

Interpol, Turkish National Police Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime, the United States Drug

Enforcement Administration, the United Kingdom National Crime Agency, Austrian BKA, Bulgarian Customs

and Counter Narcotics law enforcement, Hellenic Counter narcotics police, German BKA and ZKA, Italy, DEA

Lebanon, Dutch KLPD, Guarda Civil Spain, the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. Regional organisations con-

tributing to this report include the United Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime and the Southeast European Law

Enforcement Centre (SELEC) to whom we are most indebted.

This report was draed and prepared by Ben Crabtree.

The preparation of this report beneﬁted from the ﬁnancial contributions of Norway.

Acknowledgments

Executive Summary

The conﬂict in Syria has raged for over ﬁve years, creating massive destruction and human misery. Over 5 mil-

lion people have ﬂed Syria and over 6.6 million are internally displaced. Much of the suﬀering and conﬂict is be-

ing maintained by actors turning to a variety of illicit funding, and increasingly traﬃcking in the drug captagon.

Unlike many other drugs the primary destination markets for captagon is countries in the Arab peninsula and

increasingly Syria and the Syrian diaspora. Captagon has emerged as a conﬂict drug helping to sustain the war.

For other drugs, particularly, Afghan sourced heroin, the instability and conﬂict has had the opposite eﬀect of

moving trajectories away from Turkey and Syria and north through the Black sea. Many long-established drug

traﬃcking networks prefer a more stable environment to that found in Syria and neighboring countries.

Within Syria people living under extreme conditions oen turn to drug use, while soldiers from all parties to the

conﬂict can use the drugs as combat stimulants. 6 million Syrian migrants and refugees in neighboring coun-

tries are an at risk community to drug use and acting as mules to pay for their travel to European countries.

Though, the challenge of illicit drug traﬃcking and production in Syria is not new it has become a reliable war

drug for many actors. International interest by law enforcement in drug traﬃcking is oen limited by domestic

political concerns. Yet there are long term public health and rule of law consequences for development and law

enforcement actors that unless directly recognised now and responses planned for in a post-conﬂict Syria will

lead to more suﬀering and instability in the region.

This report looks at the current impact of drug traﬃcking and conﬂict within Syria and neighboring countries,

discussing trajectories, development and organised crime response to the challenge and opportunity conﬂict

provides.

Key ndings

• Drug traﬃcking and its impact on the rule of law is extensive and chronic, this must be factored into

development implementation in a post-conﬂict Syria. Development policies should have a mid- to long

term focus understanding the local needs, conﬂicts and development of the rule of law as a cornerstone

for success.

• Conﬂict in South Eastern Turkey has shied much of the Balkan route of Afghan opiates away from

Turkey into the caucuses and across the Black Sea. Turkish OCG’s are exploiting the Black Sea trajecto-

ries due to the perceived increased risk and instability of moving Afghan opiates through Turkey.

• Captagon production within Syria has been occurring for at least a decade. The current conﬂict has

exploited the breakdown of the rule of law to intensify production and traﬃcking with the direct involve-

ment and enrichment of actors in the conﬂict.

• Most pills seized in the region contain amphetamine base rather than Fenethylline (captagon), although

some seizures in Turkey have contained Fenethylline.

• The current level of conﬂict within Syria has forced some traﬃckers to move production of captagon

to Lebanon and Turkey and potentially other countries within the region including Sudan. If the conﬂict

worsens for either the regime, FSA, or ISIS

and extremist groups, captagon drug traﬃcking could be

ISIS is the preferred nomenclature for ISIL or IS in this work

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

moved on a larger scale to neighboring countries.

• Trajectories for captagon produced in Syria are by land, sea and air, controlled by OCG’s aﬃliated with

forces on the ground within their area of control.

• Sea trajectories include containers of captagon and other drugs transiting Libya for redirection to oth-

er countries in North Africa and the Middle East.

• Syrian and Turkish OCG’s are working directly with non-state actors such as the FSA and extremist

Islamist groups to produce captagon within Syria and to facilitate exportation.

• It is unclear if ISIS is a net exporter of captagon due to other more reliable sources of funding (oil, ex-

tortion). However, there are clear links between Tramadol traﬃcking and ISIS.

• Huge data gaps remain regarding captagon usage in Syria and neighboring countries as well as desti-

nation markets, particularly among Syrian refugee populations.

• Destination markets for captagon are predominantly in the Arab Peninsula and East Africa with con-

sumption in Turkey and Syria also rising precipitously.

• Drug traﬃcking and serious organised crime are a signiﬁcant challenge to some countries in the re-

gion, due to newer priorities and limited capacity of drug traﬃcking is a secondary or tertiary priority to

law enforcement.

• Limited reliable information on drug use and prevalence in Syria and the region.

Acknowledgments

Executive Summary

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................1

The Syrian Conﬂict: Opportunity and challenge to new and established drug traﬃckers........2

Note on methodology ............................................................................................................................................4

I: The Origins of Captagon: production and markets in South Eastern Europe ......................... 5

Diversiﬁcation as captagon production in Bulgaria declines ............................................................6

Turkey .............................................................................................................................................................................8

Syria ................................................................................................................................................................................9

Current trajectories of captagon, 2016 ............................................................................................ 10

Northern Trajectories ................................................................................................................................12

Western Trajectories: Ports ...................................................................................................................15

Southern Trajectories Jordan ................................................................................................................16

Lebanon .......................................................................................................................................................................17

Precursors .................................................................................................................................................................18

II: Actors: Organized Crime Groups and political actors in captagon traﬃcking ..................20

Free Syrian Army and Moderate Rebel forces .......................................................................................21

Syrian Regime involvement with drug traﬃcking: ................................................................................21

ISIS and Extremist Groups ............................................................................................................................... 22

III: The Balkan Route of Afghan opiates ......................................................................................................... 24

Traditional trajectories ...................................................................................................................................... 24

Latest Trends .......................................................................................................................................................... 25

IV: Future Analysis and Policy Implications. ................................................................................................ 29

Migration, Refugees and expanding addiction .......................................................................................31

Instability in Turkey .............................................................................................................................................. 32

Law enforcement priorities and capacity ................................................................................................ 32

Data and analysis gaps. ......................................................................................................................................32

Policy implications ............................................................................................................................................... 33

Table of Contents

Glossary

BMK Beth Methyl Ketinone

FSA Free Syrian Army

NPS New Psychoactive Substances

OCG Organised crime group

TNP Turkish National Police

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Introduction

Drug traﬃcking is a time honored source of income not only for organised crime but for a variety of state and

non-state actors. Historical precedent takes us as far back as the 1840s and the opium wars in China, to the

Iran-Contra aﬀair in the 1980s, plus more modern conﬂicts (e.g. FARC in Colombia and the conﬂict in Afghan-

istan). Drug traﬃcking provides large quantities of diﬃcult to trace hard currency that can be used for any

number of activities to promote political ends. Yet the less appreciated aspect is the more chronic. Drug traf-

ﬁcking and organised crime is oen exacerbated by, and serves to exacerbate conﬂict and further undermine

the rule of law.

Statements that all conﬂict or civil war are good for organised crime or that most terrorist groups are involved

in drug traﬃcking lack nuance and do not reﬂect reality. Above all, organised crime thrives on weak and cor-

ruptible, rather than non-existant, rule of law. Instability raises risks and impacts the business model of some

drug traﬃcking organised crime groups. This presents challenges to both policymakers and development ac-

tors when entering post conﬂict nation states that have been riven by drug traﬃcking and conﬂict for years.

Figure 1: Cilvegözü border crossing point between Turkey and Syria

Source: Daily sabah

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

The Syrian Conict: Opportunity and challenge to new and

established drug trackers

UNODC, World Drug Report 2015

Per Kilogram in destination markets in Western and Central Europe

See actors section ISIS and extremist groups

Previously known as Al Nusra front

Now ending its ﬁh year the conﬂict in Syria has become so complex and entrenched, that the original mass

protests in 2011, triggered by the Arab spring call for more democracy and freedoms in the region, have been

almost forgoen. With over 250,000 dead, 5 million people having le Syria altogether and another 6 million

internally displaced and an economy collapsing, the immediate human suﬀering is inescapable.

To make this conﬂict even more tragic not only has international diplomacy failed so far but Syria has turned

into a proxy war. Regional powers from Turkey, to Iran and Saudi Arabia, and great powers, the United States of

America and Russia, as well as non-state actors like Hezbollah, are all pursuing diﬀerent agendas and providing

ﬁnancial and military support to diﬀerent parties to the conﬂict. The weakness of the Syrian regime to con-

trol its territory has led to the expansion of rebel and extremist groups most notably ISIS. These groups oen

practice asymmetric warfare and support terrorist acts in Syria the region and globally. While this expansion in

human misery has rightly been the focus of most aention, the expansion of the illicit economy, and particularly

drug production is no less worrisome and will have considerable consequences for post conﬂict development.

Globally, cannabis is the most widely used illicit drug in the world

and cocaine has a higher value

and expanding

markets, New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) can be produced almost anywhere dependent upon precursor

availability. Yet it is captagon and heroin that have a strategic inﬂuence upon the region in terms of consump-

tion, impact on the rule of law and funding of terrorism and conﬂict.

Drug traﬃcking can be a great source of funding for actors to the conﬂict in Syria but not without risks. For

terrorist groups, state and non-state actors, the risk to prestige from proﬁting from drug traﬃcking can have

very negative consequences on political agenda. To be seen promoting drug production and condoning illegal

activity, can undermine actors as responsible and capable of administering justice fairly as well as tarnish their

image internationally. If other more reliable and larger sources of funding are available; actors will tend to turn

to these ﬁrst to the exclusion of drug traﬃcking, as may be the case with ISIS. ISIS is assumed to derive most of

its monthly income from oil and other sources rather than drug traﬃcking.

Yet desperate times lead to desperate actions, actors other than ISIS, from the FSA to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham

to smaller independents as well as the Syrian regime need access to new and easily exploitable sources of fund-

ing, provided by captagon production and traﬃcking. With the fragmented and protracted conﬂict in Syria, and

with oil prices falling globally, drug traﬃcking has become an important mainstay of the war economy.

The conﬂict in Syria, and its subsequent impact upon surrounding countries, has provided the right environment

for the explosion of captagon production, traﬃcking and use. This explosion of production and traﬃcking has

been because of sudden intensity of demand from conﬂict actors in Syria as well as the funding needs of state

and non-state actors within Syria and the wider region to wage war and administrate areas under their control.

Moreover, the close proximity of large destination markets in Saudi Arabia and the rest of Arab peninsula, are

very aractive to captagon producers in Syria. Although connections between Syrian OCG’s and South-East

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

European captagon producers have existed since the 1980s, captagon production in Syria and the wider region

is relatively new, having begun in the mid to early 2000s. Yet the conﬂict has allowed this production and traf-

ﬁcking to expand considerably.

Captagon production and traﬃcking has become a perfect source of ﬁnancing for conﬂict actors in Syria. The

simplicity and mobile nature of production facilities and limited chemical knowledge combined with close prox-

imity to major destination markets plus burgeoning demand within Syria oﬀer highly proﬁtable sources of in-

come with low risk of interception due to a lack of law enforcement capacity and priorities. Despite the conﬂict

and instability captagon production is booming.

For Afghan opiates transiting the Balkan route, which was recently valued at USD 26.8 billion

, traﬃckers prefer

to avoid conﬂict and instability. Established over decades, the Balkan route of Afghan opiates has traditionally

transited Afghanistan and Iran ﬁnally entering South-Eastern Turkey before heading by land, and occasionally

sea, for destination markets in Western and Central Europe. Afghan Opiate traﬃckers have established their

modus operandi and targeted weakness in the rule of law over decades of practice and experience. This has

developed into a preference for reliability, stability and routine rather than conﬂict or increased law enforce-

ment and border control pressure. Since the conﬂict between the Turkish government and Kurdish separatist

intensiﬁed in mid-2015, traditional trajectories for Afghan opiates have become increasingly unviable and this

has impacted traﬃcker’s business models. Compounded with the recent Turkish army incursion into Northern

Syria, the Southern border provinces of Turkey have become even more unstable and diﬃcult to permeate.

This has resulted in a recent shi of some well-established Afghan opiate traﬃckers and trajectories north

into the caucuses bypassing Turkey and the unstable South East of the country. While conﬂict in Syria has bred

production and traﬃcking of captagon in Syria and the region the main thesis of this report is to show that the

ideal situation for long term opiate traﬃckers is corruptible and minimal rule of law rather than instability and

lawlessness presented by conﬂict. By contrast actors party to the conﬂict are looking for reliable sources of

funding, independent of outside donors; drug traﬃcking is one such source.

This report consists of a narrative of the development of the traﬃcking in these illicit drugs from the recent

past to understand how we arrived at the situation today and the challenges that face Syria and the wider re-

gion post-bellum. The ﬁrst chapter explores questions related to captagon production and traﬃcking. Among

other questions, this section asks how did captagon production start, where is production occurring and how

may it develop into countries beyond Syria and recently Lebanon and Turkey.

Secondly, the impact of the conﬂict in Syria and the wider region has aﬀected traditional drug traﬃcking routes,

namely the Balkan route of Afghan opiates. How this diﬀers from captagon traﬃcking and its relevance to con-

ﬂict is discussed in the second chapter.

In the concluding chapter analysis is provided of the impact in the mid to long term on Syria and the region, how

it undermines the rule of law now and post-conﬂict development. A brief analysis of the impact of the recent

coup aempt in Turkey is also discussed due to the critical role Turkey plays in the region in particular to drug

traﬃcking. This section also raises the data gaps that still exists and highlights the need for continued monitor-

ing of the situation to eﬀectively engage development aer the conﬂict has ended.

UNODC, Drug Money: the illicit proceeds of opiates traﬃcked on the Balkan route 2015

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Note on methodology

Most of the data and information used within this report has been provided through interviews and data ex-

change from a variety of national and international law enforcement, and civil society actors. Over 15 interviews

were conducted with law enforcement actors in Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq during 2016. Field research also took

place in Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq. In many cases seizure data is used to draw some analysis and conclusions. Due

to the nature of drug traﬃcking this only provides the analyst with the “visible” understanding of production,

trajectories and modus operandi as well as appropriate conclusions. While other points may be more conjectur-

al, and is noted so correspondingly in the text. Accepting this weakness in the methodology highlights the fact

that regardless of how much research is conducted, perfect or complete data on a subject such as drug traﬃck-

ing can never be achieved. Moreover, due to the dynamic nature of the subject, traﬃcking trends can change

quickly in response to law enforcement actions or other factors potentially rendering some analysis redundant.

In the case of captagon seizures there is some incompatibility of the unit of measurement. Dependent on the

country, reporting authorities sometimes use kilograms or pieces seized. While a rough conversion can be sug-

gested of 5,000 pieces/pills per kilogram, in this report the author uses the original data without conversion.

While this complicates the data analysis it avoids the possibility of manipulation on the part of the author.

The nexus of conﬂict and drug traﬃcking in Syria continue to reinforce and fuel one another, and impact the

stability of other countries in the region. As and when some kind of peace selement is formed it will be of

crucial importance to disrupt and dismantle, illicit activities, particularly lucrative ones such as drug traﬃcking.

If not tackled and recognised from the start, drug traﬃcking will create long term instability and act as an im-

pediment to peace and development. Such has been the fate of Afghanistan, Mali and Libya. A proactive moni-

toring and mapping of illicit networks of drug traﬃcking needs to be implemented now to provide an accurate

knowledge of the political economy that will serve as a foundation for future negotiations and avoid repeating

past mistakes.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

I: The Origins of Captagon: production and

markets in South Eastern Europe

With the end of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1990 many former Soviet countries were

le to reorient themselves towards a capitalist free market economy and the establishment of multi-party

democracy. While in the Western Balkans this resulted in wars of secession from Yugoslavia by its constituent

parts, countries such as Bulgaria and Romania found themselves dismantling large state run enterprises.

Bulgaria had a long tradition of a large chemical industry with strong experience of chemical production for

export abroad. Already in the 1980s state controlled chemical companies were producing large amounts

of captagon for export.

During this time the production of captagon was tightly controlled by the Bulgarian

security services. They enforced what could be produced and traﬃcked out of Bulgaria.

Centre for the study of Democracy, 2007, Organized Crime in Bulgaria: Trends and Markets; p.39

Interview Bulgarian law enforcement June 2016.

Ibid. p.40

Interview Bulgarian law enforcement June 2016.

Centre for the study of Democracy, 2007, Organized Crime in Bulgaria: Trends and Markets; p. 68

Captagon? Is that a pill?

Captagon is a misnomer for an amphetamine type stimulant (ATS) called fenethylline. Fenethylline was

developed in 1961 in Germany as a medicine for children with aention deﬁcit disorder (ADD). It acts

as a stimulant, improving concentration and awareness, as well as making the user feel very energetic

and active. In the 1980s it was listed as a controlled substance and banded. Marketed and branded as

captagon in the 1980s it has since developed into a recreational drug particularly in the middle east

and Arab peninsula. However, law enforcement in South East Europe and the Middle East oen seize

pills that contain lile to no active amphetamine, but substitutes such as high concentrated caﬀeine.

Indeed, actual captagon is probably rarely produced and it is more likely pills contain amphetamine

base with the captagon stamp on the pill.

Before the end of the cold war almost all captagon production in Bulgaria had been state controlled and only for

export in particular to the Middle East.

The market for captagon in Syria and the Middle East was facilitated

by political and technical cooperation between Bulgaria and Syria. During the cold war many Syrians went to

study chemistry in Bulgaria and established contacts that would aid illicit drug traﬃcking and production later.

Captagon le over from the pre-1990 produce of state pharmaceutical companies was reportedly exported by

black market entrepreneurs who exploited previous contacts with the Arab world to make continuing deliveries

to Middle Eastern countries.

With a large technically capable work force void of employment, due to denationalisation, many former

chemists turned to illegal, but lucrative sources of funding in Bulgaria. Chief among these was the production

of captagon.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Not only Bulgarian but also Serbian OCG’s were deeply involved in captagon production at this time and oen worked

together.

Syria

Jordan

Iraq

Israel

Saudi Arabia

Turkey

Greece

Macedonia

Serbia

Kosovo

Albania

Romania

Egypt

Libya

Lebanon

Bulgaria

Adana

Detected captagon producing

labs in Turkey mid 2000s

Istanbul

Figure 2: Captagon traﬃcking routes from Bulgaria to the Middle East (1990-2007)

Production moves to Turkey (2007-2009)

Aer the Cold War, chemist were able to produce for the domestic market as well leading to a rise in drug use

within Bulgaria. It must be noted that the captagon that was being produced by Bulgarian OCG’s

was not capta-

gon itself but rather an amphetamine base with the pills branded like captagon. Rarely, did Bulgarian or Serbian

law enforcement come across cases of active fenethylline.

By the mid-2000s Bulgarian police had begun a crackdown on captagon production in Bulgaria forcing produc-

tion to be moved to countries closer to the destination markets in the middle east, namely Turkey, and Syria.

This was facilitated by the strong links already established between Bulgarian OCG’s and middle eastern OCG’s

in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Diversication as captagon production in Bulgaria declines

Bulgarian law enforcement with assistance from international actors was enabled to actively disrupt captagon

production in Bulgaria. Seizures of captagon grew exponentially peaking in 2004 (see Figure 1) at just over 1.4

tons. While this was hailed as a great victory in the ﬁght against drug traﬃcking, few cases of grand corruption

or seizure of assets and money related to drug traﬃcking within Bulgaria or the wider region occurred.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Source: SELEC DATA 2006-2013, Bulgarian counter narcotics law enforcement 2000-2015

Figure 3: Bulgarian Amphetamine seizures 2000-2015 (kg)

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

2000

214.61

64.84

208.19

617.31

1,119.69

875.96

209.30

252.90

229.50

188.01

36.59 35.80

505.92

1,456.22

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

182

4.7

This is not to say that production in Bulgaria has stopped altogether. Bulgarian law enforcement still regular-

ly dismantle amphetamine producing ‘kitchen’ labs.

As late as 2013, the latest year of available information,

Bulgarian law enforcement reported dismantling 35 laboratories for synthetic drug production but noted that

most of these were of a small scale for domestic markets.

Although the traﬃcking seems to have lessened,

as will be noted later, Bulgarian chemists continue to export their expertise in amphetamine production to

producers in the middle east and ties with Syria remain strong.

In 2015, Bulgarian law enforcement in cooperation with Sudanese law enforcement, dismantled an amphet-

amine lab in Sudan that was producing pills with captagon stamps on them.

Three Bulgarian nationals, one

Syrian national and one Pakistan/ Bulgarian national were arrested. The scale and size of the lab suggests the

captagon pills were intended for regional markets.

While captagon production has declined other drugs such as ecstasy originating from the Netherlands, is tran-

siting the reverse Balkan route to markets in Turkey and the Middle East.

It has been determined that Turkish

OCG’s with residence in the Netherlands but using Bulgarian and other nationalities of the region as couriers

are the primary actors in this trade.

As is oen the case, OCGs react to law enforcement pressure by moving production, oen closer to destina-

tion markets. Just aer the peak of captagon seizures in Bulgaria in 2004, law enforcement oﬃcers noted

the movement of captagon production facilities away from Bulgaria to the Middle East and Turkey from 2005

onwards.

Mobile easy to set up and dismantle labs capable of producing large quantities of usually low quality amphetamine for

domestic markets.

EMCDDA, National Report Bulgaria 2015 p.122

Data provided by Bulgarian law enforcement

Bulgarian Counter Narcotics Police, interview June 2016.

Centre for the study of Democracy, 2007, Organized Crime in Bulgaria: Trends and Markets; p.71

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

This is also true of ecstasy. Produced in the Netherlands and traded for heroin destined for Turkish markets. Source:

EMCDDA, National Reports Bulgaria and Turkey, 2007 p.77; p.111

KOM Annual Report 2008 p. 20

KOM annual report 2014 p.18

KOM annual report 2011 p.20

Turkey

Some production of captagon moved to Turkey, as Bulgarian and Turkish OCG’s have always had a strong con-

nection through their involvement in the Balkan route traﬃcking of Aafghan opiates. Indeed, during this time

period, Turkish and Bulgarian law enforcement reported that some shipments of heroin from Afghanistan would

be bartered for captagon from Bulgaria.

Figure 4: Turkey Captagon Seizures 2002-2015 (number of pieces)

Source TNP SELEC

122.732 144.121 245.011

13,834,136

19,971.625

2002

5,000,000

10,000,000

20,000,000

15,000,000

25,000,000

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Aer this ﬁrst cycle of traﬃcking from South Eastern Europe into Turkey ended in 2005, large production fa-

cilities of captagon were dismantled in Istanbul and Hatay province starting in the same year. Yet this period of

production within Turkey seems to have been brief and ended by 2009, due in part to law enforcement pressure

and more lucrative opportunities in countries closer to the destination markets in the Arab peninsula. TNP re-

ported that 72% of the Captagon seized in 2008 (2,145,000) were brought to Turkey from Syria through hiding

in legal cargo and seized in Adana on its way to Saudi Arabia.

This highlighted the shi in Turkey‘s position from

producer back to a transit country with regard to Captagon from Syria at an early stage before the conﬂict be-

gan. In 2014 TNP noted that 80% of the people arrested from operations with captagon traﬃcking were Syrian

citizens.

Focus had clearly shied to Syrian exports of captagon.

In addition to being a transit country Turkey also became a destination market for Syrian captagon. Although

the amounts being seized between 2006 and 2011 declined signiﬁcantly the number of operation carried out

against street dealers increased signiﬁcantly. The number of captagon operations increased by 530% and the

number of arrests increased by 77%.

There has been a signiﬁcant upsurge in captagon seizures in street level

operations in recent years. This indicates that availability and consumption of captagon increased dramatically

in Turkish illicit drug markets.

Conversion of pieces/ pills to kg

5000 pills to 1 Kg

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Syria

There was a strong historical connection between Bulgarian producers, Turkish traﬃcking facilitators and Syr-

ian OCG’s since the late 1980s. With the increase in law enforcement eﬀectiveness, production began to move

to Syria with the technical know-how and logistics networks moving at the same time. Turkey remained a strong

route for captagon moving through Northern Syria into Turkey, and continues to do so now. However, the current

conﬂict has fragmented the Syrian state, limiting production facilities and altering entry and exit trajectories

for captagon traﬃckers, as well as incentivizing some OCG’s to relocate to Lebanon and more recently Turkey.

According to regional law enforcement captagon production in Syria received new impetus since 2011 and the

beginning of the conﬂict. Although reliable seizure data within Syria remains scarce, Syrian regime oﬃcials

have noted an increase in captagon seizures to a record 24 million tablets seized in 2015.

Considering the limit-

ed capacity of law enforcement in Syria, this is more than the rest of the countries in the region declared in 2015,

and an indication that the problem is far larger.

Figure 5: Captagon seizures for 2015

Syria

million

Egypt

Iraq

Israel

Saudi Arabia

13.8 million

million

16.7

million

Turkey

Jordan

Lebanon

Al Monitor “Major Busts in Syria, Lebanon shed light on drug trade”, 04 March 2016 hp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

sites/almonitor/contents/afp/2016/03/syria-conﬂict-lebanon-drugs.html

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Figure 6: Current Trajectories

Jordan

Yemen

Egypt

Oman

Iraq

Iran

Israel

Syria

Saudi Arabia

Turkey

Libya

UAE

Lebanon

Sudan

Sea routes

Land routes

Potential route

Destination/

transit country

Production of captagon

(captagon labs)

Current trajectories of captagon, 2016

As noted above the production and traﬃcking of captagon in Syria has been occurring for at least a decade

if not longer. The primary trajectories for captagon out of Syria to destination markets in the Arab Peninsula

and East Africa, remain similar to the

ante bellum

situation with the conﬂict forcing some changes in moving

captagon out of the country

Country of origin Transit Country Country of destination Route type

Syria Turkey Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE By Land, by sea

Syrian Ports Jordan, Libya Jordan, Saudi Arabia By sea

Syria Lebanon Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE By air and sea

Syria Jordan Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE By Land

Figure 7: Primary trajectories for the movement of captagon from Syria to destination markets

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

The four primary trajectories are by land and sea. From the ports of Latakia and Tartous in western Syria, con-

tainer shipments of captagon (and hashish) can head by open sea either directly through the Suez Canal to ports

in the Arab peninsula or East Africa. To the north west, captagon is moved through South Eastern Turkey, to

ports on the Mediterranean coast and/ or markets either within Turkey or the Arab peninsula. Some captagon is

moved south through the land border with Jordan especially through rebel held areas in southern Syria. Finally,

west through Lebanon and then by sea or air to destination markets in the Arab peninsula. While the interna-

tional airport in Damascus oﬀers direct access to markets in the Arab peninsula, there have been no recorded

instances of captagon being seized at the airport or from ﬂights originating from Damascus since the conﬂict

began. However, it remains at risk to penetration by traﬃckers.

A ﬁnal and consistent trajectory is by land into Lebanon and then by sea or air for markets further aﬁeld. While

some captagon is being produced in Syria and sent across the land border to Lebanon, some actors have moved

captagon production from Syria to Lebanon due to quicker access to precursor chemicals and more secure

places to produce captagon, thus impacting the importance of this trajectory.

Currently, there is lile evidence that captagon is moved in large quantities from Syria directly into Iraq. This

is probably because the conﬂict there reduces the stability required for consistent traﬃcking.

However, ac-

cording to the 2015 INCSR report “Fenethylline pills (an amphetamine-type stimulant, or ATS) are traﬃcked via

the Iraq Syria border for domestic consumption and for shipment to other countries in the Middle East”.

In the

Kurdish controlled north of Iraq, law enforcement seemed surprised at the possibility of captagon traﬃcking

through Iraq, being more concerned with opium usage of ethnic Kurds migrating from Iran.

The Iraqi government ﬁrst seized fenethylline pills in 2009, and seizures have increased substantially since that

time. However, with the deepening conﬂict between ISIS and the Iraqi government as well as the KRG, reliable

information on captagon production and traﬃcking in Iraq is scarce.

Weighing the relevant importance of these four primary trajectories is diﬃcult based predominantly on seizure

data. While large shipments of millions of pills have been seized or noticed going into Turkey and leaving the

ports of Syria, smaller shipments seem to be leaving via land to Jordan or by air freight or passengers. Port ac-

tivity may be more reliable as the container shipments oﬀer more reliable and less risk to eﬀective interception

than shipments in trucks or small vehicles via the land borders to the south into Jordan.

A further complication is the volatility of the current situation. Some BCPs in Syria and Turkey are permanently

closed while others open intermiently dependent on security and level of control by Syrian actors as well as

by neighboring countries.

Interview Kurdish Regional Government, law enforcement, May 2016.

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2016 - hp://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2016/vol1/253275.htm

Interview KRG law enforcement May 2016

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Figure 8: Northern Syria

Northern Trajectories

Lebanon

Hatay

Kilis

Gaziantep

Sanliurfa

Mardin

Sirnak

Bitlis

Siirt

Batman

Diyarbakir

Elazig

Malatya

Adiyaman

Kahramanmaras

Osmaniye

Adana

Nigde

Kayseri

Nevsehir

Aksaray

Mersin

Turkey

Syria

Homs

Latakia

Idlib

Hama

Tartus

Rif Dimashq

Al-Raqqah

Aleppo

Deir ez-Zor

Al-Hasakah

To Ankara

and Istanbul

To UA and

Saudi Arabia

Sea routes

Sea ports

Open BCP

Closed BCP

Provinces with

captagon labs

Main routes

Provinces

with potential

captagon labs

Ӧncüpınar

Civlegӧzü

Güveççi

Akçakale

Mürşitpınar

Karkamış

Yayladağı

Şenyurt

The Northern trajectories from Syria into Turkey have been established since at least the mid-2000s. The four

main provinces along the Turkish border with Syria (Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis and Sanliurfa

) contain 8 primary

BCPs for the movement of goods and people. These are supplemented by small mountain paths across the bor-

der that are diﬃcult to monitor. Some BCPs have been closed permanently since the start of the conﬂict while

others open or close on a day to day appreciation. This situation is further complicated by contestation of BCP’s

on the Syrian side of the border. Some such as the BCP at Mursitpinar/ Kobane

are permanently closed to traf-

ﬁc from the Turkish side, while others such as Yayladagi/ Kesab, in Hatay province, remain contested between

FSA and Syrian regime forces, therefore reducing its aractiveness to traﬃckers.

In addition to this the entire border between Turkey and Syria has been double fenced and land-mined, with

regular military and Jandarma patrols. Combined with the potential of being shot or blown up by landmines, this

forces illicit traﬃc through the major BCP’s. This is quite unusual as many borders, particularly in South East

Europe, are quite porous with traﬃckers ﬁnding mountain passes or parts of the border that are not regularly

patrolled.

Kilis is a border province but is surrounded on three sides by the province of Gaziantep.

Turkish/ Syrian name of BCP

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Figure 9: Top 3 provinces for seizures in Turkey of Captagon pills 2014

Source: TNP

Hatay - 4,276,639

Gaziantep - 146,544

Adana - 11,983

EMCDDA National Report Turkey 2007

KOM Annual report 2014, p.18

It is at Reyhanli in Hatay province that much of the captagon smuggled out of Syria may be entering Turkey.

Since 2007, local Hatay police and TNP have noted the key importance of Hatay province to Syrian captagon

traﬃckers.

Several big seizures have occurred near or at the BCP of Reyhanli/ Bab al Hawa. In 2013 a seizure

of 4.2 million captagon pills took place in Reyhanli, the traﬃckers had come from Syria and were planning on

transporting the pills to Saudi Arabia via the port of Mersin.

A further, even larger seizure of 10 million pills

occurred in December 2015 in Hatay, with the same destination market of the Arab peninsula via the port of

Mersin. Interestingly, this seizure contained active fenethylline, suggesting some producers do have access to

the correct precursors and necessary lab equipment.

Such large seizures indicate increased sophistication of traﬃckers to produce captagon on a large scale and

prepare them for shipment in containers or fuel trucks. It is also an indication of the risks involved in captagon

traﬃcking to markets in the Arab peninsula and Saudi Arabia speciﬁcally. OCG’s try to produce as much as

possible and sell it on in Saudi Arabia where the death penalty for traﬃcking, regardless of quantity, promotes

this approach of large shipments. Sophisticated logistics networks are needed for movement of such large

amounts of captagon across multiple land and sea borders.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

From the latest available data there is a clear preference for traﬃckers of transiting Hatay province over the oth-

ers. This may in part be because Hatay oﬀers the shortest distance between Syria and the large ports of Mersin and

Adana on the Mediterranean coast and thence to destination markets in the Arab peninsula. Additionally, the good

transportation links in the province oﬀer the shortest distance from Hatay to destination markets within Turkey,

such as the bigger cities of Ankara and Istanbul.

Of secondary importance are the BCP in the provinces of Gaziantep and Kilis. These provinces contain several major

BCP’s such as Ӧncüpınar and Karkamış, that oﬀer good connections to markets in Turkey and the wider region. How-

ever, the current level of conﬂict within these Kurdish dominated provinces of Turkey plus the intermient access

of these BCP present challenges for traﬃckers.

However, over 90% of the seizure totals for Turkey of captagon in 2014 and 2015 came from one seizure each year

with millions of pills. While, this does skew the data the fact that both seizures did occur within Hatay province does

suggest a preference by traﬃckers from Syria using the BCP’s in Hatay over those in Gaziantep and Kilis.

The smaller mountain trails also oﬀer possibilities for Syrian smugglers to enter Turkey more clandestinely at the

cost of mobility, however Turkish law enforcement and the army are now constantly patrolling the border regions

further raising the risks for traﬃckers.

Conversely, the movement of captagon through these provinces may have already led to the establishment of cap-

tagon producing facilities within these regions. Gaziantep and Hatay have been consider potential provinces where

captagon production has begun to occur in 2016.

While it is potentially possible that some traﬃcking of captagon through these provinces is occurring from Turkey

into Northern Iraq and then by land to markets in the Arab peninsula, due to the level of conﬂict there presently, this

would be an extreme risk for traﬃckers when alternate trajectories are more reliable.

Information provided by DEA May 2016

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Western Trajectories: Ports

Yemen

Oman

Iraq

Iran

Israel

Turkey

Jordan

Lebanon

UAE

Syria

Saudi Arabia

Libya

Egypt

Sudan

Sea routes

Sea ports

Lakatia

Tripoli

Musratha

Ras Lanouf

Abu

Kammash

Benghazi

Darna

Duba

Jeddah

Jizan

Port Sudan

Tartous

Figure 10: Western Trajectories

The primary ports of Latakia and Tartous oﬀer traﬃckers direct access to shipping lanes to get captagon to

markets in the Arab peninsula and other destinations. This has most recently been evidenced by a large seizure

in December of 2015 of 102kg of captagon and 1 ton of hashish by the Turkish coast guard oﬀ the coast of Libya.

Such use of the ports requires access to large container vessels as ferry traﬃc has ceased from these ports and

smaller go fast boats are not as reliable for the longer journey to East Africa and the Arab peninsula.

It is possible that Libya is acting as a redistribution point of captagon and hashish shipped from Syria to transit

countries or potentially destination markets in East Africa (particularly Sudan) and elsewhere. Maritime law

enforcement within the region have noted that Libya has become a transit point for organised crime not only for

illegal migrants into Europe but for moving illicit drugs throughout the region with limited detection.

While these ports are government controlled, it may be possible that ISIS is also using these ports to bring in

illicit drugs. Hellenic police seized large quantities of tramadol in June 2016 that were heading for Syria.

The

companies controlling these shipments were related to ISIS. Moreover, inﬁltration of the ports by other groups

and sheer corruption of regime forces controlling the ports make Latakia and Tartous ideal entry and exit points

for the smuggling of captagon out of the country and for bringing precursors in.

Interview Hellenic Law enforcement June 2015

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Southern Trajectories: Jordan

Iraq

Israel

Lebanon

Saudi Arabia

Egypt

Jordan

Ma`an

`Amman

Az Zarqa`

Al Mafraq

Irbid

Madaba

Al Balqa`

Jarash

Ajlun

Al `Aqabah

Al Taﬁlah

Al Kakak

Homs

Latakia

Idlib

Hama

Tartus

Rif Dimashq

Al-Suwayda

Daraa

Quneitra

Al-Raqqah

Aleppo

Deir ez-Zor

Al-Hasakah

Syria

Anti-Government /

Opposition

ISIS

Syrian Government

Syria rebel held areas

Sea routes

Land routes

Tripoli

Aqaba

Figure 11: Southern Trajectories: Jordan

The Southern trajectory is probably the least understood of the routes out of Syria due to the contested nature

of the territory. Jordanian police have repeatedly clashed with traﬃckers in the border regions and at major

BCP’s. The amounts seized are oen in the millions of pills.

Yet, the value and end market of this trajectory is

unclear. While much of the captagon entering Jordan by land will head for destination markets in the Arab pen-

Al Bawaba “Jordanian military seizes over four million captagon pills in border drug bust”, 06 April 2016 hp://www.

albawaba.com/news/jordanian-military-seizes-over-four-million-captagon-pills-border-drug-bust-830034

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Middle East Eye “Shootout reveals link between Syria and war on drugs” 02 June 2015 hp://www.middleeasteye.net/

news/shoot-out-jordanian-border-reveals-link-between-syria-war-and-drugs-trade-392617814

Interview DEA Lebanon 2016

EMCDDA

Daily Star “Bulgarian captagon cook busted in Lebanon” 07 June 2014 hp://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Leba-

non-News/2014/Nov-25/278876-notorious-bulgarian-captagon-cook-busted-in-lebanon.ashx

insula, open source reports suggest that the value of the Jordanian market is also considerable. Pills that are

produced in Syria very cheaply can fetch between USD 5-20

in Jordan.

While the land routes from Syrian/ Jordanian border have seen large seizures of captagon heading for the Saudi

border, the port of Aqaba also plays a role in importing and exporting captagon. Shipments of captagon tran-

siting from Syria are oen boarded on to ships heading for Saudi Arabia and UAE. Conversely, captagon from

Lebanon has been noticed to enter the port of Aqaba via the Suez canal. A large seizure in Tripoli, Lebanon in

March 2016 was headed for transshipment to Saudi Arabia via Aqaba.

Lebanon

Lebanon’s experience with captagon is relatively recent. The challenge of captagon traﬃcking and production

has escalated due in part by the conﬂict in Syria. Much of the captagon production that moved from Turkey and

Bulgaria in the mid-2000s moved to production facilities in Syria. However, even in the mid-2000s Lebanese law

enforcement were already noticing the presence of Bulgarian OCG’s in providing Lebanese, and through Leba-

non, Syrian OCG’s technical expertise and equipment in captagon production.

This continues to be the case and

is exempliﬁed by the arrest and conviction of a well known Bulgarian captagon chemist Boris Karbazov in 2014. In

conjunction with a Palestinian and a Syrian, he was arrested in Lebanon for captagon production in 2014.

Figure 12: Captagon seizures in Lebanon 2011-2015

Source: DEA Lebanon

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

5,000,000

15,000,000

25,000,000

35,000,000

10,000,000

20,000,000

30,000,000

40,000,000

Since the outbreak of conﬂict in Syria beginning in 2011, there has been an exponential increase in captagon sei-

zures within Lebanon. As can be seen from table one, above, there were almost no captagon seizures by counter

narcotics forces in Lebanon prior to 2011. But in the successive years, it increased from 463,977 pieces in 2012

to over 12,390,124 pieces in 2013. Over 27 times as many pieces were seized in 2013 as 2012. This trend has con-

tinued even more into 2014 and 2015, peaking in 2014 at 35 million pieces seized.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Interview Lebanese Drug Enforcement Agency.

DEA-Lebanon, January 2014.

Interview DEA-Lebanon May 2016.

BBC “Lebanon charges Saudi prince with drug smuggling” 02 November 2015 hp://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-

east-34700489

P2P can also be used in Methamphetamine production

It should be noted that many of these pre-precursors including APAAN were placed on the INCB controlled list in 2014.

With conﬂict in Syria intensifying, some production, though not all, has moved from Syria into Lebanon and

particularly the Bekaa’ valley.

In 2013 and 2014 Lebanese law enforcement seized captagon producing equip-

ment in the Bekaa’ valley and at seaports. The OCG which was dismantled consisted of Lebanese and Syrian

national’s intent on producing captagon in Lebanon for distribution in the region.

Some production continues

to occur within the Bekaa’ valley in particular with the seizure of large quantities (tons) of precursors chemical

and equipment there.

Captagon produced in Lebanon is being moved in bulk (millions of pills per shipment)

through the major sea ports of Lebanon and the international airport of Beirut.

The instability of land border with Syria makes it a risky, yet not unheard of, proposition to send shipments by

land from Syria into Lebanon to destination markets in the Arab peninsula and East Africa. In March 2016, Leb-

anese law enforcement made a seizure of 2.6 million captagon pills in the port of Tripoli that were said to have

come from Syria via the border crossing at Masnaa on the route from Damascus. The ports of Beirut and Tripoli

seem to be heavily favored by captagon traﬃckers with large shipments bound for both primary destination

markets in the Arab peninsula as well as Egypt and East Africa.

The international airport of Beirut is also an outlet for captagon traﬃckers. While the sensational seizure in No-

vember 2015 of 2 tons of captagon aboard a private plane, and the subsequent arrest of a Saudi prince involved

in the case

, aract widespread media interest, less spectacular, but more frequent seizures, also occur. Small

packages can oen be located in hand luggage on commercial ﬂights. In and of themselves this is not much,

usually lile more than several kilograms, but with traﬃckers using ﬂights two to three times a day this could,

in theory, result in hundreds of kilos being ﬂown out of Beirut international airport annually.

Precursors

There are a variety of precursors and chemical agents, that go into the illicit production of captagon or am-

phetamine base pills. Chief amongst these are BMK (also known as P2P), and norephedrine.

However, in response to law enforcement activity, amphetamine producers have in recent years also turned to

using pre-precursors. These chemicals, that are oen not as strictly controlled as precursors, can be shipped

more easily to avoid detection by law enforcement.

The chemicals are then turned into the precursors in the

clandestine labs in preparation for making amphetamines. The main pre-precursors noted by law enforcement

are called APAAN, APAA and occasionally Acetic Anyhdride (AA) which is also a necessary precursor for hero-

in. Globally, the primary sources for these precursors are China and India.

While precursors are oen sourced directly from a manufacturer, amphetamine traﬃckers will also turn to

buying or stealing large quantities of cough medicine from pharmaceutical companies or pharmacies (usually

in pill form) that contain norephedrine or other precursors. These medicinal pills are reduced and repurposed

in clandestine labs to create amphetamine pills.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

UNODC, Drugs monitoring Platform

Interview Lebanese Customs

While it is true that before the conﬂict started in 2011, Syria and Jordan were the destination for 75% of the

world licit trade in BMK, much of this will have been used up already as the licit economy in Syria collapsed.

There have been no recorded instances of precursor seizures in Syria or destined to Syria in the last four

years.

This raises the question of how traﬃckers are importing the necessary precursors or pre-precursors

into Syria and what logistics networks are used. As the source countries for these chemicals are diﬀerent

from the destination markets, diﬀerent logistics networks must be at play involving actors from outside the

Syria and the Arab world.

While there is lile evidence of precursors being seized in Syria, neighbouring Lebanon has reported seizing

large quantities (tons) of BMK and ephedrine in recent years.

While it is possible that these precursors are

only destined for labs within Lebanon one possibility is that they are traﬃcked further into Syria for amphet-

amine production there. A lack of precursor interdiction is partly due to other priorities of law enforcement

within the region. Where drug traﬃcking itself is subsumed by a focus on illegal migration and counter-terror-

ism by law enforcement, precursor risk analysis and interdiction is even lower on the list of priorities for law

enforcement capacity. This data gap is crucial to further interdiction of captagon production at an interna-

tional level.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

II: Actors: Organised Crime Groups and

political actors in captagon tracking

Iraq

Lebanon

Saudi Arabia

Turkey

Jordan

Homs

Latakia

Idlib

Hama

Tartus

Rif Dimashq

Al-Suwayda

Daraa

Quneitra

Al-Raqqah

Aleppo

Deir ez-Zor

Al-Hasakah

To Libya

To Sudan,

UAE and

Saudi Arabia

Anti-Government /

Opposition

SDF / YPG

ISIS

Turkish Army/FSA

Syrian Government

Syria rebel held areas

Figure 13: Actors

Drug traﬃcking is ﬁrst and foremost a business: maximising proﬁt while minimising risk. Captagon production in

Syria is a reliable and considerable source of income for actors in the conﬂict in Syria and neighboring Iraq, par-

ticularly for those actors that have few other reliable sources of ﬁnancing. This combined with the amounts of

captagon seen to be leaving Syria in recent years suggest that most serious parties to the conﬂict are aﬀected by,

if not involved in, traﬃcking.

The story is similar for the conﬂict between the Turkish government and Kurdish separatists in South Eastern Turkey.

Taxation and facilitation of opiate shipments through Kurdish controlled territory has funded the PKK for decades.

Direct involvement in drug traﬃcking by actors in a conﬂict environment is less common as it is oen easier for state

and non-state actors to simply tax the activities of traﬃckers active in areas that the state/non state actors control,

rather than take on the risk of production and traﬃcking to destination markets.

Within Turkey this has long been

FATF, Financial Flows Linked To Production and Traﬃcking of Afghan Opiates, 2014 p.48

M. Shaw and F. Mangan, Proﬁts and Losses: Illicit economies and emerging paerns of organised crime as obstacles to

peace and state consolidation in Libya, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace, 2013

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

the case with the PKK. PKK commanders tax Afghan opiate traﬃckers roughly 7% for secure movement of ship-

ments through their territory.

Due to the volatile situation in Syria, it is diﬃcult to accurately assess which groups may be involved in the traﬃcking

of captagon through understanding organised crime paerns. However, the prevalent trajectories of captagon from

Syria, overlaid with the areas controlled by various actors, do suggest who may be involved in drug traﬃcking either

overtly or through protection and taxation of OCG’s active in drug traﬃcking through their territory.

Free Syrian Army and Moderate Rebel forces

Rebel groups within the FSA have almost certainly used and beneﬁed from captagon traﬃcking. While some of the

production has moved to Lebanon, groups within Syria may still be active in using this funding, as well still controlling

some local production. A recent documentary on the involvement of individual FSA commanders with captagon traf-

ﬁcking has highlighted a clear link between the FSA and drug traﬃcking.

Moreover, as can be seen by the trajectories from Syria into Hatay province, it is FSA or other rebel groups that con-

trol the primary BCP between Northern Syria and Turkey. While this does not necessarily denote active collusion,

taxation is more than probable as it provides a reliable source of funding for these actors particularly when other

sources of funding (oil, extortion etc.) provide meagre returns to groups in this part of Syria.

Syrian Regime involvement with drug tracking

The boom in traﬃcking via Syria seems indicative of a weakening state, increasingly challenged to prevent narcot-

ics production and consumption within its borders, let alone halt cross-border smuggling. Whereas the regime had

a complicated relationship with traﬃcking groups before the conﬂict broke out, this has worsened as the regime

has struggled to ﬁnd reliable sources of funding.

During Syria’s occupation of the Bekaa valley in Lebanon, from

the Lebanese civil war until Syria pulled out in 2006, cannabis resin cultivation and counterfeiting proliferated in

either direct cooperation or as protection to OCG’s.

The regime apparently made USD 500 million a year from

this.

Within Syria the Shabiha or unoﬃcial militia/organised crime supported by the regime has carried out at-

tacks on opposition ﬁgures in exchange for which the regime looks the other way on smuggling and other proﬁt-

able illegal activities by the Shabiha.

While there is lile clear link between drug traﬃcking and the regime, collusion and corruption certainly occurs.

Several large seizures made in Turkey, and Jordan, and maritime seizures oﬀ the coast of Libya, from 2016 were

sourced in regime held areas. In 2013, captagon producing laboratories were discovered in areas around Homs that

may have beneﬁted the Syrian regime.

Moreover, the lack of seizures since 2011 at the Damascus International

Airport suggest some collusion between traﬃckers and the regime.

As other authors have noted, Syria has main-

UNODC GPML this percentage is not recent but indicative

Kravitz, Max Nichols, Journal of International Aﬀairs A Bier Pill to Swallow: Connections between Captagon, Syria and

the Gulf (2016) hp://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/bier-pill-swallow-connections-captagon-syria-gulf/

Herbert, Ma Partisans, proﬁteers, and criminals: syria’s illicit economy (2014) P.82

Institute for the study of War “Criminalization of the Syrian conﬂict” May 2012 hp://www.understandingwar.org/arti-

cle/criminalization-syrian-conﬂict

Ibid

Ibid. P. 79

According to open source seizures: focus has oen been on traﬃcking in the countryside or border regions with no

mention of the airport.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

ISIS and Extremist Groups

ISIS, or Daesh to use its Arabic name, spread into the conﬂict in Syria from Iraq in 2014. Taking control of the oil

ﬁelds and reﬁneries in the eastern part of Syria, especially around Raqqa, ISIS had slowly spread north and west

pushing against the border with Turkey as well as threatening Damascus. Espousing an extremist interpretation

of Islam, ISIS represents an aempt to end the traditional view of international borders and the nation-state

established by the Westphalian system and implemented in Syria and the Middle East in the aermath of world

war one. Unlike some of its forerunners, such as Al Qaeda, ISIS is determined to maintain and hold territory to

build its caliphate. Funding the administration of this territory is costly.

Source 2FATF Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (2015)

Figure 14: ISIS estimated annual sources of funding

750 mil - 1 bil

850 mil

20-45 mil

Oil

Ransom

1 mil

Trading antiquity

Donations

Taxis, customs,

seizures,

human trafﬁcking

ISIS Sources

of Funding

ISIS

Sources of

Funding

According to FATF analysis

, the primary sources of funding have been oil production and smuggling, taxation and ex-

tortion (see ﬁgure 14). As can be seen from the chart these estimates vary wildly and dependent upon their accuracy

can inform whether or not ISIS is involved in traﬃcking or how much market control ISIS has either within Syria or

markets in the region. It is interesting to note that references to drug traﬃcking by open sources such as the media

oen describe ISIS as a serious actor in drug traﬃcking, particularly with captagon or opiates. An example of this is the

reporting by the head of the now defunct Russian counter narcotics bureau, FSKN, that ISIS made over USD 1 billion

Kravitz, Max Nichols, Journal of International Aﬀairs A Bier Pill to Swallow: Connections between Captagon, Syria and

the Gulf (2016) hp://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/bier-pill-swallow-connections-captagon-syria-gulf/

CIA, WorldFact Book, 2015, hps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html

World Bank, August, 2016

Spiegel.de “Die Beute-Ökonmie“ June 2014 hp://www.spiegel.de/wirtscha/islamischer-staat-so-ﬁnanziert-sich-der-

is-a-1063522.html

tained a strong illicit economy for many years.

With the shrinking of Syria’s GDP to USD $ 55.8 billion in 2014

, a

reduction of 15.4% since 2011

, coupled with high oﬃcial unemployment, this maer can only have worsened.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Russian Times, High Finance: ISIS generates up to USD 1 billion annually from Afghan heroin, 6 March 2015 hps://www.

rt.com/news/238369-isis-drug-money-traﬃcking/

Ara News “Isis executes ﬁve drug traﬃckers” 2016 hp://aranews.net/2016/03/isis-executes-ﬁve-people-charges-drug-

traﬃcking-syrias-manbij/

Interview with DEA August 2016

This has been particularly true of inﬁghting between Pashtun and Baluch tribal factions of the Taliban.

The Koran refers to intoxicants (oen interpreted as narcotics and alcohol) as being bad for people and to avoid them in

order to prosper. Koran 5:90

Ara News “Isis executes ﬁve drug traﬃckers” 2016 hp://aranews.net/2016/03/isis-executes-ﬁve-people-charges-

drug-traﬃcking-syrias-manbij/

from drug traﬃcking and production, a claim which upon investigation is misleading due to the claims dubious focus on

Afghanistan.

On the other hand, according to the FATF’s own analysis drug traﬃcking is not explicitly mentioned as a

considerable source of funding for ISIS.

It remains unclear if ISIS is a net drug exporter or that it produces for its own sake or allows traﬃcking or production

at all. ISIS deﬁnitely has a conﬂicted relationship with drug traﬃcking, what is probable is that ISIS is importing some

synthetic opiates, such as tramadol, to be used by ISIS ﬁghters as a combat medicine to deal with the trauma of com-

bat and as a sedative. While traﬃckers caught within ISIS-controlled territory oen have been executed

, captured or

killed ISIS ﬁghters have oen been discovered with bags of pills on them for use in combat. Moreover, as seems likely

from the seizure of large quantities in Greece in June 2016 of tramadol, ISIS has needs of synthetic opiates for bale-

ﬁeld medicinal reasons as well as recreational markets. Law enforcement have seen ISIS go to considerable lengths

to import tramadol.

While comparison with the Taliban in Afghanistan are understandable, they are inaccurate. ISIS is a far more uniﬁed

actor than the Afghan Taliban as it aims to create a multinational Islamic state out of territory of multiple states. ISIS

has established a centralised “state” with governed territory, The Afghan Taliban, while undeniably controlling several

provinces, do so in contestation with the government of Afghanistan and between varying factions of the Taliban.

Moreover, the Afghan Taliban’s major role in drug traﬃcking was usually at a local level in protection rackets or taxation

of farmers and traﬃckers transiting their territory. ISIS may be just taxing captagon traﬃckers within its territory.

As indicated above, ISIS has access to multiple sources of funding beyond drug traﬃcking. While geing precursor

supplies into ISIS held areas and sending ﬁnished product out of Syria is not impossible for ISIS, it would still present

a considerable challenge when compared to the ease of resource mobilisation via oil and extortion. With the recent

loss of Manbij in Northern Syria to Arab and Kurdish forces, and Jarabulus to Turkish backed FSA units, ISIS capacity to

traﬃc captagon out of their territory, has become more diﬃcult, although a southern trajectory through Jordan would

be possible.

Finally, there is an ideological problem for ISIS and drug traﬃcking. The primary markets for captagon are Muslim ma-

jority countries in the Arab peninsula. The Afghan Taliban could claim to be allowing the sale and traﬃcking of Afghan

opiates only to inﬁdels in Western Europe and Russia. To be seen actively endorsing captagon traﬃcking could have

severe implications on ISIS propaganda eﬀorts and claims to follow a strict interpretation of the Koran.

As such, ISIS

has made occasional eﬀorts to show it is against drug traﬃcking. In March 2016 it executed 5 men it claimed were drug

traﬃckers, it has also reportedly tried to destroy cannabis plantations discovered in territory it controls.

While ISIS role in drug traﬃcking is more diﬃcult to deﬁne smaller groups such as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham are using drug

production and traﬃcking through their territory to fund their war eﬀorts. Several captagon labs around Aleppo and

Homs have been discovered by regime forces with links to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

III: The Balkan Route of Afghan opiates

Traditional trajectories

Oman

Iraq

Israel

Jordan

Lebanon

UAE

Syria

Saudi Arabia

Libya

Egypt

Iran

Turkey

Ukraine

Romania

Bulgaria

Greece

Moldova

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Recent trend

South Eastern

Europe

Figure 15: Balkan Route

While captagon production in Syria and the region is a relatively recent phenomenon, the Balkan route is a de-

cades old trajectory for moving Afghan opiates to destination markets in Western and Central Europe. From

cultivation in Afghanistan, opium base is either turned into heroin within Afghanistan or brought to neighbour-

ing countries of Pakistan or Iran for heroin conversion. The heroin produced outside of Afghanistan seems to

be of higher purity than that produced within the country. This suggests that heroin exported to destination

markets of the Balkan route may be more likely produced in Iran and Pakistan. Oen embedded in large trucks,

shipments of several hundred kilos make their way by land through Turkey into South Eastern Europe and ﬁnally

destination markets in Western and Central Europe. From 1 kilogram bricks of heroin in Iran, cuing facilities

in Turkey and South Eastern Europe cut to usually 1/2 kilogram blocks for smaller shipments. Heroin is then

repeatedly cut at diﬀerent stages until reaching consumers in Western and Central Europe.

The OCG’s primarily involved in opiate traﬃcking have most oen been of Turkish/ Kurdish origin with logis-

tics and mid-level actors consisting of citizens of the countries through which shipments pass. In particular,

Albanian OCG’s are well known to be active as logistics supplier’s for Turkish/Kurdish opiate traﬃckers. With

diaspora in Western and Central European countries as well as relationships with opiate producers in Iran and

UNODC, The Illicit Drug Trade Through South Eastern Europe, 2014

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Afghanistan, there is common consensus that Turkish/ Kurdish OCG’s have long maintained a stranglehold on

Afghan opiates transiting the Balkan route due to these comparative advantages.

This system, with some variation, has existed since at least the 1980s with trajectories within South Eastern

Europe varying dependent upon increased risks to opiate traﬃckers. With cultivation of opium consistently

rising since the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in 2001, opiate traﬃckers have had even more

heroin available to get to market.

Latest Trends

Syria

Iraq

Lebanon

Iran

Georgia

Bulgaria

Greece

Hatay

Kilis

Osmaniye

Gaziantep

Sanliurfa

Mardin

Sirnak

Hakkari

Van

Bitlis

Siirt

Batman

Agri

Igdir

Erzurum

Mus

Bingol

Kars

Ardahan

Artvin

Rize

Trabzon

Giresun

Ordu

Tokat

Sivas

Kayseri

Yozgat

Amasya

Samsun

Corum

Sinop

Kastamonu

Karabuk

Cankiri

Bolu

Zonguldak

Bartin

Ankara

Eskisehir

Afyonkarahisar

Konya

Kirikkale

Kirsehir

Nevsehir

Nigde

Adana

Karaman

Aksaray

Gumushane

Erzincan

Tunceli

Elazig

Malatya

Adiyaman

Kahramanmaras

Bayburt

Diyarbakir

Mersin

Antalya

Isparta

Bundur

Denizli

Mugla

Aydin

Izmir

Manisa

Balikesir

Canakkale

Tekirdag

Yalova

Istanbul

Kirklareli

Edirne

Usak

Kutahya

Bilecik

Bursa

Duzce

Sakarya

Kocaeli

1 to 4

5 to 9

10 to 19

20 to 39

40 to 79

more 80

Open BCP

Figure 16: Opiate seizures in Turkey (2011-2015)

As a key country along the Balkan route, through which most shipments of opiates transited, Turkish law en-

forcement, with assistance from international law enforcement actors, responded with improved risk analysis,

joint operations and tighter controls at the main BCP’s with Bulgaria and Iran. This saw a marked increase since

2011 in the seizures of heroin in Turkey as well as number of convictions. From the map above, it is clear many of

the seizures occurred around the primary BCP’s in Hakkari province on the border with Iran and in the west at

the BCP of Kapitan Andreevo with Bulgaria as well as around Istanbul.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Increased risks from conﬂict and law enforcement to the business model of many Turkish opiate traﬃckers has

forced them to look for alternative trajectories. Of particular interest is the caucuses and the Black Sea. Since

the end of 2014 law enforcement have noted a considerable shi of Afghan heroin being moved on trucks through

the caucuses to Georgia

and then across the Black Sea to ports in Ukraine and Romania. But there are also in-

centives to opiate traﬃckers using the Black Sea route. Establishing logistics companies in Georgia and Ukraine

is very easy and requires few background checks. The Black Sea itself is not well monitored, with limited radar

coverage reducing the likelihood of interdiction. The importing ports in Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria are also

good access points to destination markets in Western and Central Europe. Law enforcement has particularly

noted the vulnerability of Odessa, Ukraine in the movement of Afghan heroin into Western and Central Europe.

Iraq

Turkey

Lebanon

Syria

17,800 kg

of dried grapes

18/03/2016

178 kg

06/2016

69 kg of heroin

19/11/2015

333 kg of heroin

07/2015

146.8 kg of heroin

08/04/2015

42 kg of heroin

05/10/2015

Sea port

Balkan Route

Seizure country

Potential transit

countries

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Ukraine

Romania

Bulgaria

I.R. of Iran

Poti

Istanbul

Odessa

Constansa

Giurgiulesti

Varna

Burgas

Batumi

Figure 17: Black Sea seizure map

Particularly, the port of Poti, in Georgia is at risk.

Interviews with SELEC, NCA and DEA DLO’s, Bucharest, Istanbul 2016.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Figure 18: Turkey Heroin Seizures (2011-2015)

Source: 1 TNP

2.0000

6.0000

10.0000

4.0000

8.0000

12.0000

2011

6.4120

2012

11.0270

2013

9.8430

2014

10.0230

2015

6.9030

While this shi to the Black Sea has been occurring since at least the end of 2014, further impetus was pro-

vided by the escalation of the conﬂict between the Turkish government and the PKK in the middle of 2015,

as can be seen from the ﬁgure (NUMBER) on opiate seizures in Turkey. Turkish seizures of Afghan heroin

declined by over 30% from 2014 to 2015.

Moreover, almost 6 tons of the total 6.9 tons seized in Turkey oc-

curred in the ﬁrst 7 months of the year

before the conﬂict in South Eastern Turkey was reignited.

Additionally, there has not been a corresponding decline in opiate seizures in countries further downstream.

In July 2015 Romania seized its largest ever shipment of 333kg of heroin coming from Ukraine and the Black

Sea destined for the Netherlands and Western and Central European markets.

Several of the suspects in-

volved were of Turkish origin. Bulgarian ports have also seen increased targeting recently by Afghan opiate

traﬃckers moving heroin from Georgia and the Caucuses.

In a recent seizure of 178kg of heroin in Georgia in 2016, the purity of the heroin was tested and found to be at

52%. Such a level is similar to wholesale purity found along the traditional Balkan route through Turkey and

as provided by Turkish law enforcement.

This may suggest that traﬃckers are sticking to the same labora-

tories and production facilities that they use for opiates transiting the traditional Balkan route rather than

changing production facilities as well as trajectories. However, traﬃckers seem to have grown more cau-

tious. Most of the seizures, along the Black Sea trajectory average between 50-200kg with several notable

exceptions. This is considerably less than the 750+kg seizures that were made in the eastern parts of Turkey

in 2014 and 2013. Law enforcement have conﬁrmed that many heroin traﬃckers along the Black Sea are mov-

ing to relatively smaller but more frequent quantities than previously in order to reduce risk.

Comparing Turkish National Police seizures for 2014 and 2015.

INCSR report 2016 Turkey

SELEC hp://www.selec.org/p629/28+March+2016

IInterview Bulgarian Law Enforcement 2016

Average purity for Balkan route heroin from Turkey has been around 52% for many years. See: UNODC Afghan Opium

Poppy Survey 2014 and The Illicit Drug Trade Through South-Eastern Europe.

Interview US DEA August 2016.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

In addition to this Black Sea trajectory a further possibility has been the shiing of routes south from Iran

into Iraqi KRG, Syria and either shipments into Southern Turkey and thenceforth along the Balkan route

maritime traﬃcking from Syria to Western and Central Europe. In 2011 and 2012, several seizures of Afghan

sourced heroin were made on the Iraqi/Syrian border with transshipment through Turkey to Western and

Central Europe.

However, more recent evidence and a lack of seizures suggest that this route has dried up

even further due to the intensiﬁcation of conﬂict in Syria and within Iraq itself. Although caution should be

observed. A lack of seizures is not a complete indication of a lack of traﬃcking.

This is not to say that opiate traﬃckers have given up on Turkey completely nor that the expansion in by

Turkish OCG’s into the caucuses is solely driven by conﬂict with the Kurds. Seizures continue to be made

particularly at the BCP’s in Hakkari and Kapitan Andreevo. New law enforcement priorities and potentially

improved modus operandi may be allowing shipments to be smuggled through with limited observation. Yet

such a considerable drop in opiate seizures year on year combined with consistent seizures in surrounding

countries suggest a substantial shi in trajectories.

UNODC, Afghan Opiate Traﬃcking Through the Southern Route, 2015, p.56-57

This was further corroborated by TNP KOM reports 2010-2013

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

IV: Future Analysis and Policy

Implications

Iraq

Lebanon

Turkey

Jordan

Homs

Latakia

Idlib

Hama

Tartus

Rif Dimashq

Al-Suwayda

Daraa

Quneitra

Al-Raqqah

Aleppo

Deir ez-Zor

Al-Hasakah

Anti-Government /

Opposition

SDF / YPG

ISIS

Turkish Army/FSA

Syrian Government

Syria rebel held areas

Figure 19: Current areas of control by diﬀerent factions

While there seems no immediate end to the war in Syria, it is highly unlikely to return to the ante-bellum

situation with a centralised state. At best some kind of loose federal system may be possible, or autonomy

or independence of particular regions not least of all the Kurdish enclaves in the north.

Regardless, the pro-

longed nature of the conﬂict into the next several years make a stable and coherent Syria unlikely.

As has been discussed in the report, captagon traﬃcking and production within Syria occurred long before the

conﬂict broke out. However, the expansion of production since the beginning of the conﬂict has le many ac-

tors dependent upon drug traﬃcking as a source of income. In the event of a political solution, political forces

will be most unwilling to give up a lucrative and reliable source of income such as drug traﬃcking or other illicit

activities in the short or mid-term. This has been the case in both Mali and Libya where illicit ﬂows are strong

“Is there a political solution for Syria?” Carnegie Europe, February 2016 hp://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?-

fa=62725

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

generators of instability.

In Syria this is particularly true for those actors that have few other reliable sources

of ﬁnancing, such as the FSA. When conﬂict ends and development and rebuilding begins, actors with few other

ﬁnancial means to maintain themselves, especially when legal sources of income are inadequate, can become

obstacles to stability, security and political transition in post-conﬂict countries. Taking the examples of Libya

and Mali, the desire to control lucrative traﬃcking routes, has proven a detriment to consolidation of the state

and the monopoly of the use of violence.

Moreover, former militias in Mali and Libya became entrenched in

illicit ﬂows, which can become their raison d’être, superseeding previous political aims.

Moreover, if some of the actors lose control of territory they have gained, and from which they are able to tax or

produce captagon, this may well cause them to export production and traﬃcking to neighboring countries. As

is indicated in the report, this has already occurred to some extent with the expansion of captagon production

from Syria into Lebanon. Historical precedent is also relevant here, captagon production moved from South

Eastern Europe to Turkey and then Syria and Lebanon, as the risk / beneﬁt rationale for traﬃckers changed.

While this may be due in part to strengthened law enforcement capacity in the countries of South Eastern Eu-

rope, production of captagon will move rather than cease altogether. Due to the amount of captagon currently

being produced in Syria and Lebanon, countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Sudan and Egypt are at increased

risk of ﬁnding Syrian traﬃckers establishing captagon producing laboratories in their countries in the mid-

term, if it is not occurring already. This will further undermine stability and rule of law in these countries, many

of which are already very fragile with limited state control, if not full-blown insurgencies.

See Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, Fixing a fractured State? Breaking the cycles of crime, conﬂict and corruption in

the Sahel, April 2015, and M. Shaw and F. Mangan, Proﬁts and Losses: Illicit economies and emerging paerns of organised

crime as obstacles to peace and state consolidation in Libya, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace, 2013

Ibid

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Migration, Refugees and expanding addiction

As drug traﬃcking sprawls, so does the potential for addiction and increased abuse of captagon by Syrian na-

tionals, both within Syria and amongst the refugee population. According to the UNODC, “…studies on the

mental health of populations displaced by conﬂict have brought out the links with post-traumatic stress disor-

der and depression, both potential triggers for initiating or escalating drug use”.

At latest estimates, there are

about 6.6 million internally displaced persons within Syria, and a further 5 million within the region (see map 12).

With the level of intensity of the conﬂict and the destitution and pain this brings to people aﬀected by the con-

ﬂict; drug abuse is an understandable escape. Yet this challenge is neither well researched nor recognised as

having potential long term consequences for the post-conﬂict development of Syria as well as the wider region.

Saudi Arabia

Turkey

Egypt

Iraq

Jordan

Israel

Syria

2.7

million

1.048

million

657

thousand

117

thousand

Lebanon

250

thousand

Syrians Refugees

Figure 20: Internally displaced people (IDP) in Syria and countries in the region (September

2016)

UNODC, World Drug report 2016 p. 70

Source: UNHCR (2016) Syria Regional Refugee Response. Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

So called street rips or buy busts

Law enforcement priorities and capacity

Data and analysis gaps

A further challenge is the priority of law enforcement in the region. While countries to the west and north of

Syria are aware of traﬃcking, some have turned to focusing on interdiction eﬀorts at local level

rather than

pursuing integrated sophisticated transnational counter organised crime investigations.

Moreover, international and regional political priorities at the moment are very much focused on illegal migra-

tion, migrant smuggling and counter-terrorism. Turkey and Lebanon have received considerable political pres-

sure regarding illegal migration from the EU and Western European countries, which has led to a focus on that

issue more heavily than drug traﬃcking. Other countries, such as Jordan and Egypt have their own challenges

and internal conﬂicts to deal with. For all countries of the region counter terrorism and preventing the spread of

war take priority over drug traﬃcking and further fueling corruption. In all countries, resources for combating

organised crime are scarce. Capacity and priorities can oen be placed upon acute, though temporary challeng-

es, rather than systemic and long term ones, which combined with a lack of understanding of the relationship

between drug traﬃcking and conﬂict can further impact the rule of law.

Lack of comprehensive or accurate data is a diﬃcult problem. Many gaps remain in the data used above, and

there are many questions that have yet to be fully addressed. More needs to be researched on the business

model of captagon traﬃcking within the region. Who the actors are, what their organisational structure looks

like; from mules to accountants to logistics facilitators or modus operandi, few paerns have emerged. The pro-

duction and traﬃcking costs, expected proﬁts and repatriation of proceeds from destination markets to Syria

is lile understood. No data is available on captagon seizure testing (for active chemicals) at a regional level.

A beer understanding of the regional drug market for captagon would also be useful. While it is understood

that the primary markets are in the Arab peninsula and East Africa, the size and value of these markets remain

an open question. Levels of dependency and prevalence rates, the spread of abuse from primary to secondary

markets is not well appreciated. Understanding retail and wholesale prices between diﬀerent countries and

provinces can inform trajectories and concentrations of destination markets

Instability in Turkey

With the aempted coup in July 2016 in Turkey, the situation for opiate and captagon traﬃckers may well

change further. At the end of July, President Erdogan declared a state of emergency and removed over 60,000

Ministry of Interior personnel, including oﬃcers from TNP, KOM and the Counter Narcotics department. Within

the military and Jandarma, which have jurisdiction in rural areas and the South-East of Turkey, many oﬃcers

were also removed. This may lead to a weakening of Turkish security and capacity to interdict traﬃckers as well

as an atmosphere of distrust within Turkey and of international partners. Opiate and captagon traﬃckers may

try and exploit the situation and move more illicit drugs through the country. While the Caucasus and the Black

Sea are still heavily favoured by opiate traﬃckers, recent events may incentivise them to move back to the

traditional Balkan route trajectories. Due to the cycle between cultivation, production and shipment of Afghan

opiates potential changes may be visible in seizures and intelligence within the next 12-18 months.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

Policy implications

Drug traﬃcking and organised crime are by their nature a transnational business oriented towards proﬁt.

Responses and monitoring have to be equally transnational in nature. While some eﬀective law enforcement

cooperation already exists, political forces within some countries in the region have led to a reduction in coop-

eration for reasons of mutual mistrust, internal politics, or the imposition of external priorities. Engagement

with international law enforcement and development actors at senior, but also mid-level, is of great importance.

Instances where mid-level law enforcement can work openly with development actors on the ground can be of

immeasurable beneﬁt to both. Most importantly, a clear roadmap must be established by political and develop-

ment actors focusing on what is immediately achievable with the ongoing conﬂict, post-conﬂict and long term.

While the conﬂict continues mapping the dynamics of illicit drugs ﬂows out of Syria as well as beer under-

standing of the precursors is fundamental. With considerable amounts of captagon leaving Syria by sea for

Northern Africa or the Red Sea, cooperation and dialogue between national coast guards in the Mediterra-

nean, EUROPOL, NATO patrols in the Aegean and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in the Red Sea would

be of beneﬁt now. Though their ability to instruct or improve capacity within Syria and the region in the short

term is limited, this longer-term goal should not be overlooked. A current, and regularly updated understand-

ing of law enforcement priorities and capacity at national, regional and international levels would further help

to create more eﬃcient transnational containment and disruption eﬀorts.

Development actors should preemptively apply some of the lessons identiﬁed in Afghanistan and Iraq as

well as Libya and Mali for the immediate post-conﬂict Syria. Sustainable development is more than providing

schools and physical infrastructure for the populace, though these are undeniably important. Understanding

the extent of the rule of law in a country, and how to interact with local actors, and the relationship between

law enforcement and other public services as well as private business at local, regional and transnational lev-

els, is vital. The similarities and diﬀerences between diﬀerent tribes, sects, and religions in a given province

or area, and how they interact with one another is also important, as is their relationship to the central govern-

ment. Sustainable development actors who work with corrupt oﬃcials who can facilitate action on the ground,

may lead to short term success, but also leads to a long term undermining of the rule of law, and oen negates

any substantial progress made in sustainable development, as was witnessed in Afghanistan. Some of this

pre-emtive work can be done now in preparation for a post-conﬂict Syria. When the conﬂict ends development

actors should be in a position to identify challenges to the rule of law and what obstacles (either from the gov-

ernment or non-state actors and organised crime) need to be over-come.

Development strategies and implementation policies should be planned with a mid- to long-term approach.

Instilling a sense of the rule of law, which is necessary for sustained development, is a process that takes place

over many years, particularly when conﬂict has stripped away belief in state structures. Taking Afghanistan

and Iraq as examples, eﬀorts were focused on military development at the expense of judicial and law enforce-

ment capacity and tackling endemic corruption. This lack of capacity led to many Afghans turning to Taliban

courts which were seen as less corrupt.

Looking at the current map of conﬂict, (see map 11) borders and areas of jurisdiction will be complicated and

confused, and will be a complex mix of local and state authority. In the long- term this presents both oppor-

tunity and diﬃculties for drug traﬃckers, counter narcotic law enforcement and post conﬂict development

actors. Many of the actors on the ground with which development agencies and the UN will have to work with

will have some experience/ involvement in drug traﬃcking and organised crime in general. As shown above

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

New York Times “Tasked with combating opium traﬃcking Afghan oﬃcial proﬁt from it” 16 February 2016 hp://www.

nytimes.com/2016/02/16/world/asia/afghanistan-opium-heroin-taliban-helmand.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homep-

age&clickSource=story-heading&module=second-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news

areas currently under FSA and extremist groups are closely linked with captagon traﬃcking and regime

controlled areas are open to both pey and grand scale corruption, if not direct involvement with organised

crime. In many cases people on the ground who control logistics networks for licit and illicit goods can also be

prominent members of society, who development and law enforcement will have to work with in the mid-term

post-conﬂict Syria.

Weaning these actors oﬀ drug traﬃcking is a long term challenge. In previous examples, such as Afghanistan,

international development eﬀorts have met with mixed success, and even reversal, as in the case of increased

opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan despite alternative development eﬀorts.

The application of the rule

of law must be the cornerstone for any kind of sustainable development in Syria post-bellum. The challenge of

organised crime, and drug traﬃcking speciﬁcally, will determine the long term viability of sustainable devel-

opment in Syria and the wider region.

One view will be that as the conﬂict is still ongoing, compared to illegal migrant smuggling, kidnapping or oil

smuggling, drug traﬃcking is less of an immediate problem. This would be erroneous. Drug traﬃcking supports

terrorism and hinders development. At a regional and international level, development and law enforcement

actors should inform themselves of the challenges that drug traﬃcking in Syria presents to post-conﬂict re-

construction and development. It is therefore crucial to the maintenance in the rule of law in the region that

monitoring by international actors of drug traﬃcking and drug abuse be stepped up or face the long term con-

sequences.

The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking Syria and the wider region

www.globalinitiative.net

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